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Deekappa Malappa Hubli v. Chanbasappa Rachappa Neeli .

Bombay High Court
Feb 13, 1925
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Judicial Opinion — Structured Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The appellant obtained a decree on 23 January 1923 in Suit No. 201 of 1921 in the Court of the First Class Subordinate Judge of Dharwar against Chanbasappa Rachappa (respondent No. 1). The appellant had earlier obtained an attachment before judgment over certain properties of the respondent on 12 July 1922, and that attachment was confirmed by the decree.

Other creditors of the judgment-debtor had obtained decrees in the Court of the Second Class Subordinate Judge at Hubli. Opponent No. 2 obtained a decree on 23 June 1922 and attached certain property on 29 June 1922; that property was sold in execution by the Hubli Court on 16 March 1923. Opponent No. 3 obtained a decree on 9 July 1922 and certain other property was sold in execution on 14 July 1923. The opinion states that all properties sold in execution of these two Hubli decrees had been attached before judgment in Suit No. 201 of 1921.

The sale proceeds from the Hubli Court were held in that Court. The appellant applied to the First Class Subordinate Judge at Dharwar for those sale proceeds to be sent to his Court. The Subordinate Judge initially ordered transfer of the proceeds but then withdrew that order and advised the appellant to move the District Judge for transfer, citing the decision in Patel Naranji Morarji v. Haridas Navalram. The appellant then applied to the District Court; the District Judge expressed the view that the Code of Civil Procedure did not authorise the District Court to order the transfer, referred to Nilkanta Rai v. Gosto Behari Chatterjee, and suggested the Hubli proceedings continue to their conclusion.

The appellant filed an appeal under section 47 of the Code against the Subordinate Judge's decision. Although there was an objection by the opponents that no appeal lay, the High Court treated the matter as if it were an application under its extraordinary jurisdiction, finding factual similarity with Nilkanta Rai v. Gosto Behari Chatterjee. The Court ultimately ordered transfer of the sale proceeds from the Hubli Court to the Dharwar Court for rateable distribution under section 73 of the Code, and awarded costs to the appellant against the first respondent.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the sale proceeds deposited in the Hubli Court (where properties were sold in execution of decrees obtained in the Second Class Subordinate Judge's Court) should be transferred to the First Class Subordinate Judge's Court of Dharwar for rateable distribution among decree-holders who qualified under section 73 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
  2. Whether an appeal lay under section 47 from the Subordinate Judge's decision refusing (or appearing to refuse) the appellant's application to send for the sale proceeds.
  3. Whether the District Court has power under the Code of Civil Procedure to order the transfer of sale proceeds from one executing Court to another (as considered by the District Judge in his response to the appellant's application).

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Position

  • The appellant applied to the First Class Subordinate Judge of Dharwar for the sale proceeds held in the Hubli Court to be sent to his Court so that they could be rateably distributed pursuant to applicable provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure.
  • The appellant pursued the relief first in the Subordinate Judge's Court, then before the District Judge, and ultimately brought an appeal under section 47 to the High Court (which the High Court treated as an application under its extraordinary jurisdiction).

Opponents' and Other Courts' Positions

  • The opponents (decree-holders in Hubli) objected that no appeal lay against the Subordinate Judge's alleged refusal to accede to the appellant's application.
  • The Subordinate Judge initially ordered transfer but later withdrew the order and advised the appellant to move the District Judge, citing Patel Naranji Morarji v. Haridas Navalram.
  • The District Judge considered there was nothing in the Code of Civil Procedure to authorise the District Court to order the transfer of the sale proceeds and thought it better that the Hubli proceedings be allowed to run their course; he referred to Nilkanta Rai v. Gosto Behari Chatterjee in his reasoning.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Patel Naranji Morarji v. Haridas Navalram In the facts described, the sale held by a lower-grade Court (while attachment was pending in a higher-grade Court) was held to be valid; the applicant had no right to ask the lower Court to set aside the sale as made without jurisdiction, and it was suggested the applicant might apply to the District Judge for transfer of sale proceeds. The Subordinate Judge had relied on this decision when advising the appellant to approach the District Judge. The High Court considered the decision in assessing appropriate procedure, but ultimately found that the appellant's facts were analogous to another precedent (Nilkanta Rai) and ordered transfer itself under extraordinary jurisdiction.
Nilkanta Rai v. Gosto Behari Chatterjee Addressed situations where assets are held by a Court and more persons than one have, before receipt of such assets, made application to that Court for execution of decrees; discussed applicability of section 73 and section 63(2); the High Court in that case made an order transferring proceeds from the Munsif's Court to the Subordinate Judge's Court for rateable distribution under section 73. The High Court treated the present facts as very similar to Nilkanta Rai. It used the principles and outcome in Nilkanta Rai (transfer of proceeds and rateable distribution) as persuasive authority for ordering the transfer of proceeds from the Hubli Court to the Dharwar Court in the present case.
Bykant Nath Shaha v. Rajendra Narain Rai Is cited in conjunction with Patel Naranji Morarji to illustrate the authorities considered by earlier courts; the combined observations were used to identify the correct procedural approach discussed by Sir Charles Sargent (as referenced in Nilkanta Rai). The opinion refers to this case (together with Patel) as part of the jurisprudential backdrop that informed earlier statements about procedure (notably the consideration that the Subordinate Judge should move the District Judge for a transfer). The present Court relied primarily on Nilkanta Rai for its order.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded by comparing the facts of the present case with the earlier authorities, particularly Nilkanta Rai v. Gosto Behari Chatterjee and Patel Naranji Morarji v. Haridas Navalram. The analysis followed these steps:

  1. The Court noted the operative factual premise: properties sold by the Hubli Court in execution of its decrees had already been attached earlier by the First Class Subordinate Judge at Dharwar. Consequently, the appellant (whose attachment predated the Hubli sales) could not properly apply to the Hubli Court for rateable distribution under section 73 because his decree was not one executed by the Hubli Court.
  2. The Court examined the procedural responses of the Subordinate Judge and the District Judge. The Subordinate Judge initially ordered transfer of the proceeds but then withdrew the order and directed the appellant to the District Judge, citing Patel. The District Judge took the view that the Code did not authorise the District Court to order a transfer, and suggested the Hubli proceedings should conclude first.
  3. Considering the precedents, the Court accepted that the facts were very similar to Nilkanta Rai, in which the High Court had ordered transfer of sale proceeds from the lower Court to the Subordinate Judge's Court to enable rateable distribution under section 73. The Court also noted the role of section 63(2) (the provision that “Nothing in this section shall be deemed to invalidate any proceeding taken by a Court executing one of such decrees”) as relevant background to these problems.
  4. The Court reasoned that if the opponents' contention — that the appellant should be required to apply to the District Judge or that he cannot obtain relief — were accepted, the appellant would lose the fruits of his earlier attachment. The Court considered that result to be incorrect as a matter of law and equity.
  5. On that basis, and treating the appeal as an application under the High Court's extraordinary jurisdiction (given the procedural posture and the parties' objection to appealability), the Court concluded it was appropriate to order the transfer of the sale proceeds and the pending darkhast from the Hubli Court to the Dharwar Court to permit rateable distribution pursuant to section 73.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The High Court allowed the appeal as an application and made the following dispositive order:

It is ordered that the sale proceeds, along with the darkhast pending in the Hubli Court for rateable distribution, be transferred from the Hubli Court to the Court of the First Class Subordinate Judge of Dharwar, and that the sale proceeds be rateably distributed by that Court among the decree-holders who have qualified under section 73 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

The Court also awarded costs to the appellant against the first respondent. Coyajee, J. concurred with the order.

Immediate Consequences for the Parties

  • The sale proceeds held in the Hubli Court will be transmitted to the Dharwar Subordinate Judge's Court for distribution.
  • The proceeds are to be rateably distributed among those decree-holders who qualify under section 73 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
  • The appellant is awarded his costs against the first respondent (Chanbasappa Rachappa).

Broader Implications

The opinion applies established principles and prior authorities (notably Nilkanta Rai and Patel Naranji Morarji) to the facts and exercises the High Court's extraordinary jurisdiction to secure an equitable result. The opinion does not expressly state that it sets a new legal precedent; it grounds its decision upon similarity to prior decisions and the application of sections 63 and 73 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

Show all summary ...

Macleod, C.J:— The appellant in this case obtained a decree on January 23, 1923, in Suit No. 201 of 1921 in the Court of the First Class Subordinate Judge of Dharwar against one Chanbasappa Rachappa, respondent No. 1. He had obtained an attachment before judgment on certain properties of the respondent on July 12, 1922. This attachment was confirmed by the decree. Other creditors of the respondent had obtained decrees against him in the Court of the Second lass Subordinate Judge at Hubli. The present opponent No. 2 obtained a decree in the Hubli Court on June 23, 1922, and attached certain of the respondents' property on June 29, 1922. That property was sold in execution by the Hubli Court on March 16, 1923. Opponent No. 3 obtained a decree in the Hubli Court on July 9, 1922, and in execution of that decree certain other property of the respondent was sold on July 14, 1923. All the properties sold in execution of these two decrees had teen already attached before judgment in the Suit No. 201 of 1921.

2. It will be seen, therefore, that in spite of the attachment having been levied on the respondents' property by the First Class Subordinate Judge's Court, the properties were sold in execution of decrees of the Second Class Subordinate Judge's Court, and the sale proceeds were lying in that Court.

3. The present appellant made an application to the First Class Subordinate Judge of Dharwar that the sale proceeds should be sent for from the Second Class Subordinate Judge's Court. The Judge first made an order that the sale proceeds should be sent to his Court, and the claimants were referred to section 63 of the cpc, to have their claims settled. The same day he appears to have withdrawn that order and told the applicant that he should move the District Judge for the transfer of the sale proceeds to the First Class Subordinate Judge's Court, referring to the decision in Patel Naranji Morarji v. Haridas Navalram(1). In that case soma property had been first attached in execution of a decree of the Second Class Subordinate Judge of Surat and was thereafter attached in execution of a decree of the First Class Subordinate Judge. The Second Class Subordinate Judge's Court sold the property, and the holder of the decree passed by the First Class Subordinate Judge then applied to the Second Class Subordinate Judge to set aside the sale on the ground that it was invalid under S. 285 of the Code of 1882, as having been made while the attachment levied by the First Class Subordinate Judge was pending, and on the Second Class Subordinate Judge's refusal to do so, he applied to the High Court under its extraordinary jurisdiction. It was held that the sale was good, and that the applicant had no right to ask the Second Glass Subordinate Judge to set aside the sale as made without jurisdiction, although possibly he might have applied to the District Judge to transfer the proceeds realized by the sale to the First Glass Subordinate Judge's Court.

4. The section of the Code of 1908 corresponding to S. 285 of the Code of 1882 is S. 63(1). Sub-S. (2) of that section has been added probably in consequence of the decision which I have just referred. It runs as follows:—“Nothing in this section shall be deemed to invalidate any proceeding taken by a Court executing one of such decrees.”

5. The appellant then applied to the District Court, but the District Judge, considered there was nothing in the Code of Civil Procedure to authorise a District Court to order the transfer of these sale proceeds, although he referred to the decision in Nilkanta Rai v. Gosto Behari Chatterjee(2) He further considered that it seemed to him better that the proceedings which had been begun in the Court ab Hubli should continue to an end, and that when that end, had been reached, those parties, if any, who might be aggrieved by the outcome, should seek such remedy as they might be able to find in the Code of Civil Procedure.

6. The appellant then filed this appeal under S. 47 of the Code against the decision of the Subordinate Judge. Although it is not clear on the record what the Subordinate Judge decided, it may be taken that he refused to accede to the appellant's application to send for the sale proceeds from the Hubli Court, and advised him to move the District Judge. The appellant has made respondents to the appeal not only the original judgment-debtor, but also the two decree holders under the decrees I have referred to in the Hubli Court. An objection has been taken by them that no appeal lies, and we consider that there was considerable justification for that contention. But we can entertain the appeal as if it had originally taken the form of an application under our extraordinary jurisdiction, as we consider that the facts mow established before us are very similar to the facts in the case already referred to, viz., Nilkanta Rai v. Gosto Behari Chatterjee. There the petitioner had obtained a money decree against his judgment-debtor in the Court of the Subordinate Judge. A writ of attachment was issued and served, whereupon a claimant appeared but his objection was overruled. The claimant next proceeded to sue for the cancellation of the order and obtained an injunction restraining the petitioner from proceeding with the execution of his decree till the suit had been decided. Thereupon the Subordinate Judge stayed the sale and proceeded to dismiss the execution case. The latter was discontinued not by reason of default on the part of the decree-holder, but at the instance of an unsuccessful claimant who instituted a suit to contest the validity of the order in the claim case. Meanwhile proceedings ware taken by the opposite party, another creditor of the same judgment-debtor, for realization of his dues. The sale at his instance was fixed for April 20, 1917. On the application of the petitioner the Subordinate Judge wrote a letter to the Munsii for the stay of the sale. The Munsif received the letter after the sale had taken place. Thereupon the petitioner applied to the Subordinate Judge to attach the sale proceeds deposited in the Munsif's Court and to distribute them rateable. The Subordinate Judge having, on June 9, 1917, dismissed this application, the petitioner moved the High Court and obtained a rule. It will be seen that the petitioner was not entitled to rateable distribution under S. 73 of the Code, which provides that where assets are held by a Court and more persons than one have, before the receipt of such assets, made application to the Court for the execution of decrees for the payment of money passed against the same judgment-debtor and have not obtained satisfaction thereof, the assets, after deducting the costs of realization, shall be rateable distributed among all such persons. The petitioner had not applied for execution of his decree to the Court which held the assets. Indeed, he was not competent to make such an application, as the decree obtained by him in the Court of the Subordinate Judge could not possibly be executed by the Munsif. Nor had he been able to obtain the benefit of the principle recognised in S. 63. If the petitioner had been able to apply in time to the Subordinate Judge under S. 63, the sale might have been held in his Court. The sale, however, had been actually held by the Munsif, and was a valid sale, under S. 63(2), though the Court found that in the events which had happened neither S. 63 nor S. 73 applied. Then the Judges considered whether in the actual circumstance of the case it was still possible for the Code to give relief to the petitioner. The Court of the lower grade had actually held the sale in ignorance of the fact that proceedings in execution had already been taken in the Court of a higher grade, and that the property brought to sale was subject be a legally subsisting attachment effected in that Court. Their Lordships, after referring to Patel Naranji Morarji v. Haridas Navalram and Bykant Nath Shaha v. Rajendra Narain Rai(3), said (p. 69):—

“If we compare the observations in the two cases just mentioned, it becomes obvious that Sir Charles Sargent pointed out the correct procedure to be followed in cases of this characber, namely, the Subordinate Judge is not to direct the Munsif to transmit the proceeds to his Court, but should move the District Judge to have the proceeds so transferred.’

7. As a matter of fact Sir Charles Sargent said that the applicant, and not the First Class Subordinate Judge, might possibly have applied to the District Judge for a transfer of the sale proceeds. However that may be, the High Court made the following order:—

“Rule obtained by the applicant is made absolute, and the order of the Subordinate Judge is set aside. It is directed that the sale proceeds should be transferred from the Court of the Munsif to the Court, of the Subordinate Judge to be reteably distributed by him amongst the decree-holders who had qualified themselves under section 73 of the cpc including the present petitioner.”

8. I can see no difference between the fact of that case and the facts in this case. The property was sold by the Hubli Court, when it had already been attached by an earlier order of the First Class Subordinate Judge. The present appellant could not apply to the Hubli Court for rateable distribution, and if the contention of the present opponents were to prevail, he would lose entirely the fruits of his attachment. That cannot be a correct exposition of law which should prevail. I think the first order made by the Subordinate Judge was right, for I see no reason why the application, for transfer of the sale proceeds should be made to the District Judge.

9. Treating this as an application under our extraordinary jurisdiction we make an order that the sale proceeds along with the darkhast, pending in the Hubli Court for rateable distribution, should be transferred from the Hubli Court to the Court of the First Class Subordinate Judge of Dharwar, the sale proceeds to be rate ably distributed to him amongst the decree-holders who have qualified themselves under section 73 of the cpc. The appellant to have his costs against the first respondent.

Coyajee, J.:— I agree.

10. Appeal allowed as an Application.