1. The Forest Range Officer, Mahaboobnagar seized a motor cabearing MYW No. 7005 while it was smuggling sandal wood and produced the same before the Divisional Forest Officer, Mahaboobnagar for taking proceedings under Section 44(2-A) of the Andhra Pradesh Forest Act. The accused were, however, produced before the Munsif Magistrate for remand and for being proceeded against under Section 44(2) of the Act.

2. The 1st respondent herein, claiming to be the owner of the motor car, filed M.P No. 532 of 1977 before the Court of Munsif Magistrate for release of the car. The learned Magistrate ordered the release of the car on 10-8-1977 on furnishing a bound for Rs. 10,000/- with two sureties. Against the said order the Forest Department filed a Criminal R.C No. 16 of 1977 before the learned Sessions Judge, Mahaboobnagar contending that since the car was not produced before the Court, which was indeed produced before the Divisional Forest Officer, Mahaboobnagar an authority of competent jurisdiction, the learned Magistrate had no power to pass any orders of release with respect to the said car the learned Sessions Judge, however, over-ruled the said contention, mainly with reference to Section 457 of the Criminal Procedure Code. Hence this Writ Petition. The prayer is to quash the orders of the learned Magistrate and the learned Sessions Judge, Mahaboobnagar by issuing a writ of Certiorari. It is stated by the learned Government Pleader that they have filed this petition as a test case since the Forest Department is finding that even where the property is not produced before the Court, but only before the Forest Officer as contemplated in Section 44(2-A) of the Act, the Courts have been releasing the said property. It is contended that the Court has no jurisdiction to do so. On the other hand. Sri D.K.S Reddy, the learned Counsel for the 1st respondent, contended that once the learned Magistrate takes cognizance of an offence, he is empowered to take cognizance of the property connected with the said offence and by virtue of his powers under Section 457 Crl. P.C he is entitled to pass appropriate orders for release, if he finds the same necessary. Reliance is also placed upon Section 451 Crl. P.C and Sections 53 and 57 of the Andhra Pradesh Forest Act.

3. Before the Amending Act 17 of 1976 was introduced. Section 44 of the Act provided that where a property has been seized by an authorised Officer, or Police Officer, under the reasonable belief that a forest offence has been committed in respect thereof, a report shall be made to the Magistrate of such seizure. (Where however, the property seized was believed to be the property of the Central or Stats Government and the offender was not known, it was sufficient if a report of the circumstances of seizure was made to the Divisional Forest Officer). The seized property was liable to be produced before the Magistrate as and when required by the Court. On receipt of a report of seizure, the Magistrate was to take measure for holding the trial and for disposal of the property according to law, except where the offence was compounded. Section 45 provided for the confiscation of the seized property by the Court where a person was convicted, and Secs. 46 & 47 provided for passing of orders by the Court with respect to disposal of seized property, in other cases. By Amending Act 17 of 1376, the provisions in chapter VII were extensively amended. Sub-section (2) which provided for making a report of seizure, to the Magistrate soon after such seizure, was amended sub-section (2) now provides that the Officer seizing the property shall “without any unreasonale delay either produce the property seized before an Officer not below the rank of an Assistant Conservator of Forests authorised by the Government in this behalf by notification (hereinafter referred to as the authorised officer) or make a report of such seizure to the Magistrate.”

4. After sub-section (2), sub-section (2-A) has been introduced which says that where an authorised officer seizes forest produce or forest produce seized by another Officer is produced before him and if he is satisfied that a forest offence has been committed in respect thereof, he may confiscate the said forest produce together with all tools, ropes, boats or vehicles used in committing such offence. Sub-Section (2-B), which is newly introduced, says that no order confiscating any property shall be made under sub-section (2-A) unless a notice thereof is given to the concerned party and a reasonable opportunity of being heard is afforded to him. Sub-section (2-C) which is also brought in by way of amendment says that no order of confiscation shall be made by the forest officer if the owner of the vehicle or boat etc., proves to the satisfaction of the forest officer that the same was used in committing the offence without his knowledge or connivance. Sub-Sections (2-D) and (2-E) provide for revision and appeal against orders of consfication passed by the Authorised Officer. Section 45 has been substituted in its entirety and as amended, it empowers the Court to consficate the seized property in case where a person is convicted, “except where an order of confiscation, has already been passed in respect thereof under section 44”. The existing Section 50 has been numbered as sub-section (2) and sub-section (1) has been introduced therein which says that “where an order of confiscation of any property passed under sub-section (2-A) or sub-section (2-D) of Section 44 has become final in respect of the whole or any portion of such property, such property or the portion thereof, as the case may be shall vest in the Government free from all encumbrances.” The Amending Act has also introduced a naw Section, namely. Section 58-A which says that “an order of confiscation under sub-section (2-A) or sub-section (2-D) of Section 44 shall not be deemed to bar the imposition of any other penalty to which the person from whom the property is seized is liable, under this Act.”

5. The said Amending Act has been brought into force on 17-12-1975. Admittedly, the seizure in this case was subsequent to the coming into force of the said Amending Act.

6. After the seizure of the car and material in this case, the Forest Range Officer, Mahaboobnagar produced the seized property including the motor car before the Divisional Forest Officer and thereafter produced the 4 accused persons (who were found travelling in the car) before the Munsif Magistrate, Mahaboobnagar. In the report under which the said 4 accused were produced before the Court, the Forest Range Officer clearly stated that after the seizure of the property and the vehicle and the arrest of the said 4 accused persons, he has “produced the seized sandal wood (52) billets (1.67) quintals along with the car bearing No. MYW 7005 before the Divisional Forest Officer (Forest authorities) under Sec. 44 and its sub-section (2) and its amendment of the A.P Forest Act, 1957 for confiscation proceedings and (is) producing the (4) accused persons before the Hon'ble Court for contravention under Sec. 32 read with 36 and rules made under Section 29 and 68 of the A.P Forest Act, 1967” It is thus clear that the learned Magistrate was clearly apprised of the fact that only the accused persons were produced before him and that the seized property and the vehicle were produced before the Divisional forest Officer in accordance with the amended provisions in Section 44 of the Act. Yet, when the 1st respondent, claiming to be the owner of the vehicle, came forward with an application for release of the said vehicle, he directed the release thereof in spite of the opposition from the Forest Authorities-Thereafter, a revision was filed before the learned Sessions Judge against the said order of the Magistrate. But the learned Sessions Judge, also rejected the contention of the petitioner and affirmed the power of the Court to release the property even in such cases.

7. A perusal of the provisions in chapter VII as amended by Amending Act 17 of 1976 clearly disclose that the Legislature wanted to provide and did provide two different forums. The Criminal Court is an existing forum. A new forum, namely, the Authorised Officer was created by the Amending Act and the seizing Officer was given a discretion (exopt where the seizure is effected by the Authorised Officer himself) to produce the seized forest produce and the accompanying vehicle, boats etc., either before the Court or before the Authorised Officer. The Authorised Officer is given the power to decide whether any offence has been committed in respect of the said forest produce and to pass orders of confiscation if he is so satisfied. Only where the offenders are known, they have to be produced before the Court. The seizing officer is not bound to produce the forest produce and the accompanying vehicle etc., before the court, where he produces the accused before the court. The Amending Act clearly gives him the discretion either to produce the persons as welt as the property before the court or to produce the persons before the court and to produce the property before the Authorised Officer.

8. The forest officer is also a competent Tribunal created by statute to confiscate the property, in cases where the property is nor produced before the Court but only the persons are produced before it and where the Court is clearly told or informed that the property seized has been produced before the Authorised Offcer, the Court can have no power to pass orders of disposal with respect to such seized property.

9. Section 451 of the Criminal Procedure Code provides that “when any property is produced before any Criminal Court during any inquiry or trial, the Court may make such order as it thinks fit for the proper custody of such property pending the conclusion of the inquiry or trial……”. This said provision is attacted only where the property is produced before the Criminal Court but not otherwise.

10. Section 452, however, empowers the court to pass orders of disposal with respect to “any property or document produced before it or in its custody, or regarding which any offence appears to have been committed, or which has been used for the commission of any offence”. Section 457 goes further and provide that “whenever the seizure or property by any police offcer is reported to a Magistrate under the provisions of this Code, and such property is not procuced before a Criminal Court during an inquiry or trial, the Magistrate may make such order as he thinks fit respecting the disposal of such property or the delivery of such property to the person entitled to the possession thereof, or if such person cannot be ascertained, respecting the custody and production of such property.”

11. But the said general power of the court under the Criminal Procedure Code has to be read along with and in the context of the special procedure prescribed by the Amending Act 17 of 1976. Once a competent authority is created for dealing with the property and the property seized has been produced before such competent authority the court cannot propose to pass orders of disposal with respet to such property since any such orders are likely to interfere with the course of proceedings before the Authorised Officer. Where two jurisdictions are created, one must respect the other. In my opinion, therefore, sections 452 and 457 have to be read consistent with the powers and jurisdiction of the special forum created by the Amending Act.

12. The Amending Act has brought about a situation which is very much analogous to the position obtaining under the Essential Commodities Act, vis-a-vis. Sections 6-A and 7. Even under the Esssntial Commodities Act where the property is seized for violation of any of the orders made under the Act, the property can be produced before the District Revenue Officer and the persons concerned can be produced before the Court. Of course. It is always open to the seizing authorities to produce both the persons as well as the property before the Court but where it is not so done and where the property is produced before the special Tribunal created by the Act, it would be beyond the competence of the court to pass any oaders with respect to disposal of such property. Sri D.K.S Reddy, the learned Counsel for the 1st respondent relied upon Raghubans Dubey v. State Of Bihar (1) AIR 1967 S.C 1167 in support of the proposition, that the Court takes cognizance of an offence and not offenders. The said principle is sought to be extended to taking cognizance of the property connected with the offence, even though not produced before the Court. In my opinion, the said principle can have no application in this case. That was a case where certain Persons were produced before the Court as being involved in an offence. The complainant, however, brought to the notice of the Court that some other persons realy involved in the crime have not been put up before the Court by the police and that, they should also be proceeded against as accused persons. The Court took cognizance of the same and summoned the said persons also as accused. The said order of the Court was assailed and in that context, the Supreme Court observed that the Court takes cognizance of an offence and not of offenders and, therefore, once the Court takes cognizance of an offence, it can summon any person who appears to be involved in such offence. I do not see as to how the said principle can be applied in the present case where the property is produced before a Tribunal of competent jurisdiction and that Tribunal is seized of the said matter.

13. Though Sri D.K.S Reddy sought to rely upon two decisions of this Court, namely, Vanka Anantha Rao, Rice Dealer, Tuni, East Godavari District v. The State of A.P Represented by the Circle Inspector of Police, Ramachandrapuram, East Godavari District and others (2) 1974 (1) An. W.R 120 and W.P No. 5861 of 1973, dt. 25-6-1975 arising under the Essential Commodities Act, in support of his contention. He concedes that those were cases where the property was also produced before the court. In such cases, the Court is undoubtedy entitled to pass orders of disposal with respect thereto. The said decisions, therefore, cannot be of any help to the learned Counsel.

14. For the above reasons, I am of the opinion that in this case, the learned Magistrate had no jurisdiction to release the motor car which was not produced before him but which was produced before the Authorised officer and the latter was seized of the same.

15. But then the question arises whether this court can issue a writ against a Criminal Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In other words, the question is whether a writ of certiorari is available against a Criminal Court (or for that matter, a Civil Court) where they exceed their jurisdiction. Though this objection has not been raised by the respondent in his counter, I called upon the Government Pleader to satisfy me on this aspect and the Counsel for the respondent has also made his submissions. This question involves an examination of the true nature of writ of certiorari. In view of the decisions of the Supreme Court on the said as pect, it is unnecessary to refer to the English decisions, also because those decisions have been referred to by the Supreme Court wherever necessary. In T.C Basappa v. T. Nagappa (3) AIR 1954 S.C 440, the Supreme Court considered the fundamental principles in regard to the issuing of a writ of Certiorari. In course of the said consideration, it observed at page 444 that “Certiorari” may and is generally granted when a Court has acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction. The want of jurisdiction may arise from the nature of the subject matter of the proceeding or from the absence of some preliminary proceeding or the Court itself may not be legally constituted or suffer from certain disability by reason of extraneous circumstances, vide. ‘Halsbury’ 2nd edition, Vol. IX, page 880. When the jurisdiction of the Court depends upon the existence of some collateral fact, it is will settled that the Court cannot by a wrong decision of the fact give it jurisdiction which it would not otherwise possess, vide ‘Bunbury v. Fuller’, (1854) Ex. 111(F):— (R. v. Income tax Special purposes Commissioners. (1889) 21 QBD 313(g).”

16. It was, however, made clear in the said Judgment that the Court while issuing a writ of certiorari will not ait in appeal over the Judgment but will correct only errors of Jurisdiction. The matter was again dealt with by the Supreme Court in Radeshyam Khare v. The State of Madhya Pradesh (4) AIR 1959 S.C 107. At page 115, the Supreme Court observed:

“The writ of certiorari is a well known ancient high prerogative writ that used to be issued by the Courts of the King's Bench to correct the errors of the Inferior Courts strictly so called. Gradually, the scope of these writs came to be enlarged so as to enable the Superior Courts to exercise control over various bodies which were not, strictly speaking, Courts at all but which were, by statute, vested with powers aud duties that resembled those that wers vested in the ordinary inferior Courts”

17. The said observations have since been reiterated in several other decisions. It is thus clear that writ of certiorari is available to correct errors of jurisdiction of inferior Courts. The same conclusion has been arrived at by Ekbote J. in P. Veukata Somaraju v. Principal Munsiff Magistrate, Bhimavaram, West Godawari District (5). 1968 (II) An. W.R 343.

18. In this context, however, it is necessary to examine the decision of the Supreme Court in Naresh Shridhar Murajkar ando thers v. State of Maharashtra (6) AIR 1967 S.C 1 In that case, an oral order of Justice Tarkunde of Bombay High Court was challenged before the Supreme Court in a petition under Art. 32 of the Constitution, as infringing the petitioners' fundamental righis guaranteed to them under Art. 19(1)(a) and (g) of the Constitution. The petitioners therein were journalists and they claimed that they had a right to report correctly the proceedings before a Court. In that connection the Court examined the question whether a judicial decision pronounced by a Judge of competent jurisdiction in or in relation to a matter brought before him for adjudication can affect the fundamental rights of a citizen and held that it cannot. It was observed that the remedy open to the persons aggrieved in such cases is only by way of an appeal or revision, as the case may be, but not by way of a writ petition on the ground that his fundamental rights have been violated. It was also observed that the High Court cannot be said to be an inferior Court since the High Court also is a Superior Court of record under Article 215. For those reasons, and also on merits, the writ petitions were dismissed. In my opinion, the said decision of the Supreme Court cannot be read as enunciating that the High Court cannot issue a writ in appropriate cases, to an inferior Civil or Criminal Court. Of course the said power will not be exercised indiscriminately but sparingly and only where the circumstances of the case do warrant the invocation of such power. Ordinarily, of course the aggrieved persons may be left to pursue the ordinary remedies provided by the concerned procedural laws. Moreover, the power of the High Court to issue writs is not confined to enforcement of fundamental rights as in the case of Article 32 but it extends to correcting of statutory violations and procedural irregularities. Since in this case, it must be held that the Criminal Court has exceeded its jurisdiction conferred upon it by law and interfered with the jurisdiction of another statutory Tribunal, this is an appropriate case where the issuance of the writ is called for.

19. in this context, it is significant to notice that the order of the learned Magistrate impugned herein is an interlocutory order. In fact, no revision against the said order lies either to the Sessions Court or to the High Court in view of the express provision contained in sub-section (2) of Section 397 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973. In this view of the matter, the revision filed by the petitioner before the learned Sessions Judge was incompetent. At this stege. I may refer to a contention of Sri D.K.S Reddy, the learned Counsel for the respondent that while a writ cannot be issued against the impugned order of the Magistrate, it can be corrected in exercise of the inherent powers of this Court conferred upon it by Section 432 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973. It may be noticed that by Section 482 the inherent powers of the High Court are saved which powers can be exercised to prevent the abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. The said power can also be invoked in this case, since, in my opinion this is an appropriate case warranting the exercise of the inherent power of this court.

20. For the above reasons, the writ petition is allowed and the order of the learned Magistrate dated 10-8-1977 in Crl. M.P No. 532 of 1977 in P.0.R No. 64/141/77 as well as the order of the learned Sessions Judge, Dt. 18-8-77 in Crl. R.P No. 16 of 1977 are quashed there will be no order as to costs. Advocate's fee Rs. 150/-.