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Smt. G. Rajalakshmi ... v. Appellate Authority ...

Andhra Pradesh High Court
Mar 2, 1979
Smart Summary (Beta)

Comprehensive Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

The dispute concerns the premises known as "T.R Stall" in the civil aerodrome at Begumpet, owned by the Aviation Department of the Central Government, which had been leased to M/s. Jyoti Book Stall at a monthly rent of Rs. 1,107/-. The lease expired on 30 September 1977 and the occupant did not vacate. On 30 November 1977 the Estates Officer (second respondent) served a notice under Section 4 of the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971, calling upon the occupant to show cause why an order of eviction should not be made.

The proprietor, G. Lakshmipathi, submitted a representation (dated 11 December 1977). By order dated 15 December 1977 the Estates Officer directed the tenant to vacate within thirty days and recorded that there had been "no response" to the show cause notice. An appeal (C.M.A. No. 2 of 1978) was filed against that order. Before the appellate authority additional evidence was admitted: P.W.1 (the son) and two exhibits — Ex. A-1 (the representation of 11 December 1977) and Ex. A-2 (a postal acknowledgment showing the Estates Officer had received that representation).

The appellate authority concluded that the trial authority's recital that "there was no response" was erroneous and that the requirements of considering the representation and affording a reasonable opportunity under Section 5 had not been complied with. Nevertheless, on the merits the appellate authority affirmed the eviction order (impugned order dated 6 July 1978). G. Lakshmipathi died on 14 April 1978; his widow, son and two daughters were brought on record as legal representatives and are the petitioners in the writ petition.

The petitioners assailed the appellate order, arguing (inter alia) that the lease had been renewed by the Aerodrome Officer (third respondent) and that bills for October 1977 were issued and paid; that Ex. A-1 had been received (as shown by Ex. A-2) and yet the Estates Officer falsely recorded no representation. The respondents (through the Aerodrome Officer) countered that the lease/licence had expired, the eviction order was affirmed and executed (goods removed and returned to petitioners later), and that a fresh contractor was appointed after tenders were called.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Can a deficiency of natural justice before a trial tribunal be cured by sufficiency of natural justice before an appellate tribunal?
  2. When an appellate tribunal concludes that the original authority did not consider a representation (thus violating audi alteram partem), is it proper for the appellate tribunal to decide the merits itself or should it remit the matter to the original authority for fresh consideration?

Arguments of the Parties

Writ Petitioners' Arguments (Appellants)

  • The lease was renewed by the Aerodrome Officer (bills for October 1977 were issued and, according to the spouse, paid), implying the tenancy subsisted and the occupant was not an unauthorised occupant.
  • Ex. A-1 (the representation of 11 December 1977) was received by the Estates Officer, as evidenced by Ex. A-2 (postal acknowledgment), yet the Estates Officer falsely recorded that no representation had been received.
  • The appellate authority erred in resolving the matter on merits rather than remitting the case to the Estates Officer after concluding the Estates Officer had not considered the representation; the proper orderly procedure is remittal for consideration in the first instance.

Respondents' Arguments

  • The lease/licence had expired; the Estates Officer validly directed vacation and that order was affirmed in appeal and subsequently executed (goods removed on 11 July 1978 and delivered to the petitioners on 8 September 1978).
  • The deceased tenant had participated in tendering for a fresh contract but his tender was not the highest, and so he was not awarded the renewed contract.
  • The conclusions reached by the appellate authority on the merits were proper and free from vice.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Ridge v. Baldwin (1964 AC 40) Affirmation that the principle of audi alteram partem is part and parcel of natural justice; the scope of "notice" and fair hearing. The court invoked Ridge v. Baldwin as authority for the centrality of audi alteram partem within natural justice; it supported the conclusion that procedural fairness cannot be circumvented.
Leary v. National Union of Vehicle Builders (1970 2 All ER 713) The proposition (as stated by Megarry J.) that a failure of natural justice in the trial body cannot, as a general rule, be cured by sufficiency of natural justice in an appellate body ("unjust trial and a fair appeal"). The court expressly adopted the view in Leary and relied upon it to hold that the appellate authority should not have decided the merits once it found the trial authority had not considered the representation; instead the matter should be remitted to the trial authority.
Posluns v. Toronto Stock Exchange and Gardiner (1964) 46 DLR (2d) 210; appeal (1965) 53 DLR (2d) 193 Canadian decisions noted to have taken a differing approach (suggesting appellate consideration may sometimes be acceptable). The court acknowledged these decisions as adopting an alternative view but recorded that the judge had not read them; they were noted but not followed.
King v. University of Saskatchewan (1969 SCR 678) Another Commonwealth decision referenced as taking a contrary approach to Leary. The court mentioned this decision as part of authorities that appear to adopt a different stance, but it was not relied upon for the outcome in this case.
Denton v. Auckland City (1969 NZLR 256) New Zealand decision similarly cited as taking an alternative approach to whether an appeal can cure trial defects. The court noted the case but stated it had not had the advantage of reading it; it was not followed.
Sheopujan v. State of Bihar (AIR 1956 Pat 212) Observation by Ramaswami J. that the principle of audi alteram partem requires the affected party to be given sufficient opportunity "at any stage." The court cited this case to emphasize the flexible application of audi alteram partem — that the party must be given sufficient opportunity to know and answer the case at some stage.
Hardutt Mull Jute Mills v. State of Bihar (AIR 1957 Pat 21) Reiteration that audi alteram partem does not demand a rigid formula; it is satisfied if the affected party is given sufficient opportunity at some stage of the proceedings. The court relied on this authority to demonstrate that natural justice's requirements are not fixed in form but nonetheless impose an obligation to afford a sufficient opportunity to be heard.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court approached the dispute by first framing the central question: whether procedural deficiencies at the trial stage (specifically failure to consider a representation and to afford a proper hearing under Section 5 of the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971) can be cured by a fair and sufficient hearing at the appellate stage.

The court examined the statutory framework: definitions under Section 2(g); the scheme of Sections 3 (appointment of Estates Officers), 4 (notice to unauthorised occupants including requirement to set out grounds and service formalities), and the duty under Section 5 to consider any representation received to a Section 4 notice. The court also noted the Estates Officer's powers under Sections 7 and 8 and the appeal provisions of Section 9, including the requirement that appeals be disposed of expeditiously and the finality of the appellate order.

Factually, the Estates Officer had issued the Section 4 notice and later recorded that "there was no response"; however, Ex. A-1 (representation) and Ex. A-2 (postal acknowledgment) established that a representation had indeed been submitted and received. The appellate authority itself found that the Estates Officer's recital was erroneous and that the representation had not been considered.

The critical analytical question was procedural: having concluded that the trial authority neglected to consider the representation (thus breaching audi alteram partem), was it open to the appellate authority to proceed to decide the merits rather than remitting the case to the original authority for proper consideration?

The court reviewed existing authorities. It accepted Ridge v. Baldwin as affirming the centrality of audi alteram partem and relied substantially on Megarry J.'s reasoning in Leary v. National Union of Vehicle Builders, which held that, as a general rule, a failure of natural justice in a trial body cannot be cured by a fair appeal. The court explained that adopting Leary's approach discourages trial tribunals from giving "short shrift" to proceedings and prevents administrative decisions being rendered in a "hole and corner" fashion.

Although alternative approaches exist in some Canadian and New Zealand decisions (which the court noted but had not read in detail), the court found little binding domestic authority directly on point. The court also referenced Indian decisions (Sheopujan and Hardutt Mull Jute Mills) emphasizing that audi alteram partem is satisfied if the affected party is given sufficient opportunity "at some stage", thus recognizing flexibility in procedure while still insisting on an effective opportunity to be heard.

Applying these principles to the facts, the court concluded that because the Estates Officer had not considered the representation (Ex. A-1) and the appellate authority itself so found, it was improper for the appellate authority to decide the merits; the correct and orderly procedure is to remit the matter to the Estates Officer for fresh consideration of the representation and for that officer to pass an order in accordance with law.

Holding and Implications

Holding (core ruling):

The writ petition is allowed: the appellate order in C.M.A. No. 2 of 1978 dated 6 July 1978 and the Estates Officer's order dated 15 December 1977 are quashed, and the matter is remitted to the Estates Officer to consider the representation (Ex. A-1) and to pass an order in accordance with law.

Direct consequences and procedural directions:

  • The appellate order (dated 6 July 1978) and the Estates Officer's order (dated 15 December 1977) are quashed.
  • The subject matter is remitted to the Estates Officer for consideration of Ex. A-1 (representation dated 11 December 1977) and for fresh orders in accordance with law.
  • No order as to costs; advocate's fee quantified at Rs. 150/-.

Broader implications: The court adopted and applied the reasoning in Leary (that a fair appeal does not generally cure an unfair trial) to vindicate the principle of audi alteram partem and to strengthen natural justice. The opinion does not, however, purport to lay down a rigid rule applicable in every context and does not state that it is establishing a novel binding precedent beyond the facts and reasoning set out in this case.

Disposition: Petition allowed.

Show all summary ...

1. In this writ petition a question of general and of unusual importance is raised. The question may be formulated as under.

“Can a deficiency of a natural justice before a trial tribunal be cured by sufficiency of natural justice before an appellate tribunal”?

2. The facts relating to that issue are under - The premises known “T.R Stall” in the civil aerodrome at Begumpet owned by Aviation department of the Central Government. T.R Stall was leased out to M/s. Jyoti Book Stall on a rent of Rs. 1,107/- per mensem. The lease expired on September 30, 1977. The tenant did not vacate the premises. The Estates Officer, the second respondent served on the tenant a notice on November 30, 1977 under Section 4 of the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act 40 of 1971 and in that it was recited the tenant after the expiry of the lease continued to remain in the premises as unauthorised occupant and was asked to show cause why he should not be evicted under Act 40 of 1977. G. Lakshmipathi, the proprietor of Jyothi Book Stall submitted objections in his representation on December 11, 1977. The Estates Officer by the order dated December 15, 1977 direct the Jyothi Book Stall to vacate the premises within thirty days from the date of service of the order for it was mentioned that the occupant was called upon to show cause and “there was no response” from the occupant. The order of eviction was assailed in appeal in C.M.A No. 2 of 1978 before the appellate authority. On April 14, 1978 G. Lakshmipathi died. The widow, the son and the two daughters of the deceased were brought on record as legal representatives (the four of them are the writ petitioners). In the course of the appeal per order in I.A No. 235 of 1978 additional evidence was adduced. P.W 1, the son of Lakshmipathi was examined. Exs. A1 and A2 were marked as additional evidence in appeal. Ex. A1 was the explanation or representation submitted on December 11, 1977 to the show cause notice dated November 30, 1977. Ex. A2 is the postal acknowledgment showing the Estates Officer had received the explanation of the tenant. The appellate authority in C.M.A No. 2 of 1978, on the basis of evidence recorded, held the show cause notice issued to the occupant, an explanation (A-1) was submitted to the Estates Officer and observed:—

“The remark made by the first respondent (the Estates Officer) is undoubtedly erroneous. It therefore follows that the requirements of considering the explanation submitted by the first appellant and affording him a reasonable opportunity of being heard as contemplated under Section 5 of the Act before the impugned order was passed were not complied with by the first respondent.”

3. Having so held the appellate authority, on the merits of objections, held there was nothing which the Estates Officer would have “considered” and affirmed the order dated July 6, 1978 (the impugned order) …. the order of eviction passed by the Estates Officer.

4. The writ petitioners seek to assail the order (in C.M.A No. 2 of 1978 on July 6, 1978) and aver that the lease was renewed by the aerodrome officer, the third respondent, who had issued Bill No. 9046 dated October 24 1977 for October 1977 for the sums of Rs. 1,107/- being the rent and Rs. 55-35 towards conservancy charges and two other bills issued on October 24, 1977 for Rs. 50/- and Rupees 3.75 for the month of October, 1977; the former was for electricity charges and the latter for water charges. The spouse of the deceased averred that the bills were paid and receipts were obtained. The lease was renewed. The tenancy, it is averred, is subsisting. The occupant was a tenant in the premises and not unauthorised occupant. The representation on Decem. 11, 1977 (A-1) was received by the Executive Officer and notwithstanding the acknowledgment Ex. A-2, in the order passed by the second respondent under Section five of the said Act, a false recital is made that no representation was received. The order of the appellate authority is attacked as an improper order and the petitioners seek to quash the impugned order of July 6, 1978 in C.M.A No. 2 of 1978.

5. Sri P.C Varghese the Aerodrome officer submitted a counter on behalf of the respondents and averred that a “licence was granted to late Lakshmipathi to install a Book Stall in the space provided at the Air-port. The lease period expired. The “tenant” was directed to vacate the premises by the order of the Estates Officer. That order was affirmed in appeal. The order was executed on July 11, 1978 and ‘goods’ of Lakshmipathi were removed from the premises and delivered to the petitioners on September 8, 1978. Late Lakshmipathi, it is averred, had submitted a tender along with others when tenders were called for “fresh contract” and the tender of Lakshmipathi was not the highest and for that reason he was not “awarded the contract” for the ensuing year. In this regard the facts in regard to a suit O.S No. 749 of 1977 on the file of First Additional Judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad are averred and in that the “tenant” sought for arbitration of a dispute relating to the order of eviction passed by the Estates Officer. However, a new ‘contractor’, it is averred, was inducted in the premises by the respondents and is carrying on business. The conclusions reached by the appellate authority in the impugned order on merits are averred proper and do not suffer from any vice whatever.

6. The question debated in the circumstances of the case is :— Can a deficiency of natural justice before a trial tribunal be cured by sufficiency of natural justice before an appellate tribunal? In considering the issue, the powers of the appellate authority, to pass the impugned order are not questioned.

7. When the appellate tribunal had come to the conclusion that before the original authority there was no consideration of the representation, is it open for the appellate authority to consider the question on merits is the broad question that is mooted. Such a procedure is opted generally by civil Courts of appeal, admits of no doubt. Very often the civil Courts do consider the merits of issue which were not considered by the trial Court or in appeal for the proceedings are regulated by the Code of Civil Procedure. When a written statement is filed in a suit or in a proceeding where the Code of Civil Procedure governs the proceeding, hardly a question arises where factum of submission of an answer or written statement is disputed. The issue in the instant case is stressed in view of the fact that under Act 40 of 1971 the proceedings before the Estates Officer or in appeal are not regulated except what is contained in Act 40 of 1971.

8. The words “unauthorised occupation” are defined under Section 2 cl.(g) of the Act. Section 3 speaks of the appointment of Estates Officers. Section 4 speaks of notice by the Estates Officer to unauthorised occupant calling upon such person to show cause why an order of eviction be not made against the occupant. Clause 2 of Section 4 requires that the notice should contain the grounds on which the order of eviction is proposed to be made; clause three deals with the formalities that have to be complied with for service of notice. If any representation is received to the notice issued under Section 4, the Estates Officer shall consider and pass appropriate orders under Section 5 of the Act. The power of an Estates Officer to pass an order requiring a person in unauthorised occupation to pay rent or damages is specified in Section 7 and further powers of the Estates Officer are enumerated in Section 8 like summoning, enforcing attendance of witnesses and as to production of documents etc. Section 9 deals with appeals against an order of the Estates Officer passed under Section 5 or Section 9 in regard to public premises. Clause 4 of Section 9 reads:—

“Every appeal under this Section shall be disposed of by the appellate officer as expeditiously as possible;”

and the appellate order is final and civil court's jurisdiction in this regard is ousted.

9. The question at issue is; Can the tribunal in appeal consider the merits of the lis as the original authority and record findings or is it improper (if not illegal) to do so. It is suggested that in such circumstances on behalf of the Writ Petitioners the appellate authority should record its conclusion first as to the fact whether the trial Tribunal had violated, the rule of audi alteram partem and once the conclusion is reached that the trial Tribunal had not given due weight to the representation. the learned counsel for the petitioners argued the course open for ‘orderly procedure’ is to remit the lis to the original authority for proper consideration on merits. Such a course was not adopted by the appellate authority is the gravamen of the attack made by the writ petitioners.

10. The question thus posed has to be considered on first principles. There is very little authority in the decisions of this Court or in the Supreme Court touching this aspect of the question. It may be recalled that in Ridge v. Baldwin (1) 1964 AC 40, the House of Lords had considered the scope of “notice” forming part of the principle of audi alteram partem. Lord Reid in his speech had stressed the principle of audi alteram partem is part and parcel of natural justice. That is not disputed. A similar question as in the instant case arose directly in Leary v. National Union of Vehicle Builders (2) (1970) 2 All ER 713 at p. 720. Leary the plaintiff in the suit was a member and organiser of National Union of Vehicle Builders. The ‘Union’ in the rules, Rule 26(2) had reserved authority to expel any member who had defaulted payment of contribution for six months. The Branch Committee of the Union by order on January 16, 1969 expelled Leary without hearing him for not paying the contributions for 27 weeks. The plaintiff (Leary) in vain attacked the order in appeal before the Appeals Council and urged £5 were paid by him. Before the Appeals Council Leary was heard and afforded all opportunities. Further in the appeal committee two council members were not served notice of the meeting and one Mr. Wattas, who was not a member, formed as member of the council. The order of the appeal council was challenged in a suit. Megarry J., posed the question on the above facts :— “If a man has never had a fair trial by the appropriate trial body, is it open to appellate body to discard its appellate functions and itself give the man the fair trial that he has never had” and captioned the circumstance as “unjust trial and a fair appeal” and answered the question as a general rule “I hold that a failure of natural justice in the trial body cannot be cured by sufficiency of natural justice in an appellate body” The learned Judge held bodies differ much in their views and approach and referred to the rules of the Union as having ‘confined’ in the Branch Committee for expulsion not in the fairness of appeal. I respectfully agree with the reasoning propounded in the decision. Adoption of such a course in my view curbs the tendency in “trial tribunals” to give a short shrift to proceedings. The explanation Ex. A-1 in the instant case was received by the Estates Officer yet it was said by that authority that no explanation was received. It is with reference to such devices Rt. Hon. Lord Hewart of Bury in his book “New despotism” at page 49 observed. some such decisions are rendered in “hole and corner” fashion. Decisions of administrative tribunals are generally criticised even those in whose favour the decision is made, it is said as “mere piece of luck”. How can it be said such decisions rendered as in these proceedings are rendered under rule of law. In my view the proper course for the appellate tribunal is to remit the subject to the trial tribunal and by doing so, the principle of audi alteram partem and in turn the larger principle of natural justice stands vindicated and strengthened. I am aware that it is possible to take another view and such a view appears to have been taken in two of the commonwealth dominions, in three Canadian cases viz., Posluns v. Toronto Stock Exchange and Gardiner (3) (1964) 46 DLR (2d) 210, and in appeal of the same case in (4) CA (1965) 53 DLR (2d) 193, in King v. University of Sakatcheyan, (5) (1969) SCR 678 and one in a decision in New Zealand case in Denton v. Auckland City, (6) (1969) NZLR 256, but I had not the advantage of reading these decisions. I have understood the question as one not governed by any authority of this Court or that of the Supreme Court of India. The field in that sense is untrodden. In view of the paucity of authority whether to adopt the view taken by the Courts in England as propounded by Megarry J. in (2) (above) or to have recourse to the adoption of procedure followed in Canadian and New Zealand cases ! A number of cases were cited during the debate. There is very little guidance on this aspect. There are observations, however, made by Ramaswami J. (as he then was) in Sheopujan v. State of Bihar, (7) AIR 1956 Pat 212, wherein the principle of audi alteram partem has been accepted to mean that the party affected must be given sufficient opportunity ‘at any stage’. The concept of natural justice, true it is, cannot be imprisoned in a strait-jacket or in a fixed formula. Whether a fair opportunity has been given to a party adversely affected or not, no general test can be formulated to apply in all circumstances. Ramaswami C.J (the same learned Judge) in Hardutt Mull Jute Mills… v. State Of Bihar (8) AIR 1957 Pat 21, reiterated what is stated in the case (7) (above) and speaking again of “general requirement” observed—

“There is no such general requirement in the principles of ‘audi alteram partem’. On the contrary, the principle is satisfied if the party adversely affected is given sufficient opportunity to know the case he has to meet and to answer that case at some stage and not at all the stages of the administrative proceeding.”

11. Barring the two decisions, there is no direct authority in the large number of cases cited by the learned counsel for the parties.

12. The proceedings arose under Act 40 of 1971. The Estates Officer under the Act has to consider the objections and pass orders and not by the appellate tribunal. The analogy of Civil Courts having regard to the constitution, their power and the Code that regulates their procedure the analogy is not apposite.

13. To sum up the Estates Officer who had issued the notice under Section 4, did not consider the representation made by the tenant. The appellate authority on this question came to the conclusion that such a representation in Ex. A-1 was made but was not considered. In such circumstances following the view taken by Megarry J. in Leary's case (2)(above) in United Kingdom I think it is not open for the appellate authority to consider the question in the appeal on merits of the disputes.

14. There are two views possible in this regard and in my view it would strengthen the principle of natural justice in adopting the course decided in Leary's case (2) (supra). Therefore the order of the appellate authority in C.M.A No. 2 of 1978 dated July 6, 1978 and the order of the Estates Officer, Civil Aviation Department, Madras Region (the second respondent) dated December 15, 1977 in NOM/4(2) ESJ are hereby quashed. The subject matter is remitted to the Estates Officer to consider the representation in Ex. A-1 made by the tenant on December 11, 1977 and to pass order in accordance with law. The writ petition is accordingly allowed. No order as to costs. Advocate's fee Rs. 150/-.

15. Petition allowed.