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Purnia Kurmi v. Manindra Nath Mahanti

Gauhati High Court
Mar 27, 1968
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Case Summary — Second Appeal by Mustt. Purnia Kurmi

Factual and Procedural Background

The plaintiff-appellant, Mustt. Purnia Kurmi (an elderly widow), executed a deed of gift (Ext. 1) dated 17 November 1961 conveying her entire property in favour of the defendant-respondent, Manindra Nath Mahanti. On the same day the defendant executed another document (Ext. 2) in which he agreed to maintain the plaintiff during her lifetime and provided that if he refused to maintain her properly he would not be entitled to the gifted property. The plaintiff alleged that the defendant later tortured and ousted her from the house and failed to perform the agreed maintenance, resulting in her bringing a suit for revocation of the gift and for khas possession of the property.

The Munsiff framed several issues, tried the suit (plaintiff examined six witnesses; defendant examined none), and decided the issues (except Issue No. 3 which was not pressed) in the plaintiff's favour, decreeing the suit without costs. The defendant appealed to the Subordinate Judge, who reversed the Munsiff's judgment and decree and allowed the appeal with costs, relying principally on a Madras High Court decision. The present second appeal was preferred by the plaintiff against the Subordinate Judge's judgment.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the deed of gift (Ext. 1) is revocable in the circumstances alleged by the plaintiff — specifically, whether the contemporaneous agreement (Ext. 2) giving rise to an obligation on the donee to maintain the donor constitutes a condition enabling revocation of the gift when the donee refuses to maintain the donor.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments (as presented in the opinion)

  • Counsel for the appellant (Mr. Bhattacharjee) submitted that Ext. 1 (the deed of gift) and Ext. 2 (the contemporaneous agreement) read together demonstrate that a condition was attached to the gift: the donee must maintain the donor, and failure to do so would revoke the gift.
  • The appellant argued that the Subordinate Judge's reliance on the Madras decision (M. Ankanamma v. Narasayya, AIR 1947 Mad 127) was misplaced because that decision did not consider the existence of a contemporaneous document executed the same day as the gift which might create a condition of revocation.

Respondent's Arguments (as presented in the opinion)

  • Counsel for the respondent (Mr. Barooah) contended that Ext. 2 — being an unregistered document — could not be admitted in evidence or relied upon to impinge upon the deed of gift, invoking Section 17 of the Indian Registration Act.
  • The defendant maintained that the gift was executed voluntarily; he asserted that he had been treated as an adopted son by the donor and that he had maintained her, implying the suit was without justification.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
M. Ankanamma v. Narasayya, AIR 1947 Mad 127 Held that in the absence of any express reservation of a power of revocation in the gift deed itself, the donor does not retain the right to revoke a gift; reference to maintenance in that deed was treated as a fond wish rather than a condition. The Subordinate Judge relied on this decision to support reversal. The High Court in this opinion distinguished that case as not considering a contemporaneous instrument executed the same day as the gift which might create a binding condition of revocation; therefore the Madras decision was held not to assist the present controversy.
Jagat Singh v. Dungar Singh, AIR 1951 All 599 Support for the proposition that a condition superadded to a transfer may cause the interest created to cease on occurrence of the specified event (as contemplated by relevant provisions of the Transfer of Property Act). The High Court regarded this Allahabad High Court decision as supporting the view that Exts. 1 and 2 read together could constitute a conditional transfer such that, on the donee's refusal to maintain the donor, the gift could be revoked.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court identified the sole point for consideration as whether Ext. 1 (the deed of gift) was revocable. The court undertook a textual and factual analysis focused on the contemporaneous documents (Exts. 1 and 2) and relevant statutory provisions.

  1. Nature of the transaction: The court treated Exts. 1 and 2 as parts of one indivisible transaction. Ext. 1 conveyed the donor's entire property to the donee (a universal donee), and Ext. 2 contained the donee's acceptance on the condition that he would maintain the donor during her lifetime. The court found that the condition was integral to the transaction and could not be divorced from the gift.
  2. Statutory framework: The court referred to provisions of the Transfer of Property Act (explicitly discussing Section 126 and later referencing Section 128 and Section 31 as they appear in the opinion). It quoted Section 126 (as printed in the opinion), which permits agreement that a gift shall be suspended or revoked on the happening of a specified event not depending on the donor's will, and recognizes that a gift may be revoked in specified cases. The court also invoked Section 31 to show that an interest may be created with a condition superadded that the interest shall cease on the happening of a specified uncertain event.
  3. Application to facts: The court concluded that the condition in Ext. 2 (the donee's obligation to maintain the donor) was a specified event that did not depend on the donor's will but on the donee's conduct. Evidence on the plaintiff's side (uncontradicted on oath) established that the donee failed to maintain and mistreated the donor; the Munsiff had so found and the Subordinate Judge had not disturbed that finding. Therefore the specified event (refusal to maintain) had occurred, bringing the case within the statutory provision(s) permitting revocation.
  4. On registration: The court addressed the respondent's contention under Section 17 of the Indian Registration Act that Ext. 2 (being unregistered) was inadmissible. The court held that Ext. 2 did not create any interest in immovable property of the value of Rs. 100 or upwards nor did it extinguish rights in immovable property; rather, it was a collateral contract for maintenance permissible under Sections 31 and 126 of the Transfer of Property Act. Accordingly, Ext. 2 was not required to be registered under Section 17 and was rightly admitted and considered by the Munsiff.
  5. Precedents: The court distinguished the Madras decision relied upon by the Subordinate Judge because that case did not involve consideration of a contemporaneous, separate acceptance containing a maintenance condition. The court found support for its view in the Allahabad case of Jagat Singh v. Dungar Singh.
  6. Conclusion of analysis: Given that Exts. 1 and 2 formed one transaction incorporating a condition which had been breached by the donee, the court concluded that the gift was revocable and that the Munsiff's decree in favour of the plaintiff was justified.

Holding and Implications

The appeal is allowed. The judgment and decree of the Subordinate Judge (which had reversed the Munsiff) is set aside and the decree of the learned Munsiff is restored. The plaintiff's suit for revocation of the gift deed (and for other reliefs as decreed by the Munsiff) is upheld. The appeal is allowed with costs throughout.

Direct effect: The plaintiff's decree for revocation of the gift was reinstated and the Subordinate Judge's reversal was quashed. The opinion does not purport to lay down a novel general rule beyond applying existing statutory provisions and cited authorities to the facts; it decides the rights between the parties on the facts and documents before the court.

Show all summary ...

This second appeal is pre ferred by the plaintiff Mustt. Purnia Kurmi against the judgment and decree o the Sub ordinate Judge, Upper Assam Districts at Jorhat. who, on appeal, reversed the judgment and decree of the Munsiff, Sibsagar decreeing 'he plaintiff's suit.

(2) Briefly the prosecution case is that the plaintiff appellant is an old widow having no issue and there is none to help her. She pleaded that taking advantage of this, the defendant respondent Manindra Nath Mahanti, who help ed her in her affairs, gained her love and affec tion and succeeded in inducing her to execute a deed of gift Ext. 1 on 17th November. 1961 in his favour conveying all her property in his favour. There was. however, another document Ext. 2 executed by the defendant on the same day, whereby he agreed that he would maintain the plaintiff till her death and that in case he refused to maintain her properly, then he would not be entitled to have the gifted property. The plaintiff's case is that the defendant sometime after execution of the deed of gift used to torture and ill-treat her and she was even ousted from the house in contravention of the terms of the agreement Ext 2. She, therefore, had to refer the matter to the village Panchayat, but the defendant did not agree to abide by the decision of the panchayat. Hence she filed the present suit for revocation of the deed of gift, which she executed in favour of the defen dant respondent, and for khas possession of the entire property by evicting the defendant. The defendant denied the plaintiff's claim and con tended that the plaintiff executed the deed of gift out of her own free will and took the defen dant as her adopted son and as such the deed of gift is not liable to be revoked. The defen dant also averred that he used to maintain the plaintiff in terms of the agreement and, there fore, this suit has been brought against him falsely without any justification.

(3) The following issues were framed by the learned Munsiff. who originally tried the suit:-

(3) Is there any cause of action for the suit?

(2) Is the suit maintainable in the present form?

(3) Is the suit bad for multifariousness?

(4) Whether the plaintiff is entitled to a decree as prayed for?

(5) To what relief it any, (lie plaintiff is entitled?

The plaintiff examined six witnesses but the defendant did not examine any one. Issue No. 3 was not pressed before the learned Munsiff, who decided all the other remaining issues in plaintiff's favour and decreed the suit without costs. The defendant appealed to the learned Subordinate Judge, who reversed the Munsiff's judgment and decree and allowed the appeal with costs.

(',) The only point, which arises for con sideration in this appeal, is whether the deed of Kill Ext. 1 is revocable. Mr. Bhattacharjee, the learned counsel for the appellant submits that the deed of gift Ext. I and the agreement Ext. 2 taken together clearly establish his contention that there was a condition attached to the gift, namely that if in future the defendant donee refused to maintain the plaintiff, the gift will stand revoked. The learned Subordinate fudge did not deal with this point satisfactorily. He relied on a single Bench decision of the Madras High Court in the case of M. Ankarnma v. 1 Narasayya, AIR 1947 Mad 127, to hold that as there was no express reservation of a power of revocation in the gift deed itself, the donor did not continue to have the right to revoke the gift. The following passage in the head-note was relied on:-

"In the absence of any express reservation of a power of revocation in the gift deed a donor does not continue to have the right to revoke a gift. For if a man will improvidently bind himself up by a voluntary deed, and not reserve a liberty to himself by a power of revocation, a Court will not loose the fetters he has put upon himself'"

In this Madras case the deed contained the following recitals:-

"I have a belief that you would maintain me well during my lifetime. And as I bear affection towards you, I have got the idea of conveying my property to you. Therefore, I have conveyed to you under dhakal the property worth Rs. 800

The learned Judge in that case, therefore, agreed with the learned Subordinate Judge that the obligation to maintain was not cast upon the donee as a necessary or an essential condition of the grant. The gift was entirely out of love and affection and the reference to maintenance was only as a matter of fond wish The learned Judge held that there was, there fore, no express reservation of any power of revocation in the deed in question, and in this view of the matter refused to revoke the gift The Court was not called upon in that case to consider the case of the existence of a condition of revocation in a contemporaneous document executed on the same day of the gift and to hold whether the revocation can be said to be established in law in such a situation. This decision, therefore, is of no assistance to the present controversy raised in this appeal.

(5) The most important point for considera tion is that the plaintiff executed the deed of gift in favour of the defendant in respect of her entire property and the defendant became a universal donee. On the same day of the gift, by Ext. 2 the donee accepted the gift on condition that he will maintain the plaintiff, an old widow with none else to look after her, till her death. Exts. 1 and 2 taken together will clearly show that a condition was superadded to the gift and the condition was an integral part of the transaction and could not be divorced from the gift. In this context reference may be made to the relevant provision of Section 126 of the Transfer of Property Act, which may be set out:-

"126. The donor and donee may agree that on the happening of any specified event which does not depend on the will of the donor a gift shall be suspended or revoked; but a gift which the parties agree shall be revocable wholly or in part, at the mere will of the donor, is void wholly or in part, as the case may be.

A gift may also be revoked in any of the cases (save want or failure of consideration) in which, if it were a contract, it might be rescind ed.

Save as aforesaid, a gift cannot be revok ed. "'* *"

Here from Exts. I and 2 it will be evident that the gift is in favour of one on whom the donor has depended for her maintenance and she has even treated him as her own son. An obligation was cast on the donee to maintain such a helpless widow, who had no one to look after her and who has divested herself of all her property in favour of the donee, who was a complete outsider to the family. The condi tion under which the donee has accepted the gift is one over which the donor has no control and it does not depend on the will of the donor. It is the donee, who has to play his honorable part. It is clearly established on the one-sided evidence of the plaintiff's side in the absence of any statement on oath to the contrary, as found by the learned Munsiff and not reversed by the learned Subordinate Judge, that the defendant failed to maintain the plaintiff and that he tortured her, for which she had to leave the house to take shelter with P, W 6. Even in the written statement the defendant has not stated that he is still ready to take, care and maintain the plaintiff. It is, therefore, clear that the case is brought within the provisions of Section 128 of the Transfer of Property Act as noticed above and the specified event, namely the re fusal to maintain the plaintiff has taken place, for which the defendant alone is responsible and it did not depend on the will of the plain tiff and so the gift is liable to be revoked.

(6) A reference may be made also to Sec tion 31 of the Transfer of Property Act, which may be quoted:-

"31. Subject to the provisions of Sec. 12i on a transfer of property an interest therein may be created with the condition superadded that it shall cease to exist in case a specified uncertain event shall happen, or in case e specified uncertain event shaft not happen"
. It is clear that Exts. 1 and 2 read together, forming part of one indivisible transaction, go to show that a condition that the transfer by gift in this case had a condition superadded and the interest created by this transfer will cease to exist in case a specified uncertain event, namely refusal by the donee to maintain the donor took place. The view I have taken in this case finds support from a decision of the Allahabad High Court in the case of Jagat Singh v. Dungar Singh, AIR 1951 All 599. When, therefore, on the evidence it is clearly and unquestionably established that the donee refused to maintain the plaintiff, the plaintiff was entitled to file this suit for revocation of the gift and the learned Munsiff was perfectly justified in decreeing the suit for revocation of the gift deed and for other reliefs as claimed.

(7) Mr. Barooah, the learned counsel for the respondent submits that the condition, which was incorporated in Ext. 2, could not be taken into account at any rate, when it was found in an unregistered document. This could not be admissible in evidence, in view of the provisions of Section 17 of the Indian Registra tion Act. As noted earlier, it is true that the agreement Ext. 2 is an unregistered document. But such an agreement does not come within the terms of Section 17 of the Indian Registra tion Act. By the agreement the donee has only contracted to maintain the plaintiff during her lifetime and this condition, which is incorporat ed in the agreement, does not create any interest in any immoveable property of the value of rupees one hundred and upwards, nor does it extinguish any rights therein. It is a condition, which is permissible under Ss. 31 and 126 of the Transfer of Property Act, and the document Ext. 2, which contains such a condition, is not required to be registered under Section 17 of the Indian Registration Act, and as such the document was rightly admitted and taken into consideration by the learned Munsiff.

(8) In the result, the judgment and decree of the learned Subordinate Judge is set aside and that of the learned Munsiff restored. The appeal is allowed with costs throughout.

Appeal allowed.