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Goverdhan Singh v. Mulkh Rai

Jammu and Kashmir High Court
Jun 15, 1972
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Factual and Procedural Background

This revision challenges the order of the learned District Judge Jammu dated 25-4-1972, which confirmed on appeal the Sub Judge (C.J.M) Jammu's order granting a temporary injunction in mandatory form. The injunction permitted the plaintiff to reconstruct dismantled walls and doors of the disputed shop. The plaintiffs, tenants of the shop, filed a suit for permanent injunction against the defendants alleging interference with their possession and peaceful enjoyment. An interim injunction was initially granted restraining defendant interference. Subsequently, a portion of the shop was ordered demolished by the Collector Jammu for public purposes, leading to modification of the interim injunction to allow demolition but requiring the shop to be made habitable. The trial court ordered the defendants to reconstruct the walls and doors or alternatively allowed plaintiffs to do so at their cost. The District Judge affirmed this order on appeal. The defendants petitioners challenged the jurisdiction to grant such mandatory injunction.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the trial court was competent to issue an interim mandatory injunction requiring the defendants to reconstruct the walls and re-roof the shop.
  2. Whether a mandatory injunction can be granted in a suit for permanent injunction at the interim stage.
  3. The extent of the landlord's obligation to maintain premises habitable under applicable laws and covenants.

Arguments of the Parties

Defendants' Arguments

  • The trial court lacked jurisdiction to pass an order in mandatory form in a suit for permanent injunction.
  • The defendants conceded the plaintiffs' possession would not be disturbed despite government acquisition, but argued they could not be compelled to reconstruct or repair the shop.
  • The order exceeded the scope of the suit.
  • Relied on AIR 1956 Cal 45 and AIR 1973 Guj 160 to support that landlords cannot be compelled to undertake unremunerative repairs.

Plaintiffs' Arguments

  • The interim mandatory injunction was appropriate to maintain status quo and protect the tenants' possession and business.
  • Landlord has an obligation to provide habitable accommodation for the tenant’s protection.
  • Interim mandatory injunctions can be granted under Order 39 of CPC and relevant statutory provisions (Section 108 of Transfer of Property Act and Section 27 of Jammu and Kashmir Rent Control Act).
  • Relied on several precedents affirming courts' power to grant mandatory injunctions at the interlocutory stage.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
AIR 1926 Sind 201 Power of courts to grant interim mandatory injunction under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 CPC; used sparingly and on individual merits. Supported the court’s competence to grant mandatory injunctions at interim stage to maintain status quo.
AIR 1957 Trav Co. 286 Court’s power to grant mandatory injunction on interlocutory application to maintain habitability and prevent interference. Validated the trial court’s grant of mandatory injunction to maintain premises habitable during pendency of suit.
AIR 1966 Pat 263 Affirmation of interim mandatory injunction directing defendants to do specific acts as required by order. Reinforced the principle that courts can issue mandatory injunctions at interim stage in appropriate cases.
AIR 1956 Cal 428 Mandatory injunctions restore status quo and are equitable reliefs, granted only to preserve equity and justice. Clarified that mandatory injunctions are not to establish new states but to maintain existing conditions at suit initiation.
AIR 1956 Cal 45 Landlord cannot be compelled to undertake unremunerative repair works causing prejudice. Distinguished as not applicable to facts of current case where repair was necessary to maintain habitable status.
AIR 1963 Guj 160 Mandatory injunction refused in a suit for permanent injunction; facts differ from current case. Distinguished on facts; did not preclude interim mandatory injunction in the instant matter.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court examined the pleadings and procedural history, noting that the plaintiffs originally sought permanent injunction to protect possession and peaceful enjoyment. The necessity for mandatory injunction arose due to partial demolition ordered by the Collector for public purposes. The court recognized the power of civil courts to grant interim mandatory injunctions under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 CPC and Section 151 CPC to maintain status quo and advance justice. The court considered precedents affirming such powers, emphasizing that mandatory injunctions are equitable remedies to preserve existing conditions rather than create new rights.

The court distinguished cited authorities relied upon by the defendants, noting that those cases involved refusal to compel landlords to undertake unremunerative repairs, whereas here the repair was necessary to maintain habitability and protect tenants' possession and business. The court also noted the defendants’ concession that possession would not be disturbed, but observed that without walls and roof, possession would be rendered meaningless.

The court further observed that the plaintiffs had amended their plaint to include a suit for mandatory injunction, with defendants consenting to the amendment, and that the plaintiffs had already undertaken repairs at their own cost due to defendants’ refusal. The court held that deciding the substantive obligation of the defendants requires trial and examination of relevant covenants and laws, including Section 108 of the Transfer of Property Act and Section 27 of the Jammu and Kashmir Rent Control Act.

Given these considerations, the court found it appropriate to uphold the interim mandatory injunction pending final adjudication, to prevent hardship and preserve status quo, while allowing the trial court to address any encroachments or excesses by plaintiffs.

Holding and Implications

The revision petition is dismissed.

The court upheld the interim mandatory injunction requiring defendants to reconstruct the dismantled walls and roof to maintain the shop habitable for the tenant plaintiffs. This decision preserves the status quo and protects the tenants’ possession and business until the trial court adjudicates the substantive rights and obligations of the parties. No new precedent was established; rather, the ruling affirms the recognized power of courts to grant mandatory injunctions at the interlocutory stage under appropriate circumstances. The defendants’ challenge to jurisdiction was rejected, and no order as to costs was made.

Show all summary ...

1. This revision is directed against the order of the learned District Judge Jammu dated 25-4-1972 confirming on appeal the order of the Sub Judge (C.J.M) Jammu granting temporary injunction in mandatory form permitting the plaintiff to reconstruct the dismantled walls and doors of the shop in dispute.

2. A suit for permanent injunction brought by Mulkh Rai and others against Goverdhan Singh is pending in the court of Sub-Judge (C.J.M) Jammu. The plaintiffs' case is that they are in possession of the shop held by them as tenants. The defendants are interfering with their possession and in the peaceful enjoyment of the shop. They filed an interim application for grant of temporary injunction restraining the defendants from interfering with the peaceful enjoyment of the property. A temporary injunction was issued subject to objections of the defendants. The defendants filed an application for vacating the said temporary injunction as according to them, the Government sought demolition of a portion of the shop acquired by the Collector Jammu for public purposes. They also objected to the grant of temporary injunction on merits. The Court of Sub-Judge after hearing the arguments in the application observed that it was evident as also from the order of the High Court that a portion of the shop in question was to be demolished under the orders of the Collector Jammu. The plaintiffs are prepared for the demolition of this portion of the shop but their fear is that in the garb of this demolition the defendants might not dispossess them from the shop in question. Considering this apprehension of the defendants as genuine which was reinforced by certain facts raised in the objections filed by the defendants the trial court ordered the demolition of a portion of the shop. The court further ordered that after the demolition the shop shall be made habitable so as to make it safe for carrying on the business for which it has been held by the plaintiff applicants. The court further ordered that in case the defendants did not reconstruct the wall and doors or pay the necessary amount for its construction the plaintiffs could do so at their own cost With these observations the temporary injunction was made absolute. On appeal before the District Judge, the order of the trial court was affirmed. The learned District Judge observed that there was nothing wrong in the order under appeal as to call for any interference. The learned counsel for the appellant could not make any alternate suggestion before him as to what order other than the one passed by the trial court could in the circumstances of the case be passed.

3. Before me it has been contended on behalf of the defendants petitioners that the order of the trial court is without jurisdiction in as much as no such order could be passed in the mandatory form in a suit for permanent injunction. It is however, conceded before me that notwithstanding the fact that a portion of area under the shop has been acquired by the Collector for public purposes the defendants would not disturb the possession of the plaintiffs who are the tenants of the shop. The Plaintiffs have no objection to the retention of Possession by the tenants but they could not be compelled to reconstruct the wall or to re-roof the shop in question: The order was beyond the scone of the suit. Reliance is placed upon AIR 1956 Cal 45 and page 187 and also on AIR 1973 Guj 160. On the other hand it is sought to be established by the learned counsel for the respondents that this was the only appropriate interim order that could be passed by the court below in the circumstances of the case. After all it is the responsibility of the landlord to make the premises held by a tenant habitable. He is under an obligation to provide accommodation convenient to the tenant so that his person and property are protected in the premises. Interim injunction in the mandatory form can be issued by Court in order to maintain status quo: that is what is exactly is sought by the impugned order. Reliance is placed on AIR 1956 Cal 428 : AIR 1957 Trav. Co. 286 : AIR 1966 Pat 263 : AIR 1926 Sind 201 and on the Provisions of Section 108 of the Transfer of Property Act and Section 27 of the Jammu and Kashmir Rent Control Act.

4. The most important question that calls for decision in the case is as to whether the trial court was competent to issue interim mandatory injunction asking the defendants to rebuild the wall and re-roof the house. In order to appreciate the position it is necessary to examine the pleadings of the parties. The plaintiffs' suit originally was for grant of permanent injunction restraining the defendants from interfering with the Possession and peaceful enjoyment of the shop held by the plaintiffs as tenants. The averment made was that the plaintiffs are the tenants of the defendants and that the latter with mala fide intention threatened to demolish the walls and dismantle the roof of the shop so that the plaintiffs may be forced to hand over its possession to the defendants. The defendants were interfering with the peaceful enjoyment of the premises held by the plaintiffs. An interim application was moved alone with the plaint. The trial Court ordered interim injunction directing the defendants not to interfere with the peaceful possession of the Property held by the plaintiffs. Later on in pursuance of the order of High Court that a portion of the land under the shop was to be acquired by the Collector the order was modified. The High Court file reveals that in a suit for partition (pending in this very Bench) an application was moved by the tenants before Hon'ble Jaswant Singh, J. with the twin prayer (i) that they may be impleaded as parties to the suit for Partition and (ii) that implementation of the High Court order dated 29-12-1971 permitting the defendants to demolish the building in Question, be staved. The Hon'ble Judge vide his order dated 29-4-1972 observed that the plaintiffs could not be made parties to the suit, their only interest could be that their tenancy is protected. This they could not achieve by becoming a party in the suit and they were asked to seek some other remedy available to them under law. It was further observed in the said order that the earlier order of this Court was never intended to permit the Parties to extend the demolition to any Portion not required by the Collector so as to make it impossible for the tenants to remain in occupation of the portion other than that required for road widening. Consequent upon this order of the High Court the trial Court of Sub-Judge (C.J.M) on the application of the tenants modified its earlier order of interim injunction. In partial modification of its earlier order the trial Court passed a mandatory interim order asking the defendants landlords to make the shop habitable and reconstruct the wall after it was partially demolished as required by the Collector for the purpose of widening of road. The Court further directed that in case the defendants non-applicants did not reconstruct the wall and doors the plaintiffs could do it at their own costs. It is to be seen if the civil Court is vested with such a Power.

5. That the Court in order to maintain status quo is competent to pass even a mandatory form of order at interim stage is well recognized. This power can be exercised by the Court both under Order 39. R. 2 of the CPC and under Section 151 of the CPC in order to advance the cause of justice.

6. Labu, A.C.J in AIR 1926 Sindh 201 has held that the Court has power to grant an interim mandatory injunction under O. 39. Rr. 1 and 2 but this power is to be used sparingly and each case should be decided on its own merit for this purpose.

7. In AIR 1957 Trav Co. 286 the view adopted is that the Courts have power to grant mandatory injunction on interlocutory applications. That was a case for permanent injunction restraining the defendant tenant from using a room which had been let to him by the plaintiff as kitchen and was causing nuisance to the tenants of the adjoining rooms. The defendant was sought to be restrained from using second room as verandah and courtyard for stacking firewood. Pending suit the plaintiff moved for temporary injunction in aid of the permanent injunction relief which was granted. During the pendency of the suit the door of room No. 1 was removed and also smoke tiles as this caused blockage in the Passage. An application was thereupon moved to the Court to compel the plaintiff to remove the blockage. The plaintiff in his objections submitted that the Court had no jurisdiction to issue a mandatory injunction in the matter as prayed for. The trial Court granted the mandatory injunction. In the revision before the High Court the jurisdiction of the trial Court and the impugned order was challenged but the High Court held that the plaintiff's interference with due passage and smoke tiles in the roof, tended to discredit the temporary injunction order as it made the premises not habitable. The Court below could under its powers grant mandatory order on the interim application.

8. Again in AIR 1966 Pat 263 a Division Bench of the Court affirmed the order of interim mandatory injunction passed in a suit for declaration. The trial Court had earlier passed an order of ad interim injunction but later on the application of the plaintiff issued a mandatory injunction directing the defendants to do a particular thing as required by the order.

9. Again in AIR 1956 Cal 428 relied upon by the petitioner's counsel it has been conceded therein that a mandatory injunction is granted only to restore status quo and not granted to establish a new state of things differing from stage which existed at the date when the suit was instituted. Injunctions are a form of equitable reliefs and they have to be used in aid of equity and justice according to the facts of each particular case.

10. Therefore it cannot be said that a Court has got no power to pass a mandatory injunction on an interim application should the circumstances of the case warrant the adoption of such a course and this becomes necessary to preserve the suit property from being dissipated or destroyed or the order is required to maintain status quo between the parties.

11. AIR 1956 Cal 45 and AIR 1963 Guj 160 relied upon by the petitioners are distinguishable inasmuch as in the first mentioned authority the question was decided with reference to Section 38 of the Houses and Rent Control Act of West Bengal which corresponds to Section 27 of our Act. The principle enunciated is that the landlord could not be compelled to undertake an unremunerative repair works which may ultimately prove useless, and he cannot also be reasonably expected to undertake them to his own prejudice.

12. AIR 1963 Guj 160 (Supra) was a suit for permanent injunction in which mandatory injunction was refused. But the facts of this authority are different from the one which is before us.

13. In the instant case the plaintiffs after they filed suit for permanent injunction prayed that they be permitted to amend the plaint so that they could bring a suit for mandatory injunction. This the plaintiffs stated, was necessitated because of changed circumstances. The Court invited objections from the defendants. They agreed to the amendment. The Court therefore recorded an order on 17-2-1972 that as the defendants had no objection in granting permission by the Court for filing amended plaint so permission was granted. On 23-2-1972 amended suit for mandatory injunction was Presented. During this interval the portion of the shop was dismantled because of widening of the road. This necessitated the re-erection of wall and repairing of the roof in order to make the shop habitable, as the defendants were ordered to undertake the repair work but as they refused to rebuild the wall and repair the roof and challenged the order of the trial Court the plaintiffs did it at their own costs.

14. The defendants' contention is that there is no obligation cast on them to rebuild the shop and in this context the order of the trial Court is invalid. In my opinion this important question cannot be decided off hand without reference to the material which has yet to come on record. This is also to be decided with reference to the covenants made in the rent note and in the absence of any such covenant with reference to the ordinary law applicable to the case. In this case reference may be made to Section 108 of the Transfer of Property Act which lays down law regarding the rights and obligations of the lessor and the lessee, and also Section 27 of the Jammu and Kashmir Houses and Shops Rent Control Act of 1966.

15. Now that a suit for mandatory injunction is awaiting trial in the Court below and the plaintiffs have executed the necessary repairs in the shop and have made it habitable, therefore it would not be conducive to the advancement of justice to order the vacation of the impugned order as it is likely to cause great hardship to the tenants in occupation of the premises.

16. If the walls are ordered to be demolished and roof is dismantled it would expose all the goods of the tenants in the shop to peril and Put their business in jeopardy and disturb status quo. Moreover it is to be borne in mind that the defendants are not against the holding of shops by the tenants in their possession. It has been unequivocally stated on their behalf at tile Bar that their possession would not be disturbed and that they could retain the possession of the shoos as before. But how can the plaintiff tenants retain Possession of the shops if they have got no roof and no walls and are rendered uninhabitable? In view of this and in view of the fact that the two courts below have exercised their discretion in favour of granting the mandatory injunction, it would be quite appropriate to let the order remain in fact till the mutual rights and obligations of the parties are finally decided by the trial Court. The court below will also see whether the plaintiffs have not under the cover of the court order made any encroachment on the landlords' rights and if this has been done it will afford necessary relief to the landlords.

17. With these observations the revision petition is therefore, dismissed. I however make no order as to costs.

18. Revision dismissed.