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M/S. South India Ins... v. Motor Accidents Clai...
Structured Summary of the Opinion
Factual and Procedural Background
Respondents Nos. 2 to 8 filed a claim petition on 16-12-1970 before the District Judge, Jammu, acting with the powers of a Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal under the Motor Vehicles Act, seeking compensation for the death of Lt. Amir Chand in a collision with Truck No. J. & K. 9617. The trial began and issues were framed. On 10-7-1971, when the case was called for arguments on issue No. 1, none of the parties appeared and the claim petition was dismissed for default of prosecution.
On 12-7-1971 respondents Nos. 2 to 8 applied for restoration of the claim, alleging that their counsel was busy in the High Court and that the first respondent could not obtain conveyance in time. The petitioner and respondent No. 9 opposed the restoration, arguing (inter alia) that the dismissal amounted to an award which was appealable and that there was no sufficient cause for default. Additional objections included that the Claims Tribunal was a persona designata and the Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) did not apply.
By S.R.O. 383 dated 24-8-1971 a one-man State Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal for Jammu and Kashmir was constituted and the High Court ordered transfer of pending cases from the District Judges acting as Claims Tribunals to the new Tribunal. The restoration proceedings were transferred to respondent No. 1, who on 3-6-1972 allowed the application and restored the claim petition. The petitioner challenged that order by filing the present petition seeking quashing of the restoration order.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the Tribunal constituted by S.R.O. 383 dated 24-8-1971 had jurisdiction to hear claims arising out of accidents that occurred before its constitution.
- Whether the Code of Civil Procedure applies to proceedings before the Claims Tribunal, and specifically whether the Tribunal could dismiss a claim petition for default of appearance and thereafter restore it.
- Whether a dismissal in default by the Claims Tribunal amounts to an award (thus making appeal the appropriate remedy) and consequently whether an application for restoration of such a petition is maintainable.
Arguments of the Parties
Petitioner's Arguments (as presented by Mr. Bhagat Ram, Chowdhary)
- The Tribunal created by S.R.O. 383 (24-8-1971) had no jurisdiction to try claims arising from accidents that occurred before its constitution; such claims could only be heard by Civil Courts.
- The Code of Civil Procedure does not apply to proceedings before the Tribunal; therefore, the Tribunal lacked power to dismiss a claim petition for default and consequently lacked power to restore it.
- A dismissal in default by the Tribunal amounts to an award against which an appeal lies; therefore an application for restoration is not maintainable.
Respondents' / Other Parties' Objections and Contentions (as recorded)
- The order of dismissal amounted to an award and hence an appeal lay — therefore the application for restoration was not maintainable (this was one of the grounds urged against the restoration application by the petitioner and respondent No. 9).
- The respondents (seeking restoration) alleged that the absence was not deliberate: their counsel was engaged in the High Court and conveyance was not available in time, and thus the claim petition ought to be restored.
- Additional objections filed asserted that the Claims Tribunal was a persona designata and that CPC provisions did not apply to claims proceedings (these were raised in opposition to the restoration application).
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| AIR 1970 Pat 172 | Authority for the proposition that Claims Tribunals cannot try claims arising out of accidents that occurred before their constitution (i.e., Civil Courts have jurisdiction). | The court acknowledged that this authority supports that general proposition but held it was not applicable to the present case because the claim had been filed before the earlier Claims Tribunal (the District Judge acting as Tribunal) and the newly constituted Tribunal was its successor. |
| AIR 1970 All 408 | Similar proposition as AIR 1970 Pat 172: jurisdiction of Civil Courts for accidents prior to Tribunal constitution. | The court treated this authority as consonant with the cited principle but found the point inapplicable to the facts of the present case for the same reasons stated in relation to AIR 1970 Pat 172. |
| AIR 1973 J. & K. 36 (Smt. Sheel Kaur v. Union of India) | Prior decision of the same judge holding that a Claims Tribunal has no jurisdiction to hear claims arising from accidents which took place before the Tribunal's constitution. | The court noted its earlier holding but again explained that this principle did not arise in the present case because the claim was originally filed before the earlier Tribunal and then transferred to the successor Tribunal. |
| AIR 1972 Gauhati 35 | Relied upon regarding whether a Claims Tribunal may dismiss a claim application for default of appearance where rules under the Act make CPC provisions applicable. | The court observed that this authority, under rules framed in that State making CPC provisions applicable, quashed a dismissal because issues had been framed. The court read this authority as supporting the respondent's position (i.e., that applicability or non‑applicability of CPC provisions depends on rules and context) and distinguished it from the facts before it. |
| AIR 1964 Punj 235 | Support for the proposition that a Claims Tribunal may follow principles embodied in provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure (here: substitution under Order 1, Rule 10) by analogy. | The court cited this as authority that Tribunals may act in accordance with CPC principles by analogy and held it supports the view that the Tribunal acted properly when applying analogous CPC principles. |
| Mathra Das v. Om Parkash, (1957) 59 Pun LR 45 | Holds that unless prohibited by rules under the Act, the Tribunal is free to follow any procedure it considers expedient in the interests of justice. | The court relied on this precedent to support its conclusion that in absence of state rules the Tribunal may formulate its own procedure and adopt CPC principles analogously in the interests of justice. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court addressed the three principal contentions in turn and explained its reasoning as follows:
- Jurisdictional Objection: The court found the first objection to be based on a misconception. The claim had been filed on 16-12-1970 before the District Judge acting as Claims Tribunal. After constitution of the State Tribunal by S.R.O. 383 the proceedings were transferred to the newly constituted Tribunal, which the court characterised as the successor of the previous Tribunal. Therefore the general rule — that a Claims Tribunal cannot try claims which arise out of accidents occurring before its constitution — did not apply to these facts because the claim had been pending before the predecessor Tribunal when the transfer occurred.
- Applicability of CPC and Power to Dismiss/Restore: The court acknowledged that Claims Tribunals are persona designata and ordinarily must follow the procedure provided by the Motor Vehicles Act and any rules made under it. The Act contains Sections 110-A to 110-F governing claims; Section 110-C(1) permits the Tribunal to follow such summary procedure as it thinks fit, subject to any rules. Section 110-C(2) grants specified civil‑court powers (evidence, attendance of witnesses, discovery, and certain criminal procedural provisions).
- In the absence of state rules under Section 111-A (no rules had been framed in the present case), the Tribunal had to formulate its own procedure under Section 110-C(1). While the CPC does not automatically apply, the Tribunal may be guided by analogous CPC provisions because those provisions embody long experience and established principles. The court noted that in several States rules expressly make certain CPC provisions applicable to claims proceedings (for example, Assam's Rule 20 makes Order IX applicable).
- The court concluded that where no rules exist the Tribunal's acts in dismissing for default and subsequently restoring the petition represent its own procedure. By analogy to CPC Order 9 Rule 9 the Tribunal could set aside a dismissal for sufficient cause. However, the Tribunal's procedural freedom is not absolute — it remains a judicial discretion guided by reasons and justice; it must weigh rival considerations using trained judicial technique.
- Appeal versus Restoration: The court addressed the argument that a dismissal in default is tantamount to an award and hence only appeal lies. It held that because the Tribunal may apply the principles of the CPC by analogy, the remedy of restoration (available under CPC for setting aside a dismissal in default) could likewise be entertained by the Tribunal on analogous grounds. Consequently, an application for restoration was maintainable.
- Overall Conclusion of Analysis: Taking these points together, the court found no merit in any of the three contentions advanced by the petitioner: the jurisdiction objection was misplaced on the facts; in the absence of rules the Tribunal could formulate procedure and apply CPC principles by analogy, including dismissals for default and restoration; and dismissal in default did not preclude restoration by application to the Tribunal.
Holding and Implications
Holding: The petition challenging respondent No. 1's order of 3-6-1972 restoring the claim petition is DISMISSED.
Implications:
- The direct consequence is that the Tribunal's order restoring the claim petition stands and the petitioner's challenge fails.
- The court ordered dismissal of the petition without any order as to costs (i.e., no costs awarded).
- The opinion explains and reaffirms the principle that where no statutory rules have been framed under the Motor Vehicles Act the Claims Tribunal must formulate its own procedure and may, by analogy, adopt principles from the Code of Civil Procedure; it also reiterates that this procedural flexibility remains subject to judicial restraint and reasoned discretion. The decision does not purport to create a broad new precedent beyond applying established authorities to the facts before the court.
End of summary based exclusively on the provided opinion text.
1. This is a petition for the Issuance of a writ of certiorari for quashing the order of respondent No. 1 dated 3-6-1972 whereby the said respondent restored a claim petition filed by respondents Nos. 2 to 8 which had been dismissed by respondent No. 1 for default of prosecution.
2. The facts out of which this petition arises are that respondents Nos. 2 to 8 filed a claim petition on 16-12-1970 before the District Judge, Jammu, Who was invested with the powers of Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal under the Motor Vehicles Act (hereinafter called ‘the Act’). The claim was made with regard to death of one, Lt. Amir Chand who was the father of respondents 2, 4 to 8 and husband of respondent No. 3 and had died in an accident when the Vehicle in which he was travelling collided with Truck No. J. & K. 9617. The trial of the claim had started and the issues were framed. The case was fixed for 10-7-1971 for arguments on issue No. 1. On that day the case was called and none of the parties being present the same was dismissed for default of prosecution.
3. Respondent Nos. 2 to 8 filed an application for restoration of the said claim before respondent No. 1 on 12-7-1971 wherein it was alleged that the counsel for the petitioners being busy in the High Court when the case was called, could not appear and the petitioner No. 1 could not get the conveyance in time. The absence being not deliberate it was prayed that the claim petition may be restored. The petitioner and respondent No. 9 contested the said application firstly on the ground that the order of dismissal amounts to an award against which an appeal lay and the application for restoration was not maintainable. Secondly there being no sufficient cause for the default of the respondents Nos. 2 to 8 to prosecute the application the same was liable to be dismissed. They later filed two additional objections, firstly that the Claims Tribunal was a persona designata and the claims proceedings being not a suit the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure do not apply. Secondly that dismissal for default amounts to an award and appeal should have been filed and the petition for restoration was not maintainable. In fact this objection was already in the previous objections, in the meanwhile by S.R.O 383 dated 24-8-1971 one man State Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Jammu and Kashmir was constituted and Shri Hari Singh Hirdesh was appointed its member. The High Court ordered that all the cases pending before the District Judges Jammu and Srinagar as Claims Tribunal, should be transferred to the newly constituted State Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal (hereinafter referred to as ‘Tribunal’). This order was conveyed by the Registrar High Court vide his letter No. 10037.GS dated 26-10-1971 to the Claims Tribunal Jammu. Consequently by the order of the District Judge Jammu, as Claims Tribunal dated 11-5-1972 the proceedings for restoration were transferred to respondent No. 1. The respondent No. 1 after hearing the parties accepted the application for restoration on 3-6-1972 and restored the claim petition. Aggrieved by this order the petitioner has filed the present petition for which he seeks the quashing of the abovesaid order.
4. Mr. Bhagat Ram, Chowdhary appearing for the petitioner raised the following three points:—
(1) That the present Tribunal was constituted by S.R.O 383 dated 24-8-1971 so Tribunal has no jurisdiction to hear the claims regarding the accidents which had occurred before its constitution. Those claims could only be heard by the Civil Court.
(2) That the Code of Civil Procedure did not apply to the proceedings before the said Tribunal and the Tribunal could not dismiss the claim petition in default. Because the Tribunal has no power to dismiss the claim petition in default so it had no power to restore the same.
(3) The dismissal in default amounts to an award against which an appeal was provided and the application for restoration of the claim petition was not maintainable.
5. The learned counsel for the parties were heard at length and the first objection of the learned counsel for the petitioner is based on misconception. The claim petition was filed on 16-12-1970 before the District Judge Claims Tribunal Judge Jammu as it then was. After the constitution of the State Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal for Jammu and Srinagar i.e the Tribunal, the Proceedings were transferred to it. The newly constituted Tribunal was the successor of the previous Tribunal. So it cannot be said that the proceedings regarding the claim which were transferred to the file of respondent No. 1 should be deemed to be filed before it or the cause of action had arisen before the constitution of the Tribunal although it is well settled that a Claims Tribunal cannot try a claim pertaining to the accident which had occurred before its constitution but the said proposition is not applicable in the present case. The learned counsel for the petitioner placed his reliance on AIR 1970 Pat 172 and AIR 1970 All 408, and derived support for the abovesaid proposition of law. As stated earlier the enunciation of law in these two authorities is in consonance with all other authorities which held that the Civil Courts alone have the jurisdiction in respect of such claims which arise out of accidents having taken place before the constitution of the Tribunal. This point came up for decision before me also in Civil Transfer Appln. No. 43 of 1972 entitled Smt. Sheel Kaur v. Union of India decided on 26-5-1972 = (reported in AIR 1973 J. & K. 36) in which I have also held that the Claims Tribunal has no jurisdiction to hear such claims. But as indicated earlier this point does not arise in the present case as the claim was filed before the Claims Tribunal, as it then was and the accident having taken place after the constitution of the previous Tribunal which is succeeded by respondent No. 1.
6. The second point requires a detailed consideration. There is no denying the fact that the Claims Tribunal is a persona designate and has to hold the enquiries according to the procedure laid down in the statute under which it is created. The Code of Civil Procedure as such is not applicable unless the same is applied by means of the statute under which a tribunal is created or rules made under that statute. The Claims Tribunals are constituted under Sec. 110 of the Act. The procedure regarding the claims is given in Sections 110-A to 110-F of the Act. Section 110-A deals with applications for compensation. Section 110-B provides for making an award after holding an enquiry regarding the claim. For the purposes of this petition Section 110-C of the Act is important which runs thus:—
“110-C. Procedure and power of Claims Tribunals:—
(1) In holding any inquiry under Section 110-B. the Claims Tribunal may, subject to any rules that may be made in this behalf, follow such summary procedure as it thinks fit.
(2) The Claims Tribunal shall have all the powers of a Civil Court for the purpose of taking evidence on oath and of enforcing the attendance of witnesses and of compelling the discovery and production of documents and material objects and for such other purposes as may be prescribed; and the Claims Tribunal shall be deemed to be a Civil Court for all the purposes of Section 195 and Chapter XXXV of the Cr PC, 1898 (V of 1898).
(3) Subject to any rules that may be made in this behalf the Claims Tribunal may, for the purpose of adjudicating upon any claim for compensation, choose one or more persons possessing special knowledge of any matter relevant to the inquiry to assist it in holding the inquiry.”
7. According to sub-section (1) of this section the enquiry of the claim has to be held according to the procedure laid down by the Tribunal itself subject of course to any rules that may have been made under the Act in that behalf. Sub-section (2) of this section empowers the Tribunal with certain powers of a Civil Court which are given therein. This is a common ground between the parties that no rules have been framed by the State regarding such enquiries. According to Section 111-A the State Government has the power to make rules for the purpose of carrying into effect the provisions of Sections 110-A to 110-E of the Act but no rules having been framed under the abovesaid section the Tribunal has to act under sub-section (1) of Section 110-C of the Act. It has to formulate its own procedure. While formulating its own procedure the tribunal will ordinarily be guided by analogous provisions in the Code of Civil Procedure. Although the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure do not apply to the enquiries before the Accidents Claims Tribunal but the principles underlying the same can be pressed into service by the Claims Tribunal. There is no denying the fact that the rules or procedure laid down in the Code of Civil Procedure are based on long experience and proved utility. In fact in many States e.g Assam. Bihar, Bengal and Delhi, rules have been framed in which some of the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure have been made applicable to the claims petitions. For instance. Rule 20 framed by the Assam State specifically makes Order 9 applicable to such proceedings. The rule is quoted as under:—
“Rule 20 reads as follows:—
“20. Code of Civil Procedure to apply in certain cases:— The following provisions of the first Schedule to the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, shall so far as may be, apply to proceedings before the Claims Tribunal namely, O.V Rr. 9 to 13 and 15 to 30; Order IX, Order XIII. Rules 3 to 10; Order XVI. Rules 2 to 21; Order XVII; and Order XXIII, Rules 1 to 3.”
8. Rules 20, 238 and 8.22 framed by the States of Bihar. Bengal and Delhi respectively are similar. The learned counsel for the petitioner has relied on AIR 1972 Gauhati 35. According to him, the Claims Tribunal had no jurisdiction to dismiss a claim application for default of appearance. His further contention was that the order of the Tribunal being illegal there was no power to set aside the order. In my opinion this authority does not support the learned counsel rather it supports the case of the respondent. It was held therein, relying on the rules framed under the Act that the claim petition when issues had been framed could not be dismissed for default. As such the order of the Tribunal was quashed in revision.
9. In the instant case, there being no rules the procedure had to be formulated by the Tribunal itself and there was no specific bar in the Act to dismiss a petition in default or to restore it. Whatever action was taken by the Tribunal either in dismissing the petition or in restoring the same will be deemed to be the procedure formulated by the Tribunal. According to the procedure laid down by the Tribunal itself the petition could be dismissed in default and on the analogy of the provisions of Order 9. Rule 9 of the CPC the said order could be set aside for sufficient reasons to be shown. There is no prescribed procedure rigidly controlling the proceedings of the tribunal. So while formulating its own procedure the tribunal has to keep in mind that it has not got wholly unfettered, absolute and arbitrary powers to do what it likes or wills. The matter truly and essentially pertains to the domain of judicial discretion governed by the rules of reasons and justice. The Tribunal in the absence of positive authority like the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure has to accept the reasons by analogy as nearly as possible to such provisions and has to come to a decision by weighing rival considerations according to the trained judicial technique. This is also the view expressed in AIR 1964 Punj 235. In this case the tribunal had allowed substitution of a party in accordance with the principles embodied in Order 1, Rule 10 of the CPC and the court held that the tribunal had acted quite properly. The same Court in Mathra Das v. Om Parkash, (1957) 59 Pun LR 45, held that unless there was any prohibition in the rules framed under the Act the Tribunal is free to follow any procedure which it considers expedient in the interests of justice.
10. From the above discussion if is clear that the Tribunal respondent No. 1 had to formulate its own procedure. Therefore the order of dismissal passed by the tribunal and also the order of restoring the claim petition are not without jurisdiction.
11. The third contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner was that the dismissal in default amounted to an award and appeal lay for which reason the application for restoration was not maintainable. As stated earlier the principles of the Code of Civil Procedure could be applied by the tribunal and appear to have been applied. As the remedy of restoration of a petition dismissed in default was available under the Code of Civil Procedure so the Tribunal on the analogy of those provisions could entertain an application for restoration.
12. For the foregoing reasons, I do not find any force in all the three contentions raised by the petitioner and the petition must fail.
13. The petition is, therefore, dismissed but under the circumstances of this case without any order as to costs.
14. Petition dismissed.
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