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S. Manjit Singh v. J.P. Jarrawalla
Factual and Procedural Background
An objection was raised by the defendants that a document described as an "agreement" was in substance a lease deed or an agreement for lease and therefore chargeable under the Stamp Act. The document (dated 22nd November, 1956) contains terms including commencement of lease from 1st April 1957 for eleven months, annual rent of Rs. 13,400, an option to extend for two years subject to prior written notice and advance payment, restrictions on subletting, a covenant that a regular rent deed would be executed, an obligation on the landlords to deliver possession and to complete construction before commencement, and a statement that Rs. 13,400 had been advanced as one year's rent (separate receipt). The point as to whether the instrument creates a present demise (lease) or is merely an executory agreement was argued at length by counsel. The court reviewed the document and the parties' pleadings (including the plaint which described the tenants as having obtained the property "on rent basis in pursuance of an Agreement dated 22nd day of November, 1956"), examined cited precedents, and delivered an order directing payment of stamp duty and penalty with a date to reappear after two weeks.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the document in question is a mere executory agreement or whether it creates an actual and present demise (i.e., is an agreement to lease / lease deed).
- Whether, if the instrument creates a present demise/agreement to lease, it is chargeable with stamp duty under the Stamp Act.
- If chargeable, what is the amount of stamp duty and any penalty payable in respect of the instrument.
Arguments of the Parties
Defendants' Arguments
- The document creates an actual demise (i.e., a present lease) despite stating the lease was to commence from 1st April 1957 and despite a regular rent deed being to be signed later.
- It is immaterial whether possession was to be delivered at execution or at a future date; the entire instrument must be construed and the intention of the parties as revealed by the document shows a present demise.
- All lease terms were settled at execution; reliance placed on precedents (AIR 1930 Bom 210; AIR 1934 Mad 418; AIR 1930 Pat 530) supporting that a formal future deed does not preclude present demise.
Plaintiffs' Arguments
- The plaintiffs' counsel contended the document does not create a present demise but is only an executory agreement, because a regular rent deed was to be executed at a future date and possession was to be delivered on 1st April 1957 after completion of construction.
- The plaintiffs relied on authorities (including AIR 1928 Bom 553; AIR 1969 Raj 22; AIR 1954 SC 496) to argue that only documents creating an actual and present demise are leases or agreements to lease for purposes of stamp duty.
- The plaintiffs emphasised that a mere contingency or future act prevents treating the instrument as creating a present demise; the whole instrument and conduct are relevant to ascertain intention.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| AIR 1930 Bom 210 | Held that it is immaterial whether possession passes; an agreement set out in writing can constitute a present demise even though a formal lease is to be drawn up later (condition seen as a further assurance). | The court relied on this authority to support the proposition that the requirement of a subsequent formal lease or delayed possession does not necessarily prevent the instrument from operating as a present demise. |
| AIR 1934 Mad 418 | A Division Bench interpreted an oral agreement (with rent paid at the time and a formal deed to be executed later) as a lease; formal future execution did not prevent the agreement from operating as a lease. | Cited to show that payment of rent and settled terms at the time of agreement can indicate a present demise despite a formal deed being executed later; the court used it to reinforce the same principle as Bom 1930. |
| AIR 1930 Pat 530 | A deed of agreement was construed and held to be an agreement for lease operating as a present demise based on its operative words. | Used to illustrate that an agreement may operate as a present demise where wording and terms evidence that intent; court considered the operative language in the present instrument analogous in effect. |
| AIR 1928 Bom 553 | In that case, the document did not amount to an agreement to lease because the party had no present interest in the property to be leased and the property was not in existence. | The court distinguished this precedent as not applicable to the present facts, since here there was no assertion that the lessor lacked present interest or that the property did not exist. |
| AIR 1925 Cal 1087 | Expressed the view that even if the term of the lease commences in future and a formal document is to be executed later, the agreement may still operate as a present demise. | Relied upon to support the proposition that commencement at a future date and the requirement of a later formal deed do not preclude an instrument from creating a present demise. |
| AIR 1969 Raj 22 | Stated that to hold an agreement to let (or lease) chargeable under the Stamp Act, it is necessary to establish that such agreement creates an actual demise. | Referenced for the general rule that stamp liability depends on whether the instrument creates an actual and present demise; the court applied this as a threshold legal test to the instrument before it. |
| AIR 1954 SC 496 | Held that an instrument is usually construed as a lease if it contains words of present demise, but even then it can be treated as executory; the test is whether the instrument contains words of actual demise. | The court cited this Supreme Court authority for the legal test: whether the instrument contains words of actual demise, and applied that test to conclude the instrument created a present demise. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court analyzed the entire instrument and the parties' conduct and pleadings to determine whether the document created a present demise or was merely executory. Key points in the court's step-by-step analysis were:
- Examination of the instrument's terms: the document expressly set out lease commencement (1st April 1957), duration (eleven months), rent (Rs. 13,400 per annum), an option to extend, restrictions on subletting, a requirement that a regular rent deed be executed, the landlords' obligation to deliver possession and complete construction before commencement, and a recital that Rs. 13,400 had been advanced as one year's rent (separate receipt).
- Consideration of parties' pleadings: the court noted that the plaint described the tenants as having obtained the property "on rent basis in pursuance of an Agreement dated 22nd day of November, 1956," which the court treated as an admission that the parties themselves treated the document as an agreement to lease.
- Assessment of the significance of payment: the court regarded the payment of an advance rent (the instrument refers to rupees advanced; the court recorded that "Rupees 13000.00 were paid as advance rent" in its factual summary) as significant evidence of an operative transaction consistent with a present demise.
- Application of precedent authorities: the court applied authorities (including AIR 1930 Bom 210; AIR 1934 Mad 418; AIR 1930 Pat 530; AIR 1925 Cal 1087; AIR 1954 SC 496; AIR 1969 Raj 22) to the effect that the presence of words of present demise, settled terms, and payment can render an instrument a present demise despite a future formal deed; it distinguished AIR 1928 Bom 553 as inapplicable because that case involved a lessor lacking present interest or the property not existing.
- Legal test applied: the court followed the test from higher authority that an instrument should be construed as creating a lease if it contains words of actual demise and the objective terms and conduct show an intention to create a present demise. Applying this test to the document, the court concluded the instrument created a present demise.
Holding and Implications
Holding: The court held that the instrument is not a mere agreement but an agreement to lease (i.e., it operates as a present demise) and is therefore chargeable under the Stamp Act.
Direct consequences ordered by the court:
- Under Article 35, Schedule I sub-clause (i) of the Stamp Act, the stamp duty payable for this instrument is Rs. 101.00.
- Because the document is over one year, the plaintiffs must pay Rs. 101.00 as actual stamp duty and Rs. 1,010.00 as penalty, totalling Rs. 1,111.00.
- The plaintiffs have already paid Rs. 1.50 in stamp duty on the agreement; the balance due is Rs. 1,109.50, which the plaintiffs must pay in the form of stamps within two weeks from the date of the order.
- The case was directed to come up after two weeks (i.e., to be listed again following the payment period).
Broader implication: The court applied established precedent and legal tests to reach its conclusion; the order enforces stamp liability in this case but does not purport to establish a new legal principle beyond application of existing authorities.
1. In this case an objection has been taken by the defendants that the document which has been termed as an agreement is not a mere agreement but a lease deed or an agreement for lease and therefore chargeable under the appropriate head under the Stamp Act. This point was argued by the learned counsel for the parties at great length. It is relevant to reproduce the contents of the document which are as follows:—
“1. The lease shall commence with effect from 1st April, 1957.
2. The rental is fixed at Rs. 13400/- (Rupees Thirteen thousand and four hundred) only per annum payable in advance.
3. This lease shall remain in force for a period of eleven months commencing from 1st April 1957.
4. The tenants are given option to extend the lease for a further period of two years on the terms given hereunder, provided the tenants inform the landlord in writing six months before the termination of the lease of their intention to extend, along with an advance rent of one year to be extended. This advance payment of rent must reach the landlords before the expiry of 28th February, 1958.
5. The tenants shall have no right to sublet the property. But the landlords will not object to the inclusion of their brothers in the contract at the time of execution of regular rent deed. It is further agreed that the regular rent deed may be signed by any of the tenants or by their brother but the same shall be binding on all of them.
6. That Landlords are bound to deliver the possession of the property to the tenants on 1st April, 1957 on their executing a regular rent deed. They are further bound to complete its construction in all respects before the date of the commencement of the lease.
7. The tenants lake upon themselves to make all the arrangements for furniture etc. at their own cost, and shall be entitled to remove the same at the time of vacating the premises.
8. The landlords shall make electric and water pipe fittings, but the respective taxes and fees shall be payable by the tenants for term of their occupation.
9. All the repairs of usual tear and wear including distempering shall be effected by the landlords. The tenants are however responsible to pay damages for any damage caused by them to the property other than usual tear and wear.
10. The compound which is common among the landlords and S. Kalwant Singh and S. Inderjit Singh is to be used by them for further construction of buildings destroyed in fire. The tenants cannot object to it. However the landlords shall arrange for an appropriate passage leading to the bund as also a small open space as compound in front of the dining shall the tenants cannot exercise the option of the extension of the lease for a further period without payment of the lease for a further period without payment of the advance rent for the term to be extended.
11. The landlords are entitled to possession at the termination of the lease.
12. Rupees thirteen thousand and Pour hundred have been advanced to the landlords at this time as an advance rent of one year commencing from 1st April, 1957, as per separate receipt.”
2. The contention of the learned counsel for the defendants is that the document creates an actual demise although it is mentioned in the said document that the lease is to commence from 1st of April, 1957 and that a regular rent deed will be signed by any of the tenants defendants. It is submitted that it is immaterial whether possession had to be delivered at the time of the execution of the said deed or at some future date. For construing a document, the whole of the instrument is to be looked at. The intention of the parties as revealed by the document, was to create a present demise and all the terms relating to the lease were settled at the time of the execution of the said deed. Reliance is placed on AIR 1930 Bom 210 : AIR 1934 Mad 418 and AIR 1930 Pat 530.
3. As against this the learned counsel for the plaintiffs has submitted that it is only when a document creates actual demise that it can be said to be a lease deed or an agreement to let it is urged by referring to the various terms of the document that this does not create any present demise, Lease deed had to be executed at a future date and the landlord had to deliver the possession of the property to the tenants on 1st of April, 1957 on their executing a regular rent deed and the landlords were further hound to complete its construction. In all respects before the date of commencement of the lease. The tenants took upon themselves to make all arrangements for furniture etc. at their own cost. Reliance is placed on AIR 1928 Bom 553 : AIR 1969 Raj 22 and AIR 1954 SC 496. It is true that an agreement to lease is Included in the word lease under the Stamp Act, but in order to make such a document chargeable with stamp duty as an agreement to lease or lease deed the document must show the creation of an actual and present demise. It should not be contingent on the happening of a certain event or on doing of a certain future act. In order to know the intention of the parties as to whether they meant to treat the document as creating a present demise or that it was only an executory agreement, the document as a whole is to be read and along with it the conduct of the parties is to be judged in this context. In the document before us there is no doubt a mention of this fact that regular rent deed is to be executed in future and that delivery of possession will also take place in future. But it is admitted that no formal lease deed was executed afterwards as contemplated in the said agreement. Bather the very plaint shows that the parties have treated this agreement as an agreement for lease Para No. 1 of the plaint is relevant and significant. It reads as under:—
“That the defendant No. 1 and the husband of the defendant No. 2 late Shri Ciman Bhai in pursuance of an Agreement dated 22nd day of November, 1956 obtained from the plaintiffs on rent basis from the plaintiffs jointly owned three storeyed building situated at Bund Kothi Bagh Srinagar. … … … … ……” The executant inter alia had covenanted with the plaintiffs as under:—
“a. That the lease was to commence with effect from 1st April 1957 for a term of 11 months.
b. That the rent was fixed at Rs. 13400.00 per annum.
c. That the tenants executant had the option of extending the lease to a further period of two years.
d. That the tenant will have no right to sublet the property.”
4. Thus from the very plaint it is clear that the plaintiffs have treated this document as an agreement to lease. The plaintiffs themselves say in the plaint that the tenants obtained the suit property from the plaintiff on rent basis in pursuance of the agreement dated 22nd November, 1956 thus admitting the creation of actual demise by the instrument. All the terms relating to the lease have been settled under the deed. According to the document itself Rupees 13000.00 were paid as advance rent at the time of the execution of the deed. The mere fact that the defendant tenants had covenanted to execute a formal lease deed would not make the document before us as one not creating present demise in the property. The very payment of advance rent is significant. In AIR 1930 Bom 210 it has been held that it is immaterial whether possession of the rented property passes or not. The agreement arrived at in that case was set out in the letter. It was held to constitute a present demise of land notwithstanding the condition that a formal lease was to be drawn up and executed later on which condition was held to be in the nature of a further assurance only.
5. In AIR 1934 Mad 418, a Division Bench of that court interpreted an oral agreement for a lease of three years as a lease. In that case rent was paid at the time of oral agreement, formal deed was to be executed at some future date. Their Lordships took the view that the mere fact that a formal document was to be executed in future would not come to the rescue of the party who termed the transaction as a mere agreement.
6. Again in AIR 1930 Pat 530 a deed of agreement was the bone of contention. In that case the operative words in the agreement were as under:—
“I therefore considered it proper and suggested to the said Musammat to take over 16 annas Mauza Makhdumpur …………in lieu of Rs. 10,000 out of her dower-debt on the condition of paying annually Rs. 500 on account of revenue and cases and for my personal expenses. Accordingly, my second wife Mst. Bibi Khodaijatul Kubra alias Jamil Khatun liked and accepted it. But it is impossible at this time to execute any necessary deed at this place Islampur Konand……. I therefore executed this deed of agreement with the same condition, I do declare that on reaching Sahibganj. District Gaya, within three months, I shall execute a necessary deed to the above effect and shall put (her) in possession and occupation of the said mauza. If God forbid, a necessary deed to the above effect may not be executed even on the expiry of the aforesaid period of three months, or I failed to execute it for any reason, the said Mt. Khodaijatul Kubra alias Jamil Khatun has and shall have right and power, according to this deed of agreement, to take possession of the said Mauza Makhdumpur in lieu of Rupees 10,000.00 out of the dower-debt due to her on the condition of paying annually Rs. 500, on account of revenue and road cess and for my personal expenses to me and to my heirs and representatives in respect of Mauza Makhdumpur ………… and of paying sadr jama of Rs. 36-9-0 year after year and to get a necessary deed executed by me and my heirs and representatives through Court or in whatever way she may think possible and proper.”
7. It was held on construction of the instrument that the same was an agreement for lease operating as a present demise, AIR 1928 Bom 553 cited by the learned counsel for the plaintiffs is not applicable to the facts of the present case as in that case a party had by means of a document agreed to lease a property in which he had no present interest and the property to be leased was not in existence. It was held that the document did not amount to an agreement. There cannot be any dispute with regard to this proposition. AIR 1925 Cal 1087 the view adopted is that although the term of a lease is to commence at a future date and a formal document is to be executed, it does not necessarily follow that the agreement will not operate as a present demise of the premises. There can possibly be no two opinions on the view expressed in AIR 1969 Raj 22 that in order to hold the agreement to let or as lease and chargeable under the Stamp Act, it is necessary to establish that such agreement creates actual demise. Again in AIR 1954 SC 496 it has been made manifestly clear that an instrument is to be usually construed as a lease if it contains words of present demise and it is to be construed as an executory agreement notwithstanding that it contains words of present demise. The test laid down by their Lordships is that an instrument should contain words of actual demise. That is clear from the document itself in the case before us. The instrument undoubtedly creates a present demise in the suit property and this appears to have been admitted by the plaintiffs in their plaint (vide para 1 (supra)).
8. I, therefore, hold that the Instrument is not a mere agreement but an agreement to lease and therefore chargeable under the Stamp Act as such.
9. Under Article 35, Schedule I sub-clause (i) of the Stamp Act the Stamp Duty payable for this instrument is Rs. 101.00 The document being over one year the plaintiffs will have thus to pay Rs. 101.00 the actual stamp duty and Rs. 1010.00 as penalty, in all Rupees 1111.00 The plaintiffs have paid stamp duty of Rs. 1.50 on the agreement. The balance comes to Rs. 1109.50 which the plaintiffs must pay in the form of stamps within two weeks from today's date. Case to come up after two weeks.
10. Order accordingly.
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