K.V. Gopalakrishnan Nair J.:-

The petitioners seek to get the order of the Custodian General dated 23-4-1958 quashed by certiorari and to restore the order of the Provincial Rehabilitation Officer Jammu dated 14-7-1956. The salient facts of the case may briefly be stated.

(2) Hari Chand, deceased husband of res­pondents 1 and 2 was allotted an extent of land measuring 13 kanals and 5 marlas in village Bhore. According to the affidavit of respondents 1 and 2 this allotment was made in Maghar 2005 (1948/49). Subsequently 29 kanals and 13 marlas of land in village Arnia was allotted to him in 2011 (Bikrami) and he took possession of it in March 1955.

The petitioners who are some of the displaced persons who have been allotted land in the Bhore village complained to the Provincial Rehabilitations Officer Jammu some time in January 1956 that Hari Chand has obtained double allotment and that the allotment to him in Bhore village may be cancelled. Meanwhile, Hari Chand informed tha Asstt. Custodian at R. S. Pura that he was willing to give up the land allotted to him in Arnia village. This request of Hari Chand was duly; forwarded to the Provincial Rehabilitation Officer who on 3-3-1956 issued an order cancelling the Arnia allotment in favour of Hari Chand.

This order enabled Harichand to retain the land allotted to him in the Bhore village. But the petitioners did not rest content and they continued to agitate the question of cancelling the allotment in favour of Hari Chand in Bhore village. They petitioned the Provincial Rehabilitation Officer again. Consequently by an order issued by tiie Provincial Rehabilitation Officer on 14-7-1956 the allotment in favour of Hari Chand in the Bhore village was cancelled and that in the Arnia village was regularized.

Hari Chand preferred an appeal to the Dy. Custodian General on 25-8-1956. The appeal was allowed on 12-6-1957 and Hari Chand was held entitled to retain the land allied to him in Bhore village. The allotment in Amia village was cancelled. The petitioners made an unsucc­essful application for review before the Dy. Cus­todian General. Thereafter they moved the Custodian General for setting aside the order of the Dy. Custodian General. Here also they failed.

The Custodian General by his order dated 23-4-1958 dismissed the application of the petition­ers and confirmed the order of the Dy. Custodian General dated 12-6-1957. The petitioners have' now moved this court in certiorari for quashing the order of the Custodian General dated 23-4-1958 and restoring that of the Provincial Rehabilitation Officer issued on 14-7-1956.

(3) The Custodian General is the third respon­dent. The respondents contend that the writ peti­tion is misconceived that the order complained of is not amenable to certiorari that the orders pass­ed by the Dy. Custodian General and the Custodian General were just and proper and that the applica­tion for writ is devoid of merit. They also con­tend that the application is not maintainable be­cause the order challenged is a pre-constitution order.

(4) We shall first dispose of the objection that the writ petition is not competent because it is directed against a pre-constitution order. The argu­ment on behalf of the respondents is that writ juris­diction was conferred On this court only by Art. 103 of the State Constitution which came into force on 26th January, 1957. There is admittedly no question in this case of any fundamental right so as to attract the provisions of Art. 32 of the Con­stitution of India as applied to the State by the President's Order of 1954.

The authority of this court to issue the writ is therefore confined to S. 103 of the State Constitu­tion. This section has no retrospective operation. It can be invoked only to deal with matters which arose subsequent to its coming into force, that is to say, on and after 26-1-1957. No writ can there­fore issue in the instant case. Reliance is placed upon the decision of the Supreme Court in -the State Of U.P v. Mohammad Nooh ., AIR 1958 SC 86.

(5) The learned counsel for the petitioners has vigorously urged that the decision of the Supreme Court in Mohd. Nooh's case, (AIR 1958 SC 86), has no application here and that the argument of the respondents purporting to base upon that ruling is fallacious. We are inclined to agree with the contention of the petitioners' learned counsel on this point. In AIR 1958 SC 86 the order of dis­missal of the Head Constable was made much be­fore the Constitution came into force.

An appeal and a revision preferred by the aggrieved officer against the pre-constitution order of his dismissal proved unsuccessful. This circum­stance only served to emphasize the fact that the effective order against him was the one passed prior to the coming into force of the Constitution. The operation of that order was in no way suspended or affected by the appeal and the revision preferred by the aggrieved officer. On the facts of that case it is abundantly clear that it was the pre-constitu­tion order of dismissal which really aggrieved the officer concerned.

What is of importance to note is that the Sup­reme Court held against the aggrieved officer not because disciplinary proceedings against him had been started before the date of the commencement of the Constitution, but because the order of dis­missal agains' him was passed before that date. It cannot be doubted that if the order which is sought to be challenged by way of writ is a pre-constitu­tion order, the subsequently conferred writ jurisdic­tion cannot successfully be invoked to quash that Order.

But in the instant case, the order which is challenged by the petitioners was passed much after 26-1-1957 when the State Constitution came into force. It is not at all material whether the facts which led to 'he proceedings which culminated in that order had occurred before the commencement of the Constitution, nor would it matter even if the proceedings had started before the commence­ment of the Constitution. The crucial fact to ascertain is when was the effective order which really prejudiced the petitioners passed?

If that order was passed before the Commence­ment of the Constitution, the petitioners cannot in­voke Art. 226 (Section 103 of the State Constitution) to quash it. But if that order was passed after the Constitution came into force, although the proceedings might have been pending from a date order to the commencement of the Constitution, that order will not be a pre-constitution order but a postconstitution order which can legitimately attract the writ jurisdiction conferred oh the High Court by the Constitution.

Applying this test to the facts of the present case, it clearly emerges that the Provincial Rehabili­tation Officer had issued an order on 14-7-56 can­celling the allotment in favour of Hari Chand in the Bliore village. That order was favourable to the petitioners. It was only when the Dy. Custo­dian General by his order dated 12-6-1957 set aside the order of the Provincial Rehabilitation Officer that the petitioners felt aggrieved. Thereupon, the Custodian General was moved but he on 23-4.-1958 confirmed the order of the Dy. Custodian Gene­ral.

It cannot, therefore, be said that the order with which the petitioners were aggrieved was in any sense a pre-Constitution order. As we have, already pointed out, it is immaterial whether the proceedings had commenced even before the Con­stitution had come into force. What is crucial w the date of the order which in truth and effect pre­judiced the petitioners. That order in the present! case was made after the Constitution came into force and, therefore, the objection 'hat the writ is not competent because it relates to a pre-Constitution matter is untenable.

(6) The next point for consideration is whether a writ of certiorari can properly be issued in the present case. The nature of the powers of the High Court to issue a writ of certiorari and the grounds on which it can be issued have been authoritatively pointed out in several decisions of the Supreme Court and also in the decisions of English Courts. In Veerappa v. Raman and Raman Ltd., AIR 1952 SC 192 at pp. 195-196 it was pointed out:

"Such Writs as are referred to in Art. 226 are obviously intended to enable the High Court to issue them in grave cases where the subordinate tribunals or bodies or officers act wholly without jurisdiction, or in excess of it, or in violation of the principles, of natural justice or refuse to exercise a jurisdiction vested in them or there is an error apparent on the face of the record & such act, omission error, or excess has resulted in However extensive the jurisdiction to us that it is not so wide the High Court to convert appeal and examine for itself he correctness of the decisions impugned and decide what is the proper view to be taken or the order to be made."

(7) In T. C. Basappa v. T. Nagappa, AIR 1954 SC 440, at p. 444, the Supreme Court again exa­mined at length the principles governing the exer­cise of certiorari jurisdiction.

"One of the funda­mental principles in regard to the issuing of a writ of 'certiorari', is that the writ can be availed of only to remove or adjudicate on the validity of judicial acts................."

"The second essential feature of a writ of "certiorari" is that the control which is exercised through it over judicial or quasi-judicial tribunal's or bodies is not in an appellate but supervisory capacity. In granting a writ of 'certiorari' the sup­erior court does not exercise the powers of an appellate tribunal. It does not review or reweigh the evidence upon which the determination of the inferior tribunal purports to be based. It demo­lishes the order which it considers to be without jurisdiction or palpably erroneous but does not sub­stitute its own views for those of the inferior tri­bunal................"

"The supervision of the superior court exer­cised through writs of 'certiorari' goes on two points, as has been expressed by Lord Sumner in King v. Nat Bell Liquors Ltd., ( 1922) 2 AC 128 at p. 156. One is the area of inferior jurisdiction and the qualifications and conditions of its exercise! the other is the observance of law in the course of its exercise; these two heads normally cover all the grounds On which a writ of 'certiorari' could be demanded .............."

"An error in the decision or determination it­self may also be amenable to a writ of 'certiorari' but it must be a manifest error apparent on the face of the proceedings, e. g., when it is based on clear ignorance or disregard of the provisions of law. In other words it is a patent error which can be corrected by 'certiorari' but not a mere wrong decision."

(8) The essential features of 'he remedy by way of 'certiorari have been lucidly though briefly stated by Morris L. J., in Rex v. Northumberland Compensation Appellate Tribunal,' 1952-1 KB 338 at p. 357, as follows:

"It is plain that 'certiorari' will not issue as the cloak of an appeal in disguise. It does not lie in order to bring up an order or decision for re-bearing of the issue raised in the proceedings. It exists to correct error of law when revealed on the face of an order or decision or irregular! y or absence of or excess of jurisdiction when shows."

(9) In Hari Vishnu v. Ahmad Ishaque, (S) AIR 1955 SC 233, a Full Bench of the Supreme Court pointed out the character and scope of a writ of 'certiorari' and the conditions under which it could be issued. The following four propositions were laid down by the Supreme Court in that case:

(1) 'Certiorari' will be issued for correcting erru7$, of jurisdiction, as when an inferior court or tribunal acts withou1 jurisdiction or in excess of it, or fails to exercise it;

(2) 'Contiorari' will also be issued when the Court or Tribunal acts illegally in the exercise of ifs undoubted jurisdiction, as when it decides with­out giving an opportunity to the parties to be or violates the principles of natural justice.

(3) The cour1 issuing a writ of 'certiorari' acts in exercise of a supervisory and not appellate juris­diction. One consequence of this is that the court will not review findings of fact reached by the in­ferior cour1 or Tribunal, even if they be erroneous. This is On the principle that a court which has juris­diction over a subject-matter has jurisdiction to decide wrong as well as right, and when 'he Legis­lature does not choose to confer a right of appeal against that derision, it would be defeating its purpose and policy, if a superior Court were to re-hear the case on the evidence, and substitute its own finding in 'certiorari'.

(10) Regarding the fourth proposition the Sup­reme Court observed as follows:

"The further question on which there has been some controversy is whether a writ can be issued, when the decision of the inferior court or Tribunal is erroneous in law."

I After discussing the several English and Indian I decisions bearing on 4he point the conclusion is set out in the following words at page 244:

"It may therefore be taken as settled that a writ of 'certiorari' could be issued to correct an I error of law. But it is essential that it should be ( something more than a mere error; it must be one I which must be manifest on the face of the record."

(11) The latest decision of the Supreme Court [ on the subject is in Nasendra Nath v. Commr of Hills Division, AIR 1958 SC 398, where His Lord­ship Mr. Justice Sinha observed at p. 412:

"It is clear from an examination of the autho­rities of this court as also of the courts in England1, that one of the grounds on which the jurisdiction of the High Court on certiorari may be invoked, is an error of law apparent on the face of the record and not every error either of law or fact, which can be corrected by a superior 'court, in exercise of its statutory powers as a court of ap­peal or revision.

So far as we know, it has never been contend­ed before this court that an error of fact, even though apparent on the face of the record, could be a ground for interference by the court exercising it, writ jurisdiction. No ruling was brought to our notice in support of the proposition that the court exercising its powers under Art. 226 of the Consti­tution, could quash an order of an inferior tribunal, on the ground of a mistake of fact apparent on the face of the record.

But the question still remains as to what is the legal import of the expression 'error of law appa­rent on the face of the record.' Is it every error of law that can attract the supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court, to quash the order impugned? This court, as observed above, has settled the law in this respect by laying down that in order to attract such jurisdiction it is essential that the error should be something more than mere error of law; that it must be one which is manifest on the face of the record.

In this respect the law in India and the law in England are, therefore, the same. It is also clear, on an examination of all the authorities of this court and those in England, referred to above, as also those considered in the several judgments of this court, that the common-law writ, now called order of certiorari which was also adopted by our Constitution, is not meant to take the place of an appeal where the statute docs not confer a right of appeal.

Its purpose is only to determine, on an exa­mination of the record, whether the inferior tribu­nal has exceeded its jurisdiction, or has not pro­ceeded in accordance with the essential require­ments of the law which it was meant to administer. Mere formal or technical errors, even though of law, will not be sufficient to attract this extraordinary, jurisdiction.”

(12) We may also notice with advantage ano­ther decision of the Supreme Court in Prem Singh v. Deputy Custodian General, (S) AIR 1957 SC 604, where the learned Chief Justice at pp. 809, 810, indicated in the following words the import of an error apparent on 'he face of the record which would justify interference on certiorari:

"The errors pointed out, if they are errors at all, are mostly errors of fact and even if the errors may by any stretch of argument be said to consti­tute errors of law, they are nothing more than mere errors of law, which may be corrected by a court of appeal, but which do not render the order "speak­ing order" showing a clear ignorance or disregard of the provisions of the law, so as to be amenable to correction by a writ of certiorari. There is in our opinion, no substance in this contention." Having set out the true scope and nature of a writ of certiorari, and the grounds on which it can pro­perly issue, we have now to see whether such a writ can issue in the present case. The main point urged by ''he petitioner's learned counsel was that the Dy. Custodian General as well as the Custo­dian General did not exercise their discretion pro­perly in allowing the respondents to retain in the land allotted to them in the Bhore village. This attack on the exercise of discretion is entirely based on facts.

The manner in which Hari Chand, the late has band of the respondents, obtained allotment of the land in two different villages, was specially stress­ed to show that no discretion in favour of Hari Chand should have been exercised. In this connation our attention was also drawn to para 12 of Cabinet Order No. 578-C under which the autho­rities are given power to cancel both the allot­ments in case a double allotment obtained by a displaced person is suppressed by him.

But this paragraph does not make it obligatory upon the authorities to cancel both the allotments. It is a matter resting with their discretion. Further­more, Hari Chand himself had brought to the notice of the Provincial Rehabilitation Officer that the allotment of land made in Arnia village in his favour may be cancelled. What was the motive which actuated Hari Chand to take this step, it is not necessary for us to ascertain.

Whether the conduct of Hari Chand deserved cancellation of the entire land allotted to him or not is left by the relevant rules to the determina­tion of the concerned authorities. And the mere circumstance that those authorities exercised their discretion in one way and not in another way or that they reached one conclusion and not the other on their own appreciation of the facts of the case is surely not a ground for interfering on certiorari.

(13) A faint attempt was made to suggest that under the rules embodied in Cabinet Order 578-C of 1954 no allotment at all could have been made to Hari Chand. But this point was not seriously pressed before us, and rightly so. Even the order of the Custodian General dated 23-4-1958 which is impugned in these proceedings has clearly stated "it is not disputed that the non-applicants are enti­tled to allotment under rules."

Not even the slightest attempt has been made to show that this statement in the Custodian General's order is in any manner incorrect. It is not open to the petitioners to adopt an entirely different stand before this court in writ proceedings. What is even more important is that there is nothing in the rules which precluded land being allotted to Hari Chand. It appears 'hat the first allotment in Bhore village was made in his favour in Maghar 2005, i. e., some years before the coming into force of the rules em­bodied in Cabinet Order 578-C of 1954 on which reliance is placed by the petitioners.

It is common ground that these rules came into force only on 7-5-1954. Even these rules, did by necessary implication confirm the allotments pre­viously made. They, however, provided against double allotments and against continuance of allot­ments of lands in excess of prescribed areas. It is not disputed that the extent of the land allotted to Hari Chand in Bhore village does not exceed the prescribed quota fixed by the rules.

Thus there appears no good ground for saying that Hari Chand was not entitled to any allotment at all. It is also well to remember that the peti­tioners themselves conceded that the allotments in favour of Hari Chand in Arnia village may be allow­ed to stand. If this were so, one finds no reason why the allotment in the Bhore village should not be allowed to stand instead of that in Arnia village.

(14) Another attempt on behalf of the peti­tioners was to show that the Custodian General had no jurisdiction to pass the order dated 23-4-1958. But it was the petitioners themselves who moved the Custodian General, and got an adverse order. It is not therefore, open to them to chal­lenge the jurisdiction of the Custodian General to pass that order. It is obvious that the petitioners banked on the possibility of the Custodian General passing an order in their favour.

With such a possible contingency in view, they moved him and put forward their case before him as strongly as they could. But it eventually transpired 'hat the order of the Custodian General went against them. Therefore, they have now attempted to get rid of it by saying that under the provisions of the Evacuee Property Act the Cus­todian General had no power to hear a revision against the order of the Dy. Custodian General, whose powers are concurrent with those of the Cus­todian General.

(15) It is not necessary in 'his case to decide whether or not the Custodian General is empower­ed under the Act to revise the orders of the Dy. Custodian General. It is clear that the petitioners having themselves invoked the jurisdiction of the Custodian General, cannot, when they find that his order is not in their, favour challenge its validity on the ground that he had no jurisdiction.

In a case where a person submits to the jurisdiction of a Subordinate Tribunal without objecting to its jurisdiction he cannot be heard to urge in certiorari proceedings that 'he subordinate Tribu­nal had no jurisdiction, except perhaps where it is shown by his affidavit that he had no knowledge of the facts which constituted the defect of jurisdiction of the subordinate tribunal. This- position is well-settled. Please see Lachmanan Chettiar v. Commr Corporation of Madras AIR 1927 Mad 130; G. M.' T. Society v. Bombay'State, AIR 1954 Bom 202; and Messrs Pannalal v. Union of India AIB,,'l957 SC 397 at p. 412.

The principle of these decisions applies, a for­tiori, where the petitioner himself moved the sub­ordinate tribunal and invited it to adjudicate (upon his grievance. In the case on hand even if we hold that the order of the Custodian General is without jurisdiction, the petitioners cannot succeed, because that would leave intact the order of Dy. Custodian General which is to the same effect as that of Custodian General. The order of the Custodian General confirming the order of the Dy. Custodia General will in that case be treated as a mere plusage.

There is absolutely no valid ground for holding that the order of the Dy. Custodian General is bad and is liable to be quashed in certiorari. There­fore, the argument relating to lack of jurisdiction on the part of the Custodian General does not avail the petitioners from any point of view.

(16) The facts of the present case- do not dis­close any valid ground or show a legitimate occa­sion for issuing a writ of certiorari.

(17) We may also point out that even if there be some technical error of law or formal defect of jurisdiction in a given case, we are riot bound to issue a writ of certiorari unless we are satisfied that the interests of justice demand the granting of such a writ. We may in this connection refer to the following observations of the Supreme Court in Sangram Singh v. 1. Election Tribunal, Kotah, (S) AIR 1955 SC 425, at p. 429:

"That, however is not to say that the jurisdiction will be exercised whenever there is an error of law. The High Courts do not, and should not act as Courts of appeal under Art. 226. Their powers are purely discretionary and though no limits can be placed upon that discretion it must be exercised along recognized lines and not arbitrarily; and one of the limitations imposed by the courts on them­selves is that they will not exercise jurisdiction in this class of case unless substantial injustice has ensured, or is likely to ensure.”

(18) To the same effect is the decision in A.M Allison & H.P Brigg v. B.L Sen & Others, (S) AIR 1957 SC 227 at p. 231, where Bhagwati J., stated:

"Proceedings by way of certiorari are "not of course" (Vide Halsbury's 'Laws of England', Hail-sham Ed. Vol. 9, paras 1480 and 1481, pp. 877-S78). The High Court of Assam had the power to refuse the writs if it was satisfied that there was no failure of justice, and in these appeals which are directed against the orders of High Court in application under Art. 226, we could refuse to inter­fere unless we are satisfied that the justice of the case requires it."

(19), We have at an earlier part of this judg­ment cited the decision in AIR 1952 SC 192, where their Lordships of the Supreme Court have clearly stated that a writ will issue only "when such act, omission, error or excess has resulted in manifest injustice."

(20) Both the Dy. Custodian General and the Custodian General have pointed out in their orders , that justice requires that the land in Bhore village i should be allowed to be retained by the respondents because they have constructed houses on that land and have been residing there long enough. The interests of justice do not require that we should interfere; on the other hand if we interfere as asked for by the petitioners substantial injustice will ensue to the respondents. This is an added reason and a weighty one at that for not allowing the petition.

(21) In view of the foregoing the petition is dismissed with costs. One set Advocates fee Rs. 50/-.

(23) J. N. WAZIR C. J.: I agree. K.S B. Petition dismissed.