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Nand Lal And Others v. State Of Jammu And Kashmir And Another

Jammu and Kashmir High Court
Jul 10, 1959
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Factual and Procedural Background

The petitioners sought writs of certiorari or mandamus (and any other appropriate relief) challenging the Revenue Commissioner, Jammu's order of 13-9-1958 vacating an interim stay which he had earlier granted on 22-5-1958. The stay related to two plots of land (Khasra No. 175 and Khasra No. 201) in Samba Tehsil that the petitioners alleged they had been cultivating and which the Tehsildar had recorded as grazing land and ordered mutation in favour of villagers, directing eviction of the petitioners.

Procedurally: the petitioners appealed to the Collector at Jammu against the Tehsildar's order; the appeal was dismissed on 27-8-1956 and an application for restoration was also dismissed. In February 1958 the petitioners applied to the Revenue Minister, who on 11-3-1958 ordered that, because Rabi crops were on the land, the petitioners could reap the crops and then vacate, subject to furnishing security of Rs. 500 (which was furnished).

On 31-3-1958 the petitioners filed a revision before the Revenue Commissioner, who on 22-5-1958 ordered that status quo be maintained until the next date of hearing (13-9-1958). After the villagers of Swankah brought to the Commissioner's attention the Minister's file and the petitioners' undertaking, the Revenue Commissioner called for the file and on 13-9-1958 issued an order vacating his earlier stay, stating: “Stay order be vacated in view of the clear directions on the file issued by the Revenue Minister. As to the case for revision it shall be heard on merits on due date.”

The petitioners alleged improper interference by the Revenue Minister causing the Commissioner to vacate the stay and sought quashing of that order and directions that the Commissioner proceed independently, protecting petitioners' possession pending the revision. The State (respondents) opposed the petition, asserting factual inaccuracies and that no relief was due to the petitioners.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the Revenue Commissioner, in vacating his interim stay on 13-9-1958, acted under unlawful direction or interference from the Revenue Minister and thereby failed to discharge his quasi-judicial functions independently.
  2. Whether the order of the Revenue Commissioner vacating the stay should be quashed and the Commissioner directed to proceed with the revision independently of any ministerial directions.
  3. Whether the petitioners' conduct in making alleged misrepresentations or omissions in ex parte proceedings warrants dismissal of their writ petition (i.e., the effect of failure to make full and frank disclosure on an ex parte application).
  4. As a procedural note (not decided): whether a discretionary interlocutory order granting or declining stay is properly the subject-matter of a writ of certiorari or mandamus (the court stated it was not necessary to decide this question in the present case).

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioners' Arguments

  • The petitioners contended they had a revision pending before the Revenue Commissioner against the Collector's order upholding the Tehsildar, and that the Commissioner had granted an interim stay on 22-5-1958 pending that revision.
  • They alleged that in July 1958 the Revenue Minister issued directions to the Revenue Commissioner to vacate the stay, and that as a result the Commissioner unlawfully vacated the stay on 13-9-1958, failing to act independently as a quasi-judicial tribunal under the Land Revenue Act.
  • They sought quashing of the order vacating the stay and a direction that the Commissioner proceed with the revision independently and secure the petitioners in undisturbed possession until disposal of the revision.

Respondents' Arguments

  • The State and the Revenue Commissioner contended that the petition was misconceived and contained erroneous or incomplete facts; they denied that any improper directions had been issued by the Revenue Minister with respect to the revision before the Commissioner.
  • They pointed to the earlier application by the petitioners to the Revenue Minister (February 1958) and the Minister's order of 11-3-1958 permitting the petitioners to reap Rabi crops and directing them to furnish security and vacate thereafter — matters which the respondents said the petitioners had not disclosed.
  • They argued that the Commissioner, after calling for and examining the Minister's file (at the villagers' prompting), legitimately concluded there was no ground for continuing the interim stay until the date then set for hearing.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Rex v. Kensington Income-tax Commissioner, (1917) 1 K.B. 486 (Lord Cozens-Hardy M.R.) On ex parte applications the applicant must observe uberrima fides (utmost good faith); full disclosure of material facts is required; if deception is practised the court should refuse to go into merits. The court relied on this authority to support the proposition that the petitioners' failure to disclose material facts and the impression they conveyed justified refusal to entertain the petition on its merits and warranted dismissal.
Dalglish v. Jarvie, (1850) 2 Mac & G 231 Precept that every material fact must be stated on ex parte application or the injunction/order may be dissolved. Quoted with approval through Lord Cozens-Hardy's citation to emphasise the duty of full disclosure in ex parte applications and the consequences of omission.
The Asiatic Engineering Co. v. Achhru Ram, AIR 1951 All. 746 (Full Bench, Allahabad High Court) An applicant for extraordinary relief under Article 226 must come with clean hands, not suppress relevant facts, and must not mislead the court when seeking ex parte orders. The court applied this pronouncement to the present facts, observing that the petitioners' suppression and misleading statements were sufficient ground to dismiss the writ petition.
R. v. Churchwardens of All Saints, Wigan, (1876) 1 AC 611 (Lord Hatherley) On prerogative writs judges may withhold relief for discretionary reasons connected with conduct of the parties, delay, or other matters of discretion. The court cited this authority to show that discretionary considerations (including conduct of the applicant) may justify withholding relief.
Reg v. Garland, (1870) 39 L.J. QB 86 Where a process is ex debito justitiae, the court may refuse to exercise discretion in favour of an applicant if the application lacks bona fides. Used to support the conclusion that lack of bona fides or misleading conduct by the petitioners justified refusing the extraordinary relief sought.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court examined the documentary and chronological record and proceeded in two linked lines of analysis: (1) whether the Revenue Commissioner had been improperly influenced by the Revenue Minister and (2) whether the petitioners' conduct in their pleadings and affidavit justified denying relief.

On the question of improper ministerial interference, the court found that the Commissioner had originally granted an interim stay only until 13-9-1958. The Revenue Minister's earlier order of 11-3-1958 (issued on the petitioners' own application) permitted the petitioners to reap Rabi crops and required them to furnish security of Rs. 500 to vacate after harvest. Villagers of Swankah brought this ministerial file to the Commissioner's attention in a petition dated 27-7-1958; the Commissioner obtained the file and acquainted himself with the prior history. The court held that the Commissioner's 13-9-1958 order (vacating the stay) referred to those prior ministerial "directions on the file" but did not amount to an execution of any fresh ministerial direction to vacate the stay in the revision proceedings pending before him. The Commissioner was found to have acted on the relevant history and circumstances and in the exercise of his own discretion.

The court emphasised the established principle that a statutory/quasi-judicial tribunal must act independently and not be swayed by irrelevant extraneous considerations or the wishes of executive superiors; if such undue influence is proved, the order will be struck down. However, applying the facts, the court concluded the Commissioner had not surrendered his judicial functions nor acted solely under ministerial influence. The Commissioner had considered prior orders (properly part of the case history) and the petitioners' antecedents in deciding there was no case for an extended stay.

Separately, and decisively, the court found the petitioners had failed to state material facts correctly and had omitted to disclose in their affidavit and petition the application they had made to the Revenue Minister in February 1958 and the subsequent ministerial order of 11-3-1958. The affidavit's assertions that the Minister issued directions in July 1958 to vacate the stay created a misleading impression that the Minister intervened after the Commissioner's stay and caused its vacation. Because the petition was admitted and an ex parte stay was granted on the basis of these incomplete/misleading statements, the court held that the petitioners had misled the court.

The court relied on established authority (as cited above) that ex parte applicants must make full and fair disclosure and that the court may refuse to examine merits where applicants have practised deception or failed to disclose material facts. Given the petitioners' conduct and the merits assessment already outlined, the court concluded the petition had to be dismissed.

The court expressly stated it was unnecessary to decide whether a discretionary interlocutory order granting or refusing stay is properly the subject-matter of a writ of certiorari or mandamus in the present case.

Holding and Implications

DISMISSED.

Holding: The writ petition was dismissed. The court held (1) that there was no improper ministerial direction that caused the Revenue Commissioner to vacate his interim stay, and (2) that the petitioners' failure to disclose material facts and their misleading statements in the affidavit/petition (particularly omission of their own application to the Revenue Minister and the ministerial order of 11-3-1958) warranted dismissal of the petition without going into its merits.

Implications: As a practical consequence, the petitioners do not obtain the relief sought (the quashing of the Commissioner's order vacating the stay or directions to the Commissioner to proceed independently to protect petitioners' possession). The court did not establish any new law beyond applying settled principles that ex parte applicants must disclose all material facts and that tribunals must act independently; the court also declined to decide the broader question whether interlocutory stay orders are amenable to writs in every case. The decision's immediate effect is the dismissal of the petition; the court noted that the petitioners' conduct alone sufficed to refuse relief.

Show all summary ...

1. This is a petition for a writ of certiorari or Mandamus and also for any other writ, direction or order that may be deemed proper by the Court. The main allegation of the petitioners is that they had filed a revision to the Revenue Commissioner at Jammu against tile order passed in appeal by the Collector at Jammu confirming the orders of the Tehsildar at Samba in relation to the declaration and mutation of Khasra No. 201 situated in Kalah Swankah Tehsil Samba as Kahcharai and of Khasra No. 175 as Khalsa Sarkar. On 22-5-1958 the Revenue Commissioner passed an order for stay as prayed for by the petitioners pending the final disposal of the revision before him.

2. Subsequently, the Revenue Minister issued directions in July 1958 to the Revenue Commissioner to vacate the order of stay. In obedience to this direction the Revenue Commissioner vacated the stay order on 13-9-58. The Revenue Commissioner thus failed to act as an independent agent or to exercise his quasi-judicial functions as an independent Tribunal established under the Land Revenue Act. The petitioners, therefore, pray that the order cancelling the stay be quashed and the Revenue Commissioner be directed to proceed with the revision before him according to law, ignoring the instructions or directions of the Revenue Minister or any other authority and to secure the petitioners in undisturbed possession of the land till the revision is disposed of.

3. The respondents who are the State of Jammu and Kashmir and the Revenue Commissioner, Jammu oppose the application on grounds based on facts as well as law. They point out that the petition is totally mis-conceived, that the facts alleged therein are erroneous, that true facts have not been stated by the petitioners, and that the petitioners are not entitled to any relief whatever. In view of the conflicting statements of the parties regarding facts, it is necessary to notice the material facts as borne out by the records.

4. Two plots of land, one measuring 107 kanals and 14 marlas in khasra No. 175 situated in village Kalah Tehsil Samba and the other measuring 298 kanals and 13 marlas situated in Khasra No. 201 in Swankah village in Samba Tehsil are referred to in the petition. It is the case of the petitioners that portions of these lands were reduced to their cultivating possession. The land in Khasra No. 201 in village Swankah was recorded as grazing land by the Tehsildar and mutation was effected in the name of the villagers of Swankah and the petitioners were ordered to be evicted.

5. Against this order of the Tehsildar dated 10-2-56 the petitioners preferred an appeal to the Collector at Jammu. It was dismissed on 27-8-1956. An application for restoration was also dismissed by him. Thereafter, on 28-2-58 a petition was presented before the Revenue Minister alleging that in spite of the stay order obtained by the petitioners the Tehsildar was seeking to evict them from the lands in their possession.

6. On that petition the Revenue Minister issued a stay in favour of the petitioners, pending receipt of the report of the Collector at Jammu which was called for. After obtaining the Collector's report, the Revenue Minister ordered on 11-3-58 that as the land in dispute was under Rabi crops raised by the petitioners, they may be allowed to reap the crops and thereafter vacate the land. He also directed them to furnish security in a sum of Rs. 500/- for vacating the land, soon after they harvested the crops. The security was duly furnished.

7. Thereafter, on 31-3-58 the petitioners moved the Revenue Commissioner, Jammu in revision against the order passed by the Collector on 27-8-56 dismissing their appeal and also against his subsequent order dismissing their restoration application. On 17-5-58 the Revenue Commissioner was moved for a stay of likely proceedings in ejectment against the petitioners. On 22-5-58 the Revenue Commissioner issued an order directing that status quo be maintained till the nest date of hearing which was 13-9-58.

8. On 27-7-58 an application by the residents of Swankah was filed before the Revenue Commissioner bringing to his notice the petition filed by the petitioners before the Revenue Minister and the undertaking given by them that they will vacate the land soon after the Rabi crops were harvested. The Commissioner thereupon sent for the necessary papers and acquainted himself with what had transpired. Then the revision petition before him which was posted to 13-8-58 came up for hearing. It is well to remember that the stay order of the Revenue Commissioner was to last only till that date. However, he passed a fresh order on 13-9-58 expressly stating that his previous stay order is vacated. The order reads as follows:

“Stay order be vacated in view of the clear directions on the file issued by the Revenue Minister. As to the case for revision it shall be heard on merits on due date.”

9. It is the first sentence of the order which refers to “the clear directions on the file issued by the Revenue Minister” that has been seized upon by the petitioners to make out that the Revenue Minister had illegally and unauthorizedly interfered in the matter and caused the Revenue Commissioner to vacate the stay order. This contention does not, however, stand scrutiny. It may sound plausible in the ears of a person who is totally unacquainted with the history of the case, but in view of the chronicle of facts set forth above it seems to be clear that no direction whatever was issued by the Revenue Minister to the Revenue Commissioner in regard to the revision filed before the latter.

10. What the Revenue Commissioner was referring to was only the order passed by the Revenue Minister on 11-3-58 on the application filed before him by the present petitioners themselves. The Revenue Commissioner, as already stated, called for that file as it was specifically brought to his notice in a petition filed before him on 27-7-58 by the villagers of Swankah. In view of the previous orders of the Revenue Minister and the security furnished by the petitioners and their undertaking to vacate the land soon after the Rabi crops were harvested, the Revenue Commissioner was perfectly justified in issuing the order complained of.

11. It appears to me extremely difficult to contend successfully that the Revenue Commissioner was not an independent agent and that he acted subserviently to the orders of the Revenue Minister. In fact, the interim stay issued by the Revenue Commissioner was to enure only till 13-9-58. By that date the Revenue Commissioner had posted himself with the prior history of the petitioners' efforts to stick to the land in question. I have no doubt that the Revenue Commissioner, as would any other person in his position, came to the conclusion that there was no case for stay in view of the antecedents disclosed by the relevant records.

12. No doubt, the Revenue Commissioner could have couched his order in words more carefully chosen and thereby made his order absolutely unsusceptible of any possible interpretation that he allowed himself to be influenced by the Revenue Minister's directions. But this circumstance cannot obscure the outstanding fact that the Revenue Minister did not issue any direction to the Revenue Commissioner or in any manner seek to interfere with the functions and jurisdiction of the Revenue Commissioner. Nor can it legitimately be said that the Revenue Commissioner was guided exclusively by the previous orders passed by the Revenue Minister.

13. Those orders were part of the history of the matter and it was in order for the Revenue Commissioner to acquaint himself with them, more especially so when he was plainly invited to do so by a petition of the villagers of Swankash who were vitally interested in the subject matter of the proceedings before him. The order impugned by the petitioners only show that the Revenue Commissioner took into consideration the previous orders passed in the matter by the Revenue Minister at the instance of the petitioners themselves and came to the conclusion that further stay should not be granted.

14. It is impossible to stay that the Revenue Commissioner had not taken the other facts also into consideration in exercising his discretion whether to grant further stay or not. What he did was only to take note of certain facts which were relevant to the matter and exercise his discretion in the light of those facts. This he was ??? to do, without laying himself open to the charge of surrendering his functions or allowing himself to be influenced by extraneous and irrelevant factors.

15. It is no doubt well-settled that a statutory Tribunal entrusted with statutory functions and exercising statutory jurisdiction should not allow itself to be influenced by irrelevant and extraneous considerations in passing quasi judicial orders in discharge of its duties. It has to exercise its own mind and come to its own independent judgment. A person who acts as such Tribunal may happen to be an officer in a particular department of the executive Government and may in that capacity have his official superiors.

16. But he must keep his capacity as a Tribunal distinct and separate from his executive capacity, and must not permit his official superiors in the executive department to interfere in any manner with the exercise of his duties and functions as a Tribunal. If it is found that he permitted himself to be influenced by the directions or the desire of his official superior in passing a particular order as a Tribunal, that order will be struck down. The reason is clear; he failed to act as an independent Tribunal and surrendered his judgment and discretion to the wishes of an outside agent, namely, his official superior in the executive department.

17. But that is not the case here, as the facts set out above amply bear out. I cannot, therefore, find any good ground for quashing the impugned order. I do not also consider it necessary in this case to go into the question whether or not a discretionary and interlocutory order granting or declining to grant stay can properly be the subject-matter of a petition for a writ of certiorari or Mandamus.

18. Before concluding, I must refer to another important aspect. The petitioners have unfortunately not stated the relevant facts correctly either in their petition or in the affidavit in support of the petition. They have also chosen to refrain from stating candidly all the material facts of the case in the affidavit and the petition. I may refer in this connection to the clear averments in the affidavit in support of the petition that in July 1958 the Revenue Minister issued directions to the Revenue Commissioner to vacate the stay granted by the latter.

19. Not a word is mentioned either in the affidavit or in the petition about the application which the petitioners made to the Revenue Minister in February 1958 or to the orders obtained by them on that petition. The statements in the affidavit and in the petition convey the unmistakable impression that after the Revenue Commissioner granted the stay, the Revenue Minister unauthorizedly stepped in and issued directions to the Revenue Commissioner to vacate the stay order. I have no doubt that the petitioners wanted to convey this and no other impression to the court. On the faith of the statements in the affidavit, the court admitted the petition when it came up for preliminary hearing and also issued an order of stay even before issuing notice to the respondents.

20. Had the correct facts been purveyed to the court, the petition might not have been admitted and no ex parte order of stay would have been granted. The result therefore has been that the court was misled in this case on account of the wrong statements of fact made in the affidavit as well, as on account of the omission to set out the relevant material facts. This aspect of the matter is by itself sufficient to entail an outright dismissal of the writ petition without going into its merits. And even if the petitioners have a good case on merits, the court will be entitled to decline to go into the merits and dismiss their petition, because the conduct of the petitioners has been such as to mislead the Court. This position appears to be well-settled by authority. In Rex v. Kensington Income-tax Commissioner, (1917) 1 K.B 486 Lord Cozens-Hardy M.R quoted with approval the following observations made by Lord Langdale in Dalglish v. Jarvie, (1850) 2 Mac and G 231 at p. 238:

“It is quite clear that every fact must be stated, or, even if there is evidence enough to sustain the injunction, it will be dissolved.”

21. Lord Cozens-Hardy went on to observe:—

“On an ex parte application uberrima fides is required, and unless that can be established, if there is anything like deception practised on the court, the court ought not to go into the merits of the case, but simply say we will not listen to your application because of what you have done.”

22. Lord Scrutton, L.J put the matter very clearly by saying:

“It has been for many years the rule of the court and one which it is of the greatest importance to maintain, that when an applicant comes to the court to obtain relief on an ex parte statement he should make a full and fair disclosure of all the material facts—facts not law…….. The applicant must state fully and fairly the facts, and the penalty by which the court enforces that obligation is that if it finds out that the facts have been fully and fairly stated to it, the court will set aside any action which it has taken on the faith of the imperfect statement.”

23. Although the court was in that case satisfied that the Kensington Commissioners had no jurisdiction to make the assessment complained or, it felt itself entitled to say:

“We refuse the writ of prohibition without going into the merits of the case on the ground of the conduct of the applicant in bringing the case before us.”

24. This authority has been followed by a Full Bench of ‘the Allahabad High Court in The Asiatic Engineering Co. v. Achhru Ram, AIR 1951 All. 746 where it was observed at p. 787:—

“A person obtaining an ex parte order or a rule nisi by means of a petition for exercise of the extraordinary powers under Article 226 of the Constitution must come with clean hands, must not suppress any relevant facts from the court, must refrain from making misleading statements and from giving incorrect information to the Court. Courts, for their own protection, should insist that persons invoking these extraordinary powers should not attempt, in any manner, to misuse this valuable right by obtaining ex parte orders by suppression, misrepresentation or misstatement of facts.”

25. I may also refer to the opinion of Lord Hatherley in the R. v. Churchwardens of All Saints, Wigan, (1876) 1 AC 611 at p. 622:

“Upon a prerogative writ there may arise many matters of discretion which may induce the Judges to withhold the grant of it—matters connected with delay, or possibly with the conduct of the parties..”

26. I may also notice the decision in Reg v. Garland, (1870) 39 LJ QB 86 where it was held that where a process is ex debito justitiae the court would refuse to exercise its discretion in favour of the applicant where the application is found to be wanting in bona fides. In view of the above authorities as well as in view of the meritsf of the case which I have discussed in the foregoing paragraphs, I am clearly of the view that this petition has to be dismissed.

HC/V.B.B

27. Petition dismissed.