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P.C Vareed v. Gopalbai Bahubai Patel Rambai Gopalbai Patel .
Factual and Procedural Background
This appeal concerns the execution of a decree obtained against the appellant by the Subordinate Judge of Coimbatore. The decree, based on a promissory note, was passed on 24-10-1949. At the commencement of the action the appellant was not resident in, nor present in, the Province of Madras and had not submitted to the jurisdiction of the court which passed the decree. The decree was obtained ex parte but was a decree on the merits. The central procedural posture is an appeal from an order relating to execution of that decree; the learned judge delivering the opinion is Menon, J.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether a decree obtained in the Province of Madras (Coimbatore court) on 24-10-1949 against an absent non-resident who had not submitted to jurisdiction was a decree of a court of competent jurisdiction for purposes of private international law and therefore executable outside the territorial jurisdiction where it was obtained.
- Whether subsequent constitutional and statutory changes (notably the inauguration of the Constitution of India and the coming into force of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, as amended by Central Act 2 of 1951) could render a decree, which at the date it was passed was not from a competent court for private international law purposes, capable of execution in another part of India.
- Whether nationality or citizenship (common allegiance introduced by the Constitution) can, as a matter of private international law, provide a retrospective basis to treat a foreign decree as executable within another part of the country when the defendant was not a national or subject of that jurisdiction at the time of the judgment.
- What is the effect of Section 20 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Amendment Act, 1951) (Central Act 2 of 1951) — particularly its saving clauses — on rights or immunities that existed under a local Code (Cochin) immediately before the Central Code came into force.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant's Arguments
- The appellant was not resident or present in the Province of Madras when the action began and had not submitted to the jurisdiction of the Coimbatore court; accordingly the decree was not a decree of a competent court for the purposes of private international law and was incapable of execution outside British Indian territory at the time it was passed.
- The appellant relied on the proposition (as conceded by the respondent in part) that the decree at the date it was passed was not capable of execution elsewhere because the court lacked competence under private international law.
Respondent's Arguments
- The decree-holder/respondent contended that the inauguration of the Constitution of India introduced common citizenship throughout the country, so that the appellant (as an Indian citizen) could not now contend that the decree of a court in the Province of Madras was a nullity on the ground that he was an absent foreigner who had not submitted to that court's jurisdiction.
- It was further argued by respondent's counsel (Mr. Ramanan) that the common allegiance should be treated as beginning earlier — from 14-7-1949 (the date of the Instrument of Accession executed by the Rajpramukh of Travancore-Cochin) — so as to overcome the difficulty that at the date of the decree the appellant was not a subject of the court which pronounced it.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Schibsby v. Westenholz (1871) 40 LJ QB 73 | Expressed the proposition: "If the defendants had been at the time of the judgment subjects of the country whose judgment is sought to be enforced against them, we think that its laws would have bound them." | Quoted to illustrate the view that nationality at the time of judgment may bind a defendant; used as authority for the proposition that nationality must exist at the date of the judgment. |
| Gavin Gibson & Co. v. Gibson (1913) 82 LJ KB 1315 | The judgment discussed earlier dicta and regarded those expressions as largely obiter but of weight. | Quoted (via Lord Atkin) to show that judicial expressions favouring nationality as the basis of jurisdiction are generally obiter dicta but influential. |
| Sirdar Gurdyal Singh v. Rajah of Faridkote (1894) AC 670 | This case was one of the authorities where nationality-related dicta appear (specific rule not restated in the provided text). | Cited as part of the body of older authority containing obiter dicta on nationality as a basis of jurisdiction; relied on for persuasive weight only as described by Lord Atkin. |
| Rousillon v. Rousillon (1800) 49 LJ Ch. 338 | One of the cases containing judicial expressions relevant to nationality and jurisdiction (specific text not reproduced). | Cited among precedents whose dicta were considered by subsequent judges; treated as part of the background debate on nationality as a jurisdictional basis. |
| Emanuel v. Symon (1908) 77 LJ KB 180 | Another authority cited in relation to the nationality question (specific rule not reproduced in the opinion). | Included among the authorities whose obiter dicta support the nationality argument; cited for their persuasive value. |
| Ramalinga Iyer v. Swaminatha Ayya, AIR 1941 Mad 683 | Held that renunciation of local nationality after the date of a decree does not affect executability if the respondent was a subject at the date of the decree. | Applied to support the proposition that nationality/status must exist at the date of the decree; cited as authority that subsequent renunciation does not alter executability. |
| Vecht v. Taylor (1917) 33 T.L.R. 317 | Principle used in Ramalinga Iyer: effect of renunciation after judgment (specific text not reproduced). | Referred to via Ramalinga Iyer as supporting the idea that subsequent change of nationality/status does not affect a prior judgment. |
| Chunnilal Kasturchand v. Dundappa Damappa, AIR 1951 Bom 190 | The opinion cites this case (specific rule not set out in the provided text). | One of several cases cited in the argumentation; identified among authorities discussed in relation to nationality and jurisdiction. |
| Dominion of India v. Hiralal, AIR 1950 Cal 12 | Cited (specific principle not reproduced in the provided text). | Referred to in discussing the question of nationality and jurisdiction; included among cited cases. |
| Bhagwan Shankar v. Rajaram, AIR 1951 Bom 125 | Listed among authorities cited in support of executability (specific rule not given in the opinion excerpt). | Cited by the respondent as supporting the contention that the decree is executable. |
| Dwarkadas Jethabhai v. Gokaldas Naranji, AIR 1952 Sau 90 | Listed among cases cited; specific rule not stated in the provided text. | Cited in support of the position that the decree is executable. |
| Mcosakulty Hajee v. Pylotu Joseph, AIR 1952 Trav-C 89 | Listed among cases cited; specific principle not reproduced. | Cited in support of executability. |
| Firm Sawai Modi, AIR 1953 Raj 204 | Listed among cases cited; the opinion does not detail the rule. | Cited in support of executability. |
| Ramdayal v. Shankarlal, AIR 1952 Hyd 80 | Listed; specific principle not set out in the excerpt. | Cited among authorities argued to support executability. |
| D.C. Machine Co. v. Syed Jahangir, AIR 1953 Hyd 19 | Listed among cited cases; rule not specified in the provided text. | Cited in support of executability. |
| Golden Knitting Co. v. Mural Traders (India) in Sind Market, Karachi, AIR 1950 Mad 293 | Listed among cases cited; the opinion excerpt does not state the principle cited. | Cited as authority by the parties; included in the body of cases relied on in argumentation. |
| Said-ul-Hamid v. Federal Indian Assurance Co. Ltd., AIR 1951 Punj 255 | Listed; specific rule not reproduced in the excerpt. | Cited in support of executability. |
| Subbaraya Setty & Sons v. Palani Chetty & Sons, AIR 1952 Mys 69 | Listed among cases cited in support of the converse position; specific rule not stated. | Cited in support of the position contrary to executability. |
| Firm Lanaji Narayan v. Purshottam Charan, AIR 1953 Madh-B 225 | Listed among authorities supporting the converse view; specific principle not reproduced. | Cited in support of the converse position (i.e., that decree is not executable). |
| Shah Premchand v. Shah Danmal, AIR 1954 Raj 4 | Listed among cases on the converse side; specific rule not provided in the excerpt. | Cited in support of the converse position. |
| Kantilal v. Dominion of India, AIR 1954 Cal 67 | Listed among cases cited for the converse position; the excerpt does not state the exact principle cited. | Cited in support of the converse position; the court noted divergence of opinion in such decisions. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court undertook a step-by-step examination limited to the material in the opinion:
- Proper court vs. competent court: The court accepted that the Coimbatore Court was a "proper court" in the sense of being authorised by local law to adjudicate the matter; however, it distinguished that concept from being a "court of competent jurisdiction" for private international law purposes. The court relied on Dicey’s summary (as quoted) that, for actions in personam, a foreign court is considered competent only in restricted situations (defendant resident/present at commencement; defendant a subject at time of judgment; or submission by conduct).
- Temporal nature of jurisdictional basis: The court emphasized Dicey's principle that, even if nationality can be a basis for jurisdiction, it must exist at the time of the decree. Because the decree in question was passed on 24-10-1949 (before the Constitution), the relevant status at that date controls.
- Nationality as basis of jurisdiction — doctrinal uncertainty: The court reviewed authorities and scholarly opinion reflecting disagreement. Some judges and writers favour nationality as a basis (cited dicta and textbooks), while others (notably Cheshire, as quoted) reject nationality "per se" as a principle of private international law. The opinion records that nationality remains an uncertain basis.
- Effect of subsequent constitutional change: The respondent argued that the inauguration of the Indian Constitution (referred to in the opinion as having been inaugurated on 28-1-1950) effected a common citizenship, making the decree executable. The court held it unnecessary to resolve the abstract question whether nationality alone suffices for jurisdiction because Dicey's formulation requires that the defendant must have been a subject of the country at the time of the decree, which was not the case here.
- Article 261(3) of the Constitution: The court cited Article 261(3) ("Final judgments or orders delivered or passed by civil courts in any part of the territory of India shall be capable of execution anywhere within that territory according to law.") but held that it has no retrospective effect and applies only to judgments and orders delivered or passed subsequent to 26-1-1950. Thus Article 261(3) could not validate a decree passed on 24-10-1949.
- Statutory change by Code of Civil Procedure (Amendment Act, 1951) (Central Act 2 of 1951): The court examined the change in the definition of "foreign court" when the Central Code came into force in the State (from Cochin definitions to "a court situate outside India..."). It observed that from 1-4-1951 the Coimbatore court ceased to be a "foreign court" under the then-applicable Code.
- Effect of Section 20 (savings) of the Central Act: The court analyzed whether a claim to resist execution on the ground that the decree was a nullity under private international law constituted a "right or privilege acquired, or accrued" under the previous Cochin Code and therefore saved by Section 20. Using Salmond's typology of rights, the court classified the defendant's entitlement to immunity from execution (where a judgment was not pronounced by a court of competent jurisdiction) as an "immunity" — a fourth-category right — which is saved by Section 20.
- Result of the analysis: Because the defendant enjoyed an immunity under the earlier Cochin Code (i.e., that a foreign judgment not pronounced by a court of competent jurisdiction was not conclusive), that immunity was saved by Section 20 of the Central Act. Therefore the subsequent change in definition of "foreign court" by the Central Act did not retrospectively deprive the defendant of that immunity.
- On the body of authorities: The court acknowledged numerous cases cited on both sides. It noted a divergence of opinion in existing decisions and stated that to the extent any decisions departed from the principles it had stated, the court would respectfully decline to follow them.
Holding and Implications
Holding: The appeal was allowed. The court concluded that the decree passed on 24-10-1949 was not a decree of a court of competent jurisdiction for the purposes of private international law at the date it was passed and that subsequent constitutional or statutory changes did not validate that decree for execution in this State. The court allowed the appeal with costs here and in the court below.
Implications:
- The direct effect of the decision is to sustain the appellant's position resisting execution of the 24-10-1949 decree in this State; the execution could not be sustained on the basis of subsequent changes in sovereignty or statutory definitions.
- The court emphasized that Article 261(3) of the Constitution does not operate retrospectively to validate judgments delivered before 26-1-1950.
- The saving provisions of Section 20 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Amendment Act, 1951) protect rights or immunities (here classified as an "immunity") that had accrued under the previous local law; therefore a later statutory redefinition of "foreign court" did not extinguish that immunity.
- The opinion records a divergence in prior decisions on this general subject and explicitly states that decisions departing from the principles laid down in this opinion will not be followed by this court. The opinion does not, however, undertake any broader constitutional pronouncement beyond the facts and statutory provisions considered.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
Menon, J.:— The question involved in this appeal relates to the execution of a decree obtained against the appellant in the court of the Subordinate Judge of Coimbatore. The decree was based on a promissory note and was passed on 24-10-1949. The appellant was not resident or present in the Province of Madras at the time the action was commenced and it is agreed that there has been no submission by him to the jurisdiction of the court which passed the decree. It is also agreed that the decree, though ‘ex parte’, was a decree on the merits.
2. It is conceded that the Coimbatore Court was a “proper court”, that is, a court which is authorised by the law of the country to which it belongs, or under whose authority it acts, to adjudicate upon the matter involved in the suit. But that is not the same thing as being a court of competent jurisdiction for the purposes of private international law. In actions ‘in personam’ a foreign court can be considered as a court of competent jurisdiction only under certain specified circumstances. The three cases in which it will be so considered are summarised by Dicey (Conflict of Laws, 6th Edn., p. 351) as fallows;
“First Case:— Where at the time of the commencement of the action the defendant was resident or present in such country; so as to have the benefit, and be under the protection, of the laws thereof.
Second Case: — (Semble) Where the defendant is at the time of the judgment in the action, a subject or citizen of such country.
Third Case:— Where the party objecting to the jurisdiction of the courts of such country has, by his own conduct, submitted to such jurisdiction, i.e, has precluded himself from objecting thereto:
(a) by appearing as plaintiff in the action or counter-claiming; or
(b) by voluntarily appearing as defendant in such action; or
(c) by having expressly or impliedly contracted to submit to the jurisdiction of such courts”.
3. It is clear from what has been stated in paragraph (1) above, and it is conceded by the respondent (subject to the argument dealt with in paragraph. 8 below) that the decree on the date it was passed was not a decree of a competent court and that at that time it was incapable of execution outside what was then British Indian territory.
4. The contention that we have to deal with in this case and which has found favour with the court below is that even though it was not possible to execute the decree in this State at the time it was passed it has since become capable of such execution by virtue of events that have transpired subsequent to the passing of the decree. The argument in essence is that consequent on the inauguration of the Indian Constitution on the 28-1-1950 there has been a change of status in respect of the appellant and the courts concerned and as a result the decree can now be executed within this State.
5. According to the decree-holder-respondent the Constitution of India introduced a common citizenship throughout the country and the appellant as a citizen of India cannot now contend that the decree of a court in the Province of Madras is a nullity on the ground that he was an absent foreigner who had not submitted to the jurisdiction of the court that passed the decree.
6. Nationality as a basis of jurisdiction in these matters is a subject of controversy. Judicial dicta is in favour of recognising the jurisdiction of foreign courts over the nationals of their country even though the defendant was not present in that country at the time the proceedings were instituted.
7. In — ‘Schibsby v. Westenholz’, (1871) 40 LJ QB 73 (A), Blackburn, J., said:
“If the defendants had been at the time of the judgment subjects of the country whose judgment is sought to be enforced against them, we think that its laws would have bound them;” & in — ‘Gavin Gibson & Co. v. Gibson’, (1913) 82 LJ KB 1315 (B), Lord Atkin after dealing with the dicta in favour of nationality forming a basis of jurisdiction in the case mentioned above, in — ‘Sirdar Gurdyal Singh v. Rajah of Faridkote’, (1894) AC 670 (C); — ‘Rousillon v. Rousillon’ (1800) 49 LJ Ch. 338 (D) and — ‘Emanuel v. Symon’, (1908) 77 LJ KB 180 (E), said:
“It will be apparent that in none of the above cases was the defendant in fact a subject of the country where the judgment sued on was pronounced nor was it claimed that he was, and the judicial expressions, above referred to are therefore in the nature of ‘obiter dicta’. They are, however, of so great weight that I should probably feel compelled to follow them.”
8. The text books are also not agreed on the subject. As stated by Graveson the proposition is accepted by Westlake, Dicey, Foote and Schmitthoff, but rejected by Cheshire. He himself is content to leave the question by saying that nationality as a basis of jurisdiction remains uncertain.
9. Cheshire deals with the question as follows:
“It remains……..to ascertain whether the fact that the defendant is a national of the foreign country where the judgment has been obtained is sufficient to render him amenable to the jurisdiction of the local courts. There is no English authority which contains an actual decision to this effect, but the truth of the proposition has been affirmed ‘obiter’ in several cases. It is also adopted by text book writers. Nevertheless it is submitted with some confidence that nationality ‘per se’ is not a reason which, on any principle recognised by private international law, can justify the exercise of jurisdiction.
The argument usually advanced in its favour, namely that ‘a subject is bound to obey the commands of his sovereign, and, therefore, the judgments of his sovereign courts’, is surely out of touch with the known facts of modern life, but, even if it is admitted, it does ‘not follow that it is the duty of another sovereign to see those commands obeyed.’ Aliegiance is all-important in public international law, but:n itself has not been a contributing element to the formation of private international law.”
10. And points out that
“to make allegiance the basis of jurisdiction is scarcely practicable in the case of the British Commonwealth.”
11. Prof. C.H Alexander of the Madras University apparently agrees with this view for in dealing with — ‘Chunnilal Kasturchand v. Dundappa Damappa’, AIR 1951 Bom 190 (F) and — ‘Dominion of India v. Hiralal’, AIR 1950 Cal 12 (G), in his article on “International Law in India” in the International and Comparative Law Quarterly Vol. I, p. 289 (299) he says:
“The question arises whether we are faced in these cases with a deviation from English private international law according to which nationality and allegiance do not justify the exercise of jurisdiction, though they are an important element in public international law. It seems probable that there is rather a confusion of ideas than a deviation.”
12. Tne decree in this case was passed on 24-10-1949, that is, prior to the Constitution, and so it is unnecessary for us to consider whether nationality by itself will afford a sufficient basis for jurisdiction. Dicey's formulation makes it clear that even if nationality is an acceptable basis the defendant must have been a subject of the country in which the decree was passed at the time of the decree and not subsequent thereto.
13. In — ‘Ramalinga Iyer v. Swaminatha Ayya’, AIR 1941 Mad 683 (H) the court had to deal with a case in which a subject of the Cochin State contended that a decree of the District Court of Trichur given in his absence and without submission was not executable against him in the Province of Madras on the ground that he had renounced his Cochin nationality subsequent to the date of the decree. The Madras High Court negatived the contention and following the principle of — ‘Vecht v. Taylor’, (1917) 33 T.L.R 317 (I) said:
“If the respondent was a Cochin State subject at the date of the passing of the decree any declaration renouncing his Cochin nationality after the passing of the decree would leave the position unchanged.”
14. Mr. Ramanan, learned counsel for the respondent, attempted to get over the difficulty by insisting that the common allegiance should be deemed to have commenced not on 20-1-1950 with the inauguration of the Constitution but from 14-7-1949, the date of the Instrument of Accession executed by His Highness the Rajpramukh of Travancore-Cochin. We feel it unnecessary to consider this argument and the scope and effect of the Instrument of Accession in the light of the principles we have discussed and dealt with in the paragraphs that follow.
15. The question that remains to be considered is whether as a result of the Constitution there has been a change in the status of the Madras and Cochin courts by which foreignness has disappeared and the decree has now become executable in this State. Article 261(3) of the Constitution provides that:
“Final judgments or orders delivered or passed by civil courts in any part of the territory of India shall be capable of execution anywhere within that territory according to law.”
16. There can be no doubt that this provision has no retrospective effect and that it will apply only to judgments and orders delivered or passed subsequent to the 26-1-1950. It is clear from the provision, however, that the makers of the Constitution realised that but for such a provision the judgment of one of the States of India will be regarded as a foreign judgment in every other State in the country in spite of the evolution of a common Indian federation. There was no such full faith and credit clause in the Instrument of Accession of the 14-7-1949.
17. In a federation for all national purposes embraced by the federal Constitution the State is of course one, united under the same sovereign and authority and governed by the same laws. But in other respects the States are necessarily foreign to and independent of each other and a foreign judgment for purposes of private international law need not necessarily be of a State owing a different allegiance. It is enough if it is the judgment of another independent or unconnected jurisdiction and as to whether it is of an independent or unconnected jurisdiction will have to be decided according to the law in force in the State where execution is sought.
18. Scotland and Ireland, for example, having been treated as foreign countries from the point of view of private international law and before the Judgments Extension Act, 1868, as pointed out by Cheshire (Private International Law, 4th Edn., p. 590):
“a plaintiff who had obtained judgment in either of these countries and who desired to enforce it against the defendant in England was in no better position than if he had obtained his judgment in some country which did not form part of the United Kingdom.”
19. The Code of Civil Procedure in force in Cochin until 1-4-1951 was Act 29 of 1111. Section 2(5) of that Act defined the expression “foreign court” as meaning “a court having no authority in cochin” and S. 2(6) defined the expression “foreign judgment” as meaning “the judgment of a foreign Court*. As a result of the Code of Civil Procedure (Amendment Act, 1951)(Central Act 2 of 1951) the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, came into force in the State with effect from the 1-4-1951 and from that date the definition of the expression “foreign court” was changed to:
“a court situate outside India and not established or continued by the authority of the Central Government.”
20. There can be no doubt that the Coimbatore court has from 1-4-1951 ceased to be a foreign court under the Code of Civil Procedure in force in this State and the only question is, what, if any, is the effect of the change introduced by Act 2 of 1951.
21. Section 20 of the Act provides:
“(1) If, immediately before the date on which the said Code conies into force in any Part B State, there is in force in that State any law corresponding to the said Code, that law shall on that date stand repealed.
Provided that the repeal shall not affect—
(a) the previous operation of any law so repealed or anything duly done or suffered thereunder, or
(b) any right, privilege, obligation or liability acquired, accrued or incurred under any law so repealed, or
(c) any investigation, legal proceeding or remedy in respect of any such right, privilege, obligation, liability, penalty, forfeiture or punishment as aforesaid, and any such investigation, legal proceedings or remedy may be instituted, continued or enforced, & any such penalty, forfeiture or punishment may be imposed as if this Act had not been passed.
(2) Subject to the provisions contained in sub-section (1), notifications published, declarations and rules made, places appointed, agreements filed, scales prescribed, forms framed, appointments made and powers conferred under any enactment hereby repealed shall, so far as they are consistent with the said Code, have the same force & effect as if they had been respectively published, made, appointed, filed, prescribed, framed and conferred under the said Code and by the authority empowered thereby in such behalf.
(3) In every law or notification passed or issued before the commencement of this Act in which reference is made to or to any Chapter or section or any law hereby repealed, such reference shall, so far as may be practicable, be taken to be made to the said Code or its corresponding. Part, Order, section or rule”.
22. And the question really resolves into the further question as to whether a claim to resist execution on the ground that the decree sought to be executed is a ??? under the rules of private-international law “is a right or privilege acquired, or accrued” under the Cochin Code of Civil Procedure by virtue of the definitions of the expression “foreign court” and “foreign judgment” embodied therein and S. fl of that Code which provided that a foreign judgment shall not be conclusive “where it has not been pronounced by a court of competent jurisdiction”.
23. As stated by Salmond (Jurisprudence, 10th Edn., p. 245) there are four classes of rights conferred by the law:
“Right in the strict sense, when the law limits me liberty of others in my behail, liberty, when the law allows to my will a sphere of unrestrained activity; power, when the law actively assists me in making my will effective; immunity, when the law denies to others a particular power over me.
A right in the narrow sense is that which other persons ‘ought’ to go on my behalf; a liberty is that which I may do innocently; a power is that which I can do effectively; an immunity is that which other persons ‘cannot’ an effectively in respect of me. I enjoy my rights through the control exercised by the law over the acts of others on my behalf; I use my liberties with the acquiescence of the law; I use my powers with its active assistance in making itself the instrument of my will; I use my immunities through its refusal to accord this active assistance to others.”
24. Immunity according to him is “exemption from, the power of another” and the defendant's right in this case to immunity from execution on the ground that the decree is a nullity as far as the Cochin courts are concerned by virtue of the definitions of foreign court and foreign judgment, in the Cochin Code of Civil Procedure and the provisions of ??? of that Code which provided that a foreign judgment shall not be conclusive where it has not; been pronounced by a Court of competent jurisdiction must necessarily be considered as a right of the fourth category saved by S. 20 of Act 2 of-1951.
25. ‘Bhagwan Shankar v. Rajaram’, AIR 1951 Bom 125 (FB)(J-K): — ‘Chunnilal Kasturchand v. Liundappa Damappa’, AIR 1951 Bom 190 (F): — ‘Dwarkadas Jethabhai v. Gokaldas Naranji’, AIR 1952 Sau 90 (FB)(L): — ‘Mcosakulty Hajee v. Pylotu Joseph’, AIR 1952 Trav-C 89 (M); — ‘??? v. Firm Sawai Modi’. AIR 1953 Raj 204 (FB)(N); — ‘Ramdayal v. Shankarlal’, AIR 1952 Hyd 80 (FB)(O); — ‘D.C Machine Co. v. Syed Jahangir’, AIR 1953 Hyd 19 (P); — ‘AIR 1950 Cal 12 (G)’, — ‘Golden Knitting Co. v. Mural Traders (India) in Sind Market, Karachi’, AIR 1950 Mad 293 (Q); and — ‘Said-ul-Hamid v. Federal Indian Assurance Co. Ltd., New Delhi’. AIR 1951 Punj 255 (R), were cited before us in support of the contention that the decree is executable and — ‘Subbaraya Setty & Sons v. Palani Chetty & Sons’, AIR 1952 Mys 69 (S) — ‘Firm Lanaji Narayan v. Purshottam Charan’, AIR 1953 Madh-B 225 (T); — ‘Shah Premchand v. Shah Danmal’, AIR 1954 Raj 4 (U) and — ‘Kantilal v. Dominion of India’, AIR 1954 Cal 67 (V) in support of the converse position. The divergence of opinion is essentially based on the nature and scope of the political changes that have taken place in this country and their effect on citizenship and the courts of the various States. To the extent these decisions depart from what we have stated above we must respectfully decline to follow them. In the light of what is stated above the appeal has to be allowed and we do so with costs here and in the court below.
A/M.K.S
26. Appeal allowed.
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