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The Jamath Mosque v. Vakhan Joseph Counter Petitioner.

Kerala High Court
Mar 10, 1955
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Structured Summary of the Opinion — Menon, J.

Factual and Procedural Background

The opinion concerns two revision petitions by the Jamath Mosque of Koehangadi seeking to vacate orders of the learned Temporary Additional District Judge of Anjikaimal in M.P. Nos. 561 and 576 of 1952. Those M.P. matters relate respectively to A.S. Nos. 214 and 216 of 1123. The Mosque prayed for posting of the concerned appeals for hearing and disposal.

The appeals originate from O.S. 270 of 1121, a suit filed by the Mosque before the Court of the District Munsiff, Cochin. The decretal portion of that judgment (quoted in the opinion) granted the Mosque a decree for surrender of the scheduled properties, arrears of rent, future pattom as per the Cochin Verumpattomdars Act, damages for waste, directions about payment of values of improvements to certain defendants, and specified rules for costs and commission.

When the appeals came up for hearing on 24-3-1950, they were stayed by a consent order under Proclamation No. VI of 1124 issued by His Highness the Maharaja of Cochin. The Mosque's case was that the consent was given under a misapprehension, that the stay was wrong and should be held inoperative because the Proclamation violated Articles 14, 19(1)(f) and 31 of the Constitution. It was accepted by the parties that if the Proclamation is intra vires the Constitution, the stay is correct and should be maintained.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether Proclamation No. VI of 1124 (Maharaja of Cochin) is intra vires the Constitution, specifically insofar as it is alleged to violate Article 14 (equality), Article 19(1)(f) (right to acquire, hold and dispose of property) and Article 31 (compulsory acquisition / substantial deprivation of property).
  2. If the Proclamation is not intra vires, whether the consent stay orders of 24-3-1950 maintaining stay of the appeals should be vacated.
  3. Whether the indefinite duration (Section 6) and the staying of eviction and recovery of certain pattom under Ss. 1 and 2 of the Proclamation amount to unreasonable restrictions on rights under Article 19(1)(f).

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's (Jamath Mosque) Arguments

  • The consent to the stay was given under misapprehension and thus the stay ordered in the appeals was wrong.
  • The Proclamation No. VI of 1124 is unconstitutional and inoperative after 26-1-1950 because it violates Articles 14, 19(1)(f) and 31 of the Constitution.
  • The Proclamation improperly suspends eviction for an indefinite period and denies the coconut pattom directed under Section 5 of the Cochin Verumpattomdars Act, thereby making further inroads into landlord rights.
  • A related contention (as presented) was that the restrictions acquire an unreasonable character because Section 6 does not specify a definite period of operation.

Respondent / Government-Related Arguments (as reflected in the opinion)

  • The Proclamation was promulgated to consolidate and amend landlord-tenant law and to stay certain actions pending legislation; it is in the interests of the general public (no contention was advanced that it was not).
  • Distinctions in tenancy legislation between Cochin and Travancore have legislative justification and are addressed by subsequent legislative measures (for example, the Holdings (Stay of Execution Proceedings) Act 1950 and amendments).
  • Even if the restrictions were held unreasonable, the petitioner might not be entitled to relief because the orders of 24-3-1950 staying the trial of the two appeals were consent orders passed after the Constitution came into force (this point was relied upon by respondents, though the Court found it unnecessary to decide in light of its primary conclusion).

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
State of Bombay v. Bhanji Munji, AIR 1955 SC 41 To show that Articles 19(1)(f) and 31 deal with different subjects and do not overlap. Used to support the proposition that one must determine whether Article 31 is attracted only where there is substantial deprivation; consequently Article 19(1)(f) and Article 31 are distinct inquiries.
State of West Bengal v. Subodh Gonal Bose, AIR 1954 SC 92 Authority for the non-overlap between Articles 19(1)(f) and 31 (as cited alongside other cases). Cited with other cases to establish that Articles 19(1)(f) and 31 cover different fields and do not overlap.
Dwarkadas Shrinivas v. Sholapur Spinning and Weaving Co. Ltd., AIR 1954 SC 119 Support for the proposition that Articles 19(1)(f) and 31 are distinct; and the concept of "substantial deprivation" of property. Relied on to explain the meaning of "substantial deprivation" and to conclude Article 31 is not engaged because landlords retained substantial rights.
A.K. Gopalan v. State of Madras, AIR 1950 SC 27 Illustrates that Article 19 freedoms presuppose the existence of the subject matter (e.g., property or liberty); if substantially deprived, recourse is to Article 31. Applied to show that if there were a substantially total deprivation of property, Article 31 would be the relevant provision — but here that condition was not met.
Chintamanrao v. State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1951 SC 118 Defines the test of "reasonable restriction" (limitation must not be arbitrary or excessive; must strike proper balance with the right). The Court applied this articulation of reasonableness to assess whether the Proclamation's restrictions on property rights under Article 19(1)(f) were permissible.
State of Madras v. V.G. Row, AIR 1952 SC 196 Explains that the test of reasonableness is contextual and must consider right infringed, purpose of restriction, extent/urgency of evil, disproportion, and prevailing conditions. Used to frame the multi-factor inquiry the Court applied in determining if the Proclamation's restrictions were reasonable on the relevant date.
Dr. N.B. Khare v. State of Delhi, AIR 1950 SC 211 Affirms that the reasonableness test is an objective one judged by the "prudent man" standard rather than subjective satisfaction. Invoked to emphasize that the Court must apply an external yardstick of reasonableness when evaluating the Proclamation.
Saghir Ahmad v. State of U.P., AIR 1954 SC 728 Holds that when legislation appears to violate a fundamental right, those who support the legislation must show it falls within the permissible exception; burden of proof lies on them. Cited as authority for the allocation of burden; the Court recognized the presumption of constitutionality but noted that those supporting restrictions must justify them.
Bhaskar Narayan v. Mohd. Alimullakhan, AIR 1953 Nag 40 Support for the principle that the legislature's assessment of the need for restrictions is entitled to deference. Applied to stress that the judgment of the legislature (or analogous authority) on the need for restrictions is accorded weight, particularly when read with the Proclamation's preamble.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court's analysis proceeded in discrete steps. Below is a concise reconstruction of that reasoning strictly as presented in the opinion.

  1. Scope of challenge and preliminary observation: The Mosque challenged Proclamation VI of 1124 on the basis that it violated Articles 14, 19(1)(f) and 31. The Court observed that if the Proclamation is intra vires the Constitution then the consent stay is correct and must be maintained.
  2. Article 14 (Equality): The Court treated the contention under Article 14 as an exaggeration. The Mosque's submission that landlords like the Jamath Mosque were placed "altogether outside the pale of the law" was rejected. The Court also noted that differentiation between Cochin and Travancore tenancy law had legislative justification (and referred to later legislative measures such as the Holdings (Stay of Execution Proceedings) Act 1950), concluding that mere differentiation does not invalidate legislation absent lack of valid foundation.
  3. Relation between Articles 19(1)(f) and 31: The Court accepted the now-settled position that Articles 19(1)(f) and 31 cover different fields and do not overlap. It relied on cited precedents to conclude that Article 31 is engaged only in cases of "substantial deprivation" of property. Applying that test, the Court held that there was no substantial deprivation of landlords' rights in this case and therefore Article 31 did not arise.
  4. Primary focus — Article 19(1)(f): Having ruled Article 31 inapplicable, the Court considered whether the Proclamation's restrictions implicated Article 19(1)(f) and if so whether they were "reasonable" under Clause (5). The Court observed Clause (5) permits reasonable restrictions in the interests of the general public (or for protection of Scheduled Tribes, which was not relevant here). No party contended the Proclamation was not in the public interest.
  5. Test of reasonableness applied: The Court adopted established principles: (a) a restriction must not be arbitrary or excessive and must strike a proper balance (Chintamanrao), (b) reasonableness must be judged with reference to the nature of the right, purpose of the restriction, extent and urgency of the evil, disproportion, and prevailing conditions (State of Madras v. V.G. Row) and (c) the standard is objective (Dr. N.B. Khare). The Court also reiterated that those who support a restriction bear the burden of establishing that it falls within permissible limits (Saghir Ahmad), while recognizing the presumption of constitutionality that attends legislative measures (including a Proclamation).
  6. Application to the Proclamation: Reading Section 6 together with the Proclamation's preamble, the Court interpreted the Proclamation's duration as limited to the period necessary for the government to enact the contemplated legislation — in other words, until the proposals were embodied in statute and became part of Cochin law. The Court found the restrictions of Ss. 1 and 2 of the Proclamation were reasonable and necessary to safeguard tenants' interests pending enactment of legislation. The fact that delay (resulting from integration of Travancore and Cochin and constitutional changes) had occurred did not alter the reasonableness of the restrictions as of the crucial date, 26-1-1950.
  7. Consent orders and final disposition: Because the Court concluded the Proclamation's restrictions were reasonable, it held it unnecessary to decide the respondents' alternative contention that the petitioner was not entitled to relief because the stay orders were consent orders passed after the Constitution came into force. Ultimately the petitions were dismissed with costs.

Holding and Implications

Holding: Petitions dismissed. The Court dismissed the two revision petitions of the Jamath Mosque with costs.

Implications / Consequences:

  • The consent stay of the appeals (orders of 24-3-1950 made under Proclamation No. VI of 1124) stands because the Court held the Proclamation to be intra vires the Constitution on the grounds discussed.
  • The Court found no substantial deprivation of landlord property rights that would engage Article 31; the relevant inquiry was under Article 19(1)(f) and the Proclamation's restrictions were held to be reasonable as of 26-1-1950.
  • The decision addresses only the direct controversy between the parties (dismissing the petitions and upholding the stay). The opinion does not purport to lay down a new precedent broadening constitutional doctrine beyond its application of existing authorities; it resolves the petitions on application of existing principles and authorities cited in the opinion.

End of summary — all statements above are confined to and derived from the text of the provided opinion.

Show all summary ...

Menon, J.:— These are two revision petitions by the Jamath Mosque of Koehangadi and the orders sought to be vacated are the orders of the learned Temporary Additional District Judge of Anjikaimal in M.P Nos. 561 and 576 of 1952. M.P No. 561 of 1352 relates to A.S 214 of 1123 and M.P 576 of 1952 to A.S No. 216 of 1123. The prayer in both the petitions was for a posting of the concerned appeals for hearing and disposal.

2. The appeals arise from O.S 270 of 1121, a suit filed by the petitioner before the Court of the District Munsiff, Cochin. The decretal portion of the judgment reads as fallows:

“In the result the plaintiff mosque is given a decree for surrender of the plaint schedule properties with arrears of rent as claimed in the plaint as also future pattom as per the provisions of the Verumpattomdars Act. Plaintiffs are also entitled to Rs. 58-8-0 as damages for waste. Plaintiffs will deposit Rs. 935-0-8 due to the 3rd defendant, Rs. 22-3-0 due to the 4th defendant and Rs. 804-14-4 due to the 5th defendant as value of their respective improvements.

Personal relief is allowed only for arrears in respect of the last 6 years. Set off is allowed between the plaintiffs and defendants 5 and 4. The plaintiffs will get their costs from the 3rd and 4th defendants. Defendants will bear their costs. Plaintiffs and defendants 3 and 4 will share the commission batta in equal proportions. Plaintiffs will pay 3rd defendant the amounts covered by Est. III series.”

3. The appeals were stayed — it was a consent order — under the Proclamation of His Highness the Maharaja of Cochin, No. VI of 1124, when they came up for hearing on 24-3-1950. The petitioner's case is that the consent was given under a misapprehension, that the stay directed was wrong, and that it should be deemed to be inoperative on the ground that the Proclamation violates Articles 14, 19(1)(f) and 31 of the Constitution. It is not disputed that if the Proclamation is intra vires of the Constitution, the stay ordered is correct and should be maintained. The only contention is that even though the Proclamation was promulgated prior to the Constitution, its continued operation after 26-1-1950 is hit by the Articles above mentioned.

4. Proclamation opens with the words:

“WHEREAS Government intend to consolidate and amend the law relating to landlord and tenant; and whereas it is considered expedient, pending the enactment of such legislation, to stay the collection and recovery of pattom in excess of the pattom payable in money specified in the contract of tenancy in respect of garden lands the major produce of which is coconut and to prevent the eviction of certain classes of tenants and kudikidappukars from their holdings; We are hereby pleased to command as follows:”

5. And concludes with Section 6:

“This Proclamation shall be in force until such time as Government may, by notification in the Cochin Government Gazette, determine.”

6. It is admitted by the Mosque that the lease involved in A.S Nos. 214 and 216 of 1123 is a verunipattom lease of lands situate outside the limits of the Municipalities constituted under the Cochin Municipal Act. XVIII of 1113, and hence coming within the ambit of the Cochin Verumpattomdars Act, VIII of 1118. That Act conferred fixity of tenure on verampattom tenants and the grounds on which eviction was possible after that Act came into force was only on any one of the six grounds enumerated in S. 8 of that enactment viz.:

“(a) that he has wilfully denied the title of the jenmi or of any intermediate landlord between himself and the jenmi before the date of such suit;

(b) that he has intentionally and wilfully committed such acts of waste as are calculated to impair materially and permanently the value or utility of the holding;

(c) that he has not paid the pattom due in respect of the holding or the revenue, cess, tax or special charges, if any, specified in Section 6;

(d) that lie has not paid within six months from the commencement of this Act the entire arrears of pattom, if any, due in respect of the holding at the commencement of this Act;

(e) that he has intentionally or otherwise allowed a stranger to encroach on the holding or part thereof adversely to the interests of the ‘jenmi’ or any intermediate landlord between himself and the jenmi;

(f) that at the end of the agricultural year the ‘jenmi’ or any intermediate landlord requires the holding or part thereof, except the Kudiyiruppu ‘bona fide’ for building residential quarters for the use of himself or for any member of his family or tarwad or thavazhi who has a beneficial or proprietary interest therein.”

7. The complaint of the Mosque is that Proclamation VI of 1124 makes still further inroads into the rights of the landlord—inroads which violate the Constitution — by suspending eviction for an indefinite period and denying the coconut pattom directed under Section 5 of the Cochin Verumpattomdars Act, VIII of 1118. The provisions in that behalf are those embodied in Ss. 1 and 2 of the Act:

“1. Notwidistanding anything contained in the Cochin Verumpattomdars Act, VIII of 1118, (hereinafter referred to as the Act) or in any other Law for the time being in force, no suit for eviction of a verumpattomdar to whom the provisions of the Act apply, shall be maintainable in Our Courts on the ground that he has not paid the pattom due in respect of the holding or the revenue, cess, tax or special charges, if any, specified in Section of the Act, and all suits, appeals, revisions, reviews and proceedings in execution of a decree shall be stayed by OUR Courts in so far only as they relate to the relief for eviction of such verumpattomdar on the ground mentioned in Clause (c) of sub-section (I) of Section 8 of the Act.

2. (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (2) of Section 5 of the Act, where coconut is the major produce of a garden land and the pattom fixed therefor under the contract of tenancy is payable by the verumpattomdar in money, the collection or recovery by the lessor of the pattom in excess of the amount payable in money specified in the contract of tenancy is, in respect of the pattom payable from 1st Chingom 1124, hereby stayed.

(2) Where a verumpattomdar to whom the provisions of sub-section (1) apply has by himself or through his predecessor-in-interest been holding the garden land at the commencement of the Act as a Verumpattomdar and has renewed the contract of tenancy after the commencement of the Act and undertaken to pay pattom in kind or a higher pattom in money, the collection or recovery of the pattom payable by him in excess of the pattom in money fixed in the contract of tenancy subsisting immediately prior to the commencement of the Act is, in respect of the pattom payable from the day of Chingoni 1124, hereby stayed.”

8. Article 14 of the Constitution enshrines the right to equality and provides that “the State shall not deny to any person equality before the law or the equal protection of the laws within the territory of India”. The contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the effect of the Proclamation is to place landlords like the Jamath Mosque altogether outside the pale of the law and thus deny them equality with those who are within the pale is an obvious exaggeration which it is impossible to accept.

9. His further contention is the more familiar one of discrimination as between the Cochin and Travancore portions of this State. The development of tenancy legislation in the two States has not been uniform, and a complete identity of provisions in every respect cannot but be a matter for the future.

10. The legislative history provides an ample justification for the differences that obtain and the desire of the legislature to ensure parity of treatment is clear from the Holdings (Stay of Execution Proceedings) Act 1950, and the amendments thereto. This should be sufficient to dispose of the contention based on Article 14 of the Constitution. Differentiation by itself does not make a piece of legislation obnoxious. It is the lack of a valid foundation for the differentiation that indicates the view and abrogates a statute.

11. The other arguments urged before us were based on Articles 19(1)(f) and 31 of the Constitution. It must now be taken as settled law that the two Articles do not Overlap and that it is not possible to take shelter under both, of them at the same time. The distinction between the two Articles in so far as it is material for the disposal of the petitions before as is clearly brought out in the allowing extract from the judgment in — ‘State of Bombay v. Bhanji Munji’, (S) AIR 1955 SC 41 (A):

“In — ‘State of West Bengal v. Subodh Gonal Bose’, AIR 1954 SC 92 (B) and — ‘Dwarkadas Shrinivas v. Sholapur Spinning and Weaving Co. Ltd.”, AIR 1954 SC 119 (C) the majority of the fudges were agreed that Articles 19(1)(f) and 31 deal with different subjects and cover different fields. There was some disagreement about the nature and scope of the difference but all were agreed that there was no overlapping.

We need not examine those differences here because it is enough to say that Article 19(1)(f) read with Clause (5) postulates the existence of property which can be enjoyed and over which right can be exercised because otherwise the reasonable restrictions contemplated by Clause (5) could not be brought into play.

If there is no property which can be acquired, held or disposed of, no restriction can be placed on the exercise of the right to acquire, hold and dispose of it, and as Clause (5) contemplates the placing of reasonable restrictions on the exercise of those rights it must follow that the Article postulates the existence of property over which those rights can be exercised. In our opinion, this was decided in principle in — ‘A.K Gopalan v. State Of Madras.’, AIR 1950 SC 27 (D), where it was held that the freedoms relating to the person or a citizen guaranteed by Article 19 assume the existence of a free citizen and can no longer be enjoyed if a citizen is deprived of his liberty by the law of preventive or punitive detention.

In the same way when there is a substantially total deprivation of property which is already held and enjoyed, one must turn to Article 31 to see how far that is justified.”

12. Substantial deprivation means “the sort of deprivation that substantially robs a man of those attributes of enjoyment which normally accompany rights to, or an interest in, property” (AIR 1954 SC 119 (C)) leaving behind if at all, just a “mere husk” or an “illusory phantom” of there it is only in such cases that Article 31 is attracted and as there is no such deprivation in this case and substantial rights still remain with the landlord we must hold that the question of the ultra vires character of Proclamation VI of 1124, vis-a-vis, Article 31 of the Constitution does not arise for consideration at all.

13. Tho only question, therefore, that remains to be considered is the result, if any, of the impact of Article 19(1)(f) on the provisions of the Proclamation on 26-1-1950. The right “to acquire, hold and dispose of property” is the sixth of the seven fundamental rights guaranteed by Article 19 of the Constitution and it can be affected or abridged only in accordance with Ci. (5) of the said Article which provides that nothing in Cl. (1)(d), (e) and (f) “shall affect the operation of any existing law in so far as it imposes, or prevent the State from making any law imposing, reasonable restrictions on the exercise of any of the lights conferred by the said subclauses either in the interests of the general public or for the protection of the interests or any Scheduled Tribe.”

14. We are not concerned with a law “for the protection of the interests of any Scheduled Tribe”. The expression “general public” is wide enough to include a section of the public and the removal of the grievances of a particular section is very often in the interests of the public generally. There wast no contention before is that Proclamation VI of 1124 is not “in the interests of the general public.”

15. The only contention was that the restriction's imposed by Ss. I and 2 of the said Proclamation cannot be considered as “reasonable restrictions” on the right “to acquire, hold and dispose of property” conferred by Article 19(1)(f) of the Constitution.

16. The principles that govern the test of reasonableness are well established and can be summed this in the words of — ‘Chintamamao v. State of Madhya Pradesh’, AIR 1951 SC 118 (E), a case dealing with the fundamental right “to practice any profession, or to carry on any occupation, trade or business”.

“The phrase “reasonable restriction” connotes that the limitation imposed on a person in enjoyment of the right should not be arbitrary or of an excessive nature, beyond that is required in the interests of the public. The word “Reasonable” implies intelligent care and deliberation, that is, the’ choice of a course which reason dictates.

Legislation which arbitrarily or excessively invades the right cannot be said to contain the quality of reasonableness and unless it strikes a proper balance between the, freedom guaranteed in Article 19(1)(g) and the social control permitted by Cl. (6) of Article 19, it must be held to be wanting in that quality.”

17. The observations apply with equal force to clauses, 2 to 6 of Article 19 of the Constitution and so does the following passage from the judgment in. — ‘State Of Madras v. V.G Row”, AIR 1952 SC 196 (E):

“It is important in this context to bear in mind that the test of reasonableness, wherever prescribed, should be applied to each individual statute impugned, and no abstract standard, or general pattern of reasonableness can be laid down as applicable to all cases. The nature of the right alleged to have been infringed, the underlying purpose of the restrictions imposed, the extent and urgency of the evil sought to be remedied thereby, the disproportion of the imposition, the prevailing conditions at the time, should all enter into the judicial verdict.”

18. It has also to be borne in mind that what is involved in these matters is an objective standard, not a subjective one, an “external yard stick”, the standard of the prudent man. In other words, what we have to ask ourselves is not whether we as individuals feel satisfied that the restrictions are reasonable; but whether the normal, average, reasonable man would regard them as reasonable or not: — ‘Dr. N.B Khare (Dr.) v. State Of Delhi. AIR 1950 SC 211 (C).

19. There can be no doubt that in final analysis the burden of proving the reasonableness of any restriction on fundamental rights will be on those who seek to support the restriction, it is this and this alone that has been laid down in the following passage from — ‘Saghir Ahmad v. State of U.P’, AIR 1954 SC 728 (H) on which great reliance was placed by the learned counsel for the petitioner.

“When the enactment on the face of it is found to violate a fundamental right guaranteed under Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution, it must be held to be invalid unless those who support the legislation can bring it within the purview of the exception laid down in Clause (6) of the Article. If the respondents do not place any materials before the Court to establish that the legislation comes within the permissible limits of Clause (6), it is surely not for the appellants to prove negatively that the legislation was not reasonable and was not conducive to the welfare of the community.”

20. There is a presumption that the laws passed by a legislature are valid and intra vires, that they come “sheathed in the armour wrought by prior legislative deliberation” and the sentence immediately preceding the passage extracted above is:

“There is undoubtedly a presumption in favour of the constitutionality of a legislation”.

21. The presumption is available whether the provision impugned is the product of a democratic legislature or a Proclamation, as in this case, of His Highness the Maharaja of Cochin. There is no justification for the distinction based on the legislative source and none was attempted to be made by the learned counsel for the petitioner.

22. We cannot also forget that the question of “Reasonableness” alone is justiciable and that:

“It is for the legislature to scrutinize the need for restrictions and also, in the first instance, to decide upon their reasonableness. As to the need for restrictions, the judgment of the legislature must be regarded as final as has been so often laid down by their Lordships of the Privy Council.’ ‘Bhaskar Narayan v. Mohd. Alimullakhan’, AIR 1953 Nag 40 (I).

23. It can hardly be disputed in the light of the Preamble to the Proclamation that the restrictions embodied in Ss. 1 and 2 are not only reasonable but necessary to safeguard the interests of the tenants until the proposals contemplated are passed into law. We understood the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner to be based not so much on any intrinsic unreasonableness in the restrictions themselves as on the assumption that those restrictions acquire an unreasonable character for lack of a specified and definite period of operation.

24. It is true that S. 6 only provides that the Proclamation “shall be in force until such time as Government may, by notification in the Cochin Government Gazette, determine”; but the section has to be read along with the Preamble and when so read it becomes quite clear that the duration contemplated was no more than the period of time necessary for embodying the proposals in a legislative enactment and making it a part of the statute law of Cochin.

25. That a considerable amount of delay has as a matter of fact been occasioned consequent on the integration of the States of Travancore and Cochin and the new and extraordinary demands on administrative and legislative ‘time’ that the constitutional changes in this country have involved cannot colour our judgment or affect the issue as to whether the restrictions were reasonable as on the crucial date, viz., 26-1-1950.

26. In the view we have taken, that the restrictions are reasonable, it is unnecessary for us to consider the contention urged on behalf of the respondents that even if the restrictions are held to be unreasonable the petitioner is not entitled to succeed as the orders of 24-3-1950 staying the trial of the two appeals were consent orders passed after the Constitution came into force. It follows that these petitions must fail and they are hereby dismissed with costs.

27. Petitions dismissed.