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Narayana Pillai Kunjunni Piliai v. Narayana Pillai Bhaskaran Pillai And Others
Structured Summary of the Opinion (Subramonia Iyer, J.)
Factual and Procedural Background
The Full Bench reference arose because of a conflict in earlier reported decisions of the erstwhile Travancore High Court on the question whether a member or a branch of a Malabar tarwad who is allotted properties for purposes of maintenance is entitled to claim compensation for improvements before dispossession in connection with a suit for partition or otherwise.
Facts (as stated in the opinion): In the year 1065 there was an arrangement in the tarwad that divided properties into three parts. One portion was placed in the possession of one sakha, another portion in possession of the other sakha; the third portion was meant for the maintenance of the karnavan of the tarwad for the time being and for certain charities. Neither sakha was accountable for the income of the properties allotted to the other sakha nor was the karnavan accountable for income derived from the sakhas' properties.
The plaintiff and the defendants belong to the two sakhas respectively. The first defendant became karnavan in 1095 and a house (item No. 4 in the plaint) and other improvements were put up upon property allotted to the defendants' sakha. In the partition suit the first defendant (in his written statement) and the 4th defendant claimed compensation for improvements effected by their sakha. The 4th defendant later did not appear and the suit proceeded without him. The first defendant, when examined as a witness (D.W.4), stated that he had incurred the cost of the house and other improvements.
The Munsiff decreed partition and directed that if possible the site of the building (item No. 4) be allotted to the defendants' sakha; the Munsiff found no value could be given for other improvements. On appeal the District Judge upheld the claim for improvements and assessed a value. The Courts below concurrently found that the 1065 arrangement was not an outright partition. The 4th defendant (by second appeal) challenged that finding and sought enhanced compensation; the plaintiff filed cross-objections challenging the appellate decree for improvements. The first defendant died pending the appeal in the Court below.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether a member or a branch of a Malabar tarwad to whom properties are allotted for the purpose of maintenance is entitled to claim compensation for improvements effected on those properties before dispossession in connection with a suit for partition or otherwise.
- Whether the arrangement of the year 1065 constituted an outright partition (this point was raised on appeal but was concurrently found against the appellant by the Courts below and was not the only issue pressed before the Full Bench).
Arguments of the Parties
Defendants' (Appellants') Arguments
- The sakha (branch) of the defendants effected various improvements on the property allotted to it and therefore claimed compensation for those improvements in the partition suit (as asserted in written statements by the first and the 4th defendants).
- The first defendant, in his oral evidence (D.W.4), stated that the house and other improvements were put up and effected by him at his own cost (implying a claim for compensation or recognition of an equitable claim).
- The 4th defendant separately made a similar claim on behalf of his sakha in a written statement (though he later did not appear further in the proceedings).
Plaintiff-Respondent's Position
- The plaintiff challenged the lower appellate court's decree awarding improvements to the defendants by filing a memorandum of cross-objections. The memorandum claimed 1/24th of the value of improvements awarded to the defendants' sakha, reference to the plaintiff's 1/24th share of the entire property being the basis for that fraction.
- The cross-objection's practical effect, as the Court construed it, was to negativate the exclusive entitlement claimed by the defendants to the value of improvements (i.e., the plaintiff sought his fractional share of such value consistent with his interest in the property).
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Narayana Pillai v. Raman Pillai, 29 Trav LJ 220 (A) | Held that an allottee of properties for the purpose of maintenance is not entitled to claim compensation for improvements. | Identified as one of the decisions taking the view that maintenance allottees cannot claim compensation; relied upon for the proposition that such claims are not sustainable. |
| Narayani Amma v. Lekshmi Amma, 30 Trav LJ 754 (B) | Reported decision taking a view different from the earlier view (i.e., it did not follow the view that maintenance allottees are precluded from compensation). | Noted as a conflicting earlier Travancore High Court decision; the Full Bench observed that this case's view differed from the other reported decisions. |
| Raman Pillai v. Raghavan Pillai, 30 Trav LJ 737 (C) | Took the view that an allottee of properties for maintenance is not entitled to compensation for improvements (aligned with A). | Noted among the decisions supporting non-entitlement; part of the conflicting body of Travancore High Court authority prompting the Full Bench reference. |
| Thanu Pillai v. Mathevan Pillai, AIR 1951 Trav-C 98 (Full Bench) (D) | Addressed whether improvements by a karnavan constitute an "acquisition" under S.40 of the Travancore Nayar Act; held they do not. The opinion contains the statement: “The trees planted by a Karnavan in the ordinary course of husbandry cannot be treated as acquisitions falling within S.40 of the Act. The karnavan's claim under this head cannot be put on the same basis as value of improvements effected by a junior member on tarwad properties allotted to him for maintenance.” | The Court treated this Full Bench decision as against the appellant's position; used to distinguish a karnavan's claim from a junior member or maintenance-holder's claim and to reject the contention that S.40 entitled the karnavan to such compensation. |
| Gopala Pillai v. Narayana Pillai, A.S. No. 664 of 1120, Dated 15-2-1951 (T-C) (unreported) (E) | Expressed the principle (as later cited in Parvathi Amma) that improvements on tarwad property cannot be legally enforced against the tarwad to recover their value unless there is an express understanding that such improvements will be compensated in case of disturbance. | Referred to via subsequent reported authority; the Court quoted and relied on the stated principle to support the conclusion that absent an express agreement, maintenance allottees cannot enforce a legal claim for improvements against the tarwad. |
| Parvathi Amma v. Narayani Amma, AIR 1952 Trav-C 412 (F) | Reports and refers to earlier unreported decision (E) and states: “The improvements were effected on the tarwad property, and while it is possible that equitable considerations may prevail when a re-arrangement or re-adjustment is brought about, no claim can be legally enforced against the tarwad to recover the value of improvements effected on the property in the course of such enjoyment, unless there is an express understanding to the effect that such improvements will be compensated for in the event of any disturbance of possession or enjoyment.” | Quoted by the Court for the legal principle that absent an express agreement, no enforceable legal claim for improvements exists against the tarwad. |
| Narayana Pillai v. Kutti Amma, AIR 1953 Trav-C 175 (G) | Latest reported decision of this Court on the question; the view taken aligned with the earlier Travancore Court decisions that maintenance allottees cannot claim compensation. | Noted by the Court as consistent with the view reached by the Full Bench; used to show continuity in authority against the entitlement of maintenance allottees to compensation for improvements. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court proceeded on the following reasoning, strictly as stated in the opinion:
- Reference and Scope: The second appeal had been referred to a Full Bench because of conflicting opinions in earlier Travancore High Court decisions on whether a maintenance-allottee (member or branch of a tarwad) can claim compensation for improvements. The Courts below had concurrently found that the 1065 arrangement was not an outright partition; accordingly, the question to be decided by the Full Bench was limited to whether a sakha (holding the property for maintenance) could claim the value of improvements.
- Examination of Authority: The Court reviewed the line of Travancore and this Court's authorities (A–G). It identified that some Travancore High Court decisions (A and C) held that maintenance allottees are not entitled to compensation, while one reported Travancore decision (B) took a differing view. The Court also considered this Court's Full Bench decision in Thanu Pillai (D), which addressed whether a karnavan's improvements are an "acquisition" under S.40 of the Travancore Nayar Act and held they are not. The Court quoted S.40 as framed in the statute and discussed the limited scope of that provision.
- Principle from Precedents: The Court relied on later decisions (including Parvathi Amma as to the principle in the unreported Gopala Pillai decision) that state: improvements effected on tarwad property cannot be legally enforced against the tarwad to recover their value unless there is an express understanding that such improvements will be compensated in the event of disturbance of possession or enjoyment. The latest reported decision (G) was said to be in accord with this view.
- Analytical Foundation: The Court articulated the core conceptual rationale: an allottee of tarwad property for maintenance holds it as a member of the tarwad; the allottee is in possession of "his own property" (within the tarwad framework) and thus appropriates the income for maintenance. If such an allottee were allowed to claim value for improvements, the claim would be against the tarwad (i.e., effectively against oneself or the collective) because the allottee is a member; there is no independent proprietary interest of a party distinct from the person against whom the claim would be made.
- Contrast with Situations Where Claims Arise: The Court contrasted maintenance-holders with cases where a holder has an interest independent of the person against whom the claim is made (examples given in the opinion: a junior member allotted tarwad property or a branch of the tarwad who is a lessee). In those circumstances a claim for value of improvements could be entertained because the possession is not qua member of the tarwad but in a separate capacity (e.g., as lessee or separate allottee).
- Conclusion from Application: Applying the legal principles and precedents, the Court concluded that a maintenance-holder (whether member or branch) has no sustainable claim for compensation for improvements effected on tarwad property in the absence of an express agreement to that effect.
- Cross-Objections: The Court considered the plaintiff's memorandum of cross-objections (seeking 1/24th of the value awarded to defendants). The Court construed that memorandum as effectively negativing the defendants' claim to exclusive entitlement and, on that understanding, allowed the cross-objections. The Court noted that this construction avoided potential court-fee issues because the memorandum, if valued differently, might have attracted a valuation problem.
- Relief and Directions: While disallowing the defendants' entitlement to value for improvements, the Court directed that during partition by metes and bounds the site containing the building and improvements should, as far as possible, be allotted to the defendants' share (so that the plaintiff's 1/24th slice does not take any item of improvements). If it is not possible to allot the plaintiff a slice free of the improvements, the defendants were to have liberty to remove the improvements provided removal does not injuriously affect the site. The appellant (the second-appeal appellant) was ordered to pay the costs of the respondents both in the second appeal and in relation to the memorandum of objections.
Holding and Implications
Holding: The decree of the lower appellate court insofar as it awarded compensation for improvements to the defendants is set aside, and the second appeal is dismissed. The plaintiff's memorandum of cross-objections (construed as challenging the defendants' exclusive entitlement) is allowed.
Implications and direct effects:
- Defendants (the sakha held to be maintenance-holders) are not entitled to compensation for improvements effected on the tarwad properties in question in the absence of an express agreement to that effect.
- On partition by metes and bounds, the Court directed that, as far as possible, the site containing the building and other improvements should be allotted to the defendants' share so that the plaintiff's 1/24th share does not include items of improvement; if that is impossible, defendants are permitted to remove the improvements without injuring the site.
- The appellant must pay costs of the respondents in the second appeal and upon the memorandum of cross-objections.
- The Court applied and followed the line of precedent (as reviewed in the opinion) that construes maintenance-allottee claims for improvements as unsustainable absent an express understanding; the decision was reached by reference to existing authorities and principles quoted in the opinion.
No broader new legal principle beyond the application of and alignment with the cited authorities was announced in the opinion; the decision implements the direct effects listed above for the parties to this litigation.
End of summary.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
Subramonia Iyer, J.:— This second appeal has been referred to a Full Bench on account of a conflict of opinion revealed by the reported decisions of the earst while Travancore High Court on the question Whether a member or a branch of a Malabar tarwad to whom is allotted properties for purposes of maintenance is entitled to claim compensation for improvements before dispossession of those properties in connection with a suit for partition or otherwise.
2. The facts are these: In the year 1065 there was an arrangement in the tarwad of the parties wherein the properties were divided into three. One portion was put in possession of one of the two sakhas of the tarwad and another in the possession of the other sakha. Plaintiff and the defendants belong to the said two sakhas respectively. The third division of property was meant for the maintenance of the karnavan of the tarwad for the time being as also for meeting the expenses of certain charities which were being conducted by the tarwad which the karnavan for the time being was to conduct thereafter. Neither of the two sakhas was accountable for the income of the properties put in their possession nor was the karnavan accountable for the income derived from the other group of properties. The first defendant became karnavan of the entire tarwad in the year 1095. He was also, therefore, the karnavan of the defendants' sakha. A house was put up in the property allotted to that sakha which is item No. 4 in the plaint. Other improvements were also effected upon those properties. In answer to the suit which was one for partition of all the properties of the tarwad the first defendant in his written statement claimed that his sakha effected various improvements in the property for which the sakha is to be compensated. The 4th defendant in a separate written statement made a similar claim on behalf of his sakha. The 4th defendant did not appear thereafter in the case which proceeded without him. The first defendant when examined as D.W 4 said that the house as also the other improvements were put up and effected by him at his own cost.
3. The Munsiff decreed partition with the direction that the site on which the building, item No. 4 in the plaint, stands would if possible be allotted to the defendants' sakha. As regards the other improvements he found that no value could be given therefor. In appeal by defendants 1 and 4 together the District Judge upheld their claim for improvements and fixed their value at a certain figure. Both the Courts below concurrently found that the plea of the defendants that the arrangement of the year 1065 was an outright partition cannot be accepted. The 4th defendant by this second appeal challenges that finding and claims enhanced compensation for the improvements. The first defendant died pending the appeal in the Court below. The plaintiff has filed a memorandum of cross-objections challenging the decree given by the lower appellate Court for improvements.
4. The question of the character of the arrangement of the year 1065 having been concurrently found by the Courts below the only point pressed before us and before the learned Judge who made the reference related to the question whether value of improvements could be claimed by the sakha of the defendants who were upon the concurrent finding holding the properties only on an arrangement for maintenance.
5. There are three decisions of the erstwhile Travancore High Court reported in — ‘Narayana Pillai v. Raman Pillai’, 29 Trav LJ 220 (A); — ‘Narayani Amma v. Lekshmi Amma’, 30 Trav LJ 754 (B) and — ‘Raman Pillai v. Raghavan Pillai’, 30 Trav LJ 737 (C), the first and the last of which took the view that an allottee of properties for the purpose of maintenance is not entitled to claim compensation for improvements. The case in — ‘30 Trav LJ 754 (B)’ though reported at a later page was in fact decided before the case reported at p. 737 and the view taken in the second case was different from the earlier view. No reference is seen made to the first case in the second nor is reference made to the second in the third. There have been three decisions of this Court, the first of which is reported in — ‘Thanu Pillai v. Mathevan Pillai’, AIR 1951 Trav-C 98 (FB)(D). That was a case where the karnavan of a tarwad who was in management of tarwad properties claimed compensation for improvements alleged to have been effected by him upon tarwad properties. The claim was disallowed saying that:
“The trees planted by a Karnavan in the ordinary course of husbandry cannot be treated as acquisitions falling within S. 40 of the Act. The kamavan's claim under this head cannot be put on the same basis as value of improvements effected by a junior member on tarwad properties allotted to him for maintenance.”
6. Section 40 of the Travancore Nayar Act, II of 1100, provides that:
“If a person was in management of his or her tarwad, one-fourth of the acquisition, if any, made by such person during such management with the aid of the income from tarwad property shall, on partition, be allotted to him in addition to the share which he would otherwise be entitled to get.”
7. Whether the improvements effected by a karnavan would be an acquisition within the meaning of that section was the only question that their Lordships had to consider and it was held that they will not. If the improvements would constitute an acquisition within that section the karnavan would be entitled to Compensation to the extent provided for by that section. Against this right of the karnavan as a contrast the learned Judges refer to the claim made by are anandiravan for improvements made by him ora tarwad properties allotted for maintenance. It appears to us that the learned Judges were of the view that the claim of the anandiravan who is in possession of property for maintenance for improvements is not sustainable. This decision which is relied upon by the appellant is in our view against him.
8. The nest decision of this Court is — ‘Gopala Pillai v. Narayana Pillai’, A.S No. 664 of 1120, D/- 15-2-1951 (T-C)(E) which has not been reported but which has been referred to in the, later decision reported in — ‘Parvathi Amma v. Narayani Amma’, AIR 1952 Trav-C 412 (F). At p. 413, the learned Judges say:
“The improvements were effected on the tarwad property, and while it is possible that equitable considerations may prevail when a re-arrangement or re-adjustment is brought about, no claim can be legally enforced against the tarwad to recover the value of improvements effected on the property in the course of such enjoyment, unless there is an express understanding to the effect that such improvements will be compensated for in the event of any disturbance of possession or enjoyment.”
9. The latest reported decision of this Court on this question is — ‘Narayana Pillai v. Kutti Amma’, AIR 1953 Trav-C 175 (G). The view taken there is in accord with the view already expressed by this Court in the aforesaid earlier decisions.
10. The allottee of tarwad properties for purposes of maintenance, whether a member or a branch, is in possession of the properties allotted as a member or members of the tarwad. That is to say, the allottee is in possession of his own property, the income whereof he is entitled to appropriate for his maintenance. There is no scope for any claim arising on account of the improvements made by him in that property because if he improves property and has to claim value therefor he has to make the claim against himself. It is only when the holder of a property has an interest independent of and apart from the person against whom the claim is to be made it is possible to think of a claim for value of improvements. If, for example, a junior member is an allottee of tarwad property under the tarwad or a branch of the tarwad is a lessee then the possession of that member or that branch is not qua member or members of the tarwad and they hold the property as lessees just like a stranger would do. That will not be the case when members of a tarwad are put in possession of tarwad properties as such members for purposes of their maintenance. In our judgment there is no scope for doubt upon this question as it appears to us to be clear that a claim for improvements by a maintenance holder cannot be sustained.
11. In this view the decree appealed against in so far as it awards compensation for improvements to the defendants is set aside. The second appeal is dismissed. As regards the memorandum of cross-objections filed by the plaintiff-respondent in the second appeal a preliminary objection is taken by the appellant that it does not call in question the decree of the lower appellate Court awarding improvements to the defendants' sakha. The language of the memorandum no doubt may afford some little ground for this objection because the memorandum claims 1/24th of the value of improvements awarded to the defendants' sakha. The share claimed by the plaintiff is 1/24th of the entire property and a claim to 1/24th of the value of improvements awarded to the defendants is one way of negativing the title of the defendants to exclusive claim to the improvements made by them.
12. The plaintiff is not concerned whether 23/24th of the value of improvements is paid to the defendants because they are the persons liable to pay. The plaintiff's interest in the property being limited to 1/24th the claim by him to that fraction of the improvements made by the defendants really means a negativing of their claim for improvements. Understanding the memorandum of objections in this fashion which is the only way to understand it, we allow the memorandum of cross-objections. There is a virtue perhaps in having couched the memorandum in this fashion because otherwise a question of court-fee might have arisen as the memorandum may have to be valued at the amount granted by the Court below as value of improvements.
13. While disallowing the defendants' claim to get value of improvements we direct that in effecting the partition by metes and bounds and slicing out the 1/24th share due to the plaintiff the site on which the building and the other improvements exist should as far as possible be allotted to the share of the defendants, that is to say, the slice to which the plaintiff is entitled may be so selected as not to take any item of improvement to which the defendants lay claim as theirs. If, however, it is not possible to so allot the plaintiff's share, and a share has to be allotted to him in which any improvement effected by the defendants exist, liberty should be given to the defendants to remove the improvements without injuriously affecting the site. The appellant will pay the costs of the respondents both in the second appeal as well as in the memorandum of objections.
A/V.S.B
14. Appeal dismissed.
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