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Joseph v. John

Kerala High Court
Oct 8, 1953
Smart Summary (Beta)

Factual and Procedural Background

This matter arises from a reference made by the learned Sessions Judge of Kottayam in a revision concerning a proceeding initiated under section 145, Criminal Procedure Code, by the Division First Class Magistrate of Kottayam in M.C. 3 of 1951.

The factual nucleus is a clash on 13 April 1950 over a disputed 14 cents of land in Thoppil Purayidom, Madappally, which resulted in injuries and two criminal cases (C.C. 237 and 240 of 1950) being charge-sheeted. While those trials were pending, the police reported the matter under section 143 Cr. P. C., leading to a preliminary order on 27 January 1951 and attachment and possession of the property by a receiver on 30 January 1951.

The petitioners had filed their written statement; the matter stood posted for the written statements of the counter-petitioners. On 2 March 1951 the learned magistrate passed an order directing the parties to have the boundaries of the survey fields refixed under the Survey and Boundaries Act and directed that the disputed plot remain under attachment until that was done. Feeling aggrieved, the petitioner requested the magistrate to proceed with the enquiry after accepting the counter-petitioners' written statements; that request was dismissed on 15 March 1952 on the ground that the magistrate was incompetent to re-open the matter.

The petitioner then moved the Sessions Court to revise both orders (2 March 1951 and 15 March 1952). The Sessions Judge admitted the revision, issued notice to the parties and the Public Prosecutor, heard them, and on 20 May 1952 held that the magistrate's order was not contemplated by law and was illegal; the Sessions Judge made a reference to the High Court. The High Court heard the matter, received submissions from counsel for the counter-petitioners and the State, considered the legality of the magistrate's procedure, and set aside the magistrate's orders, remitting the case for disposal in accordance with law.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the Division First Class Magistrate's order dated 2 March 1951 was a lawful exercise of jurisdiction under Chapter XII of the Criminal Procedure Code (i.e., whether it was properly made under section 145(5), section 146(1), or any other provision).
  2. Whether a magistrate can refuse to complete the enquiry instituted under section 145 and instead refer the parties to the revenue authorities (Survey and Boundaries Act) before receiving and considering evidence, or otherwise dispose of the proceeding by directing a survey without completing the statutory enquiry.
  3. Whether, and how, decisions under the Survey and Boundaries Act may be used to determine possession for the purposes of section 146 or to justify orders under section 145(5) or section 145(6).
  4. Whether the Sessions Court properly exercised revisional jurisdiction in setting aside orders that the High Court found to be passed without jurisdiction.

Arguments of the Parties

Learned Public Prosecutor's Arguments

  • Contended that the magistrate's order of 2 March 1951 must be taken to have been made under subsection (5) of section 145, Cr. P. C., which enables the magistrate to cancel his preliminary order and stay further proceedings where there is no longer apprehension of a breach of the peace.
  • Supported the magistrate's reliance on decisions which hold that an order of the Collector under the Survey and Boundaries Act is a determination by a competent court as to the person entitled to possession within the meaning of section 146.

Counsel for the Counter-petitioners (Mr. N. K. Job) and Representative for the State (Mr. N. Kumaran Achan)

  • Supported the magistrate's order and disputed the Sessions Judge's view that the order was illegal.
  • Suggested at different times that the impugned order might fall under section 145(5) (public prosecutor's contention) or that it was made under subsection (1) of section 146 (as suggested before the High Court by Mr. Kumaran Achan).
  • Cited decided cases to support the proposition that a decision under the Survey and Boundaries Act may be treated as a determination by a competent court for the purposes of section 146, and that subsequent survey decisions could entitle the successful party to possession of attached land.

Petitioner's Position (before the Magistrate)

  • The petitioner moved that the magistrate proceed with the enquiry after accepting the counter-petitioners' written statements; this application was dismissed by the magistrate on the ground that he was incompetent to re-open the matter after his earlier order.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Sohoni's Criminal Procedure Code (1941 edition), pp. 259–260 Authorities indicating that a magistrate has no jurisdiction to proceed under section 146 unless he has completed the enquiry contemplated by section 145 (i.e., received and considered evidence). The court relied on this principle to hold that the magistrate could not validly act under section 146 without first conducting the enquiry under section 145.
Mitra's Criminal Procedure Code (1949 edition), Vol. I, p. 382, para. 451 Same general proposition as above: section 146 jurisdiction arises only after the enquiry under section 145 has been completed. Used by the court to support the conclusion that the magistrate lacked jurisdiction to treat the matter as one under section 146 prior to completion of the section 145 enquiry.
Radha Raman v. Emperor, A.I.R. 1936 All. 177 Judicial authority for the requirement that enquiry under section 145 must precede action under section 146. Cited by the court as part of settled authority that section 146 cannot be invoked until after the section 145 enquiry has been conducted and evidence considered.
Ambler v. Sami Ahmed, (1910) I.L.R. 39 Cal. 331 Case where an order under section 146(1) was made after due enquiry; the question was whether a subsequent decision under the Survey and Boundaries Act could be used to claim possession of lands placed under attachment. The court observed that such cases are inapplicable here because in those cases an order under section 146(1) had been validly made after enquiry, whereas in the present case no order under section 146(1) was ever made before the impugned action.
Ram Ranbijaya Prasad Singh & Others v. Ram Prasad Gupta & Others, A.I.R. 1939 Patna 348 Authority holding that when an order under section 146(1) was made after due enquiry, a subsequent decision under the Survey and Boundaries Act could entitle the successful party to possession of land attached under section 146(1). The court distinguished these decisions as not assisting the magistrate here because no valid section 146(1) order had been made before the referral to the revenue authority.
Mt. Ram Sri v. Sri Kishun & Others, A.I.R. 1924 All. 777 Case in which an order under section 146 existed and a subsequent decision by revenue authorities in mutation proceedings was held to be a decision of a competent court for possession purposes. The court noted the case but explained it did not help the magistrate's position because here there was no prior valid order under section 146 when the magistrate referred the matter to the revenue authorities.
Mrs. Argles v. Chhail Behari, A.I.R. 1949 All. 230 Example where, after a decision under the Survey and Boundaries Act, the magistrate passed an order under subsection (6) of section 145 in favour of the party successful before the revenue authorities. The court cited this as an example of the proper sequence: where a survey decision exists and the apprehension of breach of peace has been removed, a magistrate may act under section 145(6) to give possession to the successful party.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court proceeded by analysing whether the impugned order of 2 March 1951 fell within any valid statutory power under Chapter XII of the Criminal Procedure Code. The key points of its analysis were:

  1. The magistrate's order could not be treated as one under section 145(5), because that subsection presupposes that the magistrate is satisfied that there is no longer any apprehension of a breach of the peace. The impugned order, by contrast, expressly continued the attachment—an indication that apprehension still existed—so the magistrate was not acting under section 145(5).
  2. The court rejected any notion that the order could be regarded as an order under section 146(1). Section 146 is available only after the enquiry under section 145 has been completed and the magistrate has come to the requisite conclusion (that neither party was in possession or that he could not satisfy himself as to which party was in possession). The doubt enabling recourse to section 146 must arise from an inability to decide on the evidence produced at the section 145 enquiry; it cannot be a doubt entertained without that enquiry.
  3. The court relied on established authorities (texts and decisions cited) to reinforce the proposition that a magistrate must receive and consider evidence in the section 145 enquiry before proceeding under section 146.
  4. The magistrate's conduct was criticised as being improperly executive in character: the magistrate passed the impugned order a day before the date fixed for receiving the counter-petitioners' written statements, without notice to or hearing of the parties, and without conducting the enquiry required by section 145. The magistrate also improperly relied on knowledge of evidence and findings in the state prosecutions (C.C. Nos. 237 and 240) to dispose of the Chapter XII proceeding; while, with consent, evidence from those prosecutions might have been used, the way the magistrate relied on them had no sanction in the Code or the Evidence Act.
  5. The court found the order of 2 March 1951 to be a "thoroughly illegal order" made without jurisdiction, and therefore the Sessions Judge was correct to set it aside and to make the reference.
  6. The court explained the proper courses available after a survey decision: if a decision under the Survey and Boundaries Act had intervened and removed the apprehension of breach of peace, the magistrate could (a) act under subsection (5) of section 145 if apprehension had disappeared, or (b) if apprehension still continued but a survey decision favored a party, accept that decision and pass an order under subsection (6) of section 145 in favour of the successful party. If no survey decision exists, the magistrate must proceed to complete the enquiry under section 145 in one of the modes recognized by the Code.
  7. On the point of revisional jurisdiction, the court observed there is no statute prescribing a period of limitation for the exercise of revisional jurisdiction; where an order is found to have been passed without jurisdiction, revisional courts may entertain petitions filed after the conventional period (and the court felt bound to exercise its revisional jurisdiction in the present case).

Holding and Implications

HOLDING: The High Court upheld the Sessions Judge's reference and held that the orders of the Division First Class Magistrate bearing the dates 2 March 1951 and 15 March 1952 (the opinion recounts the latter date as 13 March in one place but identifies the second magistrate order as 15-3-1952 earlier) were illegal and made without jurisdiction. The orders are cancelled and the case is remitted to the Magistrate's Court for disposal in accordance with law.

Implications and direct consequences:

  • The magistrate must receive the written statements of the counter-petitioners and proceed with the section 145 enquiry in accordance with the Criminal Procedure Code; he cannot simply refer the parties to the revenue authorities and leave the proceeding undetermined by him.
  • If, in the meantime, a decision under the Survey and Boundaries Act has been made and the apprehension of a breach of the peace has disappeared, the magistrate may properly pass orders under subsection (5) of section 145. If a survey decision exists but apprehension persists, the magistrate may accept the revenue decision and pass an order under subsection (6) of section 145 in favor of the successful party (as exemplified in Mrs. Argles v. Chhail Behari).
  • The court emphasised that while referring parties to a competent court (revenue authority) might be expedient to avoid delay, the law does not permit disposal of a Chapter XII proceeding by mere referral without the magistrate conducting the statutory enquiry.
  • The Sessions and High Courts exercised revisional jurisdiction to correct orders passed without jurisdiction; no statutory limitation prevented entertaining the revision in this instance.

Note: This summary is based exclusively on the provided opinion and does not introduce information beyond that text.

Show all summary ...

1. This is a reference made by the learned sessions judge of kottyam in a revision before him concerning a proceeding initiated under section 145, Criminal procedure code, By the division first class magistrate of kottayam in m. C. 3 of 1951. On the day previous to the date the counter - petitioners thereto had to file their written statements. The learned magistrate passed the following order:

"the subject of dispute in this case is 14 cents of land in thoppil purayidom in madappally kara of madappally pakuthy. There was a clash between the 1st petitioner and the counter - petitioners on this land on the 13th april 1950 in which people on either side sustained injuries. On that incident two cases, Each counter to the other were charge - sheeted by the police before this court [c. C. 237 and 240 of 1950]. While these cases were pending trial the police reported action under section 143 crl. P. C. In respect of the land so as to avoid further clash between the parties. Accordingly the preliminary order in this case was issued on 27 - 1 - 1951 and the property was attached and taken possession of by the receiver in the presence of both parties on 30 - 1 - 1951. The petitioners have filed their written statement already and the case stands for the written statement of the counter - petitioners. The 2nd petitioner was examined as p. W. 8 in c. C. 240/50.

c. C. Nos. 237 and 240 have since been disposed of. Evidence regarding possession was let in by the parties in both the cases. The petitioner's case is that the disputed land forms part of s. No. 841/6 obtained in a court delivery, While the counter - petitioner's case is that it is s. No. 841/7 h. 13 obtained by a sale deed in his favour. It is admitted by both parties 'that, The petitioners are in possession of s. No. 841/6 and the counter - petitioners in possession of s. No. 841/7 h. 13 and that there is no dispute between the parties on this point. It has been found in the above cases that it is not possible to decide as to whether the disputed plot lies in s. No. 841/6 or 841/7 and therefore not possible to decide as to which of the two parties was in possession of the disputed plot on the date of the disturbance unless the boundaries of the survey fields are refixed on the ground under the provisions of the survey and boundaries act. As the question has thus been decided it is unnecessary to proceed further with this case. The parties are accordingly directed to take steps to fix the limits of their holdings on the ground. When this is done any portion of the disputed land which comes within s. No. 841/6 will be banded over to the 1st petitioner and any portion which comes within s. No. 841/7 h 13 will be handed over to the counter petitioner. Till then the disputed plot will continue under attachment".

feeling aggrieved by this order the petitioner before the learned magistrate moved a petition requesting the magistrate to proceed with the enquiry after accepting the written statements from the counter - petitioners. But this petition was dismissed. The learned magistrate observed that final orders have already been passed in the case on 2 - 3 - 1951 (referring to the order quoted above) and that he was therefore incompetent to re - open the matter. This was on 15 - 3 - 1952. It was after this that the petitioner moved the sessions court to revise the two orders passed by the learned magistrate (the order dated 2 - 3 - 1951 and the order dated 15 - 3 - 1952). While admitting the revision the learned sessions judge issued notice to the counter - petitioners as also to the public prosecutor. After due hearing of all the interested parties and the public prosecutor the learned sessions judge passed the order under reference on. 20 - 5 - 1952. The opening paragraph of the order re - capitulates the circumstances which led to the revision petition. The second and the third paragraphs read as follows:

"after hearing counsel on both sides and the learned public prosecutor on whom notice had been served, I am satisfied that the order passed by the lower court is one not contemplated by law and is illegal. The procedure for an enquiry under section 145 has been prescribed by the section itself, And the learned magistrate had to proceed to a final determination, Unless he acted under sub - section 5 of section 145. The learned public prosecutor contended, That whatever be the language employed by the magistrate, His order would fall under sub - section 5, Enabling him to cancel his preliminary order and stay all further proceedings, But i am clear that this is not the scope or the intendment of the order passed. The learned magistrate did not at all feel, That there was no dispute likely to cause a breach of the peace; on the contrary, He directed the attachment to continue. This is inconsistent with the exercise of the jurisdiction under sub - section 5, Nor is this a case falling under section 146, Where the magistrate is unable to satisfy himself as to which party was in possession. That can be only after the enquiry is completed. In this case, The posting was for the written statement only. I do not think, That the magistrate was warranted in advising the parties to have a survey conducted in accordance - with the survey and boundaries act. I am therefore of the view, That the order passed by the magistrate cannot be supported, And that it has to be set aside and the case sent back for disposal in accordance with law. I have 'therefore to make the above report to the honourable high court"
.

when this reference came up before us we directed notice to the parties as also to the state. At the hearing the petitioner was not represented before us. Mr. N. K. Job, Who appeared for the counter - petitioners and mr. N - kumaran achan who represented the state, (supported the order passed by the division first class magistrate. In other words, In their view, The opinion expressed by the learned sessions judge in his order of reference was wrong. We regret we cannot accede to their contention.

2. It is difficult to comprehend under what provision of ch. 12 of the code of criminal procedure the learned division first class magistrate passed his order of 2 - 3 - 1951. Before the sessions court, The public

prosecutor contended that it must be taken to be one passed under sub - section (5) of section 145; but as pointed out by the learned sessions judge that position is untenable. The learned magistrate was not satisfied that there was no longer any apprehension of a breach of the peace when he passed the impugned order. On the other hand the order clearly indicates that the apprehension continued. He has allowed the attachment to remain in force until a decision is obtained under the survey and boundaries act. In this court mr. Kumaran achan did not say that the order fell under sub - section (5). He appeared to us to be suggesting that the order was made under sub - section (1) of section 146. That is equally untenable. It is open to a magistrate to take action under section 146 only on the completion of the enquiry initiated under section 145 and in the event of his coming to the conclusion that neither party was in possession or that he cannot satisfy himself as to which party was in possession. The doubt on which a magistrate can act under section 146 must arise from his inability to decide on evidence offered by the contending parties as to their possession and not on a doubt entertained without such enquiry. Decided cases go to the extent of holding that unless and until a magistrate has made the enquiry contemplated by section 145, That is to say, Unless he has received and considered the evidence produced before him by the parties, The magistrate has no jurisdiction to proceed under section 146. See sohoni's criminal procedure code (1941 edition) pp. 259 and 260, Mitra's criminal procedure code (1949 edition) vol. 1 page 382, Paragraph 451 and the decision in radha raman v. Emperor, A. I. R. 1936 all. 177.

3. The learned magistrate was holding a judicial enquiry but in performing that judicious function he would appear to have been more executive minded than the executive itself. The case stood posted to 3 - 3 - 1951 for receiving the written statements of the counter - petitioners, But the impugned order was passed on the previous day and that without notice to the parties and without hearing them. The magistrate was also not justified in referring to the evidence and the decisions in c. C. Nos. 237 and 240 to dispose of the proceeding under oh. 12. C. C. Nos; 237 and 240 were state prosecutions. As an enquiry under ch. 12 is of a quasi civil nature, With the consent of the parties, It might perhaps have been open to the magistrate to treat the evidence in those cases as evidence in the proceeding. However the use the learned magistrate made of his knowledge about those cases in the present enquiry is something for which no sanction or warrant can be found in the criminal procedure code or the evidence act or any other enactment we are aware of. The order dated 2 - 3 - 51 is a thoroughly illegal order and it was made without jurisdiction. It has therefore to be set aside.

4. The learned public prosecutor told us that by his order dated 2 - 3 - 51 the magistrate contemplated a further order. The second order the magistrate passed on 15 - 3 - 1952 however belies that position. All that the magistrate contemplated by the words employed by him in the concluding part of his first order was that the attachment would cease with the decision under the survey and boundaries act and that possession would be handed over to the successful party before the revenue authorities.

5. Counsel for the counter - petitioners and the learned public prosecutor supported the order of the magistrate en the strength of certain decided cases which say that the order of the collector as to a land, Under the survey and boundaries act, Is a determination by a competent court of the rights of the person entitled to the possession thereof within the meaning of section 146, Criminal procedure code. It is unnecessary to quarrel with that proposition. A decision under section 24 of the travancore survey and boundaries act of 1094 as to a land can and has to be held to be an order of a competent court determining the person entitled to the possession of it as contemplated by section 146. In each one of the cases cited there "was a valid order under section 146 made after due enquiry and the order under the survey and boundaries act was made use of to determine the attachment effected under the section.

6. In ambler v. Sami ahmed (1910) i. L. R. 39 gal. 331 and in ram ranbijaya prasad singh and others v. Ram prasad gupta and others a. I. R. 1939 patna 348 which were cited on behalf of the counter - petitioners there were orders under section 146 (1) made after due enquiry and the question was whether the persons in whose favour decisions under the survey and boundaries act were subsequently made could claim possession of the lands placed under attachment under section 146 (1). The question was answered in the affirmative. These decisions are of no avail here where no order under section 146 (1) has ever been made nor a decision under the survey and boundaries act existed when the impugned order was passed. In lending support to mr. Job's contention the learned public prosecutor cited before us the decision in mt. Ram sri v. Sri kishun and others a. I. R. 1924 all. 777. In that case also there was an order under section 146, Though that was passed at the request of the parties concerned. Boys, J. Held that a person in whose favour a subsequent decision is made by the revenue authorities in mutation proceedings can claim possession of the attached property. In other words that was held to be a decision of a competent court as to possession within the meaning of section 146.

7. It was stated at the bar that since the order impugned was made, A decision under the survey and boundaries act has been made in favour of the counter - petitioners. We did not find any such order among the records of the case. Some plans made by the village officers which are found among the papers in the receiver's file' no doubt show that according to the revenue records the disputed plot stands registered in the name of the counter - petitioners.

8. In the circumstances, Notwithstanding the support the learned public prosecutor gave to the order of the division first class magistrate which is impugned in this proceeding, We feel bound to uphold the learned sessions judge's view and accept his reference. The orders of the division ' first class magistrate bearing the dates 2 - 3 - 1951 and 13 - 3 - 1952 are cancelled and the case is sent back to his court for disposal in accordance with law. He will receive the written statements of the counter - petitioners and proceed with the enquiry. '

9. If a decision under the survey and boundaries act has since intervened and with that the apprehension of a breach of the peace has disappeared, It is perfectly open to him to pass orders under subsection (5) of section 145. On the other hand if even after such an order apprehension of a breach of the peace continues, It is up to him to accept the decision and pass an order under sub section (6) of section 145 in favour of the party who was successful before the revenue authorities. This was what was done in the case in mrs. Argles v. Chhail behari a. I. R. 1949 all. 230. If no decision under the survey and boundaries act has been made, The only course open to the learned magistrate is to proceed with and close the enquiry initiated by him in one of the modes recognised by the provisions of the criminal procedure code in that behalf. The reference" is answered as above.

10. To countenance the procedure adopted by the learned division first class magistrate would be to hold that a proceeding initiated under ch. 12, Criminal procedure code, Can be disposed of by referring the parties to a competent court without any enquiry by the magistrate himself. That, No doubt, Is a good expedient, To avoid laws' delays, But the law as it stands now does not sanction it.

11. Before concluding, We desire to point out that counsel for the counter - petitioners raised a point that the revision before the sessions court was filed long out of time. The revision was accepted by the learned sessions judge and it was filed there on 20 - 3 - 1952, Within 5 days of the second order of the learned magistrate. There is no statute prescribing a period of limitation for the exercise of a revisional jurisdiction. In a proper case a revision, Court will, Entertain a petition filed after the conventional period of 3 months. Regard being had to the terms of sections 435, 438 and 439 we feel bound to exercise our revisional jurisdiction when the learned magistrate's order is found to be one passed without jurisdiction. Order accordingly.