- Bookmark
- Share
- CaseIQ
South Travancore Electrical Workers' Union v. Nagercoil Electric Supply Corporation And Others
Structured Summary of the Opinion delivered by M.S. Menon, J.
Factual and Procedural Background
The decision under review is an appeal from an order of Subramonia Iyer, J., in O.P. No. 15 of 1952 which had granted a writ of certiorari quashing an Interim Award made by the Industrial Tribunal, Trivandrum, in Industrial Dispute No. 13 of 1951. The certiorari was granted on the ground that the Interim Award was in excess of jurisdiction and contained an error apparent on the face of the record. The appellate court examined the Award and concluded that it was not vitiated and that the appeal should be allowed.
The material factual chronology (as recorded in the opinion) is as follows:
- 28-4-1951: Retrenchment of 14 workmen.
- 2-5-1951: Dismissal of 14 more workmen.
- 9-6-1951: A conference (attended by the Chief Minister and others) produced resolutions including (1) that the Chief Engineer (Electricity) determine required staff strength, (2) retrenchment if necessary to be effected in consultation with Labour Commissioner, (3) payment by employer of wages to the 28 affected workers until retrenchment/dismissal was given effect to and arrears to be paid by 12th June 1951, and (4) the union agreed to call off strike and demonstrations.
- 16-6-1951: Report of the Chief Engineer (Electricity) opined that the current staff strength was more than ample for maintenance and that the proposed retrenchment was "quite in order" though the method adopted was irregular; the report noted grievances about selection criteria and referred that aspect to the Labour Commissioner.
- 14-8-1951: The Government of Travancore-Cochin referred for adjudication three issues (identifying which workers should be retrenched per the Chief Engineer's decision; whether gratuity and other benefits should be granted and their amounts; whether any arrear wages should be given to retrenched, discharged or dismissed workers).
- 27-12-1951: The Industrial Tribunal passed an Interim Award ordering the management to pay wages with arrears to the twenty-eight workers (the 14 retrenched and 14 dismissed) and to continue payment until retrenchment, if found necessary, was given effect to; part payments had already been made by the management.
- Subsequently the order of Subramonia Iyer, J., quashed that Interim Award by writ of certiorari, prompting this appeal.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the Interim Award of the Industrial Tribunal was in excess of jurisdiction or contained an error apparent on the face of the record such as to justify quashing it by certiorari.
- Whether the Tribunal misconceived Issue No. 3 by treating it as equivalent to resolution No. 3 of the conference and thereby acted outside its remit.
- Whether the Tribunal erred in treating as still open the question of the necessity for any reduction in personnel despite the Chief Engineer's report that current strength was adequate.
- Whether an appeal lay from the Interim Award to the Appellate Tribunal (i.e., competency of an appeal from an interim award under Section 2(b) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and Section 7 of the Industrial Disputes (Appellate Tribunal) Act, 1950).
- Whether the Tribunal's specification that arrears be paid "within a week from the date of publication of the Award in the Gazette" violated Section 17-A of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (which provides that awards become enforceable only on the expiry of 30 days from publication), and if so whether that invalidates the whole Award.
Arguments of the Parties
Contentions as Recorded in the Judgment Under Appeal
- The judgment under appeal proceeded on an assumption that the Tribunal had committed two mistakes: (a) it misunderstood the scope of Issue No. 3 by treating it as the same as resolution No. 3 of the conference, and (b) it considered the question of whether any reduction in personnel was necessary as still open despite the Chief Engineer's report concluding current strength was adequate.
- It was also contended before the courts that the Interim Award's requirement of payment of arrears "within a week from the date of publication" contravened Section 17-A's thirty-day enforceability rule and that this ultra vires fixation of time vitiated the entire Award.
Arguments Advanced Before this Court (as reported)
- One argument advanced (and considered by the court) was that fixing a one‑week period for payment of arrears made the award ultra vires Section 17-A and therefore vitiated the whole Award.
- Respondent's counsel relied on the decision 'R. v. Industrial Disputes Tribunal' (1953-1 All E.R. 593) in support of a contention; the court concluded that that authority was inapplicable to the present point.
- The tribunal and the parties had acknowledged that part of the arrears had already been paid and the Tribunal ordered payment of the remaining arrears and continuation of payments until retrenchment (if found necessary) was given effect to.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Punjab National Bank Ltd. v. A.N. Sen, AIR 1952 Punj 134 | Used to show that an appeal from an award (including interim awards) is competent under the statutory provisions cited. | The court relied on this authority to support the view that there can be no doubt an appeal was competent, in the light of Section 2(b) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and Section 7 of the Industrial Disputes (Appellate Tribunal) Act, 1950. |
| R. v. Industrial Disputes Tribunal, 1953-1 All E.R. 593 | The respondent relied on this case in argument (as an authority for a point advanced by counsel). | The court stated that this case had nothing to do with the point at issue before it and therefore declined to treat it as persuasive on the question concerned (the Section 17-A point). |
| Veerappa v. Raman & Raman Ltd., AIR 1952 SC 192 | Principle that where remedies and redress are provided in a statute creating new rights and liabilities, those statutory remedies should normally be used rather than resort to constitutional writs under Article 225. | The court applied this principle to emphasise that the Industrial Disputes Act and the Appellate Tribunal Act form a self-contained code; ordinarily aggrieved parties should seek relief within that framework rather than by writs under Article 226. |
| State of Madras v. C.P. Sarathy, AIR 1963 SC 53 | Courts should not be astute to discover formal defects or technical flaws to overthrow settlements reached under the Act; emphasis on speedy and peaceful settlement of labour disputes within the Act's framework. | The court cited this passage to underline the public interest in allowing Industrial Tribunals to resolve disputes without undue judicial interference and the need for deference to tribunal settlements. |
| Sree Meenakshi Mills Ltd., Madura v. State of Madras, AIR 1951 Mad 974 | Quoted for a passage (from Julian Huxley) regarding the need to translate old ideas into new conceptions of social duties and responsibilities in industrial relations. | The court used the quotation, also approved in other local cases, to support a modern approach to labour relations and to justify deference to industrial adjudication and progressive awards. |
| D.S.M. Association v. Industrial Tribunal, Madurai, AIR 1953 Mad 102 | Also cited in conjunction with the Sree Meenakshi Mills passage endorsing a modern conception of labour relations and social duties. | The court relied upon this and the other local authority to reinforce the point that historical notions of absolute employer contractual rights are yielding to social duties and responsibilities in industrial law. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court conducted a textual and contextual analysis of the Interim Award and the objection raised by Subramonia Iyer, J., in the judgment under appeal. The court's reasoning unfolded in the following steps (as presented in the opinion):
- Review of Award and Conclusion of No Infirmity: The court stated that after careful consideration it found no infirmity vitiating the Award and concluded that the appeal should be allowed.
- Addressing the Two Assumed Mistakes: The court identified two mistakes the learned judge had apparently found—(a) that the Tribunal misunderstood Issue No. 3 as equivalent to resolution No. 3, and (b) that the Tribunal treated the question of personnel reduction as still open despite the Chief Engineer's report—but the court rejected both characterisations.
- Interpreting the Tribunal's Approach to Interim Relief: The court explained that the Tribunal was entitled to treat the question of which of the twenty-eight workers were to be retrenched as an open question until it applied industrial canons (such as selection by length of service) in determining who should actually be retrenched pursuant to the Chief Engineer's report. On that view, it was proper for the Tribunal to award interim relief (payment of wages and arrears) until retrenchment, if any, of all or any of the twenty-eight workmen was given effect to.
- Clarifying the Wording of the Award: The court construed the phrase "till the retrenchment if found necessary is given effect to" to mean "till the retrenchment of all or any of the twenty-eight workmen if found necessary is given effect to" rather than "till the question whether there should be any reduction in personnel is decided."
- Competency of Appeal from Interim Award: The court held that an appeal was competent. It relied on the statutory definition of "award" in Section 2(b) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (which includes interim determinations) and Section 7 of the Industrial Disputes (Appellate Tribunal) Act, 1950 (which allows appeals from awards/decisions on specified matters including retrenchment, wages, gratuity, etc.). The court cited Punjab National Bank Ltd. v. A.N. Sen to show that this point was beyond controversy.
- On the Section 17-A (Enforceability) Point: The court analysed the objection that fixing a one‑week period for payment made the Award ultra vires Section 17-A (which provides that an award becomes enforceable only after thirty days from publication). The court pointed out a distinction between (a) the date an award "becomes enforceable" and (b) the date an award "comes into operation" (i.e., when it is to be operative). The court reproduced a passage from Haidar's treatise illustrating that the operative date may be one specified by the award, while enforceability (i.e., the right to enforce) is governed by Section 17-A's 30‑day rule; the two dates can differ and such a difference does not invalidate an award. Thus the Tribunal's specifying an operative date different from the enforceability date was not a ground to vitiate the award.
- Rejection of Reliance on R. v. Industrial Disputes Tribunal: The court considered the respondent's reliance on that English case but concluded it was inapposite to the point at issue.
- Deference to Statutory Machinery and Industrial Peace: The court emphasised the principle that where a statute creates remedies, ordinarily parties should seek redress under that statutory machinery (citing Veerappa v. Raman & Raman Ltd.). It further underscored the public interest in allowing Industrial Tribunals to settle labour disputes quickly and without unnecessary judicial interference, quoting State of Madras v. C.P. Sarathy and other authorities to support a modern and purposive approach to industrial adjudication.
- Disposition: On the combined analysis the court found the Tribunal's approach proper, within the ambit of the referred issues, and concluded that the Interim Award should not have been quashed.
Holding and Implications
Holding: The appeal is allowed. The court held that the Interim Award of the Industrial Tribunal was not vitiated for the reasons advanced in the judgment under appeal and that the Tribunal's approach to interim relief and to the referred issues was proper and within its jurisdiction. The court also held that an appeal from the Interim Award was competent under the relevant statutes.
Direct consequences and costs (as specifically ordered in the opinion):
- The appeal is allowed with costs.
- Advocate's fee ordered: Rs. 200/- (as costs to the prevailing party in this appeal).
- The appellant will also have his costs in O.P. No. 15 of 1952 from the petitioner therein, advocate's fee Rs. 200/-.
Broader implications identified by the Court (as expressed in the opinion):
- The Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and the Industrial Disputes (Appellate Tribunal) Act, 1950 constitute a self-contained code; ordinarily redress should be sought within their framework rather than by writ under Article 226.
- Courts should be cautious about overturning tribunal settlements on technical or formalistic grounds because of the public interest in prompt and peaceful resolution of labour disputes and the need to allow tribunals to discharge their duties without undue interference.
- The opinion endorses a modern approach to labour relations that recognises social duties and responsibilities and does not treat employers' traditional contractual claims as sacrosanct against progressive awards or legislation.
This summary is based exclusively on the content of the provided court opinion. No facts or conclusions beyond those contained in the opinion have been added.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
M.S Menon, J.:— This is an appeal from the order of Subramonia Iyer, J., in O.P No. 15 of 1952 granting the petitioner's prayer for a writ of certiorari quashing the Interim Award passed by the Industrial Tribunal, Trivadrum, in Industrial Dispute No. 13 of 1951, on the ground that it is in excess of jurisdiction and contains an error apparent on the face of the record. We have carefully considered the Award in the light of the observations of the learned Judge and have come to the conclusion that no infirmity vitiates the Award and that this appeal has to be allowed.
2. The following chronological narrative details the events that led up to the Interim Award:
28-4-1951: Retrenchment of 14 workmen.
2-5-1951: Dismissal of 14 more workmen.
9-6-1951: Conference attended by the Chief Minister and others at which the following resolutions were recorded:
“(1) It was agreed that the total number of workers required for the efficient working of the Nagercoil Electric Supply Corporation be decided by the Chief Engineer (Electricity). The number of people required in the various sections of the Corporation will also be decided by the Chief Engineer (Electricity).
(2) Actual retrenchment if it is ultimately, found to be necessary will be effected by the management in consultation with the Labour Commissioner, or Assistant Labour Commissioner.
(3) Till retrenchment if found necessary is given effect to, the 14 workers retrenched as well as 14 workers dismissed will be paid their wages by the employer from the date of their retrenchment or dismissal as the case may be. The arrears will be paid on or before 12th June 1951.
(4) The Union agrees to call off the strike, satyagraha and other demonstrations started by them in this connection”.
16-6-1951: Report of the Chief Engineer (Electricity) the relevant portion of which reads as follows:
“The work connected with the electric supply in Nagercoil comprises of operation of the Powerhouse for about 3 hours daily, maintenance of the distribution system, service to consumers, meter reading and billing for the energy consumed. There is practically very little new construction work and all that the Licensee has to carry out is maintenance of the existing system. For this purpose, the staff employed by him as shown in Statement I is more than ample end I do not consider that there is any scope for providing employment for mort staff. The retrenchment proposed by him was therefore quite in order though the method adopted is quite irregular. I have made a comparison of the number of people engaged by him with the Government owned distribution systems of similar size, and I am quite satisfied that the staff employed by him at present is quite sufficient for maintaining the system very efficiently.
I may however remark in this connection that the method adopted by the Licensee for retrenching is not in ??? with any accepted principles. If Statement II is perused, it will be seen that he has retrenched several people who have had long service when he has retained persons with comparatively short period of service. At the time of retrenchment, no proper explanation has been given for retrenching persons with long service, and therefore the grievances of the strikers appear to be genuine as far as this aspect is concerned. This is a matter for the Labour Commissioner to go into and he may be given instructions to take suitable action”.
14-8-1951: Reference of the following issues for adjudication by the Government of Travancore-Cochin (Industrial Dispute No. 13 of 1951):
“(1) Who are the workers that are to be retrenched from the Nagercoil Electric Supply Corporation, as per the decision of the Chief Engineer, Electricity?
(2) Whether any gratuity and other benefits are to be granted to the workers on the termination of their services? If so, what they should be?
(3) Whether any arrear wages should be given to the retrenched, discharged or dismissed workers?
27-12-1951: The Interim Award in Industrial Dispute No. 13 of 1951 (Travancore-Cochin Government Gazette dated 29-1-1952, Part I, p. 86) the relevant portion of which reads as follows:
“I hold that the management has to pay the wages with arrears to the twenty-eight workers who are either retrenched or dismissed and has to find issue No. 3 in favour of the Union. It is admitted by both sides that the management has paid a portion of the arrears of wages to the workers. The management will pay to the twenty-eight workers the wages remaining unpaid and continue to pay it till retrenchment if found necessary is given effect to, (paragraph 8).
3. The judgment under appeal is apparently cased on the assumption that the Tribunal has made two mistakes:
(a) Misunderstood the scope of Issue No. 3 as being the same as that of resolution No. 3; and
(b) Considered the question as to whether any reduction in personnel was necessary as still open in spite of the report of the Chief Engineer (Electricity) to the effect that the strength at the time of the report was adequate and sufficient.
4. We cannot agree. All that the Tribunal has done is to take the view—which it was entitled to take—that until it came to the conclusion that the twenty-eight workmen discharged by the employer were the workmen to be actually retrenched in pursuance of the report of the Chief Engineer (Electricity) & according to the canons of Industrial Law based on the length of service and other such relevant considerations, the question as to whether all or any of the twenty-eight workmen was to be retrenched or not was an open question, and interim relief should be awarded on that basis. The words “till the retrenchment if found necessary is given effect to” in the passage from the Award which we have extracted above does not mean as Subramonia Iyer, J., seems to have thought “till the question whether there should be any reduction in personnel is decided”, but “till the retrenchment of all or any of the twenty-eight workmen if found necessary is given effect to”, and the reference by the Tribunal to resolution No. 3 in dealing with issue No. 3 was only to place the dispute against its proper background and to meet the contention of the employer that interim relief was precluded by the wording of that resolution. As we understand the Award the approach of the Tribunal has been nothing but proper ind its conclusion well within the ambit of the three issues referred.
5. Subramonia Iyer, J., appears to have entertained some doubts as to whether an appeal would I lie from the Interim Award under dispute. There lean be no doubt that an appeal was competent and in the light of Section 2(b) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, and section 7 of the Industrial Disputes (Appellate Tribunal) Act, 1950, the matter should be considered as clearly beyond controversy — ‘Punjab National Bank Ltd. v. A.N Sen’, AIR 1952 Punj 134 (A).
6. Section 2(b) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 defines the expression “Award” as follows:
“award means an interim or final determination by an Industrial Tribunal of any industrial dispute or of any question relating thereto”
7. And section 7 of the Industrial Disputes (Appellate Tribunal) Act, 1950 provides:
“subject to the provisions of this section, an appeal shall lie to the Appellate Tribunal from any award or decision of an industrial tribunal if—
(a) the appeal involves any substantial question of law; or
(b) the award or decision in respect of any of the following matters, namely:
(i) wages,
(ii) bonus or travelling allowance,
(iii) any contribution paid or payable by the employer to any pension fund or provident fund,
(iv) any sum paid or payable to, or on behalf of, the workman to defray special expenses entailed on him by the nature of his employment,
(v) gratuity payable on discharge,
(vi) classification by grades,
(vii) retrenchment of workmen,
(viii) any other matter which may be prescribed”.
8. The only other argument, apart from those Indicated above, which was advanced before us was that the period of a week specified for the payment of arrears in the concluding paragraph of the award which is extracted below violates the provisions of Section 17-A of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, and that the violation vitiates the whole Award and makes it inoperative:
“In the result I pass this Interim Award ordering the management to pay the arrears within a week from the date of publication of the Award in the Gazette, as specified above and this will be in effect till Final Award is passed. I submit this Award to Government under Section 15 of the Industrial Disputes Act (Central Act XIV) of 1947”.
9. The argument is summarised as follows in the judgment under appeal:
“It is also contended that viewed as an Award under Section 15 of the Act, as the Interim Award purports to fix a period of a week from the date of its publication for its coming into force, it violates the provisions of the Act as regards the coming into operation of Awards under Section 15, as under Section 17-A, an award shall become enforceable only on the expiry of 30 days from the date of its publication in the Gazette. The fixation of the period of 7 days, from the date of publication for its coming into force, it is contended, as an inseparable part of the Award and therefore the fixation of time: being ‘ultra vires’, the entire award is vitiated”.
10. It proceeds on a misunderstanding of S. 17-A(1):
“The award of a Tribunal shall become enforceable on the expiry of thirty days from the date of its publication under S. 17……”
11. And the non-recognition of the distinction between
(a) the date on which an award becomes enforceable, and
(b) the date when it comes into operation.
12. The law on the subject is correctly summarised in Haidar's Indian Law of Industrial Disputes, p. 149:
“Although normally the date of enforceability and the date of operation may be identical, yet there may be cases where these two dates may be different. The date from when the award of a Tribunal shall be ‘operative’ is the date specifically mentioned as such in the award itself. The date of ‘enforceability’ of the award of a Tribunal is the date which comes on the expiry of 30 days from the date of its publication under Section 17. A simple illustration will make this point clear. If an award specifically mentions that it is to come into operation on 10-11-1950, then that date is the date from which the award becomes operative. If the award is published on 15-11-1950, it will be enforceable on 16-12-1950. The enforceable date-in this case is not the same as the date of operation of the award. The two dates are different.
The directives given in the award, though, operative, will not be enforceable except from 16-12-1950, and when it becomes enforceable then all the directions in the award will have to be-implemented from the date of its operativeness, viz., 10-11-1950…………If, however, it is ‘not’ specifically mentioned in the award as to the date from which the award shall come into operation then the date of operation as well as the enforceable date will be identical, that is to say, the date which falls on the expiry of the 30 days from the date of its publication under section 17”.
13. In support of his contention the learned counsel for the respondent relied on — ‘R. v. Industrial Disputes Tribunal’, 1953-1 All E.R 593 (B). That case has nothing whatever to do with the point at issue before us. In spite of Article 10 of the Industrial Disputes Order, 1951, which reads:
“Where an award on a dispute or issue has been made by the tribunal then as from the date of the award or from such other date, not being earlier than the date on which the dispute or issue to which the award relates first arose, as the tribunal may direct, it shall be an implied term of the contract between the employer and workers to whom the award applies that the terms and conditions of employment to be observed under the contract shall be in accordance with the award until varied by agreement between the parties or by a subsequent award of the tribunal……….”.
14. An award was passed increasing wages as from the 23rd November 1951, a date anterior to the date on which the dispute arose.
15. Lord Goddard, C.J, said that the tribunal had no jurisdiction to make such an award and:
“The earliest date from which they could have awarded the increased rate of wages would have been from the date when the dispute arose. It was for the tribunal, no doubt, to determine that date and to have awarded from that date and they should have so awarded. In these circumstances, as we cannot amend it, the award is bad and an order of certiorari must go and it must be quashed”.
16. It is settled law that when the remedies for the redress of grievances or the correction of errors are found in a statute which creates new rights and liabilities it is to those remedies and those remedies alone that resort should normally be made, — ‘Veerappa v. Raman & Raman Ltd., AIR 1952 SC 192 (C). The Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, and the Industrial Disputes (Appellate Tribunal) Act, 1850, form a self-contained code with an elaborate and adequate machinery for the composing of industrial disputes and ordinarily the aggrieved party should seek his redress within the framework of those enactments and not in this court under Article 225 of the Constitution.
17. In dealing with such matters this court will also have to remember the words of the learned Chief Justice of India in — ‘State of Madras v. C.P Sarathy’, AIR 1963 SC 53 (D):
“In view of the increasing complexity of modern life and the interdependence of the various sectors of a planned national economy, it is obviously in the interest of the public that labour disputes should be peacefully and quickly settled within the framework of the Act rather than by resort to methods of direct action which are only too well calculated to disturb the public peace and order and diminish production in the country, and courts should not be astute to discover formal defects and technical flaws to overthrow such settlements”
18. And the significance of the passage from Julian Huxley quoted with approval in — ‘Sree Meenakshi Mills Ltd., Madura v. State of Madras’, AIR 1951 Mad 974 (E) and — ‘D.S.M Association v. Industrial Tribunal, Madurai’, AIR 1953 Mad 102 (F):
“Many of our old ideas must be retranslated, so to speak, into a new, language. The democratic idea of freedom, for instance, must lose its nineteenth century meaning of individual liberty in the economic sphere, and become adjusted to new conceptions of social duties and responsibilities. When a big employer talks about his democratic right to individual freedom, meaning thereby a claim to socially irresponsible control over a huge industrial concern and over the lives of tens of thousands of human beings whom it happens to employ, is talking in a dying language”.
19. The Industrial Tribunals under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, are charged with, difficult and delicate task and in the interests of industrial peace they should be allowed to discharge their duties without delay or interference. Any employer who feels the urge to move this court will do well to note that Article 226 of the Constitution is no charter for the preservation of antique concepts of contractual rights in the field of labour relations against the impact of awards which are liberal or legislation which is progressive. We allow the appeal with costs, advocate's fee Rs. 200/-. The appellant will also have his costs in O.P No. 15 of 1952 from the petitioner therein, advocate's fee Rs. 200/-.
B/D.H.Z
20. Appeal allowed.
Alert