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Chakko Daniel v. Daniel Joshua And Others
Written Summary of the Opinion — Koshi, C.J.
Factual and Procedural Background
Two minor children, represented by their mother as next friend, sued the defendant (their putative father) for a declaration that he was liable to maintain them until they reached majority and for a decree directing payment of maintenance. The plaint claimed maintenance at the rate of Rs. 7½ per month for each plaintiff. The District Munsiff of Pathanamthitta granted the declaration and awarded maintenance at the rate of Rs. 5 per month. The lower court's decision was dated 20-1-1950, with maintenance made payable from 1-2-1950. The defendant appealed against that decree.
Material factual matters found in the opinion: the parties are Syrian Christians of Travancore; the defendant had entered a registered alliance with the plaintiffs' mother while his lawful wife was alive (a relationship described in the opinion as concubinage); the defendant admitted paternity and admitted he was not maintaining the children; the children were not living with him and the parents had long fallen out.
The defendant's pleaded position in the lower court was that he had no legal responsibility to maintain the plaintiffs and that a civil court could not grant the declaration or decree sought. The District Munsiff rejected that contention and stated that the defendant "is bound in law and in equity to maintain the minor plaintiffs as he has not made out any lawful grounds for not maintaining them."
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether, under the personal law applicable to Christians in Travancore (and by reference to relevant common-law authorities), a putative father is civilly liable to maintain his illegitimate children and whether a civil court may grant a declaration and decree for such maintenance.
- Whether the decree of the District Munsiff (which declared the defendant liable and awarded maintenance) could be sustained in law.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant (Defendant)'s Arguments
- The defendant admitted paternity but contended he had no legal responsibility to maintain the plaintiffs under the applicable law.
- He argued that the court could not properly give the declaration sought or pass a decree for maintenance against him.
Respondents (Plaintiffs / Next Friend)'s Position
- The plaintiffs (through their mother as next friend) sought a declaration that the defendant was liable to maintain them until each came of age, and a decree for monthly maintenance (Rs. 7½ per month claimed for each plaintiff in the plaint).
- The lower court accepted this position in substance and awarded maintenance (Rs. 5 per month), but the appeal challenges that outcome.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Viswasam v. Anthoni Nadar, 24 Trav LJ 405 (FB) | Authority indicating that children born of a union entered into while a lawful wife survived (a concubinage) are illegitimate under Travancore practice. | The court relied on this authority to conclude that the plaintiffs, born of the defendant's union with the next friend while his lawful wife was alive, were illegitimate. |
| Mariam v. Varki, 9 Trav LT 861 | Support for the proposition that children of such a union are illegitimate. | Used, together with Viswasam, to characterize the plaintiffs as illegitimate under the personal law context addressed in the opinion. |
| Ghana Kanta v. Gereli, 32 Cal 479 | Contains an observation suggesting the father of a child is bound to provide for its maintenance (as noted in the opinion); that view was cited by the lower court. | The opinion noted the decision but treated the observation as of doubtful foundation and at best obiter; the court declined to adopt it as a general principle capable of sustaining the lower court's decree. |
| V.J Walter v. M.J Walter, AIR 1928 Cal 600 (Mukherji J.) | Dissenting view criticizing the broad proposition in Ghana Kanta, stating "The broad proposition ... has hardly any foundation." | The court relied on Mukherji J.'s view to undermine the persuasive force of Ghana Kanta and to support the conclusion that the broad proposition lacks foundation. |
| Philomena Mendoza v. Dara Nussarwanji Mistry, AIR 1943 Bom 338 | Chagla J. criticized 32 Cal 479, describing the observation as obiter and difficult to understand; approved Mukherji J.'s comment. | The opinion cited Chagla J.'s treatment to reinforce the position that 32 Cal 479 does not establish a sound general principle that permits civil enforcement of a father's maintenance obligation in these circumstances. |
| Lingappa Goundan v. Esudasan, 27 Mad 13 | Holds that where the personal law (in that case for a Christian plaintiff) does not make the father or his estate liable, statutory remedy (CrPC s.488) is available only as provided by statute; common-law entitlement and statutory remedies differ in operation. | The court used the decision to explain that where common law (or personal law) does not create a civil right to maintenance, the remedy under the criminal/statutory provisions is the particular route and civil courts cannot create a broader civil right. |
| Beck Ford v. Hood (1798) 7 TR 620 | Authority referenced for the proposition that where an illegitimate child is entitled under common law, statutory remedy (CrPC s.488 analogues) is cumulative. | Cited via the passage in Lingappa Goundan to show the distinction between cases where common law gives a right (cumulative remedy) and where it does not (statute alone governs). |
| Ramayyar v. Vedachalla, 14 Mad 441 | Followed Beck Ford for the proposition on cumulative nature of statutory remedy when common law entitlement exists. | Used in the same cluster of authority in Lingappa Goundan to explain limits of remedies. |
| Sattappa Pillai v. Raman Chetti, 17 Mad. 1 | Followed earlier Madras authorities on maintenance remedies. | Referenced in Lingappa Goundan; used to illustrate precedent on the interaction of common-law rights and statutory remedies. |
| Sarojani v. Ramanarayana Menon, (1122) 38 Cochin LR 542 | Decision of the Cochin High Court (referred to by one of the judges in the present opinion) where the unanimous view was that an illegitimate child could not claim maintenance from its father through a civil court. | The court cited this decision as supporting the proposition that civil courts cannot entertain a suit for maintenance by an illegitimate child under the personal law context involved. |
| Narayanaroo v. Kutty, 20 Trav LR 65 | Early Travancore High Court decision where majority allowed maintenance claims, but the decision turned on custom and usage applicable to the parties (not applicable to Christians in this case). | The court noted the decision but held it did not govern the present case of Christians; the respondent's counsel relied on it but candidly admitted limitations in its application. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court proceeded by first determining the legal status of the children and the applicability of relevant personal and common law rules. It accepted that the children were born of a union contracted while the defendant's lawful wife was alive and therefore treated them as illegitimate, citing Travancore authorities (Viswasam v. Anthoni Nadar; Mariam v. Varki).
The court then examined whether the father's civil obligation to maintain his children—legitimate or illegitimate—existed under the personal law applicable to Christians in Travancore or under general/common-law principles. The opinion surveyed authoritative textbooks on English law (Trevelyan on Minors; Simpson on the Law of Infants; Stephen's Commentaries; Halsbury's Laws of England) and distilled their shared proposition: while English law recognizes a moral or "imperfect" duty of a father to maintain and educate his children, civil courts (apart from poor law provisions and except where statutory mechanisms apply) have no direct means to compel a father to provide maintenance out of his property.
The court considered case law cited by the parties. It observed that the lower court's view aligned with an observation in Ghana Kanta v. Gereli, but treated that observation as of limited authority: subsequent and persuasive commentary in Mukherji J.'s judgment in V.J Walter v. M.J Walter and Chagla J.'s discussion in Philomena Mendoza indicated that the broad proposition in 32 Cal 479 "has hardly any foundation" and was at least obiter. The court relied on those later treatments to cast doubt on Ghana Kanta's force as a general principle.
The court also relied on the Madras decision in Lingappa Goundan v. Esudasan to explain the relationship between common-law rights and statutory remedies: where under the applicable personal or common law a child is not entitled to maintenance from the putative father, any statutory remedy (for example, under provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure) is the specific course for relief and civil courts cannot create a broader civil remedy by action. The court noted that English authorities and leading text-writers uniformly described the father's maintenance duty as one of imperfect obligation, not enforceable by civil proceedings in the absence of statutory provisions.
Applying these principles to the facts, the court concluded that the District Munsiff's decree could not be maintained: the civil court lacked the jurisdiction under the applicable personal/common-law framework to grant the declaration and award of maintenance made in the suit. The court also considered an early Travancore decision (Narayanaroo v. Kutty) relied on by the respondent's counsel but held it was distinguishable because it turned on local custom and therefore could not govern the present Christian parties.
Holding and Implications
Holding: The appeal was allowed. The court set aside the decree passed by the lower court and DISMISSED THE PLAINTIFFS' SUIT.
Immediate consequences for the parties:
- The District Munsiff's declaration and maintenance order were set aside.
- No order as to costs was made, having regard to the "somewhat novel character of the question involved."
- The next friend of the plaintiffs was ordered to pay the court-fee due to the State on the plaint she filed on behalf of her minor children.
Broader implications: The opinion treats the father's obligation to maintain (in the context of Christians in Travancore and by reference to English common-law authorities) as a duty of imperfect obligation not ordinarily enforceable by civil action; the court relied on established authorities and text-books to refuse to create a civil remedy. The opinion did not purport to establish a new, sweeping precedent beyond the application of these authorities to the present facts.
Decree: Appeal allowed; decree accordingly.
Koshi, C.J:— This is a defendant's appeal. His two minor children represented by their mother as next friend brought the action giving rise to this appeal for a declaration that he is liable to maintain them until each of them comes of age and for a decree directing payment of maintenance. In the plaint, maintenance at the rate of Rs. 7½ per month was claimed for each plaintiff. The District Munsiff of Pathanamthitta who tried the suit granted the declaration asked for and allowed maintenance at the rate of Rs. 5/- per month. The decision was given on 20-1-1950 and maintenance is made payable from 1-2-50. The defendant seeks to challenge the correctness of the decree by way of this appeal.
2. The parties are Syrian Christians belonging to Travancore. The defendant entered into a marriage alliance with the next friend of the plaintiffs by a registered deed while his lawful wife was alive. It would appear that woman is still alive. The defendant admitted the paternity of the children and that he was not maintaining them. They were not living with him or under his protection. For some years now the parents had fallen out. The defendant's answer to the suit was that he had no legal responsibility to maintain the plaintiffs and that the court could not give the declaration asked for or pass a decree for maintenance. The lower court made short work of his contention by stating that
“he (the defendant) is bound in law and in equity to maintain the minor plaintiffs as he has not made out any lawful grounds for not maintaining them.”
3. The judgment does not discuss the question or refer to any law or authorities in support of the proposition stated in such broad terms. As the defendant's lawfully wedded wife was alive when he entered into the so-called second marriage with the plaintiffs' mother, the relationship between the defendant and that woman was one of mere concubinage. The children born of that union are illegitimate. See — ‘Viswasam v. Anthoni Nadar’, 24 Trav LJ 405 (FB) and — ‘Mariam v. Varki’, 9 Trav LT 861. The personal law relating to Christians in Travancore does not make a father legally liable to maintain his children whether they be legitimate or illegitimate. A view similar to what the learned District Munsiff enunciated in this case is seen set out in a decision of the Calcutta High Court reported in — ‘Ghana Kanta v. Gereli’, 32 Cal 479. That case related to a claim by an illegitimate child of a Hindu and we shall presently show that view has hardly any foundation. In Trevelayan's Law Relating to Minors (Fifth Edition) it is stated it page 209 that in cases which are not governed by either the Hindu or the Mahomedan law, the English law would apparently be applicable. The learned author further states:
“Although that law recognises the duty of the father to maintain and educate his children, the Civil Courts have no direct means of enforcing this obligation, so as to compel him to maintain them out of property in which they have no interest.”
4. A reference to text books relating to English law shows that the above is well-supported by recognized authorities.
5. Simpson on the Law of Infants (Fourth Edition) opens the Chapter (VIII) on Maintenance and Education as follows:
“Hitherto we have been considering the rights of parents with respect to the custody of their children: we have now to consider their correlative duties. The father's obligation to maintain and educate his children has been constantly recognised both by courts of law and equity; but it being only a duty of imperfect obligation neither court had any direct method of enforcing this duty, though they were enabled to some extent to do so indirectly. It is now well established that, except under the operation of the Poor Law, there is no legal obligation on the part of the father to maintain his child, unless indeed the neglect to do so should bring the case within the criminal law. Civilly there is no such obligation.” (P. 129).
6. To the same effect is the enunciation of the law at page 290 of Vol. I of Stephen's Commentaries on the Laws of England (19th Edition). In Halsbury's laws of England (Hail-sham Edn.) at page 579 of Vol. II and at page 671 of Vol. XVII the law is set out in the same terms as in the above extract.
“The respondent is a Parsi. There is no code of law which governs the Parsis in this country, and except for the statutory law they are governed by the common law of England. Therefore the question that arises is whether under the English Common law there is any obligation upon a putative father to maintain his illegitimate child. So authoritative a text-book as Halsbury's “Laws of England” Hailsham Edition, Vol. II, at p. 579, expresses the emphatic opinion that the father of an illegitimate child, so long as it remains illegitimate, is not recognized by the law of England for civil purposes. Therefore, he is under no obligation to provide for the child, in the absence of any affiliation order. Even a legitimate child has no right under the English common law to claim maintenance from its father. As pointed out by Halsbury in his Hailsham Edition, Vol. XVII, p. 671, except under the operation of the poor law, there is no actual legal obligation on a father or mother to maintain a child, unless the neglect to do so would bring the case within the criminal law. The only duty of a father to maintain his infant children is merely a normal obligation or a duty of imperfect obligation.”
7. Earlier in this judgment we referred to the decision in — ‘Ghana Kanta v. Gereli’, 32 Cal 479 and stated that the view the learned Munsiff expressed in this case conforms to an observation contained in that decision. A later Calcutta decision categorically dissented from that view and said:
“The broad proposition that under general principles the father of a child is bound to provide for its maintenance such as was suggested in the case of — ‘Ghana Kanta v. Gereli’, has hardly any foundation.” Per Mukherji J. in — ‘V.J Walter v. M.J Walter’, AIR 1928 Cal 600 at p. 604.
8. This case refers to decided English cases and the law applied there is in accord with what we find in the text books referred to above. In — ‘Philomena Mendoza… v. Dara Nussarwanji Mistry….*”, AIR 1943 Bom 338, Chagla J. referred to the decision in 32 Cal 479 and observed that apart from the fact that the observation that the defendant having begotten the child is bound to provide for its maintenance was obiter, it was difficult to understand what were the general principles the learned Judges had in their mind. The learned Judge also cited with approval the comment Mukherji J. made in AIR 1928 Cal 600 about that decision.
9. In the face of the law as set out in the foregoing decisions and the text books referred to above, it is clear that the decision rendered in this case by the lower court cannot be maintained. We would, however, also refer to the decision of the Madras High Court by Benson and Bhashyam Ayyangar, JJ., in — ‘Lingappa Goundan v. Esudasan’, 27 Mad 13. There an illegitimate child of a Hindu through a Christian mother brought an action against the-undivided members of the putative father's family after the father had died. The learned Judges said that as the plaintiff was a Christian the personal law governing him did not make the father or after the father's death his estate liable to maintain him. The judgment in that case contains the following instructive passage:
“In the case of illegitimate children entitled to claim maintenance under the common law i.e, the personal law applicable to them, the statutory remedy given by Section 488 of the Cr PC, will only be a cumulative remedy and will not take away the remedy under the common law to enforce such right by action brought against the father during his life-time or after his death, against his estate — ‘Beck Ford v. Hood’, (1798) 7 TR 620 also — ‘Ramayyar v. Vedachalla’, 14 Mad 441 (FB) followed in — ‘Sattappa Pillai v. Raman Chetti’, 17 Mad. 1. But in regard to illegitimate children who, like the plaintiff in this case, are not, under the common law, entitled to claim maintenance from the putative father, the right conferred on them by the statutory law can be enforced only by the particular remedy provided by the statute and to the extent therein provided.”
10. This view is referred to approvingly by Chagla J. in — ‘Philomena Mendoza v. Dara Nusserwanji’, AIR 1943 Bom 338.
11. The plaintiffs while they are minors have certainly a right to claim maintenance from the defendant, under the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, but no civil court could give them relief. The Indian decisions cited above have all been referred to by one of us in a decision of the Cochin High Court reported in — ‘Sarojani v. Ramanarayana Menon’, (1122) 38 Cochin LR 542. The question there was whether a suit for a declaration that the defendant was the father of an illegitimate child was maintainable. The parties were Nairs. Though the opinion expressed by the Judge who is a party here that the suit was not maintainable only formed the minority view, that an illegitimate child could not claim maintenance from its father through a civil court was the unanimous view of all the three Judges who took part in the decision of the case.
12. What remains for us is to refer to a very early decision of the Travancore High Court reported in — ‘Narayanaroo v. Kutty’, 20 Trav LR 65 brought to our notice by the respondent's learned counsel Mr. P. Kochukrishna Pillai. There the question was whether a Malabar Brahmin who had ‘Sambandhom’ with a Nair lady was liable to maintain the children born of that union. The majority view was in favour of the plaintiffs to the action that they could claim maintenance, but the decision turned on the custom and usage governing the parties. That decision cannot be held to govern a case where the parties are Christians. In fairness to Mr. Kochukrishna Pillai it must be said that he candidly admitted that on the authorities it was difficult to support the lower Court's decree and that he was not able to come across decided cases or other authorities to sustain it than the decision in — ‘Ghana Kanta v. Gereli’, 32 Cal 479 and 20 Trav LR 65. In the result the appeal succeeds and setting aside the decree passed by the lower Court, we dismiss the plaintiffs' suit. Regard being had to the somewhat novel character of the question involved we make no order for costs here or in the Court below. The next friend of the plaintiffs will, however, pay the court-fee due to the State on the plaint filed by her on behalf of her minor children.
13. Decree accordingly.
A./V.R.B
14. Appeal allowed.
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