Login
  • Bookmark
  • PDF
  • Share
  • CaseIQ

Mohammed Abdulla And Others v. Gopala Pillai And Others Counter Petitioners.

Kerala High Court
Jan 8, 1952
Important Paras
Please sign up to view Important Paras.
Smart Summary (Beta)

Judgment Summary — Subramania Iyer, J. (O.P. 147/1951)

Factual and Procedural Background

This petition was presented by 17 persons (1 to 14 as members and 15 to 17 as creditors) of The Cape Comorin General Traffic Company Limited (in Liquidation), Ramavarmapuram, Nagercoil. The petition originated as O.P. 4 of 1124 in the District Court of Nagercoil, was withdrawn for trial and disposal by the High Court, and re-numbered as O.P. 147/1951. The application was made under Section 192 of the Travancore Companies Act (corresponding to Section 153 of the Indian Companies Act), being the first application under clause (1) of that section, and prayed for liberty to hold a meeting of the members under court orders to consider a proposed arrangement concerning the continuance of the company. The application was opposed by some members (contributories) and by the Official Liquidator.

The company was incorporated in 1906 with a capital of Rs. 5,00,000 made up of 5,000 shares of Rs. 100 each, Rs. 30 paid-up and Rs. 70 reserve liability per share. The company carried on the manufacture of salt under a Government licence for 50 years, with about six or seven years remaining. The secretary & treasurer (father of the 12th petitioner, succeeded by the 12th petitioner) effectively controlled the company, provided finance on onerous terms, obtained possession of the factory to recoup dues, and used voting power to oppress the minority. Earlier winding-up petitions (in the years 1110–1112) resulted in a compromise (including a provision for three minority representatives on the board) which was not implemented. Subsequent proceedings culminated in a direction by a Bench of the Travancore High Court that "it is just and equitable that the company should be wound up." The petitioners now propose (in paragraph 30 of the petition) that the 12th petitioner be excluded from holding any office and that voting be changed from one vote per shareholder to one vote per share. The petitioners seek a court-ordered meeting to consider that arrangement.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether an application under Section 153(1) (Section 192 of the Travancore Companies Act) for a court-ordered meeting to consider an arrangement is maintainable when made by members or creditors after the company has been ordered to be wound up by the Court (i.e., whether only the liquidator may apply in such a case).
  2. Whether the particular arrangement proposed by the petitioners (exclusion of the 12th petitioner from office and changing voting to one vote per share) is such that it ought to be placed before a meeting of members under the Court's direction.
  3. Whether a meeting of members can be feasibly and properly held in the present circumstances, in view of disputed share ownerships and other practical impediments.

Arguments of the Parties

Advocate-General's Objection (on behalf of respondents/opponents)

  • It was contended that under Section 153(1) (as applied to the Travancore Companies Act), once a company is being wound up by the Court the application for calling a meeting "can be made only by the liquidator" — i.e., the words "in the case of a company being wound up, of the liquidator" were argued to limit competence to apply to the liquidator alone.

Petitioners' Arguments

  • The petitioners sought liberty for a meeting to consider the arrangement set out in paragraph 30 of the petition (the 12th petitioner's agreement to be excluded from holding any office and a change in voting to one vote per share).
  • Counsel for the petitioners relied upon Sir N.N. Sirkar's statement (Indian Companies Act) that "on the first application the order asked for is usually made as a matter of course" to argue that the Court ought to order the meeting.
  • Petitioners relied on economic arguments that the company's business (salt manufacture) is profitable and that the company's licence and assets have present value; they argued that sale of assets now would secure a fair price and that the right to manufacture for the remaining licence period is valuable.
  • Reference was made to clause C of Section 153 (Section 153C?) of the Indian Companies Act (introduced by Amending Act LII of 1951) as an alternative remedy in oppression cases; counsel sought to bring the case within that provision.

Opponents / Official Liquidator and Some Members

  • The Official Liquidator and some members opposed the application; the Official Liquidator also pointed to practical and substantive objections (including that the arrangement does not affect creditors' remedies and that the application was unnecessary or unjustified in part).
  • It was pointed out that an earlier application for the identical relief by some petitioners had been dismissed by the District Court, Nagercoil, and that the order had become final.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
In Re Travancore National & Quilon Bank Ltd., AIR 1939 Mad 318 (at p. 322) Referenced in support of the proposition that the application for holding a meeting under subsection (1) "may be made, either by the company or by any member or creditor of the company. Where the company is being wound up, the application may be made also by the Official Liquidator." The Court cited this authority (along with Sirkar) to support its construction that the words "in the case of a company being wound up, of the liquidator" add the liquidator as an additional applicant, and do not exclude company, members or creditors from applying even after winding up.
Travancore High Court decisions reported in 1948 Travancore Law Reports: 1948 Trav LR 811 and 1948 Trav LR 1067 These reports include the Single Judge's dismissal and the two-Judge Bench's reversal directing winding up on the ground that "it is just and equitable that the company should be wound up." The Bench observed that the company had been "a fraud on the statute" and was a "one-man company" where the minority was being oppressively harassed. The Court relied on the Bench's observations (quoted at para. 9 of their judgment, page 1080) as describing the factual and legal basis for the winding up order and as demonstrating that the company's affairs were such that the proposed arrangement did not address the defects that had led to winding up.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded in the following analytical steps (as stated in the opinion):

  1. Maintainability: The Advocate-General argued that once a company is being wound up only the liquidator could make an application under Section 153(1). The Court examined the text of the provision and authoritative commentary (Palmer's Company Precedents; Sirkar) and concluded that the phrase "in the case of a company being wound up, of the liquidator" was intended to add the liquidator as an additional, not exclusive, applicant. The Court therefore overruled the objection and held the present application competent. The Court did, however, comment that the joinder of petitioners 15–17 (creditors) was unnecessary or unjustified since the arrangement would not affect creditors' remedies.
  2. Factual background and prior proceedings: The Court summarized the company's history of concentrated control by the secretary & treasurer and the consequent oppression of the minority, the non-implementation of a prior compromise (which had included a provision for minority representation on the board), and the subsequent proceedings that resulted in the Court ordering winding up as "just and equitable." The Court quoted earlier judicial observations that the company was effectively a "one-man company" and "a fraud on the statute."
  3. Assessment of proposed arrangement: The petitioners' proposal consisted of (a) the 12th petitioner agreeing to be excluded from holding any office, and (b) changing voting power from one vote per shareholder to one vote per share. The Court analyzed these measures and found them inadequate. It reasoned (on the facts of this case) that exclusion of the 12th petitioner from office would not prevent him from controlling the company "from behind the screen," and that changing voting to one vote per share would not remedy the problem where a small number hold the large majority of shares and can outvote the minority. The Court characterized the proposed remedy as "shadowy and not substantial."
  4. Feasibility of a meeting: The Court noted that the register of shareholders was incomplete and out of date, that numerous transfers were not recorded, and that out of 192 shareholders there were disputes regarding 102 — disputes that would have to be determined by the Court to ascertain the actual shareholders. Consequently, the Court held that more than 50% of members were unascertained and "a meeting of the members of the company is not, therefore, feasible now."
  5. Commercial and practical considerations: The Court observed that the company's most significant asset was the remaining period of the salt-manufacturing licence (six or seven years remaining), which diminishes over time. The Official Liquidator had leased salt pans; the lease expired end of 1951 and a sale had been fixed by the Court. The Court noted many claims against the company (admitted and disputed) amounting to several lakhs and that no method was suggested for liquidation of liabilities except by sale of assets. The Court reasoned that postponing sale until disputes over membership were determined would likely render a sale impossible due to diminution of the licence value.
  6. On Section 153C and timing: The petitioners' reliance on clause C of Section 153 (Section 153C?) of the Indian Companies Act (Amending Act LII of 1951) was considered. The Court held that Section 153C applies at a stage before an order for winding up is passed and "has no operation to a case where an order for winding up has been passed by the Court long before, as is the case here." The Court also observed that had the application been bona fide it should have been placed before the Court then considering winding up.
  7. Conclusion of analysis: Because (i) the arrangement proposed did not provide an effective remedy for the chronic and inherent evil that occasioned the winding up order, (ii) the register and membership disputes made a meeting infeasible, and (iii) practical considerations of asset value and pending claims made delay prejudicial, the Court concluded the arrangement did not deserve consideration by a meeting and the application should be rejected with costs.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The Court rejected the application for an order directing a meeting of the members to consider the proposed arrangement, and ordered that the petition be dismissed with costs. The Court fixed the advocate's fee at Rs. 200 each for the respondent and for the liquidator's advocate, to be paid out of the assets in the hands of the liquidator. The petitioners' application for a certificate under Article 133 of the Constitution for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court was refused.

Implications:

  • Direct effect on the parties: No meeting will be ordered to consider the proposed arrangement; the liquidator is to proceed in accordance with existing orders (including the sale fixed by the Court); costs and advocate fees were assessed and to be paid from company assets.
  • Statutory interpretation consequence: The Court construed Section 153(1) (as applied) to allow members or creditors to apply for a meeting even after winding up, and held that the liquidator is an additional but not exclusive applicant where the company is being wound up.
  • Broader precedent: The Court did not purport to lay down a novel rule beyond its interpretation and application of existing provisions and authorities; the decision is factual and case-specific concerning the inadequacy of the proposed arrangement and practical impediments to a meeting. No wider legal principle was announced beyond the Court's stated interpretations and factual conclusions.

Order accordingly.

Show all summary ...

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

Subramania Iyer, J.:— This petition is by 17 persons, 1 to 14 as members and 15 to 17 as creditors of The Cape Comorin General Traffic Company Limited (in Liquidation), Ramavarmapuram, Nagercoil. This was presented in the District Court of Nagercoii and numbered there as O.P 4 of 1124 which was withdrawn by this Court for trial and disposal and re-numbered here as O.P 147/1951. The application is under Section 192 of the Travancore Companies Act (corresponding to Section 153 of the Indian Companies Act) and is the first application under Cl. (1) of that section, praying for liberty to hold a meeting of the members of the company under the orders of the Court for considering an arrangement proposed concerning the continuance of the company. This is opposed by, some of the members (contributories) as also by the Official Liquidator.

2. We must notice an argument urged by the learned Advocate-General as to the maintainability of the application. It is contended by him that under S. 153, Cl. (1) which provides that:

“Where a compromise or arrangement is proposed between a company and its creditors or any class of them, or between the company and its members or any class of them, the Court may, on the application in a summary way of the company or of any creditor or members of the company or, in the case of a company being wound up, of the liquidator, order a meeting of the creditors or class of creditors, or of the members of the company or class of members, as the ca?e may be, to be called, held and conducted in such manner as the Court directs:”

3. The application can be made only by the liquidator because this is “the case of a company being wound up” by the Court. The provisions of the English Companies Act, & S. 153 are similar. In commenting upon the English section, in Palmer's Company Precedents, Part II, Winding Up, (15th edition), page 906, it is stated that:

“A proposal for an arrangement or compromise is not confined to the company or its liquidator (if any). It is open to any creditor or member to take the initiative. The Act expressly provides that the Court may, on the application in a summary way of the company, or of any creditor or member of the company, or in the case of a company being wound up, of the liquidator, order a meeting etc.”

4. We consider that this is the proper construction to put on the provision. The introduction of the words “in the case of a company being wound up, of the liquidator” is intended to provide an additional and not an exclusive person who could make the application. If a company, or a member, or a creditor may make the application under S. 153(1), proposing a compromise or arrangement in the case of a company which is not under liquidation, there is no reason why any of them should not be competent to make the application in the case of a company which is being wound up.

5. The interest that entitled the company, member or creditor to make the application in the case of a going concern subsists even after an order for winding up is made to sustain a similar application even at that stage.

“The application for the holding of a meeting as contemplated in sub-section (1) may be made, either by the company or by any member or creditor of the company. Where the company is being wound up, the application may be made also by the Official Liquidator.” (Sirkar, Indian Companies' Act p. 398. See also ‘In Re Travancore National & Quilon Bank Ltd.’, AIR 1939 Mad 318 at p. 322).

6. We, therefore overrule the objection and hold that the present application is competent. We may, however, mention that the junction of petitioners 15 to 17 who claim to be creditors of the company is unnecessary, if not unjustified as the arrangement proposed does not in any manner affect or curtail the remedies or claims of any creditor.

7. Th company was incorporated in the year 1906 (1081 M.E) with a capital of 5 lakhs of rupees made up of 5,000 shares of the face value of Rs. 100 each. Rs. 30 was paid up leaving a reserve liability of Rs. 70 per share. The business that the company carried on was the manufacture of salt. The company obtained a licence in that behalf from the Government of Travancore for a period of 50 years, of which six or seven years have yet to run. The father of the 12th petitioner was the secretary and treasurer of the company from its inception for about 30 years and on his death, the 12th petitioner succeeded him to that position for life. Four out of the five thousand shares are either owned or absolutely controlled by the secretary & treasurer. Instead of calling up the unpaid share capital, the secretary & treasurer functioned as financier to the company imposing onerous terms by way of a high rate of interest besides stipulating for a share in the profits. The liability that the company incurred in this fashion was allowed to accumulate and the factory was put in the possession of the financier to enable him to recoup his dues. There was a sub-lease of the factory to another party latterly.

8. The result of all this was that notwithstanding the fact that the company was working and working profitably, no dividend was declared to the share-holders, all the profits being absorbed in the appropriation of the amounts due to the secretary and treasurer by way of liquidation of the company's liabilities. This state of things was brought about and sustained by the secretary and treasurer by using his voting power with a packed majority, tyrannising over the minority to its detriment. Petitions for winding up the company were filed in the District Court, Nagercoil, in the years 1110, 1111 and 1112, which ended in a compromise the main feature of which was “putting on the Board of Directors, 3 representatives from the minority share-holders, other than the relations of the 4th counter-petitioner.” This was not given effect to.

9. It would appear that this provision in the compromise was not made honestly with a view to its being implemented but rather as a make shift arrangement to get rid of the petitions for winding up. No impediment to the implementation of the compromise is pointed out and it is noteworthy that the arrangement proposed to be placed before a meeting of the members of the company does not contain a provision to this or similar effect which would tend to avoid opposition by the minority. Its absence is all the more significant in view of the fact that one of the grounds for ordering liquidation was the non-implementation of the aforesaid terms of the compromise.

10. After the expiry of the time for giving effect to the aforesaid term of the compromise, O.P 3 of 1116 was filed by a member of the company in the District Court, Nagercoil, for its being wound up compulsorily by the Court. This was withdrawn by the erstwhile Travancore High Court for disposal in exercise of its extraordinary original jurisdiction. The learned Single Judge who dealt with the petition dismissed it. Against his order, an appeal was preferred before a Bench of two Judges of the same Court which reversed it and directed the company to be wound up, being of the opinion that “it is just and equitable that the company should be wound up”. The decision of the single Judge as also that of the Bench are both reported in 1948 Trav LR 811 and 1948 Trav LR 1067 respectively.

11. At page 1080, in Para. 9 of their judgment, the learned Judges remark thus:

“The fourth counter-petitioner has little regard for truth, scant respect for the statute and little regard for the authority of the Court. It seems to us that this company has been a fraud on the statute for 42 years. IS is a one-man company. The majority of the shares are in the hands of one individual and we are satisfied that the minority is being oppressively harassed by what is called the majority. The minority shows equal obstinacy and upon all accounts, the company cannot be said to have a domestic forum so essential for its existence. We think that the affairs of the company ought to be wound up.”

12. Feeling the force of this observation and the futility of any attempt to resuscitate the company without suggesting any means to cure the defect which proved fatal to its continuance the petitioners propose a remedy in Para. 30 of the petition. That remedy consists in the 12th petitioner's agreement to be excluded from holding any office in the company and by providing that the voting power shall be, one vote not per share-holder as it was, but per share. This is the only remedy proposed. The exclusion of the 12th petitioner irons holding office cannot be considered to be an effective remedy because, the 12th petitioner can pull the strings equally effectively from behind the screen. The suggested change in the voting power would not lead to any change in the ultimate result. The remedy suggested is shadowy and not substantial.

13. If X persons hold the large majority of shares, they can easily out-vote the minority whether the voting power be per share-holder or peri share because, upon the hypothesis they are numerically the majority share-holders and are the owners of the majority of the shares as well. It is thus obvious that the arrangement proposed does not afford a remedy for the evil which occasioned the order for winding up. If ever it is possible that there be an effective remedy, as the evil is chronic and inherent in the very situation there should be honest and sincere change of mind of the majority with which the minority is satisfied, in which event there may be no opposition. It is not possible, in this case to find a means to resusciate the company. The tyranny of the majority over a helpless minority was the ground of the liquidation. How can the same majority be trusted with the interests of the minority which they have been persistently disregarding without bona fides and for their own aggrandizement, in violation of the very foundation on which the rule of majority is based? We are not satisfied that the arrangement proposed deserves to be considered by a meeting of the members of the company.

14. Learned counsel for the petitioners relies upon the observation of Sir N.N Sirkar at page 398 of his book on the Indian Companies Act, to the effect that “on the first application the order asked for is usually made as a matter of course.” This observation is not an authority for the position that the order asked for has to be made as a matter of course. It only shows that usually it is done. The reason is that usually an arrangement proposed would, prima facie, be such as to justify such an order. From what we have said above, it is clear that the contrary is the case here. There is the further fact that an earlier application for the identical relief made by some of the petitioners was dismissed by the District Court, Nagercoii, which order has become final, not having appealed against. The present application is substantially, if not absolutely, the same. A circumstance that is relied upon by the petitioners is that the legal representatives of the petitioner on whose application the order for winding up was passed, support the application. This is of no moment at all. A proceeding to wind up a company can be started by the company, any member thereof. Or any of its creditors. Any other person competent to maintain an application is entitled to appear at the hearing and, if the petition be not or not properly prosecuted, to prosecute it. An order for the winding up of a company operates in favour of all the creditors and of all the contributories, as if made on the joint petition of a creditor and a contributory. (Section 167). The consent of the legal representatives of the petitioner for winding up, to the arrangement proposed, does not affect its consideration except as showing the consent of another member to the said arrangement. In the facts of this case, even this consent would appear to be not one given freely but one procured for the occasion.

15. The Register of share-holders of the company is not complete nor is it up to date. There appears to have been various transfers not recorded in the Register. Learned counsel for both sides agree that out of 192 shareholders, there are disputes as regards 102 and that those disputes have to be decided by the Court to ascertain who the share-holders are. The result is that as things stand, more than 50 per cent of the members of the company are unascertained. A meeting of the members of the company is not, therefore, feasible now.

16. The period of the license for manufacture of salt which was for 50 years will expire within 6 or 7 years. The petitioners say that the manufacture of salt is profitable and will continue to be profitable. They say further, that the agreement entered into by the company with the Government provides for a renewal of the license upon the terms to be agreed upon with the Government. That provision may not mean much as any party can enter into an agreement with the Government. Even so the company. The company hag no preferential right. No doubt the State will consider the fact that the company had been the prior licensee deciding upon a new licence. That apart, the real asset of the company now consists in the right to manufacture salt for the remaining period of the license, besides the salt pans and Other assets. The remaining period of the license gets gradually diminished by lapse of time and would become extinct in six or seven years.

17. The business being admittedly now prosperous, a present sale of the assets would secure to the company a fair price. The Liquidator would value the right to manufacture salt in the future at 15 lakhs of rupees and the petitioners at much more. From the annual revenue now derived, income-tax at annas 2 in the rupee has to be paid and the net profit is only below one lakh. At that rate, for the remaining period, the profit that can be expected is only below six to seven lakhs of rupees, that is, the estimated net income for the remaining period of the licence. If the sale of the right to manufacture salt be for at least that amount, it would be to the advantage of the members as that sum can be availed of in presenti and being capital, will be free from any impost of income-tax.

18. The salt pans had been leased under the orders of the Court by the Official Liquidator and the lease expired by the end of 1951. The sale has been fixed for the 16th of this month as ordered by this Court.

19. There are various claims against the company, some of which are admitted and others disputed. Some suits have been filed to enforce some of the claims and other suits may follow. The aggregate of the claims would be to the tune of several lakhs of rupees. There is no method pointed out for liquidation of these liabilities except by sale of the assets. If the assets are not now sold by auction by the Official Liquidator as ordered, the result would be that they would be brought to sale by the creditors, some of whom are related to the 12th petitioner, with the almost sure prospect of such a sale turning out to be for an inadequate price. To postpone the sale until after determination of the 102 members of the company would be, in all likelihood, to render the sale impossible by the gradual diminution and ultimate determination of the remaining period of the license which is one of the main assets of the company.

20. Learned counsel for the petitioners drew our attention to clause C of Section 153 (Section 153 C?) of the Indian Companies Act introduced by Amending Act LII(52) of 1951, which provides for a remedy alternative to winding up even in cases where an order for winding up by Court is applied for on the ground “that the affairs of the company are being conducted (b) in a manner oppressive to some part of the members” and sought to bring his case within the ambit of that provision. Section 153 (Section 153 C?) applies to a stage before the order for winding up is passed by the Court and has no operation to a case where an order for winding up has been passed by the Court long before, as is the case here. We may, however, mention that had there been any bona fides in this application, the arrangement now proposed would have been placed before the Court that was considering the question of winding up of the company and it would have considered the matter even in the absence of a statutory provision as the one contained in S. 153C, as the winding up was ordered under the last clause of S. 162 which provides:

“162 A company may be wound up by the Court:

(vi) if the Court is of opinion that it is just and equitable that the company should be wound up.”

21. If the company or any of its members satisfies the Court that the Company could be continued without the conduct of its business being subject to the complaint of its being oppressive to some part of the members, the Court would not have found it just and equitable to order the winding up of the company. This was not done and the present belated application has only the unjustified opinion of its authors to support it. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the arrangement proposed does not deserve to be considered by a meeting of the members of the company under the circumstances of this case and that the application for ordering a meeting of the members in that behalf should be rejected with costs. We fix the advocate's fee at Rs. 200/- each for the respondent and for the liquidator's advocate. The amount shall be paid out of the assets in the hands of the liquidator.

22. After this judgment was pronounced Mr. Ninan on behalf of the petitioners applies for a certificate under Article 133 of the Constitution of India for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court. We are not satisfied that this is a fit case for granting such a certificate.

23. Order accordingly.