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Gajanan Kamlya Patil v. Additional Collector And Competent Authority (Ulc) And Others

Supreme Court Of India
Feb 14, 2014
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Factual and Procedural Background

The appellant received a notice dated 17-2-2005 under Section 10(5) of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 (ULC Act) requiring surrender of land bearing Survey Nos. 47/10 and 54/4 in Village Kasarwadavli, Thane. Earlier notifications under Sections 10(1) and 10(3) (15-6-2000 and 14-3-2000) had declared the land surplus and vested de jure in the State of Maharashtra, and a further notification dated 2-8-2002 reiterated the vesting.

Contending that actual possession had never been taken and that the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Repeal Act, 1999 (adopted in Maharashtra on 1-12-2007) nullified further proceedings, the appellant filed Writ Petition No. 1669 of 2010 in the Bombay High Court. The High Court granted relief regarding Survey No. 47/10 but, accepting the State’s assertion that possession of Survey No. 54/4 had been transferred to the Mumbai Metropolitan Region Development Authority (MMRDA), relegated the appellant to a civil suit.

The appellant sought special leave; SLP No. 14690 of 2011 and connected matters were allowed, leading to the present appeals before the Supreme Court.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether, in light of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Repeal Act, 1999, the State could validly claim that possession of Survey No. 54/4 had been taken before 1-12-2007, thereby defeating the appellant’s title.
  2. Whether the High Court erred in directing the appellant to file a civil suit instead of granting relief under Article 226 of the Constitution.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • The case is fully covered by State of U.P. v. Hari Ram (2013) 4 SCC 280, which holds that vesting under Section 10(3) of the ULC Act is only de jure; physical possession must be taken in accordance with Sections 10(5) and 10(6).
  • The State of Maharashtra adopted the Repeal Act on 1-12-2007; the “possession receipt” executed on 2-7-2008 in favour of MMRDA, without notice to the appellant, was illegal and could not cure the defect.
  • Because no lawful possession was taken, the appellant is entitled to the benefit of the Repeal Act for Survey No. 54/4, just as the High Court recognised for Survey No. 47/10.

Respondents' Arguments

  • MMRDA had already taken possession of Survey No. 54/4; the question is factual and unsuitable for determination in writ jurisdiction.
  • The proper remedy for the appellant is a civil suit to establish title and possession; therefore, the High Court’s direction was correct.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
State of Uttar Pradesh v. Hari Ram, (2013) 4 SCC 280 Interpretation of Sections 10(3)-(6) of the ULC Act: vesting under Section 10(3) is only de jure; physical possession requires compliance with Sections 10(5)/(6). Relied upon as governing authority; Court applied its ratio to hold that mere statutory vesting did not divest the appellant of possession, and that no lawful physical possession was taken before the Repeal Act.
Maharaj Singh v. State of U.P., (1977) 1 SCC 155 Meaning of the term “vesting” depends on statutory context. Cited within Hari Ram passage adopted by the Court to elucidate “vesting”.
Rajendra Kumar v. Kalyan (Dead) by LRs, (2000) 8 SCC 99 Differentiation between “vested in possession” and “vested in interest”. Referenced in the explanatory quotation from Hari Ram concerning nuances of vesting.
Coverdale v. Charlton, (1878) LR 4 QBD 104 (CA) Definition of “to vest” as “to give a property in”. Mentioned within the same Hari Ram extract to support interpretative analysis.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Supreme Court adopted the interpretative framework laid down in Hari Ram, emphasising that:

  • Section 10(3) of the ULC Act effects only a transfer of title (de jure possession). Actual, physical possession passes only upon compliance with Section 10(5) (peaceful surrender) or, failing that, Section 10(6) (forcible dispossession after due notice).
  • Notices under Section 10(5) are mandatory; force can be employed only after a failure to comply, and the procedural safeguards must be documented.
  • The record disclosed no panchnama, possession receipt, or any contemporaneous document showing that the appellant had surrendered possession, nor that the authorities had taken possession using the procedure in Section 10(6).
  • Affidavits from the Competent Authority (29-4-2010) and the Principal Secretary, Urban Development Department (2-7-2010) expressly admitted that actual possession had not been taken before 29-11-2007.
  • The “possession receipt” executed on 2-7-2008—after the State had already adopted the Repeal Act—was effected without notice to the appellant and could not validate dispossession.
  • Consequently, only de jure vesting existed; de facto possession remained with the appellant. Under Section 3(1)(a) of the Repeal Act, all pending proceedings abate where possession has not been taken, and the appellant retains title.

Holding and Implications

APPEALS ALLOWED; NOTICE DATED 17-2-2005 AND ALL CONSEQUENTIAL ACTIONS QUASHED.

Direct Effect: The appellant continues to own and possess Survey No. 54/4 (as well as Survey No. 47/10); MMRDA and the State cannot rely on the earlier vesting notifications.

Broader Implications: The judgment reinforces Hari Ram, underscoring that States must demonstrate actual, lawful possession prior to a Repeal Act’s commencement; mere statutory vesting is insufficient to defeat landowners’ rights.

Show all summary ...

K.S.P Radhakrishnan, J.— Leave granted. We are, in these appeals, concerned with the question whether the High Court WP (C) No. 1669 of 2010 was justified in relegating the parties to file civil suits to recover the lands covered by Survey No. 54/4 and Survey No. 53/3, both admeasuring 1870 sq m, situated at Village Kasarwadavli, Ghodbunder Road, Taluka and District Thane, so as to get the benefit of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Repeal Act, 1999.

2. We may, for the disposal of these appeals, refer to the facts in civil appeal arising out of Special Leave Petition No. 14690 of 2011, treating the same as the leading case. The appellant herein was issued a notice dated 17-2-2005 under Section 10(5) of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 (for short “the ULC Act”) for taking possession of the appellant's land bearing Survey Nos. 47/10 and 54/4. It was stated in the notice that in accordance with the Notification published in Part I, Page No. — Konkan Division Supplementary dated 12-12-2002, in the Gazette of Maharashtra, the land notified had been vested in the Government of Maharashtra and that the Additional Collector and Competent Authority, Thane (for short “the Competent Authority”), had been authorised by the State Government to take possession of the land in question, details of which had been published in the notification under Section 10(3) and the land be handed over or possession be given within 30 days from the date of receipt of the notice. Further, it was also intimated that if the appellant had failed to give possession of the land, necessary action would be taken for taking possession by application of necessary force.

3. The appellant, aggrieved by the abovementioned notice, filed Writ Petition No. 1669 of 2010 before the Bombay High Court to quash the notice dated 17-2-2005 and also for a declaration, inter alia, that the land bearing Survey No. 54/4 admeasuring 1870 sq m is in the physical possession of the appellant and would continue to vest as such with the appellant as true and actual owner thereof. The appellant also sought a declaration that in view of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Repeal Act, 1999, the proposed action of the respondents or the State or its authorities for taking possession of the land be declared as null and void and also prayed for other consequential reliefs.

4. The High Court after examining the provisions of the ULC Act as well as the provisions of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Repeal Act, 1999 and also taking note of the affidavit filed by the State Government and by the Mumbai Metropolitan Region Development Authority (Mmrda) noticed that so far as Survey No. 47/10 is concerned, the possession had not been taken over by Mmrda. However, as far as the land in Survey No. 54/4 was concerned, after noticing that the possession had been taken over, the High Court disposed of the petition granting relief to the appellant in respect of Survey No. 47/10, but so far as Survey No. 54/4 is concerned, as already indicated, the appellant was granted liberty to move the civil court for establishing his claim over the property in question.

5. Shri Shekhar Naphade, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the appellant, submitted that the issue raised in this case stands fully covered by the judgment of this Court in State of U.P v. Hari Ram (2013) 4 SCC 280 and that the High Court has committed a grave error in holding that Mmrda is in possession of the land in Survey No. 54/4 and hence the question as to whether possession had been legally taken or not has to be decided by the civil court. The learned Senior Counsel also submitted that the State of Maharashtra has adopted the Repeal Act, 1999 on 1-12-2007 and that Respondent 1 had executed the possession receipt in favour of Respondent 3 on 2-7-2008 behind the back of the appellant, without following the due process of law. The learned Senior Counsel submitted that since possession had not been taken in accordance with law, the appellant is entitled to the benefit of the Repeal Act, 1999 as was rightly held in respect of Survey No. 47/10.

6. Shri A.S Bhasme, learned counsel appearing for the respondents, on the other hand contended that the High Court has rightly come to the conclusion that the land in question had been taken over by Mmrda and being a disputed question of fact, the same cannot be decided by the High Court under Section 226 of the Constitution of India and the only remedy available to the appellant is to file a civil suit to establish his right since the dispute is of a civil nature. The learned counsel, therefore, prayed for dismissal of the appeal.

7. We may, at the outset, point out that almost all the legal issues urged before us stand covered by the judgment of this Court in Hari Ram (2013) 4 SCC 280. However, reference to a few facts is necessary for the disposal of these appeals. The Competent Authority published a Notification dated 17-1-2000 under Section 10(1) of the ULC Act in the Gazette of Government of Maharashtra on 15-6-2000, wherein the land held by the appellant was shown as the land to be acquired by the Government of Maharashtra. Following that, a Notification dated 14-3-2000 under sub-section (3) of Section 10 of the ULC Act was published notifying the public that the land shown in the schedule therein is covered and the land in Survey No. 54/4 as well would be considered to be acquired by the Government of Maharashtra w.e.f 15-6-2000 and the said land would be vested with the Government of Maharashtra from the said date.

8. The Competent Authority then issued yet another Notification dated 2-8-2002 for information of the public that the land described in the schedule therein which included the land in Survey No. 54/4 as well, have been considered to be acquired by the Government of Maharashtra w.e.f 15-9-2002 and the said land would be vested for all purposes free from all charges to the Government of Maharashtra from the said date. The Competent Authority, as already indicated, issued a show-cause notice dated 17-2-2005 under sub-section (5) of Section 10 of the ULC Act to the appellant to hand over possession of the land in question within 30 days from the date of receipt of that notice. It was also indicated therein that if the appellant failed to give possession of the land, necessary action would be taken for taking possession by the application of necessary force.

9. We may indicate that all the abovementioned proceedings were initiated under the ULC Act, 1976 but the said Act was repealed by Parliament by the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Repeal Act, 1999 on 22-3-1999 which came into force w.e.f 11-1-1999. The State of Maharashtra vide its Notification dated 1-12-2007 adopted the Repeal Act, 1999 w.e.f 1-12-2007. After adoption of the Repeal Act, 1999 on 1-12-2007, the Circle Office Balkum, Taluka and District Thane, executed “possession receipt” on 2-7-2008 of the land bearing Survey No. 54/4 belonging to the appellant in favour of the Chief Surveyor of Mmrda, pursuant to the orders of the Collector, Thane dated 1-7-2008. No notice, admittedly, was given to the appellants before executing the possession receipt. In this case, an additional affidavit dated 29-4-2010 was filed by the Competent Authority stating that he could not find any document like panchnama or possession receipt in respect of the land covered by Survey No. 54/4 and few other survey numbers. The operative portion of the affidavit reads as follows:

“I have stated in my affidavit-in-reply dated 20-3-2010 that on 2-7-2008 the Circle Officer has delivered the possession of the land bearing Survey Nos. 103/3 area 3890 sq m, 3/10 area 3600 sq m, 98/6 area 1708 sq m, 53/3 area 2450 sq m, 54/4 area 1870 sq m to Mmrda. I state that I have inspected my record, however, I could not find any document like panchnama or possession receipt in respect of the aforesaid lands by which its possession was obtained from the landholder under the Urban Land Ceiling Act.”

10. We have another affidavit dated 2-7-2010 by the Principal Secretary, Urban Development Department, Government of Maharashtra, wherein he has categorically stated that the possession had not been handed over by the landowner to the competent authority:

10.1 The operative portion of the same reads as under:

“The record-of-rights of the said land have been mutated in favour of the Government on the basis of the notification issued under Section 10(3) of the ULC Act. I say and submit that on enquiry, it is revealed that, though the notice under Section 10(5) was issued on 17-2-2005 for handing over possession of the surplus vacant land, the possession of land has not been handed over by the landowner concerned to the competent authority or to his representative.”

10.2 The affidavit also further reads as under:

“Therefore, the Government was under impression that since the land has been vested into the Government as per the Notification under Section 10(3) dated 2-8-2002, the Government has every right to use the said land for public purpose. I say that, in the aforesaid background, the decision was taken to allot the land to Mumbai Metropolitan Region Development Authority, and therefore, as per the directions of the Government and subsequent directions of the Collector, Thane, the Circle Officer, Balkum, District Thane handed over the possession of the surplus land to the Mumbai Metropolitan Region Development Authority on 2-7-2008.”

10.3 The affidavit also says that the actual possession was not taken over as per the provisions of the ULC Act, 1976 before 29-11-2007. The operative portion of the same reads as under:

“I say and submit that, even though the possession of the land has been handed over to the Mumbai Metropolitan Region Development Authority by the Circle Officer, Balkum on 2-7-2008, the actual possession of said surplus land was not taken over as per the provisions of the ULC Act, 1976 before 29-11-2007.”

11. We may indicate that apart from the affidavits filed by the officials in this case, no other document has been made available either before the High Court or before this Court, either showing that the appellant had voluntarily surrendered or the respondents had taken peaceful or forcible possession of the lands. In Hari Ram (2013) 4 SCC 280 this Court examined the meaning and context of sub-sections (3) to (6) of Section 10 of the ULC Act and held as follows:

“30. Vacant land, it may be noted, is not actually acquired but deemed to have been acquired, in that deeming things to be what they are not. Acquisition, therefore, does not take possession unless there is an indication to the contrary. It is trite law that in construing a deeming provision, it is necessary to bear in mind the legislative purpose. The purpose of the Act is to impose ceiling on vacant land, for the acquisition of land in excess of the ceiling limit thereby to regulate construction on such lands, to prevent concentration of urban lands in the hands of a few persons, so as to bring about equitable distribution. For achieving that object, various procedures have to be followed for acquisition and vesting. When we look at those words in the above setting and the provisions to follow such as sub-sections (5) and (6) of Section 10, the words ‘acquired’ and ‘vested’ have different meaning and content. Under Section 10(3), what is vested is de jure possession not de facto, for more reasons than one because we are testing the expression on a statutory hypothesis and such an hypothesis can be carried only to the extent necessary to achieve the legislative intent.
Voluntary surrender
31. The ‘vesting’ in sub-section (3) of Section 10, in our view, means vesting of title absolutely and not possession though nothing stands in the way of a person voluntarily surrendering or delivering possession. The Court in Maharaj Singh v. State of U.P (1977) 1 SCC 155, while interpreting Section 117(1) of the U.P Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950 held that ‘vesting’ is a word of slippery import and has many meanings and the context controls the text and the purpose and scheme project the particular semantic shade or nuance of meaning. The Court in Rajendra Kumar v. Kalyan (2000) 8 SCC 99 held as follows:
‘28. … We do find some contentious substance in the contextual facts, since vesting shall have to be a “vesting” certain. “To ‘vest’, generally means to give a property in.” (Per Brett, L.J Coverdale v. Charlton (1878) LR 4 QBD 104 (CA) : Stroud's Judicial Dictionary, 5th Edn., Vol. VI.) Vesting in favour of the unborn person and in the contextual facts on the basis of a subsequent adoption after about 50 years without any authorisation cannot however but be termed to be a contingent event. To “vest”, cannot be termed to be an executory devise. Be it noted however, that “vested” does not necessarily and always mean “vest in possession” but includes “vest in interest” as well.'
32. We are of the view that so far as the present case is concerned, the word ‘vesting’ takes in every interest in the property including de jure possession and, not de facto but it is always open to a person to voluntarily surrender and deliver possession, under Section 10(3) of the Act.
33. Before we examine sub-section (5) and sub-section (6) of Section 10, let us examine the meaning of sub-section (4) of Section 10 of the Act, which says that during the period commencing on the date of publication under sub-section (1), ending with the day specified in the declaration made under sub-section (3), no person shall transfer by way of sale, mortgage, gift or otherwise, any excess vacant land, specified in the notification and any such transfer made in contravention of the Act shall be deemed to be null and void. Further, it also says that no person shall alter or cause to be altered the use of such excess vacant land. Therefore, from the date of publication of the notification under sub-section (1) and ending with the date specified in the declaration made in sub-section (3), there is no question of disturbing the possession of a person, the possession, therefore, continues to be with the holder of the land.
Peaceful dispossession
34. Sub-section (5) of Section 10, for the first time, speaks of ‘possession’ which says that where any land is vested in the State Government under sub-section (3) of Section 10, the competent authority may, by notice in writing, order any person, who may be in possession of it to surrender or transfer possession to the State Government or to any other person, duly authorised by the State Government.
35. If de facto possession has already passed on to the State Government by the two deeming provisions under sub-section (3) of Section 10, there is no necessity of using the expression ‘where any land is vested’ under sub-section (5) of Section 10. Surrendering or transfer of possession under sub-section (3) of Section 10 can be voluntary so that the person may get the compensation as provided under Section 11 of the Act early. Once there is no voluntary surrender or delivery of possession, necessarily the State Government has to issue notice in writing under sub-section (5) of Section 10 to surrender or deliver possession. Sub-section (5) of Section 10 visualises a situation of surrendering and delivering possession, peacefully while sub-section (6) of Section 10 contemplates a situation of forceful dispossession.
Forceful dispossession
36. The Act provides for forceful dispossession but only when a person refuses or fails to comply with an order under sub-section (5) of Section 10. Sub-section (6) of Section 10 again speaks of “possession” which says, if any person refuses or fails to comply with the order made under sub-section (5), the competent authority may take possession of the vacant land to be given to the State Government and for that purpose, force—as may be necessary—can be used. Sub-section (6), therefore, contemplates a situation of a person refusing or fails to comply with the order under sub-section (5), in the event of which the competent authority may take possession by use of force. Forcible dispossession of the land, therefore, is being resorted to only in a situation which falls under sub-section (6) and not under sub-section (5) of Section 10. Sub-sections (5) and (6), therefore, take care of both the situations i.e taking possession by giving notice, that is, ‘peaceful dispossession’ and on failure to surrender or give delivery of possession under Section 10(5), then ‘forceful dispossession’ under sub-section (6) of Section 10.
37. The requirement of giving notice under sub-sections (5) and (6) of Section 10 is mandatory. Though the word ‘may’ has been used therein, the word ‘may’ in both the sub-sections has to be understood as ‘shall’ because a court charged with the task of enforcing the statute needs to decide the consequences that the legislature intended to follow from failure to implement the requirement. Effect of non-issue of notice under sub-section (5) or sub-section (6) of Section 11 is that it might result in the landholder being dispossessed without notice, therefore, the word ‘may’ has to be read as ‘shall’.”

12. We have, therefore, clearly indicated that it was always open to the authorities to take forcible possession and, in fact, in the notice issued under Section 10(5) of the ULC Act, it was stated that if the possession had not been surrendered, possession would be taken by application of necessary force. For taking forcible possession, certain procedures had to be followed. The respondents have no case that such procedures were followed and forcible possession was taken. Further, there is nothing to show that the respondents had taken peaceful possession, nor is there anything to show that the appellants had given voluntary possession. The facts would clearly indicate that only de jure possession had been taken by the respondents and not de facto possession before coming into force of the repeal of the Act. Since there is nothing to show that de facto possession had been taken from the appellants prior to the execution of the possession receipt in favour of Mmrda, it cannot hold on to the lands in question, which are legally owned and possessed by the appellants. Consequently, we are inclined to allow this appeal and quash the notice dated 17-2-2005 and subsequent action taken therein in view of the repeal of the ULC Act. The above reasoning would apply in respect of other appeals as well and all proceedings initiated against the appellants, therefore, would stand quashed.

13. The appeals are, accordingly, allowed. However, there shall be no order as to costs.