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Navneet Kaur v. State (Nct Of Delhi) And Another
Factual and Procedural Background
Devender Pal Singh Bhullar was sentenced to death by the Designated Judge, Delhi on 25-8-2001. The Supreme Court affirmed the sentence on 22-3-2002 in Criminal Appeal No. 993 of 2001 and rejected a review petition on 17-12-2002. A mercy petition dated 14-1-2003 was then filed before the President of India under Article 72 of the Constitution. While the mercy plea was pending, a curative petition was dismissed by the Court on 12-3-2003.
On 30-5-2011 the Union Government informed the Government of NCT of Delhi that the President had rejected the mercy petition; the rejection was communicated to Tihar Jail authorities on 13-6-2011. Bhullar’s wife, Navneet Kaur, challenged that rejection in Writ Petition (Criminal) No. 146 of 2011. Although the Court found an unreasonable delay of eight years in disposing of the mercy petition, it dismissed the writ on 12-4-2013, holding that convicts under the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act (TADA) could not claim commutation on that ground.
A review petition against that decision was dismissed on 13-8-2013. Navneet Kaur then filed the present curative petition seeking commutation of the death sentence. During its pendency, a three-Judge Bench in Shatrughan Chauhan v. Union of India (2014) 3 SCC 1 reaffirmed that inordinate delay and mental illness are supervening circumstances warranting commutation and declared the earlier Bhullar ruling per incuriam. A February 2014 medical report showed Bhullar to be suffering from severe depression with psychotic features and other ailments.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the unexplained delay of eight years in deciding the mercy petition constitutes a supervening circumstance requiring commutation of the death sentence to life imprisonment, even for offences under TADA.
- Whether the condemned prisoner’s proven mental illness provides an additional supervening circumstance mandating commutation.
Arguments of the Parties
Petitioner’s Arguments
- Relied on the decision in Shatrughan Chauhan to contend that unreasonable delay and mental illness are valid grounds for commutation irrespective of the statute under which conviction occurred.
- Highlighted the eight-year delay in disposal of the mercy petition and the recent medical report diagnosing Bhullar with severe depression and psychotic features.
Respondent’s Arguments
- The learned Attorney General, acknowledging the ratio in Shatrughan Chauhan and its declaration that Devender Pal Singh Bhullar v. State (NCT of Delhi) is per incuriam, fairly conceded that the death sentence ought to be commuted to life imprisonment.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Shatrughan Chauhan v. Union of India (2014) 3 SCC 1 | Unexplained or inordinate delay and psychiatric illness are supervening circumstances justifying commutation of death sentences; distinction between IPC and non-IPC (e.g., TADA) offences is unwarranted. | Treated as the controlling authority; its principles were directly applied to commute Bhullar’s sentence. |
| Devender Pal Singh Bhullar v. State (NCT of Delhi) (2013) 6 SCC 195 | Earlier held that TADA convicts could not seek commutation on the ground of delay. | Declared per incuriam in light of Shatrughan Chauhan; not followed. |
| Triveniben v. State of Gujarat (1988) 4 SCC 574 | Recognised that prolonged delay in execution can violate Article 21 and justify commutation. | Cited as constitutional foundation for treating delay as a supervening circumstance. |
| Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab (1980) 2 SCC 684 | Established the “rarest of rare” doctrine for imposing death penalty. | Quoted to emphasise that gravity of the offence is already accounted for when death is imposed; it cannot negate relief based on subsequent delay. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court began by noting the authoritative pronouncement in Shatrughan Chauhan, which expressly overruled the earlier view that TADA cases form a separate category immune from relief based on executive delay. The Attorney General’s concession that this principle governs Bhullar’s case further reinforced its applicability.
Applying Shatrughan Chauhan and the Constitution Bench ruling in Triveniben, the Court held that the eight-year, unexplained delay in deciding the mercy petition satisfied the threshold of “inordinate and unreasonable” delay attributable to the executive. Such delay infringes Article 21 and independently mandates commutation.
The Court next considered the medical report dated 8-2-2014, signed by a Standing Medical Board, diagnosing Bhullar with severe, treatment-refractory depression with psychotic features and other co-morbidities. Citing Shatrughan Chauhan, which recognises insanity or mental illness as a supervening circumstance, the Court determined that executing Bhullar in his present condition would be impermissible.
Finding both grounds—unreasonable delay and mental illness—present and uncontroverted, the Bench concluded that the death sentence could not stand.
Holding and Implications
Holding: The curative petition is allowed; the death sentence imposed on Devender Pal Singh Bhullar is commuted to imprisonment for life.
Implications: The decision applies the ratio of Shatrughan Chauhan to TADA convictions, reaffirming that executive delay and mental illness are universally relevant supervening factors. While it does not establish a new legal principle, it reinforces that no statutory category of offences is automatically excluded from such humanitarian considerations. The direct consequence is that Bhullar will serve a life sentence instead of facing execution.
P. Sathasivam, C.J— Navneet Kaur, w/o Devender Pal Singh Bhullar, filed the present curative petition against the dismissal of Navneet Kaur v. State (NCT of Delhi) on 13-8-2013, wherein she prayed for setting aside the death sentence imposed upon Devender Pal Singh Bhullar by commuting the same to imprisonment for life on the ground of supervening circumstance of delay of 8 years in disposal of mercy petition.
2. Considering the limited issue involved, there is no need to traverse all the factual details. The brief background of the case is: by judgment dated 25-8-2001, Devender Pal Singh Bhullar was sentenced to death by the Designated Judge, Delhi. Thereafter, he preferred an appeal being Criminal Appeal No. 993 of 2001 before this Court and by judgment dated 22-3-2002 (2002) 5 SCC 234, this Court confirmed the death sentence and dismissed his appeal. Against the dismissal of the appeal by this Court, the accused preferred Review Petition (Criminal) No. 497 of 2002, which was also dismissed by this Court on 17-12-2002 (2003) 2 SCC 501. Soon after the dismissal of the review petition, the accused submitted a mercy petition dated 14-1-2003 to the President of India under Article 72 of the Constitution and prayed for commutation of his sentence. During the pendency of the petition filed under Article 72, he also filed Curative Petition (Criminal) No. 5 of 2003 which was also dismissed by this Court on 12-3-2003.
3. On 30-5-2011, a communication was sent from the Joint Secretary (Judicial) to the Principal Secretary, Home Department, Government of NCT of Delhi, stating that the President of India has rejected the mercy petition submitted on behalf of Devender Pal Singh Bhullar. The same was also communicated to the Superintendent, Central Jail No. 3, Tihar Jail, New Delhi on 13-6-2011.
4. On 24-6-2011, the wife of the accused (the petitioner herein) preferred Writ Petition (Criminal) No. 146 of 2011 before this Court praying for quashing the communication dated 13-6-2011. By order dated 12-4-2013 (2013) 6 SCC 195, this Court, after examining and analysing the materials brought on record by the respondents, arrived at the conclusion that there was an unreasonable delay of 8 years in disposal of mercy petition, which is one of the grounds for commutation of death sentence to life imprisonment as per the established judicial precedents. However, this Court dismissed the writ petition on the ground that when the accused is convicted under TADA, there is no question of showing any sympathy or considering supervening circumstances for commutation of death sentence.
5. Aggrieved by the said dismissal, the wife of the accused preferred Review Petition (Criminal) No. 435 of 2013 which was also dismissed by this Court on 13-8-2013. Subsequently, the wife of the accused, petitioner herein has filed the above curative petition for consideration by this Court.
6. Heard Mr K.T.S Tulsi, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner and Mr G.E Vahanvati, learned Attorney General for India appearing on behalf of the respondents.
7. Very recently, a three-Judge Bench of this Court, in Writ Petition (Criminal) No. 55 of 2013, etc., titled Shatrughan Chauhan v. Union of India (2014) 3 SCC 1, by order dated 21-1-2014, commuted the sentence of death imposed on the petitioners therein to imprisonment for life which has a crucial bearing for deciding the petition at hand. In the aforesaid verdict, this Court validated the established principle and held that unexplained/unreasonable/inordinate delay in disposal of mercy petition is one of the supervening circumstances for commutation of death sentence to life imprisonment. While deciding the aforesaid issue in the above decision, the Bench was simultaneously called upon to decide a specific issue viz. whether there is a rationality in distinguishing between an offence under the Penal Code, 1860 and the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act for considering the supervening circumstance for commutation of death sentence to life imprisonment, which was the point of law decided in Writ Petition (Criminal) No. 146 of 2011.
8. The larger Bench in Shatrughan Chauhan (2014) 3 SCC 1, after taking note of various aspects including the constitutional right under Article 21 as well as the decision rendered by the Constitution Bench in Triveniben v. State of Gujarat (1988) 4 SCC 574, held: (Shatrughan Chauhan case (2014) 3 SCC 1, 47 & 50, paras 64-65, 72 & 78)
“64. From the analysis of the arguments of both the counsel, we are of the view that only delay which could not have been avoided even if the matter was proceeded with a sense of urgency or was caused in essential preparations for execution of sentence may be the relevant factors under such petitions in Article 32. Considerations such as the gravity of the crime, extraordinary cruelty involved therein or some horrible consequences for society caused by the offence are not relevant after the Constitution Bench ruled in Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab (1980) 2 SCC 684 that the sentence of death can only be imposed in the rarest of rare cases. Meaning, of course, all death sentences imposed are impliedly the most heinous and barbaric and rarest of its kind. The legal effect of the extraordinary depravity of the offence exhausts itself when court sentences the person to death for that offence. Law does not prescribe an additional period of imprisonment in addition to the sentence of death for any such exceptional depravity involved in the offence.
65. As rightly pointed out by Mr Ram Jethmalani, it is open to the legislature in its wisdom to decide by enacting an appropriate law that a certain fixed period of imprisonment in addition to the sentence of death can be imposed in some well-defined cases but the result cannot be accomplished by a judicial decision alone. The unconstitutionality of this additional incarceration is itself inexorable and must not be treated as dispensable through a judicial decision.
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72. In the light of the same, we are of the view that the ratio laid down in Devender Pal Singh Bhullar (2013) 6 SCC 195 is per incuriam. There is no dispute that in the same decision this Court has accepted the ratio enunciated in Triveniben (1988) 4 SCC 574 (Constitution Bench) and also noted some other judgments following the ratio laid down in those cases that unexplained long delay may be one of the grounds for commutation of sentence of death into life imprisonment. There is no good reason to disqualify all TADA cases as a class from relief on account of delay in execution of death sentence. Each case requires consideration on its own facts.
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78. Taking guidance from the above principles and in the light of the ratio enunciated in Triveniben (1988) 4 SCC 574, we are of the view that unexplained delay is one of the grounds for commutation of sentence of death into life imprisonment and the said supervening circumstance is applicable to all types of cases including the offences under TADA. The only aspect the courts have to satisfy is that the delay must be unreasonable and unexplained or inordinate at the hands of the executive. The argument of Mr Luthra, learned ASG that a distinction can be drawn between IPC and non-IPC offences since the nature of the offence is a relevant factor is liable to be rejected at the outset. In view of our conclusion, we are unable to share the views expressed in Devender Pal Singh Bhullar (2013) 6 SCC 195.”
9. The learned Attorney General, taking note of the conclusion arrived at in Shatrughan Chauhan (2014) 3 SCC 1 wherein this Court held that the ratio laid down in Devender Pal Singh Bhullar v. State (NCT of Delhi) (2013) 6 SCC 195 is per incuriam, fairly admitted that applying the said principle as enunciated in Shatrughan Chauhan (2014) 3 SCC 1, death sentence awarded to Devender Pal Singh Bhullar is liable to be commuted to life imprisonment. We appreciate the rational stand taken by the learned Attorney General and accept the same.
10. In addition, it is also brought to our notice by a Letter dated 8-2-2014, which was received by the Registry on 12-2-2014 from the Institute of Human Behaviour and Allied Sciences, that the accused Devender Pal Singh Bhullar was examined by the Standing Medical Board on 5-2-2014 and the Board opined as under:
“1. The patient has been diagnosed with severe depression with psychotic features (treatment refractory depression) with hypertension with dyslipidaemia with lumbo-cervical spondylosis with mild prostatomegaly.
2. He is currently receiving anti-depressant, anti-psychotic, anti-anxiety, anti-hypertensives, hypolipedemic, anti-convulsant (for neuropathic pain) and antacid drugs in adequate doses along with supportive psychotherapy and physiotherapy.
3. Patient has shown partial and inconsistent response to the treatment with significant fluctuations in the severity of his clinical condition.
4. The treatment comprising of various combinations of pharmacological and non-pharmacological treatments have brought about partial and inconsistent improvement in his clinical condition in the last three years of hospitalisation. The scope for effective treatment options is limited and thereby the chances of his recovery remain doubtful in the future course of his illness.”
The above report has been signed by the Director and Chairman as well as four members of the Medical Board. The report clearly shows that he is suffering from acute mental illness.
11. The three-Judge Bench in Shatrughan Chauhan (2014) 3 SCC 1 held that insanity/mental illness/schizophrenia is also one of the supervening circumstances for commutation of death sentence to life imprisonment. By applying the principle enunciated in Shatrughan Chauhan (2014) 3 SCC 1, the accused cannot be executed with the said health condition.
12. In the light of the above discussion and also in view of the ratio laid down in Shatrughan Chauhan (2014) 3 SCC 1, we deem it fit to commute the death sentence imposed on Devender Pal Singh Bhullar into life imprisonment both on the ground of unexplained/inordinate delay of 8 years in disposal of mercy petition and on the ground of insanity. To this extent, the curative petition stands allowed.
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