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R. Rajanna v. S.R Venkataswamy And Others

Supreme Court Of India
Nov 20, 2014
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Factual and Procedural Background

The appellant originally filed a suit seeking a declaration that a gift deed dated 12-8-1982 executed by one Ramaiah was void and for a permanent injunction against the respondent. On 25-3-1991 the trial court decreed the suit in the appellant’s favour, declared the gift deed null and void, and ordered demolition of a building erected on the property.

The respondent filed RFA No. 223 of 1991 before the High Court of Karnataka. During the appeal a compromise petition purporting to be under Order 23 Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) was produced. Relying on that document, the High Court on 1-8-1995 allowed the appeal and set aside the trial court’s decree.

The appellant asserted that no compromise had in fact been entered, that his signature on the alleged petition was forged, and that his counsel lacked authority to report any settlement. In 2005 he instituted OS No. 5236 of 2005 before the City Civil Court, Bengaluru, seeking to set aside the High Court’s compromise decree. The respondent applied under Order 7 Rule 11(d) CPC to reject the plaint as barred by Order 23 Rule 3-A. On 11-2-2011 the City Civil Court allowed that application and rejected the plaint, relying on Pushpa Devi Bhagat v. Rajinder Singh (2006) 5 SCC 566.

Subsequently the appellant filed IAs Nos. 1 and 2 of 2011 in RFA No. 223 of 1991 before the High Court, praying to set aside the compromise decree and seeking condonation of delay. The High Court dismissed IA No. 1 of 2011, reasoning that the appellant should pursue remedies arising from his earlier suit. The present appeal challenges that order.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether, in view of Order 23 Rule 3-A CPC, the validity of a decree passed on an alleged compromise can be challenged through a separate suit or only before the court that recorded the compromise.
  2. Whether the High Court erred in directing the appellant to seek relief in the dismissed suit rather than deciding the application filed under Order 23 Rule 3.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • No compromise ever took place; the alleged petition is forged and unauthorised.
  • Counsel had no instructions or authority to file a compromise petition.
  • Order 23 Rule 3-A bars a separate suit; therefore the High Court that passed the compromise decree must itself decide the question of validity.

Respondent's Arguments

  • The appellant’s suit (OS No. 5236 of 2005) was barred by Order 23 Rule 3-A and was rightly rejected under Order 7 Rule 11(d).
  • The appellant should challenge the rejection of his plaint or pursue remedies within that suit structure rather than re-opening matters in the appeal.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Pushpa Devi Bhagat v. Rajinder Singh, (2006) 5 SCC 566 A party seeking to avoid a consent decree must approach the same court that recorded the compromise; a separate suit is barred by Order 23 Rule 3-A. Cited to show that the City Civil Court correctly rejected the independent suit and that the High Court alone was competent to examine the alleged fraud in the compromise.
Banwari Lal v. Chando Devi, (1993) 1 SCC 581 A challenge to a compromise can be raised either by application under Order 23 Rule 3 proviso or by appeal, not by a new suit. Reinforced the conclusion that the High Court should have decided the appellant’s application questioning the compromise instead of directing recourse to a separate suit.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Supreme Court extracted Order 23 Rule 3 and Rule 3-A CPC. It emphasized that:

  • Under the proviso to Rule 3, when one party alleges and the other denies the existence of a lawful written compromise, the court that recorded the compromise must determine the issue.
  • The Explanation to Rule 3 renders any void or voidable agreement unlawful for the purpose of recording a compromise.
  • Rule 3-A expressly bars a separate suit to set aside a decree on the ground that the compromise was not lawful.

Consequently, once the City Civil Court rejected the appellant’s suit as barred, it was impermissible for the High Court to tell the appellant to pursue that dismissed suit or an appeal from its rejection. The only competent forum to adjudicate the alleged fraud or non-existence of compromise was the High Court itself in RFA No. 223 of 1991. By refusing to decide IAs Nos. 1 and 2 of 2011 and directing the appellant to a barred remedy, the High Court ignored the mandatory scheme of Order 23 Rule 3 and 3-A and the binding precedent in Pushpa Devi Bhagat.

Holding and Implications

Appeals Allowed; High Court’s order dismissing IA No. 1 of 2011 is set aside; matter remitted to the High Court to decide IAs Nos. 1 and 2 of 2011 on merits.

Implications: The judgment re-affirms that challenges to a compromise decree—whether on grounds of fraud, forgery, or lack of authority—must be brought before the very court that recorded the compromise. Order 23 Rule 3-A bars independent suits for that purpose. Although the decision sets no new substantive precedent, it reinforces the procedural route mandated by the CPC and clarifies that courts must not divert litigants to remedies that the statute expressly prohibits.

Show all summary ...

T.S Thakur, J.— Leave granted. Can the validity of a decree passed on a compromise be challenged in a separate suit is the short question that falls for determination in this appeal.

2. It arises in the following circumstances: the appellant filed a suit for declaration to the effect that gift deed dated 12-8-1982 executed by one Ramaiah was void and for a permanent prohibitory injunction restraining the respondent-defendant from alienating the suit schedule property or interfering with the peaceful possession and enjoyment of the same by the plaintiff. By its judgment and order dated 25-3-1991, the trial court decreed the suit holding the gift deed in question to be null and void, hence not binding on the appellant-plaintiff. Defendants 2 and 3 in the said suit were also directed to demolish the building constructed in the schedule property and surrender possession thereof to the plaintiff.

3. Aggrieved by the judgment and decree passed against him the respondent filed RFA No. 223 of 1991 before the High Court of Karnataka at Bangalore. According to the respondent a compromise petition was in terms of Order 23 Rule 3 of the Civil Procedure Code filed by the parties before the High Court in the said appeal settling the dispute amicably.

4. The appellant stoutly disputes that position and asserts that no such comprise was neither needed nor was the same ever entered into between the parties. The appellant describes the so-called compromise deed as a forged and fabricated document. The appellant denies that he ever signed any such compromise petition or asked his advocate to file the same before the Court. Even so the High Court had proceeded on the basis that a compromise had indeed taken place between the parties in the light whereof the High Court set aside the judgment and decree of the trial court and allowed the appeal filed by the respondents. The appellant's case is that order dated 1-8-1995 passed by the High Court in RFA No. 223 of 1991 was the result of fraud played upon the High Court.

5. Aggrieved by the judgment and order dated 1-8-1995 passed by the High Court, the appellant appears to have filed OS No. 5236 of 2005 before the Additional City Civil Judge, Bangalore, in which the appellant prayed for setting aside of the compromise recorded in the High Court's order dated 1-8-1995 and the decree passed on the basis thereof. The defendant-Respondent 1 moved an application in the said suit under Order 7 Rule 11(d) read with Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure for rejection of the plaint on the ground that the suit in question was barred by Rule 3-A Order 23 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

6. By its order dated 11-2-2011, the City Civil Court, Bangalore, allowed the application filed by the respondent and rejected the plaint filed by the appellant-plaintiff. The Court took the view that in the light of the proviso to Order 23 Rule 3 CPC inserted w.e.f 1-2-1997, a party aggrieved of a decree on compromise had to approach the Court that passed the decree to establish that no compromise had taken place between the parties which could provide a basis for the Court to act upon the same. In doing so the Court placed reliance upon the decision of this Court in Pushpa Devi Bhagat v. Rajinder Singh (2006) 5 SCC 566.

7. It was after the rejection of the plaint that the appellant filed miscellaneous application IAs Nos. 1 and 2 of 2011 in RFA No. 223 of 1991 praying for setting aside of order dated 1-8-1995 by which the High Court had allowed the appeal filed by the respondents and set aside the decree passed in OS No. 5236 of 2005 on the basis of the alleged compromise between the parties. The appellant's case before the High Court was that no such compromise had taken place nor was any compromise petition ever signed by him. It was also alleged that the appellant had given no instructions to his advocate for presenting any compromise petition and that the alleged compromise petition was totally fraudulent and based on forged signature of the appellant apart from being unauthorised as the counsel engaged by him had no authority to present or report any such compromise before the Court. The appellant also prayed for condonation of delay in filing the application for setting aside the compromise decree passed by the High Court.

8. The High Court of Karnataka has by its orders impugned in this appeal, dismissed IA No. 1 of 2011 filed by the appellant without even adverting to the provisions of Order 23 Rule 3 CPC and in particular Rule 3-A which bars a suit to have a compromise decree set aside on the ground that the compromise on which the decree had been passed did not exist or take place. The High Court appears to have taken the view that even if the compromise was fraudulent since the appellant had filed a suit for declaration he ought to pursue the same to its logical conclusion. The High Court further held that even if the plaint in the suit filed by the appellant had been rejected in terms of Order 7 Rule 11(d) CPC, the appellant ought to seek redress against any such order of rejection. The High Court has on that basis declined to consider the prayer made by the appellant for setting aside the compromise decree.

9. The precise question that falls for determination in the above backdrop is whether the High Court was right in directing the appellant to seek redress in the suit having regard to the provisions of Order 23 Rule 3 and Rule 3-A CPC.

10. Order 23 Rule 3 and Rule 3-A CPC may at this stage be extracted for ready reference:

“3. Compromise of suit.—Where it is proved to the satisfaction of the Court that a suit has been adjusted wholly or in part by any lawful agreement or compromise in writing and signed by the parties, or where the defendant satisfies the plaintiff in respect of the whole or any part of the subject-matter of the suit, the Court shall order such agreement, compromise or satisfaction to be recorded, and shall pass a decree in accordance therewith so far it relates to the parties to the suit, whether or not the subject-matter of the agreement, compromise, or satisfaction is the same as the subject-matter of the suit:
Provided that where it is alleged by one party and denied by the other that an adjustment or satisfaction has been arrived at, the Court shall decide the question; but no adjournment shall be granted for the purpose of deciding the question, unless the Court, for reasons to be recorded, thinks fit to grant such adjournment.
Explanation.—An agreement or compromise which is void or voidable under the Indian Contract Act, 1872 (9 of 1872), shall not be deemed to be lawful within the meaning of this Rule.”

11. It is manifest from a plain reading of the above that in terms of the proviso to Order 23 Rule 3 where one party alleges and the other denies adjustment or satisfaction of any suit by a lawful agreement or compromise in writing and signed by the parties, the Court before whom such question is raised, shall decide the same. What is important is that in terms of Explanation to Order 23 Rule 3, the agreement or compromise shall not be deemed to be lawful within the meaning of the said Rule if the same is void or voidable under the Contract Act, 1872. It follows that in every case where the question arises whether or not there has been a lawful agreement or compromise in writing and signed by the parties, the question whether the agreement or compromise is lawful has to be determined by the court concerned. What is lawful will in turn depend upon whether the allegations suggest any infirmity in the compromise and the decree that would make the same void or voidable under the Contract Act. More importantly, Order 23 Rule 3-A clearly bars a suit to set aside a decree on the ground that the compromise on which the decree is based was not lawful. This implies that no sooner a question relating to lawfulness of the agreement or compromise is raised before the court that passed the decree on the basis of any such agreement or compromise, it is that court and that court alone who can examine and determine that question. The court cannot direct the parties to file a separate suit on the subject for no such suit will lie in view of the provisions of Order 23 Rule 3-A CPC. That is precisely what has happened in the case at hand. When the appellant filed OS No. 5326 of 2005 to challenge the validity of the compromise decree, the court before whom the suit came up rejected the plaint under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC on the application made by the respondents holding that such a suit was barred by the provisions of Order 23 Rule 3-A CPC. Having thus got the plaint rejected, the defendants (respondents herein) could hardly be heard to argue that the plaintiff (appellant herein) ought to pursue his remedy against the compromise decree in pursuance of OS No. 5326 of 2005 and if the plaint in the suit has been rejected to pursue his remedy against such rejection before a higher court.

12. The upshot of the above discussion is that the High Court fell in a palpable error in directing the plaintiff to take recourse to the remedy by way of a separate suit. The High Court in the process remained oblivious of the provisions of Order 23 Rules 3 and 3-A CPC as also orders passed by the City Civil Court rejecting the plaint in which the trial court had not only placed reliance upon Order 23 Rule 3-A but also the decision of the Court in Pushpa Devi case (2006) 5 SCC 566 holding that a separate suit was not maintainable and that the only remedy available to the aggrieved party was to approach the Court which had passed the compromise decree. The following passage from the decision of Pushpa Devi case (2006) 5 SCC 566 is, in this regard, apposite:

“17. … Therefore, the only remedy available to a party to a consent decree to avoid such consent decree, is to approach the court which recorded the compromise and made a decree in terms of it, and establish that there was no compromise. In that event, the court which recorded the compromise will itself consider and decide the question as to whether there was a valid compromise or not. This is so because a consent decree is nothing but contract between parties superimposed with the seal of approval of the court. The validity of a consent decree depends wholly on the validity of the agreement or compromise on which it is made. The second defendant, who challenged the consent compromise decree was fully aware of this position as she filed an application for setting aside the consent decree on 21-8-2001 by alleging that there was no valid compromise in accordance with law. Significantly, none of the other defendants challenged the consent decree. For reasons best known to herself, the second defendant within a few days thereafter (that is on 27-8-2001) filed an appeal and chose not to pursue the application filed before the court which passed the consent decree. Such an appeal by the second defendant was not maintainable, having regard to the express bar contained in Section 96(3) of the Code.”

We may also refer to the decision of this Court in Banwari Lal v. Chando Devi (1993) 1 SCC 581 where also this Court had observed:

“13. … As such a party challenging a compromise can file a petition under proviso to Order 23 Rule 3, or an appeal under Section 96(1) of the Code, in which he can now question the validity of the compromise in view of Order 43 Rule 1-A of the Code.”

13. In the light of the above, we allow these appeals, set aside the order passed by the High Court and remit the matter back to the High Court for disposal of IAs Nos. 1 and 2 of 2011 in accordance with law in the light of the observations made hereinabove. In the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case, we leave the parties to bear their own costs. We make it clear that we have expressed no opinion as to the merits of the application seeking setting aside of the compromise decree which aspect is left for the High Court to examine in accordance with law.