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Shamsher Singh And Others v. Rajinder Kumar And Others

Supreme Court Of India
Apr 16, 2014
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Factual and Procedural Background

The respondents (original plaintiffs) alleged that an agreement to sell dated 3-6-2002 was executed for the sale of certain agricultural land for a total consideration of Rs 3,00,000, out of which Rs 2,00,000 was allegedly paid on the date of the agreement. When the appellants (original defendants) allegedly tried to sell the land elsewhere, the plaintiffs instituted a suit for specific performance.

The defendants denied the agreement, labelling the document a forgery and asserting that their land was already mortgaged to two banks (Defendants 4 and 5).

  • Trial Court (13-5-2009): Rejected specific performance; ordered defendants to refund Rs 3,00,000 with 9% simple interest, invoking the discretionary power under Sections 20(2)(a) & (b) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963.
  • First Appellate Court (17-2-2012): Dismissed defendants’ appeal, allowed plaintiffs’ cross-appeal, and decreed specific performance directing execution and registration of the sale deed.
  • High Court (17-9-2012, RSA No. 2871 of 2012): Affirmed the first appellate court’s decree of specific performance.
  • Present Appeals: Defendants appealed to the Supreme Court challenging the concurrent appellate decrees.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether a decree of specific performance should be granted on the basis of the disputed agreement to sell dated 3-6-2002.
  2. Whether Defendants 1–3 could validly enter into the agreement when the land was already mortgaged to Defendants 4 and 5, and if so, whether the plaintiffs could compel performance without prior redemption of the mortgage.
  3. Whether the appellate courts were justified in overturning the trial court’s exercise of discretion under Sections 20(2)(a) and (b) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellants / Defendants

  • No agreement to sell was ever executed; the document relied upon is a forgery or, at best, a mortgage deed executed for a loan of Rs 85,000.
  • The land was already mortgaged to banks; hence they lacked capacity to enter an unencumbered sale agreement.
  • The trial court correctly exercised discretion under the Specific Relief Act in refusing specific performance and awarding refund.
  • Clauses of the alleged agreement conferred an unfair advantage on the plaintiffs, attracting Section 20(2)(a) of the Act.

Respondents / Plaintiffs

  • Executed agreement of sale (Ext. P-2) was valid; Rs 2,00,000 earnest money was paid.
  • Defendants acknowledged the agreement in a police-station compromise (Ext. P-8) and agreed either to execute the sale deed by 25-7-2002 or refund double the earnest money.
  • Trial court erred by not enforcing a valid contract; appellate courts correctly decreed specific performance.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
A.C. Arulappan v. Ahalya Naik, (2001) 6 SCC 600 Court’s discretion to refuse specific performance when enforcement is inequitable or gives the plaintiff an unfair advantage. Supreme Court relied on this case to reaffirm that inequitable terms and unfair advantage justify denial of specific performance under Section 20 of the Specific Relief Act.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Supreme Court scrutinised the findings of all three lower courts with particular reference to Sections 20(2)(a) and (b) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963:

  • Discretion under Section 20: Grant of specific performance is discretionary. The Court found that the trial court’s refusal was based on recognised statutory grounds: (a) clauses of Ext. P-2 gave the plaintiffs an “unfair advantage,” and (b) enforcing the contract would impose unforeseen hardship on the defendants while non-performance would not comparably harm the plaintiffs.
  • Analysis of Ext. P-2 (Agreement) & Ext. P-8 (Compromise): The operative clause in Ext. P-2 allowed the plaintiff to obtain registration “without paying the balance amount,” an inequitable term unlikely to be accepted by a rational seller. Ext. P-8 showed defendants’ willingness only to refund the earnest money, corroborating the trial court’s approach.
  • Mortgage Issue: Both parties admitted the land was mortgaged. None of the lower courts examined Section 13(c) of the Specific Relief Act, which requires a vendor to redeem encumbrances before compelling a purchaser to accept the conveyance. This omission further undermined the decree of specific performance.
  • Quantum of Refund: The trial court had ordered refund of Rs 3,00,000 though only Rs 2,00,000 was actually advanced. The Supreme Court corrected this discrepancy, limiting recovery to the earnest money with 6% interest.
  • Appellate Error: The first appellate court and High Court overturned the trial court without engaging with the discretionary factors and statutory provisions, thereby committing an error in law.

Holding and Implications

ALLOWED — High Court judgment set aside; specific performance refused; defendants directed to refund Rs 2,00,000 with 6% interest within six weeks.

Implications: The decision reinforces that specific performance is not a matter of right but of equitable discretion under Section 20 of the Specific Relief Act. Courts must scrutinise contractual clauses for unfair advantage and assess hardship before granting such relief. No new legal principle was created, but the judgment underscores vigilant application of existing statutory criteria, especially where property is encumbered.

Show all summary ...

V. Gopala Gowda, J.— Leave granted. These appeals have been preferred by the appellants (the original defendants) against the common judgment and final order dated 17-9-2012 passed by the High Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh in Shamsher Singh v. Rajinder Kumar RSA No. 2871 of 2012. By the said impugned judgment RSA No. 2871 of 2012, two separate RSAs filed by the appellants against the common judgment of the first appellate court were dismissed by the High Court.

2. The factual matrix of the case is as follows: the respondents (original plaintiffs) filed a suit for specific performance against the appellants herein alleging that an agreement to sell dated 3-6-2002 was entered into between them with respect to the suit land. It was alleged that out of Rs 3,00,000 (total agreed consideration), Rs 2,00,000 had already been paid by the plaintiffs on 3-6-2002 and as per the agreement, the balance amount was to be paid at the time of execution of sale deed i.e on 20-12-2002. It was further alleged that later, the appellant-defendants became dishonest and wanted to sell the land to some other persons. Therefore, they had to file the suit.

3. The defendants filed their written statement contending in that they had never entered into any agreement to sell the suit land to the plaintiffs. It was also contended that the alleged agreement to sell was a product of forgery and fabrication and so, it was null and void. The trial court having considered the contention of both the parties, partly decreed the suit of the plaintiffs on 13-5-2009 and directed the defendants to pay Rs 3,00,000 to the plaintiffs along with simple interest @ 9% per annum from the date of execution of the agreement to sell till the date of payment.

4. Being aggrieved by the judgment and decree, the appellant-defendants filed Civil Appeal No. 74 of 2009 on the ground that the alleged agreement to sell was not valid and legal and the appellants never intended to sell the suit land. They further contended that there was no signature of any of the attesting witness on the receipt of the earnest money and the land was already under mortgage with the banks and so there was no question of any agreement to sell and urged other grounds as well.

5. The plaintiffs also filed Special Civil Appeal No. 102 of 2009 against the judgment and decree dated 13-5-2009 with prayer for direction of execution of sale deed and transfer of possession of the suit land. Both the appeals were disposed of by the first appellate court vide common judgment and order dated 17-2-2012. The appellate court while dismissing the appeal preferred by the appellant-defendants, allowed the appeal preferred by the respondent-plaintiffs and directed the appellant-defendants to get the sale deed executed and registered in favour of the respondent-plaintiffs.

6. Second appeals preferred by the appellant-defendants against the common judgment passed by the first appellate court were dismissed by the impugned common judgment dated 17-9-2012 RSA No. 2871 of 2012. Hence, these appeals.

7. The main issues in this case are:

7.1 (a) Whether a decree of specific performance can be passed with respect to the purported agreement of sale between the plaintiff and the defendants? and

7.2 (b) Whether Defendants 1 to 3 could have entered into this purported agreement of sale with respect to the fact that their land has been contended to be mortgaged with Defendants 4 and 5 as security for loans that they have taken?

8. The first appellate court as well as the High Court have decreed the suit for specific performance, ordering the defendants to enforce the agreement of sale, Ext. P-2. The trial court, on the other hand, did not grant decree of specific performance, but instead passed a decree ordering the defendants to return Rs 3,00,000 with interest to the plaintiffs on the ground that a balanced approach should be taken as the plaintiffs should be protected and Defendants 1 to 3 should not be disproportionately penalised and that the administration of justice requires that Defendants 1 to 3 should be directed to return the amount of Rs 3,00,000 to the plaintiffs along with simple interest @ 9% per annum from the date of execution of the agreement of sale till the date of payment.

9. The trial court further went on to observe that if the defendants are directed to execute the agreement of sale, then comparatively greater hardship would be caused to them. The first appellate court, on the ground that the defendants have not taken a plea of hardship has reversed the judgment of the trial court, decreeing specific performance of the agreement of sale, directing the defendants to execute the sale deed and register it in favour of the plaintiffs on the basis of the agreement to sell, Ext. P-2. The plaintiffs were directed to deposit the balance sale consideration minus earnest amount already paid, within one month of the order. The High Court has upheld the order and judgment of the first appellate court.

10. After going through the findings and reasons recorded by the appellate courts and the impugned judgment RSA No. 2871 of 2012 and with reference to the questions of law raised in these appeals and grounds urged in support of the same, the following points would arise for our consideration:

10.1 (i) Whether the concurrent finding of the second appellate court in reversing the finding of the trial court in its judgment to exercise discretionary power not to grant decree of specific performance as provided under Sections 20(2)(a) and (b) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, after referring to Exts. P-2, P-8 and other relevant facts, is legal and valid?

10.2 (ii) Whether the appellate courts were right in ignoring the relevant legal aspect of the case viz. whether the vendors, who had mortgaged the schedule property to the banks, had the right to enter into agreement and whether such agreement is valid and in that case, do the plaintiffs then have the right of enforcing such agreement without asking the vendor to redeem the mortgage in relation to the suit schedule property and obtaining a valid discharge?

10.3 (iii) What order/decree are the appellants entitled to?

Answer to Point (i)

11. The High Court has erred in law in dismissing the second appeal filed by the defendants questioning the correctness of the judgment and decree of the first appellate court in reversing the judgment of the trial court wherein it has decreed that a sum of Rs 3,00,000 with 9% interest to be paid to the plaintiffs in lieu of granting the relief of specific performance in relation to the property in question in favour of the plaintiff by exercising its sound discretionary power under Sections 20(2)(a) and (b) of the Act. This judgment and decree of the first appellate court was challenged by the defendants urging various legal grounds. The High Court should have examined the case of Defendants 1 to 3 keeping in view the discretionary power conferred upon the courts below while examining the respective claim and counter-claims of the parties particularly in the light of the covenants in the agreement of sale, Ext. P-2 and also with reference to Ext. P-8, the compromise arrived at between the parties at the police station.

12. The appellate courts have erred in holding that the agreement of sale was proved by the plaintiff though Defendants 1 to 3 in their statement denied the execution and pleaded that it is a mortgage and not an agreement of sale. The said finding of fact recorded by the trial court was annulled by the first appellate court in exercise of its appellate power without examining the pleadings and substantiated evidence on record particularly the recitals of the agreement of sale and the compromise deed between the parties. Therefore, the said finding of fact recorded by the first appellate court in reversing the finding of the trial court recorded on the contentious issue is not only erroneous but also suffers from error in law. Therefore, the substantial question of law that would arise in the second appeal before the High Court, namely, is whether the finding of the trial court in exercise of its discretionary power under Sections 20(2)(a) and (b) of the Act must be reversed, keeping in view Ext. P-8, the compromise deed and awarding monetary decree of Rs 3,00,000 though the advance amount paid is Rs 2,00,000 is contrary to the legal evidence and the statutory provisions of Sections 20(2)(a) and (b) and also Section 21(2) of the Specific Relief Act. We have considered this question of law while answering Point (i) framed in these appeals in favour of Defendants 1 to 3.

13. An extremely important aspect of this case is the compromise, Ext. P-8 which had been arrived at between the parties to the suit, and has also been brought on record as evidence. The trial court relied on the same to show that the defendants have agreed to the agreement of sale and at the compromise arrived at by the parties at the police station, the condition agreed upon was that Defendants 1 to 3 would return the earnest amount. The said compromise also bears the thumb impressions of the defendants. The trial court held that the compromise is an important document that contradicts the version put forth by the defendants, as it has been stated in the compromise that the defendants had expressed their willingness to execute the sale deed uptil 25-7-2002. The defendants cannot then take a U-turn and deny the existence of the agreement of sale. Thus, on this ground too, we have to hold that since the defendants had agreed to return the amount as per the compromise, the judgment of the trial court decreeing return of an amount of Rs 3,00,000 with 9% simple interest from the date of execution of the agreement of sale till the date of payment, must be upheld and that of the appellate courts decreeing specific performance be rejected.

14. Therefore, the first appellate court has grossly erred in law by decreeing the suit for specific performance considering the well-reasoned order of the trial court. The High Court has also erroneously upheld the same. As per Section 20(2)(b) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 (in short “the Act”), the jurisdiction to grant decree of specific performance is discretionary and Section 20(2) lists the cases in which the court may properly exercise discretion not to grant decree of specific performance. Sections 20(2)(a) and (b) reads thus:

“20. (2) The following are cases in which the court may properly exercise discretion not to decree specific performance—
(a) where the terms of the contract or the conduct of the parties at the time of entering into the contract or the other circumstances under which the contract was entered into are such that the contract, though not voidable, gives the plaintiff an unfair advantage over the defendant; or
(b) where the performance of the contract would involve some hardship on the defendant which he did not foresee whereas its non-performance would involve no such hardship on the plaintiff;”

15. On perusal of the original records in this case, it has come to light that both the purported agreements of sale, Ext. P-2 as well as the compromise, Ext. P-8 have major discrepancies in them. Certain clauses in both the documents seem to unduly favour the plaintiffs. In Ext. P-2, the operative part of the agreement of sale which is originally in Hindi, the English translation of the same reads as under:

“… The last date for execution of sale deed is fixed as 20-12-2002. By that date if the seller fails to get the sale deed executed in favour of the buyer then the seller will pay the amount double of the advance money taken, and if by the due date the buyer does not get the sale deed executed then the advance money paid by him will be forfeited and instead of claiming compensation the buyer shall have the right to get the sale deed executed through court in his name or in anyone else's name without paying the balance amount and the seller will have no right of any objection. The buyer shall bear all costs of registration….”

This does not seem equitable and it seems unlikely that a seller would agree to such a clause. This seems to be a clear case of terms of a contract resulting in an unfair advantage for the plaintiffs over the defendants. Since the defendants are disputing the agreement of sale and claiming that the document on which they put their thumb impressions was in fact a mortgage deed in lieu of the loan of Rs 85,000 that they had asked from the plaintiffs for their household expenses, it puts the plaintiffs in a position of “unfair advantage” over the defendants, thus bringing the case for not granting decree of specific performance within Section 20(2)(a) of the Act.

16. Further, the trial court has clearly explained the reasons for not granting a decree of specific performance and instead granted a decree for recovery of the money from the defendants and this falls squarely within the conditions set out in Sections 20(2)(a) and (b) of the Act. This position of the law has been carefully enunciated by this Court in A.C Arulappan v. Ahalya Naik (2001) 6 SCC 600, wherein it was held that:

“7. … If under the terms of the contract the plaintiff gets an unfair advantage over the defendant, the court may not exercise its discretion in favour of the plaintiff. … If it is inequitable to grant specific relief, then also the court would desist from granting a decree to the plaintiff.”

17. It is clear that it will be inequitable to grant a decree of specific performance in this case where it is clear that the plaintiffs have an unfair advantage over the defendants and the trial court has rightly exercised its discretion not to grant specific performance.

18. Further, we find it necessary to refer to Para 3 of the pleadings wherein it is stated as under:

“3. That Defendants 1 to 3 entered into an agreement to sell the suit land as detailed and described in the head note of the plaint with the plaintiffs for a sum of Rs 3,00,000 (Rupees three lakhs) and they executed agreement to sell dated 3-6-2002 and received earnest money of Rs 2,00,000 (Rupees two lakhs) and executed a valid receipt on the foot of the agreement to sell dated 3-6-2002 in the presence of witnesses.”

This receipt has been executed on the same day i.e on 3-6-2002 as the agreement of sale, and the terms of the receipt are in direct contradiction with the terms of the agreement, as the receipt says that Rs 2,00,000 has been received by Defendants 1 to 3 whereas the agreement of sale speaks only of Rs 1,00,000 that has changed hands and the plaintiff will pay Defendants 1 to 3 the remaining Rs 2,00,000 at the time of registration. Further, in the written statement, the defendants have pleaded that they only took a loan of Rs 85,000 and mortgaged their land as security and were tricked into putting their thumb impressions on the purported agreement of sale.

19. It is clear from all this that the discrepancies make it difficult for us to accept that Defendants 1 to 3 have intended for this to be an agreement of sale and it is extremely likely that the plaintiff has tried to take unfair advantage of them. It is prudent on our part, therefore, to uphold the trial court's judgment not to decree specific performance of the purported agreement of sale. We will modify the trial court's decree insofar as the amount is concerned and order Defendants 1 to 3 to return Rs 2,00,000 with interest and not an amount of Rs 3,00,000 as directed by the trial court.

Answer to Point (ii)

20. Another important aspect of this case that has slipped the eyes of the courts below is the question of the mortgage of the suit property, as pleaded by Defendants 4 and 5. They placed the confirmation of mutation in favour of the bank, Ext. D-1 and the mortgage deed, Ext. D-2 as evidence. The plaintiffs have referred to the same in Para 2 of their pleadings and the defendants, in reply have admitted this in Para 2 of their written statement wherein they have stated that it is a matter of record that they have mortgaged their portion of the land in favour of Defendants 4 and 5. More importantly, the plaintiffs have admitted the same in Para 2 of their plaint, therefore it was in their knowledge that the land in question was already mortgaged with Defendants 4 and 5. There has been no finding recorded on the same by either the appellate courts or the trial court and as per Section 13(c) of the Act, when the vendor (the defendants herein) professes to sell unencumbered property but the same is mortgaged, then the vendor has only a right to redeem it and the purchaser may compel him to redeem the mortgage and to obtain a valid discharge. This aspect of the matter, too, has not been dealt with by the trial court or the appellate courts.

Answer to Point (iii)

21. Thus, the judgment and order of the trial court must be modified and the judgments and orders of the appellate courts must be reversed. There are many discrepancies on the face of this case and the trial court would have done well to examine all the evidence with care and diligence, which has not been done in the present case. In spite of the same, it would be prudent to uphold the judgment and decree of the trial court by modifying it instead of the judgments and orders of the appellate courts which have decreed the original suit for specific performance of the agreement to sell the suit schedule property.

22. For the foregoing reasons, these appeals are allowed, the impugned judgment and order RSA No. 2871 of 2012 passed by the High Court is set aside and the judgment and decree passed by the trial court in Civil Suit No. 755 of 2003 is modified in the aforesaid terms. We, hereby, order and direct Defendants 1 to 3 to repay the plaintiff an amount of Rs 2,00,000 with interest @ 6% per annum within six weeks from the date of receipt of the certified copy of this judgment.