Magnum Promoters Private Limited v. Union Of India And Others

V. Gopala Gowda, J.— This IA No. 3 of 2014 in Civil Appeal No. 4284 of 2011 is filed by the appellant seeking for direction and appropriate orders for disposal of this appeal in terms of Section 24(2) of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 (in short “the 2013 Act”). The appellant landowner has come to this Court questioning the correctness of the judgment and order dated 16-5-2008 passed by the High Court of Delhi in Magnum Promoters (P) Ltd. v. Union of India WP (C) No. 3695 of 1999, inter alia, urging various facts and legal contentions.

2. Brief facts of the case are stated hereunder: the appellant is the lawful owner of the land comprised in Khasras Nos. 750 Min (1-2½) and 751 Min (0-18) situated in the revenue estate of Village Malikpur, Kohi alias Rangpuri, Tehsil Mehrauli in the National Capital Territory of Delhi (for short “the NCT, Delhi”). Municipal Corporation of Delhi (MCD) vide its sanction bearing No. SN 406.B/HQ/17/148/AE (B) HQ III dated 12-7-1990 gave sanction for constructing the farmhouse from common land. On 17-12-1993, the completion certificate with regard to the farmhouse on the land in question was issued to the appellant by MCD.

3. On 27-6-1996, the Government of National Capital Territory issued Notification No. F.9(12)/95.L&B/LA/8474 dated 1-6-1995 under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (in short “the repealed LA Act”) for the acquisition of the different parcels of land including an area measuring 369 bighas and 1 biswa situated in the revenue estate of Village Malikpur Kohi alias Rangpuri in the NCT, Delhi. The abovesaid notification issued for acquisition of the land covered the land and building owned by the appellant bearing Khasra No. 750 for 3 bighas and Khasra No. 751 for 3.12 bighas. The public purpose mentioned in the said acquisition notification was for development of Vasant Kunj Phase IV.

4. On 24-6-1997, a declaration under Section 6(1) of the repealed LA Act was issued by the NCT, Delhi in respect of the land sought to be acquired including the land owned by the appellant. On 9-6-1999, notices under Sections 9 and 10 of the repealed LA Act with regard to the land in question were issued by the Land Acquisition Collector to the appellant. On 15-6-1999, the appellant filed Writ Petition (C) No. 3695 of 1999 before the High Court of Delhi, questioning the legality of the aforesaid acquisition notifications published under Sections 4 and 6 of the repealed LA Act urging various grounds. Other similarly placed landholders also challenged the said two notifications before the High Court. The writ petitions were heard together by the High Court and passed its judgment and order dated 16-5-2008 WP (C) No. 3695 of 1999 by dismissing the writ petitions holding that the acquisition of land by the NCT, Delhi is legal and valid and did not suffer from any legal infirmities. Hence, this appeal.

5. It is the case of the appellant that throughout the proceedings before the High Court as well as this Court, the appellant has been in continuous physical possession of the land involved in this appeal as it has been protected by various orders of “status quo” by the High Court as well as this Court SLP (C) No. 17921 of 2008 with respect to the possession of the land in question.

6. Mr Chandra Uday Singh, the learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant placed strong reliance upon Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act to substantiate the plea that actual physical possession of land has not been taken by the Land Acquisition Collector even after 5 years being elapsed after the award was passed as on the date of the 2013 Act which came into force with effect from 1-1-2014. The aforesaid provision is extracted hereunder:

“24. (2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1), in case of land acquisition proceedings initiated under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, where an award under the said Section 11 has been made five years or more prior to the commencement of this Act but the physical possession of the land has not been taken or the compensation has not been paid the said proceedings shall be deemed to have lapsed and the appropriate Government, if it so chooses, shall initiate the proceedings of such land acquisition afresh in accordance with the provisions of this Act:

Provided that whether an award has been made and compensation in respect of a majority of landholdings has not been deposited in the account of the beneficiaries, then, all beneficiaries specified in the notification for acquisition under Section 4 of the said Land Acquisition Act, shall be entitled to compensation in accordance with the provisions of this Act.”

7. Having regard to the facts narrated above that neither physical possession of the land nor was compensation awarded paid to the appellant, it is contended that the acquisition proceedings of the land of the appellant have lapsed. In support of the aforesaid submission he has placed reliance upon the decisions of this Court in Pune Municipal Corpn. v. Harakchand Misirimal Solanki (2014) 3 SCC 183, Union of India v. Shiv Raj (2014) 6 SCC 564, Bimla Devi v. State of Haryana (2014) 6 SCC 583, Bharat Kumar v. State of Haryana (2014) 6 SCC 586 and Sree Balaji Nagar Residential Assn. v. State of T.N (2015) 3 SCC 353 Therefore, the learned Senior Counsel has requested for grant of relief as prayed for in this application.

8. The abovesaid provision of the 2013 Act quoted above has been interpreted by the three-Judge Bench of this Court in Pune Municipal Corpn. (2014) 3 SCC 183, the relevant paras 20 and 21 from the case are extracted hereunder:

“20. … it is clear that the award pertaining to the subject land has been made by the Special Land Acquisition Officer more than five years prior to the commencement of the 2013 Act. It is also admitted position that compensation so awarded has neither been paid to the landowners/persons interested nor deposited in the court. The deposit of compensation amount in the Government treasury is of no avail and cannot be held to be equivalent to compensation paid to the landowners/persons interested. We have, therefore, no hesitation in holding that the subject land acquisition proceedings shall be deemed to have lapsed under Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act.

21. The argument on behalf of the Corporation that the subject land acquisition proceedings have been concluded in all respects under the 1894 Act and that they are not affected at all in view of Section 114(2) of the 2013 Act, has no merit at all, and is noted to be rejected. Section 114(1) of the 2013 Act repeals the 1894 Act. Sub-section (2) of Section 114, however, makes Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 applicable with regard to the effect of repeal but this is subject to the provisions in the 2013 Act. Under Section 24(2) land acquisition proceedings initiated under the 1894 Act, by legal fiction, are deemed to have lapsed where award has been made five years or more prior to the commencement of the 2013 Act and possession of the land is not taken or compensation has not been paid. The legal fiction under Section 24(2) comes into operation as soon as conditions stated therein are satisfied. The applicability of Section 6 of the General Clauses Act being subject to Section 24(2), there is no merit in the contention of the Corporation.”

9. Further, reliance was also placed on the decision of this Court in Sree Balaji Nagar Residential Assn. (2015) 3 SCC 353, wherein it was opined that Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act does not exclude any period during which the land acquisition proceedings might have remained stayed on account of stay or injunction or “status quo” order regarding possession of the land granted by any court. It was conclusively held that the legislature has consciously omitted to extend the period of five years indicated in Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act, even if the proceedings had been delayed on account of an order of stay or injunction granted by a court of law or for any reason.

10. It was further contended that the phrase used under Section 24(2) is “physical possession” which means actual taking over possession from the appellant landowner by the Land Acquisition Collector. In support of this contention he has also placed reliance upon two judgments of this Court in Prahlad Singh v. Union of India (2011) 5 SCC 386 and Raghbir Singh Sehrawat v. State of Haryana (2012) 1 SCC 792.

11. On the other hand, Ms Rachna Srivastava, the learned counsel on behalf of Respondents 2 and 3 contended that the 2013 Act is prospective in operation by virtue of Section 24 read with Section 114 of the 2013 Act. As provided under Section 24, the effect of Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897, the action taken by Respondents 2-4 has been saved. She submits that by reading the above two sections of the Act, it is clear that the legislature wanted to protect and save the acquisition proceedings initiated under the repealed LA Act, particularly where possession of the acquired land has been taken. It is submitted that the intention of the legislature in providing Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act was never to destroy the entire acquisition proceedings in acquiring the land for the public purpose under the repealed LA Act, 1894.

12. It is further contended that it is a well-settled position of law that the proceedings initiated and culminated under the repealed Act of 1894 are not to be disturbed by interpreting the provisions of Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act to declare the acquisition proceeding of land as lapsed on account of not taking physical possession of the land after 5 year period or not paying compensation from the date of passing of the award. Under the provisions of the repealed LA Act of 1894, by operation of Section 16 or 17(1) of the Act as the case may be, once the possession of the acquired land is taken, the land will be vested with the State Government and is absolutely free from all encumbrances. Thereafter, it is not even open for the State Government to restore the land to the landowner in exercise of its power under Section 48 of the repealed LA Act as, it is not permissible in law. The abovesaid legal position is laid down by this Court in Satendra Prasad Jain v. State of U.P (1993) 4 SCC 369 and Senjeevanagar Medical and Health Employees' Coop. Housing Society v. Mohd. Abdul Wahab (1996) 3 SCC 600. In the aforesaid cases, this Court has held that Section 11-A of the repealed LA Act, is not applicable (which is analogous to Section 24 of the 2013 Act) and that in such circumstances, the only consequence provided under the repealed LA Act is payment of interest under Section 34 in respect of the acquired land. Therefore, the acquisition of land cannot be deemed to have lapsed under Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act, in view of the law laid down in the above cases referred to supra. It is further contended by the learned counsel for the respondents that the abovesaid judgments were not brought to the notice of this Court and could not be considered at the time of rendering the decision in Pune Municipal Corpn. (2014) 3 SCC 183 and other cases of this Court referred to supra. Therefore, the reliance placed upon the said cases by the appellant's Senior Counsel do not render any assistance in support of its case for grant of relief as prayed in the application.

13. It is further contended by the learned counsel that if either of the two negative conditions mentioned in Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act remains unfulfilled, the acquisition proceedings of the land involved in this appeal cannot be held to have lapsed as it would defeat the purpose of acquisition and intendment of the LA Act. In other words, the two negative conditions contained in Section 24(2) has to be read conjunctively and as such both the conditions are required to be fulfilled for the purpose of holding the acquisition proceedings as lapsed. This aspect of the matter has been dealt with by this Court in Punjab Produce and Trading Co. Ltd. v. CIT (1971) 2 SCC 540, AIR 1971 SC 2471. It is contended that this case was also not brought to the notice of this Court in Pune Municipal Corpn. (2014) 3 SCC 183 and other cases referred to supra and therefore the said decisions require reconsideration by the larger Bench of this Court.

14. Further, it is urged that the appellant has violated the provisions of Sections 3 and 4 of the Delhi Land (Restrictions on Transfer) Act, 1972. It is contended that during the pendency of the present appeal the appellant has sold the land admeasuring area 12 bighas, falling in Khasras Nos. 745(1-18), 746 (2-14), 747 (4-8), 750 (1-16), 751 (1-4) situated in the revenue estate of Village Malikpur Kohi at Rangpuri, Tehsil Vasant Vihar, New Delhi along with all necessary rights to M/s DCBC Properties (P) Ltd. vide registered Sale Deed No. 6539 dated 1-6-2012 out of which 1 bigha 2.5 biswas in Khasra No. 750 and 18 biswas in Khasra No. 751 have been acquired under acquisition notification.

15. Sections 3 and 4 read along with Section 9 of the Delhi Land (Restrictions on Transfer) Act, 1972 are extracted hereunder for the purpose of answering the legal contention urged in this regard:

“3. Prohibition on transfer of lands acquired by Central Government.—No person shall purport to transfer by sale, mortgage, gift, lease or otherwise any land or part thereof situated in the Union Territory of Delhi, which has been acquired by the Central Government under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (1 of 1894) or under any other law providing for acquisition of land for a public purpose.

4. Regulation on transfer of lands in relation to which acquisition proceedings have been initiated.—No person shall, except with the previous permission in writing of the competent authority, transfer or purport to transfer by sale, mortgage, gift, lease or otherwise any land or part thereof situated in the Union Territory of Delhi, which is proposed to be acquired in connection with the Scheme and in relation to which a declaration to the effect that such land or part thereof is needed for a public purpose having been made by the Central Government under Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (1 of 1894), the Central Government has not withdrawn from the acquisition under Section 48 of that Act.

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9. Penalty.—If any person contravenes the provisions of Section 3 or Section 4, he shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to three years or with fine or with both.”

16. Further the learned counsel for Respondents 2 to 4 sought to distinguish the two decisions in Prahlad Singh (2011) 5 SCC 386 and Raghbir Singh Sehrawat (2012) 1 SCC 792 and further if this Court had to differ from the decision as per Sita Ram Bhandar Society v. Govt. (NCT of Delhi) (2009) 10 SCC 501 the said cases should have been referred to the larger Bench, that has not been done. Therefore, reliance placed upon the aforesaid decisions on behalf of the appellant are of no avail in support of the plea taken that physical possession of the land is not taken by Respondents 2, 3 and 4. Therefore, she has requested this Court for the dismissal of the application filed under Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act as it has no application in the case on hand.

17. We have carefully gone through the legal submissions made by the learned counsel on behalf of the parties in respect of the application filed by the appellant under Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act with reference to the averments made therein and the objection statement filed by Respondents 2-4 and response affidavit of the Land Acquisition Collector.

18. The official original record produced before us for our perusal as per our direction, discloses that the “kabza karyavahi” or possession taking proceedings of the acquired land was started on 27-12-2013. As per the record, on 27-12-2013, the taking over of possession was done only to the extent of the vacant portion of the appellant's land whereas the building structure situated on the land could not be taken on that day as the demolition squad was not available for Respondent 4. Thus, it is clear from the said document available on record that the possession of the building structure situated on the appellant's land was not taken by him on 27-12-2013. As per the possession memo available in the record, it is recorded in the said proceeding that the further action for taking over possession in respect of the land were to be continued by the Land Acquisition Collector on 28-12-2013 and there is no record to show as to whether the action continued on 28-12-2013 in this regard. The alleged taking over of possession of the land involved in this appeal was done on 31-12-2013, as per the document Annexure R-1, memo of possession taking possession of the acquired land in Award No. 07/98-99 is signed by the officers of the Land and Building Department of the third respondent; the same was alleged to have immediately been delivered to the DDA officials i.e Respondent 5 on the same day. According to Respondents 3 and 4, the possession of the land involved in this appeal has been allegedly taken by them without any objections being raised by the appellant owner. The abovesaid plea taken by them cannot be accepted by us as the same is wholly contrary to the factual position regarding possession of the land. The question of raising objection to Respondents 3 and 4 for taking possession of the land by the appellant did not arise at all for the reason that notice in this regard was not issued to it calling upon it to hand over possession of the land to the Land Acquisition Collector.

19. The reasons stated at Paras 8 and 9 in the response affidavit filed by one Mr Vivek Kumar Tripathi, who is the Land Acquisition Collector, Respondent 4 in these proceedings with regard to limits of the then existing sub-divisions tehsils in Delhi being modified, consequently the revenue estate of the boundaries of Village Malikpur Kohi, Rangpuri which previously formed part of District South, due to the said reorganisation, sub-division, Delhi Cantonment and sub-division, Vasant Vihar which were earlier part of District of South-West have become part of District New Delhi. Resultantly, Village Rangpuri which was part of Sub-division Vasant Vihar under the jurisdiction of the Land Acquisition Collector, South-West fell under the jurisdiction of District New Delhi. The Notification dated 11-9-2012 was issued by the first respondent creating 11 districts by altering sub-division tehsils in Delhi. Land acquisition of the land involved in these proceedings was transferred from District South-West to the office of Respondent 4 on 21-12-2012 and remaining records on 14-1-2014.

20. The abovesaid make-believe story narrated by the Land Acquisition Collector in his affidavit is a deliberate intention to misrepresent facts to justify the alleged taking over possession of the land on 31-12-2013. The aforesaid explanation furnished by the Land Acquisition Collector in his affidavit for the alleged taking over possession of the acquired land is wholly unnecessary and irrelevant. Therefore, the said explanation by him cannot be accepted by us.

21. The averments made at Para 10 of the response affidavit of the Land Acquisition Collector are contrary to the “kabza karyavahi (possession taking over proceedings) dated 27-12-2013 and the reason stated in the said memo is that the Land Acquisition Collector could not take possession of the building structure situated on the acquired appellant's land, as the demolition squad was not available on that day. The possession of the land taking over document Annexure R-1 to the response affidavit dated 31-12-2013 produced by the Land Acquisition Collector in which it is stated that the possession of the land of the appellant has been taken on 31-12-2013 the said averment in the affidavit is contradictory to the “kabza karyavahi” document dated 27-12-2013 available in the original record. The contradictory statements made by the Land Acquisition Collector in his response affidavit at Para 10 cannot be accepted by us.

22. The plea sworn by the Land Acquisition Collector in the affidavit is a false statement of fact for the reason that the physical possession of the land is in fact not taken and could not have been taken by the Land Acquisition Collector from the appellant when the interim order of “status quo” with regard to the possession of land of the appellant was passed by this Court on 4-8-2008 SLP (C) No. 17921 of 2008. The said order being well within the knowledge of Respondents 2-5 is evident from the record of proceedings of this Court dated 24-9-2010 as the names of the learned counsel on behalf of Respondents 1-5 is shown in this Court's record of proceedings. The further plea taken by him at Para 10 of the said affidavit that the second respondent enquired about the litigation status in respect of the order passed in relation to this case and other cases of Village Rangpuri from the fifth respondent, DDA and did not receive any response from it is once again a false statement of fact. Therefore, the office of the third respondent being unaware of any interim order SLP (C) No. 17921 of 2008 of “status quo” is once again a false statement and the same has been deliberately made by him to justify his action as stated in the response affidavit. Hence, the statement of facts sworn in at Paras 8-10 are liable to be rejected and accordingly rejected.

23. Therefore, the plea of the Additional District Collector/Land Acquisition Collector and its officers to have allegedly taken over possession of the land as stated at Para 10 of the response affidavit is false and it amounts to contempt of this Court committed by them, as they have wilfully disobeyed the interim order of this Court dated 4-8-2008 SLP (C) No. 17921 of 2008. Therefore, the plea of taking over possession of land of the appellant either on 27-12-2013 as per the original record or on 31-12-2013 as per document Annexure R-1 cannot be accepted by us. The respondents have misrepresented certain relevant facts to this Court by filing the abovereferred response affidavit with an oblique motive to deny the valuable statutory right accrued in favour of the appellant under Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act. Hence, the conduct of Respondent 4 and officials of Respondent 3 in misrepresenting the facts is deprecated by us.

24. The document Annexure R-1 to the response affidavit has been falsely created by Respondents 3 and 4 with a mala fide intention not only to defeat the statutory right of the appellant landowner accrued in its favour under the provision of Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act, but it is a clear case of misrepresentation of facts to this Court with an oblique motive to deprive the valuable constitutional right of the appellant to the land involved in these proceedings. This conduct of the ADM/Land Acquisition Collector is highly objectionable and reprehensible as his action in creating false official documents to deny the legitimate right accrued in favour of the appellant, which conduct of him amounts to breach of trust reposed with him by the public to discharge his public functions in the larger interest of public. The public officers are required to maintain the public record honestly, truly and correctly, the Additional District Magistrate cadre indulging in such unlawful acts will discredit the credibility of the public office from maintaining trust and confidence in the public office which is most important and necessary for the good administration of the second respondent. This has not been done in the case on hand by the Land Acquisition Collector which cannot be appreciated by this Court.

25. Further, the reliance is placed upon the judgment by the learned Senior Counsel on behalf of the appellant on Prahlad Singh case (2011) 5 SCC 386 to show that the alleged taking over of the possession of the land is not legally correct. The relevant paragraph reads thus:

“13. We have given our serious thought to the entire matter and carefully examined the records. Section 16 lays down that once the Collector has made an award under Section 11, he can take possession of the acquired land. Simultaneously, the section declares that upon taking possession by the Collector, the acquired land shall vest absolutely in the Government free from all encumbrances. In terms of the plain language of this section, vesting of the acquired land in the Government takes place as soon as possession is taken by the Collector after passing an award under Section 11. To put it differently, the vesting of land under Section 16 of the Act presupposes actual taking of possession and till that is done, legal presumption of vesting enshrined in Section 16 cannot be raised in favour of the acquiring authority. Since the Act does not prescribe the mode and manner of taking possession of the acquired land by the Collector, it will be useful to notice some of the judgments in which this issue has been considered.”

(emphasis supplied)

At para 19 of the above case, it has been further clearly held that the memo of taking over possession of the acquired land must be in the presence of independent witnesses, undisputedly the same has not been done by Respondents 2, 3 and 4 in the case on hand. Therefore, in view of the principles laid down in the above case, the plea of the respondents that as per memo of possession dated 31-12-2013 the possession of the said land of the appellant was taken and handed over to the DDA, Respondent 4 on the same day is not accepted by us as it is not done in fact and could not have been done in view of the interim order referred to supra and also the same has not been done in the presence of independent witnesses as required in law.

26. Further, this Court held at para 26 in Raghbir Singh Sehrawat case (2012) 1 SCC 792 as under:

“26. Bhagwati, J. (as he then was) and Gupta, J., who constituted the majority did not agree with Untwalia, J. and observed as under: (Balwant Narayan Bhagde case (1976) 1 SCC 700, 1975 Supp SCR 250)

‘28. … We think it is enough to state that when the Government proceeds to take possession of the land acquired by it under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, it must take actual possession of the land, since all interests in the land are sought to be acquired by it. There can be no question of taking “symbolical” possession in the sense understood by judicial decisions under the Code of Civil Procedure. Nor would possession merely on paper be enough. What the Act contemplates as a necessary condition of vesting of the land in the Government is the taking of actual possession of the land. How such possession may be taken would depend on the nature of the land. Such possession would have to be taken as the nature of the land admits of.’”

(emphasis supplied)

27. Thus, in view of the above decisions, this Court has clearly laid down the legal principle as to how taken over physical possession of the acquired land means the actual taking of possession of it from the landowners/interested persons.

28. The learned counsel on behalf of Respondents 2, 3 and 4 sought to distinguish the said judgments by placing reliance upon the judgment in Sita Ram Bhandar Society (2009) 10 SCC 501 wherein this Court opined thus:

“28. A cumulative reading of the aforesaid judgments would reveal that while taking possession, symbolic and notional possession is perhaps not envisaged under the Act but the manner in which possession is taken must of necessity depend upon the facts of each case. Keeping this broad principle in mind, this Court in T.N Housing Board v. A. Viswam (1996) 8 SCC 259 after considering the judgment in Narayan Bhagde case (1976) 1 SCC 700, 1975 Supp SCR 250, observed that while taking possession of a large area of land (in this case 339 acres) a pragmatic and realistic approach had to be taken. This Court then examined the context under which the judgment in Narayan Bhagde case (1976) 1 SCC 700, 1975 Supp SCR 250 had been rendered and held as under: (Viswam case (1996) 8 SCC 259)

‘9. It is settled law by series of judgments of this Court that one of the accepted modes of taking possession of the acquired land is recording of a memorandum or panchnama by the LAO in the presence of witnesses signed by him/them and that would constitute taking possession of the land as it would be impossible to take physical possession of the acquired land. It is common knowledge that in some cases the owner/interested person may not be cooperative in taking possession of the land.’

29. In Balmokand Khatri Educational and Industrial Trust v. State of Punjab (1996) 4 SCC 212 yet again the question was as to the taking over of the possession of agricultural land and it was observed thus:

‘4. It is seen that the entire gamut of the acquisition proceedings stood completed by 17-4-1976 by which date possession of the land had been taken. No doubt, Shri Parekh has contended that the appellant still retained their possession. It is now well-settled legal position that it is difficult to take physical possession of the land under compulsory acquisition. The normal mode of taking possession is drafting the panchnama in the presence of panchas and taking possession and giving delivery to the beneficiaries is the accepted mode of taking possession of the land. Subsequent thereto, the retention of possession would tantamount only to illegal or unlawful possession.’”

29. Further, on the plea taken by the learned counsel on behalf of Respondents 2 and 3 regarding contravention of Sections 3 and 4 of the 1972 Act for transfer of the land in question by the appellant during the pendency of the proceedings as it was acquired by NCT on behalf of the Central Government by placing reliance on Article 239-AA of the Constitution, with respect to the contention of the 1972 Act is concerned, the same has no application to the fact situation. In view of the said provision, it has been contended by the learned counsel on behalf of Respondents 2, 3 and 4 that the Land and Home subject-matters that are in Delhi are still with the Central Government and therefore, the acquisition of land by NCT is the acquisition made by it on behalf of the Central Government. This is a far-fetched argument of the learned counsel and therefore, the same cannot be accepted by us for the reason that the acquisition notification available in the original record would clearly show that the land is acquired by NCT, Delhi and not on behalf of the Central Government. Hence, the said contention is liable to be rejected and accordingly rejected.

30. Apart from the said reason, even assuming for the sake of argument that the 1972 Act is applicable, it has been specifically stated by the learned Senior Counsel that the competent authority has given permission to the appellants to transfer the land in favour of subsidiary company of the appellant. The same can be seen in Para 5 of the sale deed produced before this Court which reads thus:

“5. The vendor have obtained NOC under the provisions of the Delhi Land (Restrictions on Transfer) Act, 1972 from the department concerned/Tahsildar Notification, Delhi and shall obtain all such necessary clearance/permission as may be required for effectively transferring and conferring the title on the vendee.”

Therefore, the provisions of Sections 3, 4 and 9 have no application to the fact situation on hand and there is no substance in this plea of the respondent and the same is rejected.

31. In view of the aforesaid findings and reasons recorded by us, the prayer made in this application is allowed. The acquisition proceedings in respect of the appellant's land have lapsed. Consequently, the appeal is also allowed quashing the acquisition proceeding notifications in respect of the appellant's land. No costs.