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K. Prakash v. B.R Sampath Kumar .
Supreme Court of India – Civil Appeal arising out of R.F.A. No. 396 of 2007
Factual and Procedural Background
The dispute concerns a self-acquired property of the respondent’s late father, which, after family partition on 14-12-2000, fell to the respondent’s share. On 15-12-2003 the respondent (vendor) executed an agreement to sell the Bangalore property (30 × 45 ft plot with a 1700 sq ft building) to the appellant (purchaser) for Rs 16,10,000. The appellant was already in possession of the first floor as a mortgagee; the respondent’s brother Sheshadri occupied the outhouse under a separate mortgage.
An advance of Rs 5,45,000 (inclusive of earlier mortgage amounts) was acknowledged, with the balance Rs 10,65,000 payable within one year. Disputes arose within three months: the appellant filed police complaints in February–April 2004 and, on 9-7-2004, instituted a suit for specific performance. The trial court decreed the suit, directing execution of a sale deed upon payment of the balance consideration.
The respondent’s Regular First Appeal (RFA No. 396/2007) succeeded in the High Court of Karnataka, which reversed the decree and dismissed the suit as “premature.” The appellant obtained special leave; the present Supreme Court judgment decides that appeal.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the agreement dated 15-12-2003 was validly executed by the respondent and enforceable against him.
- Whether the appellant proved continuous readiness and willingness to perform his contractual obligations as required by Section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963.
- Whether the High Court was justified in reversing the trial court’s decree for specific performance on the grounds that the suit was premature and the agreement was executed under pressure.
- How the discretionary power under Section 20 of the Specific Relief Act should be exercised when property prices have risen substantially during litigation.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant’s Arguments
- The High Court failed to properly re-appreciate evidence and relied on conjecture.
- Section 16(c) was satisfied; the appellant demonstrated readiness and willingness, including arranging cheques (Rs 10,65,000 to the respondent and Rs 1,19,840 for registration charges).
- The respondent admitted execution of the agreement in an affidavit (10-10-2006) and in a letter dated 21-1-2004 acknowledging receipt of Rs 5,45,000.
- The High Court ignored documentary and oral evidence proving payment and the respondent’s admissions.
Respondent’s Arguments
- The agreement was obtained when the respondent was in financial distress and signed without understanding its contents; it was meant only as security for a loan.
- Only Rs 5000 was actually paid; the appellant fabricated figures of Rs 5,45,000.
- The market value in 2003 far exceeded the stated consideration, evidencing that the transaction was a “farce.”
- Because the appellant filed police complaints and a premature suit, the agreement stood cancelled; specific performance should be refused under Sections 16(c) and 20 of the Act.
- Granting specific performance now would cause undue hardship due to a ten-fold rise in property prices.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Rooke’s Case (1598) 5 Co Rep 99b | Discretion must be exercised according to established rules of law and equity, not arbitrarily. | Quoted to emphasise that courts, when granting or refusing specific performance, must apply judicial principles rather than personal predilections. |
| Attorney General v. Wheate (1759) 1 Eden 177 | Equitable discretion should complement, not contradict, the law; judges must act within principled limits. | Relied upon to reinforce the disciplined exercise of discretion under Section 20 of the Specific Relief Act. |
| Nirmala Anand v. Advent Corpn. (P) Ltd., (2002) 8 SCC 146 | Court may impose conditions (e.g., additional payment) when granting specific performance, especially where property values have escalated. | Guided the Supreme Court in directing the purchaser to pay an enhanced price (Rs 25 lakh) to balance equities while enforcing specific performance. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Supreme Court held that the High Court misdirected itself by concluding that the agreement was executed under pressure and by treating the suit as premature:
- Validity of Agreement: The trial court’s factual findings—based on the respondent’s admissions, acknowledgment letter of 21-1-2004, and non-reply to the legal notice—demonstrated a valid agreement with Rs 5,45,000 paid as advance.
- Readiness and Willingness: Evidence of cheques arranged through Syndicate Bank showed the appellant’s capacity and intention to pay the balance. Section 16(c) was therefore satisfied.
- Appellate Interference: Under Section 20, appellate courts should not overturn a trial court’s discretionary decree unless it is perverse. The High Court’s reliance on police complaints and filing date did not justify reversal.
- Equitable Considerations & Price Rise: Rise in property value is not, by itself, “hardship” warranting refusal of specific performance; however, the court may adjust terms to address it. Following Nirmala Anand, the Court increased the total consideration to Rs 25 lakh to balance equities.
- Exercise of Discretion: Citing Rooke’s Case and Attorney General v. Wheate, the Court reiterated that discretion must be guided by legal and equitable principles, not arbitrary sympathies.
Holding and Implications
Holding: The appeal is allowed; the High Court’s judgment is set aside and the trial court’s decree for specific performance is restored, subject to the modification that the appellant shall pay a total consideration of Rs 25,00,000 (crediting amounts already paid) and the respondent shall execute a registered sale deed within three months.
Implications: The decision affirms that appellate courts should be slow to disturb trial-level decrees for specific performance absent perversity, and clarifies that post-contract price escalation is not a standalone ground for denial—although courts may impose additional monetary conditions to mitigate hardship. The ruling primarily affects the parties; it does not create new precedent but reinforces established principles on equitable discretion under the Specific Relief Act.
M. Yusuf Eqbal, J.— Leave granted. This appeal by special leave is directed against the judgment and order dated 23-8-2011 RFA No. 396 of 2007 passed by the High Court of Karnataka whereby Regular First Appeal No. 396 of 2007 of the respondent was allowed, reversing the judgment of the trial court and dismissing the suit for specific performance of the agreement filed by the appellant-plaintiff.
2. The facts of the case lie in a narrow compass. All disputes pertain to a self-acquired property of the father of the respondent. The respondent's father had four sons and three daughters. On 31-7-1988, transfer of khata was executed by all brothers and sisters in the name of the respondent. After the demise of their parents, partition seems to have taken place on 14-12-2000 among brothers and sisters and the property in question is said to have fallen to the share of the defendant, who was required to pay a sum of Rs 1,25,000 to each of the brothers and sisters in lieu of their shares in the suit house. The plaintiff had paid Rs 1,25,000 to all his brothers and sisters except brother Selva Pillai.
3. The respondent herein executed an agreement for sale in favour of the appellant on 15-12-2003 agreeing to sell the schedule property for a total sale consideration of Rs 16,10,000. The schedule property is located at Bangalore, admeasuring 30 × 45 ft with built-up area of 1700 sq ft, consisting of ground floor and first floor including outhouse. The ground floor is occupied by the respondent and the first floor is occupied by the appellant as a mortgagee. The outhouse is occupied by the brother of the respondent-defendant, namely, Sheshadri (as mortgagee). It is relevant to note that an amount of Rs 3,75,000 was paid by the appellant to the respondent as requested by the respondent and Sheshadri, who is occupying the outhouse portion, has paid Rs 1,65,000 as a mortgage consideration to the respondent while occupying the house. The agreement further reveals that the aforesaid amounts shall be treated as advance amount received by the respondent under the agreement of sale. The understanding between the parties is that the mortgage consideration need not be repaid by the respondent to the mortgagees including Sheshadri and his mortgage consideration will be repaid by the prospective vendee i.e the appellant. However, on the date of execution of sale agreement, only a sum of Rs 5000 was paid by the appellant to the respondent. Thus, in all a sum of Rs 5,45,000 is said to have been paid by the appellant. The plaintiff could raise a loan of Rs 3 lakhs by securing property. The remaining sale consideration of Rs 7,65,000 was payable to the respondent within one year from the date of the agreement, and in case the respondent fails to comply with any of the conditions in the agreement, he would repay double the amount i.e Rs 10,90,000 to the appellant.
4. Although prescribed time was one year, litigation seems to have started between the parties within three months. Repeated complaints were filed by the appellant against the respondent before the police authorities. At last, the appellant-plaintiff moved a suit on 9-7-2004 praying for a decree of specific performance on the ground that the respondent-defendant has denied the execution of the sale deed. The sum and substance of the appellant-plaintiff's case is that the respondent-defendant has failed to perform his part of the contract though the appellant-plaintiff was ready and willing to perform his part of the contract.
5. The respondent-defendant denying agreement, Ext. P-1 pleaded in his written statement that there being difference of opinion between himself and his brothers, he was in a highly disturbed state of mind and when he approached the appellant for suggestion and help, the appellant took his signature on the alleged agreement of sale and he signed it since he had implicit faith in the appellant. The appellant-plaintiff had assured that B.R Sheshadri, brother of the respondent-defendant, who was living in the outhouse, would be made to vacate the premises in the guise of interest being created in favour of the appellant in the property. It has also been contended that the respondent had no intention to execute the agreement of sale or to sell the property and the agreement was entered into only for the purpose of securing the loan and the property was mortgaged as a security for the loan.
6. After hearing argument on both sides, the trial court decreed the suit in favour of the appellant-plaintiff with a direction to the respondent-defendant to execute the absolute sale deed in favour of the plaintiff, free from all claims and encumbrances, by receiving the balance consideration of Rs 10,65,000 and to hand over the vacant and peaceful possession of the suit schedule property to the plaintiff. Aggrieved by the decision, the respondent-defendant preferred an appeal before the High Court, which passed the impugned order RFA No. 396 of 2007 setting aside the decree of the trial court and dismissing the suit for specific performance. Hence, this appeal by special leave by the plaintiff.
7. Mr Sanjay Parikh, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant contended that instead of adverting to and reappreciating the evidence on record, the High Court erred in arriving at the findings based on conjectures and surmises. The appellant-plaintiff has complied with the provisions of Section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act by establishing his willingness to perform his part of the contract whereas the respondent-defendant failed to do so. It is further contended that the respondent has admitted by way of an affidavit dated 10-10-2006 that he executed the agreement of sale dated 15-12-2003 and also by letter dated 21-1-2004 further admitted that he has executed the aforesaid agreement and he had already received a sum of Rs 5,45,000 as part-payment of the total sale consideration. At the instance of the appellant, on 16-2-2004 Syndicate Bank issued two cheques, one for Rs 10,65,000 in favour of the respondent towards balance amount of sale consideration and another for Rs 1,19,840 in favour of Sub-Registrar, Rajajinagar, Bangalore for payment of the registration charges of the said sale deed. As contended, on failure of the respondent to reply legal notice of the appellant and execute the sale deed in favour of the appellant, the appellant had to move a suit for relief of specific performance directing the respondent to receive the balance sale consideration to execute an absolute sale deed in favour of the appellant. The learned counsel drew our attention to the exhibits and the evidence of the respondent-defendant and submitted that the appellate court has committed serious illegality in ignoring these materials and reversed the finding of the trial court.
8. Per contra, Mr Vishwanatha Shetty, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent, submitted that taking advantage of financial crises and disturbed state of mind of the respondent, the appellant suggested him to execute an agreement of sale and without revealing its contents took his signature on the agreement, which was made only for nominal purpose and he had no intention to sell the property. It is further contended that the appellant had concocted and fabricated the agreement. It is alleged by the respondent that since the appellant did not perform his part of the contract, the entire alleged agreement stood cancelled. Prevailing circumstances had forced the respondent to write the aforesaid letter dated 21-1-2004 calling the appellant to pay the entire amount. Alleged agreement and letter were created by the appellant under suspicious circumstances and mental pressure of the respondent-defendant, and as such, they are not legally enforceable for a decree under Section 16(c) read with Section 20 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963. The High Court has held that there was payment of only Rs 5000 to the defendant as against the claim of the plaintiff that he has paid a sum of Rs 5,45,000 under Exts. P-1 and P-2. It has been further contended on behalf of the respondent that the market value of the property in the year 2003 in Bangalore was much more to the consideration amount contained in Exts. P-1 and P-2. The whole transaction was nothing but farce. The respondent contends that taking into consideration all aspects of the matter, the High Court is right in reversing the judgment of the trial court, which had ignored the material evidence on record with regard to the conduct of the appellant-plaintiff.
9. While deciding the issue as to whether the agreement dated 15-12-2003 was executed by the defendant in favour of the appellant-plaintiff, the trial court has gone through the pleading and evidence and discussed the matter in detail. The trial court found that after the agreement executed between the parties on 15-12-2003 the respondent-defendant issued a letter dated 21-1-2004 calling upon the plaintiff to get ready with the entire balance amount on or before 15-4-2004 and also mentioned that in default, the agreement dated 15-12-2003 will stand cancelled and the advance amount shall be forfeited. The trial court further found that the plaintiff had paid an amount of Rs 3,75,000 to the defendant for the property in occupation of the plaintiff taken on lease and the defendant in cross-examination had admitted that the plaintiff occupied the first floor as mortgagee and that the plaintiff has paid the amount of Rs 3,75,000 (Ext. P-3). The trial court further found that the defendant was examined as DW 1 and he admitted the signature of himself, his wife and signature of the plaintiff. He further admitted in cross-examination that he had read the papers and signed the same. The defendant also handed over copies of the title deeds and the encumbrance certificate to the plaintiff on lease basis and also Exts. P-1 and P-2. The trial court came to the conclusion that the defendant entered into an agreement of sale with the plaintiff for a consideration of Rs 16,10,000 and that the amount of Rs 5,45,000 was paid as an advance towards the sale of the said property. Further, the defendant (DW 1) admitted the receipt of the legal notice dated 12-3-2004 (Ext. P-3) but he did not reply the said notice.
10. The trial court also discussed the defence taken by the defendant during cross-examination that the suit property has fallen to the share of the defendant and that all his brothers and sisters are residing separately. The trial court, therefore, came to the conclusion that there is a valid agreement to sell the suit property executed by the defendant in favour of the plaintiff on receipt of the advance consideration.
11. The High Court has taken a very peculiar view that the appellant-plaintiff filed the suit which was premature. For better appreciation, the relevant portion of para 8 of the judgment passed by the High Court is extracted hereinbelow:
“It is not in dispute that the agreement is dated 15-12-2003. Under the agreement, both the parties have agreed that the sale deed should be executed within one year from that day, that is, on or before 15-12-2004. But the suit is filed on 9-7-2004, that is, within about 7 months from the date of the agreement. Absolutely, no reasons are forthcoming as to why the suit was filed prematurely. In the meanwhile, the plaintiff approached the police for enforcement of the contract. The same is clear in the matter on record, Ext. P-11 dated 8-2-2004 is the complaint lodged by the plaintiff before the Deputy Police Commissioner. In the said complaint, he has clearly stated that though the defendant agreed for selling his property on 15-12-2003, the plaintiff has not come forward to execute the sale deed and that the plaintiff has been delaying the execution of sale deed since four days prior to the filing of the complaint. The plaintiff requested the Deputy Police Commissioner to call the defendant and to take action by directing him to execute the sale deed as agreed. He also sought for protection by filing the said complaint.
Ext. P-12 is the complaint dated 3-3-2004 filed by the plaintiff before the Police Commissioner, Bangalore City. In the said complaint also, the plaintiff has alleged that the defendant is refusing to execute the sale deed in his favour and that therefore, the Commissioner should intervene in the manner for getting the sale deed executed in favour of the plaintiff.
Ext. P-13 is the complaint dated 11-4-2004 filed by the plaintiff before the Police Inspector, Subramanyanagar Police Station, Bangalore (subsequently police station). In the said complaint, he has stated that the defendant and his family members have threatened to kill the plaintiff and his family members and therefore, action should be taken against the defendant. However, Inspector of Police has issued an endorsement on 11-3-2004, as per Ext. P-14 to the effect that dispute between the parties is of civil nature and the complainant was directed to get his grievances redressed before the jurisdictional civil court. Ext. P-15 is another complaint of similar nature. Ext. P-16 is an endorsement issued by the police officer to the wife of the complainant intimating her that the complaint lodged by her on 12-3-2004, is received and for any grievance, she can approach Subramanyanagar Police Station. Further, in Ext. P-17, the Inspector of Police has intimated the plaintiff that the defendant has denied the agreement of sale and that he had signed the sale agreement under mental pressure. Again by issuing such an endorsement, the Inspector has directed the plaintiff to get his grievances redressed before the civil court. Section 107 CrPC proceedings were initiated before the Tahsildar, Bangalore, against the parties as is clear from Ext. P-18. Based on the complaints, two charge-sheets were lodged against the defendant as per Exts. P-19 and P-21; the same are pending consideration before the criminal court. These facts clearly go to show that the plaintiff has approached the police repeatedly by making one or the other allegations that too within the span of 2 to 4 months of the agreement. He has approached the Commissioner of Police and Deputy Commissioner of Police seeking their interference in the matter for getting the sale deed executed in his favour.”
The High Court further held that in the agreement (Ext. P-1) the parties have agreed that if the sale deed could not be executed by the defendant, he will repay a sum of Rs 10,90,000. According to the High Court, the recital in the agreement shows that it was not executed by the defendant with free mind and volition rather he was under pressure while executing those documents.
12. We have given our thoughtful consideration in the matter and perused the pleading and evidence. We are of the view that the High Court has not approached the issue in its right perspective and has committed serious error of law in holding that the agreement was executed by the defendant without free mind and volition and under some pressure. The agreement was executed on 15-12-2003 wherein it has been mentioned that the total consideration amount was Rs 16,10,000 and out of that part-consideration of sum of Rs 5,45,000 was paid. The said agreement was followed by another letter dated 21-1-2004, executed by the respondent, the contents whereof are reproduced hereinbelow:
“21-1-2004
That on this 22nd day of January, 2004, I have executed the agreement of sale in favour of Sri K. Prakash, in respect of the house bearing No. 2558, 11th Main Road, Subramanyanagara, Bangalore 560 010, to sell the same for a total sale consideration of Rs 16,10,000 (Rupees sixteen lakhs ten thousand only). In all I have received a sum of Rs 5,45,000 (Rupees five lakhs forty-five thousand only) from K. Prakash and the balance sale consideration to be paid on or before 15-4-2004 evening, failing to pay the balance sale consideration as per the agreement dated 15-12-2004. This agreement stands cancelled. I agree for the same.
sd/- sd/- (Sampath Kumar) (K. Prakash) Vendor Purchaser sd/- (Kanthamani) Witnesses Witnesses sd/- (1) sd/- sd/- (2) sd/- sd/- (3) sd/-”
13. Indisputably, remedy for specific performance is an equitable remedy. The court while granting relief for specific performance exercises discretionary jurisdiction. Section 20 of the Act specifically provides that the court's jurisdiction to grant decree of specific performance is discretionary but not arbitrary. Discretion must be exercised in accordance with the sound and reasonable judicial principles.
14. The King's Bench in Rooke's case (1598) 5 Co Rep 99b said:
“Discretion is a science, not to act arbitrarily according to men's will and private affection: so the discretion which is exercised here, is to be governed by rules of law and equity, which are not to oppose, but each, in its turn, to be subservient to the other. This discretion, in some cases follows the law implicitly, in others, allays the rigour of it, but in no case does it contradict or overturn the grounds or principles thereof, as has been sometimes ignorantly imputed to this Court. That is a discretionary power, which neither this nor any other court, not even the highest, acting in a judicial capacity is by the Constitution entrusted with.”
15. The Court of Chancery in Attorney General v. Wheate (1759) 1 Eden 177 followed Rooke's case (1598) 5 Co Rep 99b and observed: (ER p. 666)
“… the law is clear, and courts of equity ought to follow it in their judgments concerning titles to equitable estates; otherwise great uncertainty and confusion would ensue. And though proceedings in equity are said to be secundum discretionem boni viri, yet, when it is asked, vir bonus est quis? The answer is, qui consulta patrum, qui leges juraque servat. And as it is said in Rooke's case (1598) 5 Co Rep 99b, that discretion is a science not to act arbitrarily according to men's wills and private affections; so the discretion which is to be executed here, is to be governed by the rules of law and equity, which are not to oppose, but each in its turn to be subservient to the other. This discretion, in some cases follows the law implicitly; in others assists it, and advances the remedy; in others, again, it relieves against the abuse, or allays the rigour of it; but in no case does it contradict or overturn the grounds or principles thereof, as has been sometimes ignorantly imputed to this Court. That is a discretionary power, which neither this, nor any other court, not even the highest, acting in a judicial capacity, is by the constitution entrusted with. This description is full and judicious, and what ought to be imprinted on the mind of every Judge.”
16. The principle which can be enunciated is that where the plaintiff brings a suit for specific performance of contract for sale, the law insists upon a condition precedent to the grant of decree for specific performance: that the plaintiff must show his continued readiness and willingness to perform his part of the contract in accordance with its terms from the date of contract to the date of hearing. Normally, when the trial court exercises its discretion in one way or the other after appreciation of entire evidence and materials on record, the appellate court should not interfere unless it is established that the discretion has been exercised perversely, arbitrarily or against judicial principles. The appellate court should also not exercise its discretion against the grant of specific performance on extraneous considerations or sympathetic considerations. It is true, as contemplated under Section 20 of the Specific Relief Act, that a party is not entitled to get a decree for specific performance merely because it is lawful to do so. Nevertheless once an agreement to sell is legal and validly proved and further requirements for getting such a decree are established then the court has to exercise its discretion in favour of granting relief for specific performance.
17. Mr Shetty lastly submitted that grant of decree for specific performance in favour of the appellant will cause a great hardship for the reason not only because of the lesser price shown in the agreement but also because of the rise in price which have been increased ten times the price agreed between the parties.
18. Subsequent rise in the price will not be treated as a hardship entailing refusal of the decree for specific performance. Rise in price is a normal change of circumstances and, therefore, on that ground a decree for specific performance cannot be reversed.
19. However, the court may take notice of the fact that there has been an increase in the price of the property and considering the other facts and circumstances of the case, this Court while granting decree for specific performance can impose such condition which may to some extent compensate the defendant owner of the property. This aspect of the matter is considered by a three-Judge Bench of this Court in Nirmala Anand v. Advent Corpn. (P) Ltd. (2002) 8 SCC 146, wherein this Court held:
“6. It is true that grant of decree of specific performance lies in the discretion of the court and it is also well settled that it is not always necessary to grant specific performance simply for the reason that it is legal to do so. It is further well settled that the court in its discretion can impose any reasonable condition including payment of an additional amount by one party to the other while granting or refusing decree of specific performance. Whether the purchaser shall be directed to pay an additional amount to the seller or converse would depend upon the facts and circumstances of a case. Ordinarily, the plaintiff is not to be denied the relief of specific performance only on account of the phenomenal increase of price during the pendency of litigation. That may be, in a given case, one of the considerations besides many others to be taken into consideration for refusing the decree of specific performance. As a general rule, it cannot be held that ordinarily the plaintiff cannot be allowed to have, for her alone, the entire benefit of phenomenal increase of the value of the property during the pendency of the litigation. While balancing the equities, one of the considerations to be kept in view is as to who is the defaulting party. It is also to be borne in mind whether a party is trying to take undue advantage over the other as also the hardship that may be caused to the defendant by directing specific performance. There may be other circumstances on which parties may not have any control. The totality of the circumstances is required to be seen.”
20. As discussed above the agreement was entered into between the parties in 2003 for sale of the property for a total consideration of Rs 16,10,000. Ten years have passed by and now the price of the property in that area where it situates has increased by not less than five times. Keeping in mind the factual position we are of the view that the appellant should pay a total consideration of Rs 25 lakhs, being the price for the said property.
21. We, therefore, allow this appeal and set aside the judgment and order RFA No. 396 of 2007 passed by the High Court and restore the judgment and decree of the trial court with the modification that on payment of Rs 25 lakhs, less already paid by the plaintiff, the defendant owner shall execute a registered sale deed within a period of three months from today.
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