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Municipal Corporation, Gwalior v. Puran Singh Alias Puran Chand And Others
Factual and Procedural Background
The respondent-plaintiffs filed Civil Suit No. 44-A of 1985 seeking a declaration of ownership and a permanent injunction in respect of 1 bigha of land bearing old Survey No. 486/19 (new Survey No. 619) in Gwalior. They claimed ancestral title and asserted possession through fencing and ancillary structures. The appellant, Municipal Corporation, Gwalior, denied the claim, contending that the land was municipal property reserved for a public park and parking. The trial court, by judgment dated 29-9-1994, dismissed the suit, principally on the grounds that (i) the plaintiffs had not served statutory notice under Section 401 of the Madhya Pradesh Municipal Corporation Act, 1956, and (ii) the plaintiffs failed to prove title or possession.
The High Court, in First Appeal No. 1 of 1995, reversed the trial court on 15-4-1998 and decreed the suit in favour of the plaintiffs, relying on revenue (khasra) entries that recorded their possession. A Letters Patent Appeal (LPA No. 150 of 1998) was later dismissed as not maintainable following the Constitution Bench decision in Jamshed N. Guzdar v. State of Maharashtra. The Municipal Corporation thereafter appealed to the Supreme Court, resulting in the present decision.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the respondent-plaintiffs established title and possession over the disputed land sufficient to warrant declaratory and injunctive relief.
- Whether revenue (khasra) and mutation entries, standing alone, confer or prove title to immovable property.
- Whether the High Court erred in reversing the trial court’s findings without proper appreciation of law and evidence, including the requirement of statutory notice under Section 401 of the Madhya Pradesh Municipal Corporation Act, 1956.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant (Municipal Corporation, Gwalior)
- The High Court committed a manifest error in overturning a well-reasoned trial court judgment.
- The suit was not maintainable because the plaintiffs failed to serve prior notice under Section 401 of the Municipal Corporation Act and Section 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
- The High Court ignored oral evidence showing that the municipality was recorded as owner in certain khasras and that the plaintiffs were, at times, classified as trespassers.
Respondent-Plaintiffs
- Their predecessors were continuously recorded in possession of the land, and therefore the High Court correctly decreed the suit.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Jamshed N. Guzdar v. State of Maharashtra, (2005) 2 SCC 591 (Constitution Bench) | Held that certain letters patent appeals are not maintainable against single-judge decisions rendered in first appeal. | Relied upon by High Court at an earlier stage to dismiss LPA No. 150 of 1998 as not maintainable; noted in procedural history. |
| Sawarni v. Inder Kaur, (1996) 6 SCC 223 | Mutation or revenue entries neither create nor extinguish title and have no presumptive value regarding ownership. | Supreme Court quoted this ruling to hold that khasra/mutation entries relied on by the High Court could not confer title on the plaintiffs. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Supreme Court reaffirmed the trial court’s findings and rejected the High Court’s reliance on revenue entries. The analytical steps were:
- Pleading and Proof of Title: The Court underscored that the burden lay on the plaintiffs to plead and prove title. Their claim of joint bhumiswami rights was unsupported by documentary title deeds or coherent pedigree evidence. Inconsistencies emerged, including plaintiffs belonging to different castes without explanation of joint acquisition.
- Reliability of Revenue Records: The Court scrutinised the revenue (khasra) entries produced by the plaintiffs (Exhibits P-10, P-11 and subsequent years) and noted discrepancies in ink, handwriting and absence of authentication. Witness PW-3’s testimony further cast doubt on their genuineness.
- Legal Effect of Mutation Entries: Citing Sawarni v. Inder Kaur, the Court reiterated that mutation or khasra entries merely facilitate revenue collection and cannot establish ownership.
- Possession Not Established: The plaintiffs failed to plead or prove actual possession—there was no convincing evidence of fencing, pond or latrine on the land attributable to them.
- Statutory Notice: Echoing the trial court, the Court noted the absence of prior notice under Section 401 of the Municipal Corporation Act, further undermining the suit’s maintainability.
- Error of the High Court: The High Court’s decision was characterised as a “grave and manifest error” for conferring title solely on doubtful khasra entries and for overlooking the above legal principles.
Holding and Implications
APPEAL ALLOWED; HIGH COURT JUDGMENT SET ASIDE; TRIAL COURT DECREE DISMISSING SUIT RESTORED.
Consequently, the respondent-plaintiffs receive no declaratory or injunctive relief, and the Municipal Corporation retains possession and ownership of the land. The decision reinforces the principle that revenue/mutation entries do not constitute proof of title; however, it does not lay down new precedent beyond applying settled law to the facts.
Sudhansu Jyoti Mukhopadhaya, J.— This appeal is directed against the judgment and decree dated 15-4-1998 passed by the High Court of Madhya Pradesh, Jabalpur, Bench at Gwalior in Civil First Appeal No. 1 of 1995. By the impugned judgment and decree the High Court allowed the appeal preferred by the respondent-plaintiffs, set aside the judgment and decree passed by the trial court and decreed the suit of the respondent-plaintiffs.
2. The factual matrix of the case is as follows: the respondents were the plaintiffs and the appellant, Municipal Corporation, Gwalior was a defendant in the original suit. Original Civil Suit No. 44-A of 1985 was filed by the respondent-plaintiffs against the defendant Municipal Corporation, Gwalior seeking declaration that land bearing Original Survey No. 486/19 (old)(New Survey No. 619) measuring 1 bigha is owned and possessed by them. They also sought for permanent injunction against the defendant on the ground that municipal authorities tried to interfere with their possession by dismantling the fencing standing on their land.
3. The case of the plaintiffs was that their ancestors were the owners of the suit land. One Ram Nath was the original tenure-holder (mool krishak) and thereafter they became joint bhumiswami. They claimed to be in possession on the ground that they constructed fencing, hauda (pond) and latrine (toilet) on the suit land. By way of an amendment of Para 2 of the plaint, the plaintiffs had shown their pedigree.
4. Defendant Municipal Corporation filed a written statement, denied the allegations and asserted that the suit land is an open piece of land belonging to the Corporation and is in its possession. It is reserved for developing park and is used as a parking place and a signboard to this effect is placed at the spot and the fencing by wire too has been done by the Municipal Corporation. It was alleged that the plaintiffs manipulated khasra entries by committing fraud to include their names.
5. The trial court on the basis of the pleadings of the parties framed the following issues:
“1. Whether the plaintiffs are bhumiswamis of the disputed land?
2. Whether the court fee paid by the plaintiffs is insufficient?
3. Whether the defendants can get Rs 3000 as compensatory cost?
4. Whether the disputed land belongs to Defendant 2 being nazul land?
5. Whether the defendant can get Rs 5000 as compensatory cost?
6. (a) Whether the disputed land belongs to the Nazul Department?
(b) If so, whether the land being open belongs to the Municipal Corporation and the same is not owned by the plaintiffs?
7. Reliefs and costs.”
6. On hearing the counsel for the parties and on considering the entire evidence, by judgment and decree dated 29-9-1994, the trial court dismissed the suit and held as follows:
“Issues 1, 4, 6(a) and 6(b)
In absence of notice under Section 401 of the Madhya Pradesh Municipal Corporation Act, 1956 the suit is not maintainable. The plaintiffs are not the owners of the disputed land and the disputed land is the property within the continued ownership and possession and management of the municipality.
Issue 2
The court fee paid is sufficient.
Issues 3 and 5
Even though the suit of the plaintiffs failed but the defendants are not entitled to get the special damages.
Issue 7
On the basis of above findings the suit of the plaintiffs for all the said reliefs is liable to be dismissed with costs.”
7. Against the trial court's decision, the respondent-plaintiffs preferred Civil First Appeal No. 1 of 1995 in the High Court. After hearing the parties, the High Court by impugned judgment allowed the appeal and set aside the judgment passed by the trial court with the following observation:
“38. That is the position in this case as well, when the respondent-defendants did not produce property register to show that this property was ever recorded as property of the Municipal Corporation. At one stage it was recorded as nazul land belonging to the State when the area had not come within the municipal limits. When the area came within the municipal limits it was mentioned to be behatnam (under management) of the Municipal Corporation. But the possession and title of the plaintiffs has been recorded throughout even thereafter and to have established abadi over this land, and therefore, the respondent-defendants could not object to the title and possession of the plaintiffs and the suit for declaration of title and injunction ought to have been decreed.”
8. Aggrieved, the appellant preferred a letters patent appeal under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent Appeal Rules before the Division Bench of the High Court. LPA No. 150 of 1998 was admitted and the order of stay was passed by the High Court. Subsequently, in the light of a Constitution Bench decision in Jamshed N. Guzdar v. State of Maharashtra (2005) 2 SCC 591, the letters patent appeal was dismissed on 17-8-2005 LPA No. 150 of 1998 as not maintainable.
9. The learned counsel for the appellant-defendant made the following submissions:
(a) The High Court committed a grave and manifest error of law in reversing the well-reasoned judgment and decree passed by the trial court.
(b) The High Court has failed to consider that as there is no prior service of notice before institution of the suit either under Section 80 CPC or under Section 401 of the M.P Municipal Corporation Act, 1956, therefore, suit was not maintainable and as such it was rightly dismissed by the trial court.
(c) The High Court has gravely erred in decreeing the suit without properly considering the oral evidence led by the plaintiffs and on the contrary the plaintiffs' witnesses admitted in their evidence that in the khasras the municipality is recorded as owner and even in some khasras the plaintiffs are recorded as trespassers.
10. On the other hand, according to the learned counsel for the respondent-plaintiffs, the first appellate court rightly decreed the suit as predecessors-in-interest of the plaintiffs were recorded to be in possession of the land.
11. After giving our careful consideration to the facts and circumstances of the case, evidence on record and the submission made by the learned counsel for the parties, we find ourselves in complete agreement with the submission made on behalf of the appellant-defendant and the judgment and decree passed by the trial court.
12. The respondent-plaintiffs claimed ownership, title and possession over the land. They are supposed to plead the fact and prove their case by placing evidence. The plaintiffs have shown their possession in the capacity of “pukhta maurusi kashtakar” and that the land was meant for agricultural purposes.
13. Further, the case of the plaintiffs was that there was no partition between them and the land continued to be joint family property (shamil shareek). The plaintiffs have given the detail of their predecessor-in-title as under:
14. Referring to the tables of the predecessors-in-interest, the trial court doubted the joint ownership of the family and rejected the claim of the plaintiffs in view of the following facts.
15. Plaintiff 1, Puran Chand belongs to Shiva Hare Caste whereas Plaintiff 2, Sham Babu, is a “Kayastha” (Shrivastava). Harinarain is a Thakur. The plaintiffs have not made clear how they claim joint ownership and joint possession of the land if they belong to three different castes. Neither were any pleadings made nor was any evidence placed by the plaintiffs to show how the land in dispute came under their ownership and when they have taken possession of the land.
16. The High Court gravely erred in law as well as on facts in connecting Ram Nath with the respondent-plaintiffs even though they have utterly failed to prove any connection with him and the pleadings are lacking regarding their particulars and even their names do not appear in Ext. P-11.
17. It is settled that for joint possession and ownership over any property, firstly the plaintiffs are required to plead the same and the said fact should be reflected in the plaint itself. There is a concept of joint family amongst the Hindus but that is required to be pleaded and proved. As the ancestors of the plaintiffs do not belong to one family, but three different families, having three different castes, the joint possession of the plaintiff cannot be accepted. The High Court failed to notice the aforesaid fact while allowing the appeal of the plaintiffs.
18. Smt Chandra Kala, widow of Shyam Babu (PW 1) and Puran Singh (PW 2) stated that they are joint owners and are in joint possession based on revenue records. The names of Mishrilal, Gopi Ram and Shyam Babu were shown. However, the name of ancestors of Plaintiff 2, Shyam Babu is not recorded, but the name of Shyam Babu himself is recorded therein. In the original plaint, it was not pleaded as to how Shyam Babu along with Mishrilal and Gopi Ram were in joint possession over the land in dispute. In this background, we hold that the trial court rightly held that the plaintiffs failed to give necessary details of their origin and ownership rights.
19. The High Court has failed to appreciate that there was no document of title/ownership on record placed by the respondent-plaintiffs and there are no pleadings in this regard as such no finding of title or ownership can be given in favour of the respondent-plaintiffs.
20. The evidence of Chander Kala, PW 1 and other evidence on record including map were enclosed in the plaint. Nothing was shown to suggest that Shyam Babu was in actual possession of the land in the plaint or in the map and no pleading as to the existence of a pataur, toilet and pond (haudi) in the suit land was made. Therefore, the trial court was correct in holding that the plaintiff Shyam Babu was not in possession of land.
21. The khasra entry of Samvat 1966 is Ext. P-11. The name of the owner of Khasra No. 486 (Vasarash Sadar), Rakam Tehsil Khewat 1 is recorded whereas Kashtakar Dakhilkar in Column 7 (Basrah Sadar) Ram Chander s/o Kashi Ram, resident of Deh Dakhilkar is mentioned. Further in Column 8 the following entry is given as skikmi kashtakar and muddat kashta:
“Manko widow Khushi Ram and Arjun Rajawati, widow of Reoti Prasad Kayastha, Mangal Singh and Ram Prasad.”
In the further columns the vegetables, crop and makka, chana, etc. is mentioned.
22. In second old khasra entry, Ext. P-10 for Samvat 1992 with respect to Khasra No. 486/19 in Column 5 for the name of the owner “Municipality No. 1” is mentioned and further Warelal Gopi Ram Mauru-Mangal Singh-Bhagwati s/o Reoti Prasad Ka. Sa. Deh. Mu. Maurusi is mentioned and in Column 20 “Kisam Abadi” is mentioned. In Column 9 Chita Lagani has been shown.
23. According to the plaintiffs, the old Account No. 486/19 of the land is in dispute, and therefore, in this khasra entry this land is reflected as bila lagani abadi under the ownership of municipality.
24. The trial court on appreciation of the entries and its genuineness which is to be presumed under the provisions of Section 117 of the Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue Code, came to a definite conclusion that the entries were made with different ink and handwriting and the compliance with the order by any competent officer is not mentioned in the khasra. In this regard when cross-examined, Gita Ram Verma (PW 3), Abhilekha Pal of Rajasava Abhilekhagar, Gwalior made certain statements at Paras 5, 6 and 7 of the cross-examination which raised doubt about the entries in some of the khasras placed by the plaintiff.
25. Gita Ram Verma (PW 3) in her statement stated the record of Samvat 1977 to Samvat 1992 in the “Abhilekhagar” (record room) of Director, Land Records. The plaintiffs could not correspond how they could get Exts. P-10 and P-11 which were available in the record room and could not prove the correctness of those exhibits. Errors and omissions have also been found in the khasra entries produced by the plaintiffs. Hence, the trial court doubted the correctness of those khasras.
26. The aforesaid fact has not been dealt with by the High Court in proper perspective. Merely on the basis of khasra of the year Samvat 1992, Ext. P-10; khasra of the year Samvat 1996, Ext. P-11; khasra of the year Samvat 2003, Ext. P-2, declaration has been given in favour of the plaintiffs. The High Court also noticed the khasra of the year Samvat 2004, Ext. P-3; Samvat 2005, Ext. P-4 and Samvat 2006, Ext. P-5, and then khasra of the years Samvat 2010 to 2014, Ext. P-6; khasra of the years Samvat 2013 to 2017, Ext. P-7 and khasra of the years Samvat 2035 to 2038, Ext. P-8.
27. In the khasra of the years Samvat 2035 to 2038, Ext. P-8 the nature of the land was mentioned as nazul abadi. In such exhibit the municipality has been mentioned in Column 3. On the basis of the aforesaid khasras, the learned Single Judge decided the title in favour of the appellant Municipal Corporation.
28. Mutation entries do not confer title. In Sawarni v. Inder Kaur (1996) 6 SCC 223 this Court held:
“7. … Mutation of a property in the revenue record does not create or extinguish title nor has it any presumptive value on title. It only enables the person in whose favour mutation is ordered to pay the land revenue in question. The learned Additional District Judge was wholly in error in coming to a conclusion that mutation in favour of Inder Kaur conveys title in her favour. This erroneous conclusion has vitiated the entire judgment.”
29. The High Court committed a grave and manifest error of law in reversing the well-reasoned judgment and decree passed by the trial court by simply placing reliance upon khasra entries even without properly appreciating the settled law that khasra entries do not convey title of the suit property as the same is only relevant for the purposes of paying land revenue and it has nothing to do with ownership.
30. For the reasons aforesaid, we set aside the impugned judgment and decree passed by the learned Single Judge in Civil First Appeal No. 1 of 1995 and confirm the judgment and decree passed by the trial court. The appeal is allowed. No costs.
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