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Rajeev Kumar v. State Of Haryana .

Supreme Court Of India
Oct 31, 2013
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Factual and Procedural Background

Vandana, wife of the appellant Dr. Rajiv Singla, suffered extensive burn injuries on the night of 26-2-1991 at their residence in Mandi Dabwali, Haryana. Assistant Sub-Inspector Madan Lal recorded her statement in hospital, and the Judicial Magistrate (R.S. Bagri) separately recorded a dying declaration under Section 164 CrPC. Vandana succumbed to her injuries in the early hours of 27-2-1991. Police investigated and filed a charge-sheet against the appellant.

The Sessions Court framed a charge under Section 304-B IPC (dowry death) and, on 31-8-1992, convicted the appellant, sentencing him to seven years’ rigorous imprisonment and a fine. The Punjab and Haryana High Court dismissed the appellant’s appeal on 16-9-2004. Aggrieved, the appellant sought special leave to appeal before the Supreme Court under Article 136 of the Constitution.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether Vandana was medically fit to make the two dying declarations relied upon by the prosecution.
  2. Whether the prosecution proved, beyond reasonable doubt, the essential ingredients of “dowry death” under Section 304-B IPC—particularly that the deceased was subjected to cruelty or harassment in connection with demand for dowry “soon before her death.”
  3. If Section 304-B IPC was not made out, whether liability under Sections 306 (abetment of suicide) and 498-A (cruelty) IPC could nevertheless be fastened on the appellant.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant’s Arguments

  • PW 4 (landlord) heard no quarrels; testimony shows a normal married life with a six-to-seven-month-old daughter, negating dowry harassment.
  • The doctor who certified fitness (PW 2) was not present when the Judicial Magistrate recorded the dying declaration; medical evidence (PW 7) indicates that a charred larynx and trachea would prevent speech, corroborated by defence witness DW 2.
  • Letters exchanged between March 1989 and January 1991 (Exts. DE-2 etc.) reveal cordial relations, undermining prosecution claims of dowry demand.
  • Reliance was placed on Supreme Court decisions in Sanjiv Kumar, Durga Prasad, Gurdeep Singh and Devinder to argue that essential ingredients of Section 304-B were missing; at most, a case under Section 306 IPC could be made out, and the appellant has already served over two years.

State’s Arguments

  • Both dying declarations (Exts. PG and PN) expressly state the deceased was harassed for dowry; medical testimony (PW 7 and DW 5) shows a person can speak while larynx and trachea are merely in the process of charring.
  • PW 2 declared Vandana fit to give her statement; PW 8 and PW 9 corroborate fitness and voluntariness of the declarations.
  • PW 5 testified that the appellant beat the deceased and demanded more dowry, satisfying the “soon before death” requirement.
  • Reliance was placed on Bansi Lal and Shanti to emphasise that proximate cruelty relating to dowry raises a presumption under Section 113-B Evidence Act that the accused caused the dowry death.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Sanjiv Kumar v. State of Punjab (2009) 16 SCC 487 Standards for establishing an offence under Section 304-B IPC. Invoked by the appellant; Court noted but ultimately found ingredients of Section 304-B unproved on facts.
Durga Prasad v. State of M.P. (2010) 9 SCC 73 Interpretation of “soon before her death” in Section 304-B IPC. Cited by appellant; Court accepted the legal test but held evidence did not satisfy it.
Gurdeep Singh v. State of Punjab (2011) 12 SCC 408 Necessity of proximate dowry-related cruelty for Section 304-B. Cited by appellant; aided Court in finding dowry link absent.
Devinder v. State of Haryana (2012) 10 SCC 763 Requirement that cruelty be connected to dowry demand. Relied on by appellant; Court drew similar conclusion that such connection was not proved.
Bansi Lal v. State of Haryana (2011) 11 SCC 359 Presumption under Section 113-B Evidence Act when dowry-linked cruelty is proved “soon before death.” Prosecution cited; Court distinguished on facts because dowry-linked cruelty was not established here.
Shanti v. State of Haryana (1991) 1 SCC 371 Once unnatural death and dowry-related cruelty are shown, Section 304-B is attracted. Cited by prosecution; Court distinguished as evidence in present case lacked direct dowry nexus.
K. Prema S. Rao v. Yadla Srinivasa Rao (2003) 1 SCC 217 Where Section 304-B fails for lack of dowry nexus, conviction can follow under Sections 306 & 498-A if cruelty drove the deceased to suicide. Relied on by Supreme Court to alter conviction from Section 304-B to Sections 306 and 498-A.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

1. Fitness to Make Dying Declarations. PW 2 certified Vandana fit at 10:30 p.m.; ASI Madan Lal (PW 9) and Judicial Magistrate Bagri (PW 8) confirmed she was conscious and speaking. Medical evidence (PW 7 & DW 5) clarified that vocal function is possible while the larynx and trachea are in the process of charring. Hence, both dying declarations (Exts. PG & PN) were held reliable.

2. Applicability of Section 304-B IPC. Although the dying declarations mention past dowry taunts, they do not establish dowry-linked cruelty “soon before” death. PW 5’s testimony described recent beatings but did not attribute them to dowry demands. Absent this essential ingredient, the statutory presumption under Section 113-B Evidence Act could not arise. Consequently, conviction under Section 304-B IPC was unsustainable.

3. Liability under Sections 306 and 498-A IPC. Under Section 113-A Evidence Act, suicide within seven years of marriage coupled with cruelty permits a presumption of abetment. The Court found: (a) marriage in January 1989, death in February 1991—well within seven years; (b) evidence of constant beatings and quarrels on petty issues. Such conduct fits the definition of “cruelty” in Section 498-A IPC and was sufficient to drive the deceased to suicide. Applying K. Prema S. Rao, the Court substituted convictions under Sections 306 and 498-A.

Holding and Implications

HELD: Conviction under Section 304-B IPC is set aside. The appellant is instead convicted under Sections 306 and 498-A IPC and sentenced to:

  • Section 498-A: One year’s imprisonment and a fine of Rs 1,000.
  • Section 306: Three years’ imprisonment and a fine of Rs 2,000.
  • In default of either fine, six months’ further imprisonment; sentences to run concurrently.

Implications: The decision clarifies that dowry-linked cruelty must be proved in close temporal proximity to the death to sustain a conviction under Section 304-B IPC. Where such nexus is absent, courts may still convict under Sections 306 and 498-A if evidence shows cruelty driving the woman to suicide, without remitting the matter for fresh charges. No new precedent is created, but the ruling reinforces the careful evidentiary distinction between dowry death and abetment of suicide.

Show all summary ...

A.K Patnaik, J.— This is an appeal by way of special leave under Article 136 of the Constitution against the judgment dated 16-9-2004 of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Criminal Appeal No. 337-SB of 1992.

2. The facts very briefly are that on 26-2-1991 at 11.20 p.m, the Assistant Sub-Inspector of Police of Police Station City Dabwali, District Sirsa in Haryana, Madan Lal recorded a statement of Vandana at CHC Hospital, Mandi Dabwali. She stated that about two years ago, she was married to the appellant and the appellant used to taunt her on petty matters and earlier the appellant used to tease her for dowry and on being fed up with the habits of the appellant, on 26-2-1991 between 7.00 and 7.30 p.m, she sprinkled kerosene on her and set herself on fire. The statement of Vandana was registered as first information report (FIR) by the SI of PS Dabwali, Kuldeep Singh. Soon thereafter on 26-2-1991, the Judicial Magistrate, First Class, R.S Bagri, recorded a statement of Vandana under Section 164 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short “CrPC”) in which Vandana reiterated her statement to the police. On 27-2-1991 at 2.20 a.m, Vandana died. Post-mortem was carried out on the body of Vandana (hereinafter referred to as “the deceased”) by Dr S.S Bansal. The police then took up the investigation and submitted a charge-sheet against the appellant.

3. On 28-8-1991 the Sessions Court framed a charge under Section 304-B IPC against the appellant to which the appellant pleaded not guilty. At the trial, the prosecution examined Kedar Nath, who had prepared the scaled plan (Ext. PA) of the place of occurrence, as PW 1; Dr R.C Chaudhary, Medical Officer, General Hospital, Mandi Dabwali, who had examined the deceased and found the burn injuries on her body as PW 2; SI Kuldeep Singh of PS Dabwali, who had registered the FIR as PW 3; the landlord of the house in which the deceased lived with her husband as PW 4; Niranjan Ram Gupta, the father of the deceased, as PW 5; Bhupinder Kumar, the uncle of the deceased as PW 6; Dr S.S Bansal, who conducted the post-mortem on the body of the deceased as PW 7; R.S Bagri, the Judicial Magistrate, who recorded the statement of the deceased under Section 164 CrPC as PW 8 and ASI Madan Lal, the investigating officer, as PW 9. The statement of the appellant was recorded under Section 313 CrPC.

4. In defence, the appellant examined Ramesh Devra as DW 1; Jagdish Kumar as DW 2; Nihal Singh, Assistant Chief Medical Officer, Sirsa, as DW 3; Dr Ajay Kumar Gupta, Medical Officer, Civil Hospital, Sirsa, as DW 4 and Dr J.L Bhutani as DW 5.

5. After considering the evidence and the arguments on behalf of the parties, the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Sirsa, in his judgment dated 31-8-1992 held that the prosecution has been able to prove the charge against the appellant and accordingly convicted him under Section 304-B IPC. Thereafter, the learned Additional Sessions Judge heard the accused on the quantum of sentence and ordered that the appellant be sentenced to seven years' RI with a fine of Rs 2000 and in default of payment of fine, to undergo further imprisonment of six months.

6. Aggrieved, the appellant filed Criminal Appeal No. 337-SB of 1992 before the High Court. After hearing the appeal, the High Court in the impugned judgment held that the deceased had indicated in her dying declarations (Exts. PG and PN) before ASI Madan Lal and the Judicial Magistrate R.S Bagri that she was being harassed by her husband with demands of dowry on account of which she had sprinkled kerosene on herself before setting herself ablaze. The High Court further held that the statement of the deceased in these two dying declarations (Exts. PG and PN) that she was being harassed for dowry stood corroborated by the evidence of the father of the deceased (PW 5) and uncle of the deceased (PW 6).

7. The High Court rejected the contention raised on behalf of the appellant that the deceased was not in the medical condition to speak inasmuch as her larynx and trachea had been charred by burns, relying on the testimony of the medical experts Dr R.C Chaudhary (PW 2) and Dr J.L Bhutani (DW 5) as well as the testimony of ASI Madan Lal (PW 9) and the Judicial Magistrate R.S Bagri (PW 8), who had recorded the dying declarations of the deceased. The High Court accordingly held that there was no ground to interfere with the orders of conviction and sentence passed by the trial court and dismissed the criminal appeal of the appellant.

Contentions of the learned counsel for the parties

8. Mr S.B Upadhyay, learned counsel for the appellant, submitted that the finding in the impugned judgment that the appellant was harassing the deceased for dowry is not correct inasmuch as PW 4, the landlord of the house in which the deceased and her husband were living, has stated in his evidence that he did not hear any sort of disharmony or fighting between the appellant and the deceased and that they used to live and lead a normal married life and both of them were blessed with a daughter, who was aged about six to seven months.

9. The learned counsel further submitted that when the Judicial Magistrate (PW 8) recorded the statement of the deceased under Section 164 CrPC, Dr R.C Chaudhary (PW 2) was not present, as will be evident from the evidence of PW 8. He submitted that PW 2, on the other hand, was the doctor who issued the fitness certificate to the Judicial Magistrate that the deceased was in a fit state to give the statement. He referred to the opinion of Dr S.S Bansal (PW 7) to submit that the larynx and trachea is a voice box containing vocal cords through which a man speaks and if they were charred by heat and burns, a person will not be able to speak. He submitted that DW 2 was present in the hospital for the whole night on 26-2-1991 and DW 2 has stated that the deceased was not in a position to speak when the alleged dying declarations are said to have been made. He submitted that the trial court and the High Court, therefore, were not correct in relying on the dying declarations of the deceased recorded by ASI Madan Lal and the Judicial Magistrate R.S Bagri for holding the appellant guilty.

10. Mr Upadhyay next submitted that on a reading of the entire evidence of PW 5 (the father of the deceased), it will be clear that the appellant and the deceased were happy with each other and this will also be evident from the letters exchanged between the family members between March 1989 and January 1991 (Exts. DE-2, DE-6, DE-7, DE-9, DE-12, DE-15, DE-17, DE-18, DE-19, DE-20, DE-21, DE-22 and DE-23). He submitted that this is, therefore, not a case where the appellant had made any demand of dowry on the deceased and had subjected the deceased to any cruelty or harassment in connection with the demand of dowry soon before her death and hence the ingredients of the offence under Section 304-B IPC, are missing in this case and, therefore, the appellant could not have been held guilty under Section 304-B IPC.

11. Mr Upadhyay cited the decisions of this Court in Sanjiv Kumar v. State of Punjab (2009) 16 SCC 487, Durga Prasad v. State of M.P (2010) 9 SCC 73, Gurdeep Singh v. State of Punjab (2011) 12 SCC 408 and Devinder v. State of Haryana (2012) 10 SCC 763 in support of his submission that the offence under Section 304-B IPC, is not made out against the appellant. He submitted that at the worst the appellant can be held guilty under Section 306 IPC, for having abetted suicide by the deceased if the dying declaration is to be accepted. He argued that the appellant has already undergone two years' imprisonment and is now on bail and also has a young daughter to take care of and, therefore, the appellant should not be subjected to further imprisonment for the offence under Section 306 IPC.

12. Mr Vikas Sharma, learned counsel appearing for the State of Haryana, on the other hand, submitted that the two dying declarations (Exts. PG and PN) of the deceased are clear that the appellant used to harass the deceased for dowry and being fed up with the habits of the appellant, the deceased sprinkled kerosene oil on herself and set herself ablaze. He submitted that the evidence of Dr S.S Bansal (PW 7) is clear that one can speak when the larynx and trachea are in the process of being charred. He submitted that even DW 5, the medical expert produced by the accused in his defence, has admitted in cross-examination that in case of charring of vocal chords, the patient may be able to speak and the trial court has relied on this admission made by DW 5. He submitted that Dr R.C Chaudhary has also deposed that the deceased was fit to make the statement. He submitted that both these witnesses were medical experts and were rightly relied on by the trial court and the High Court to reject the contention of the appellant that the deceased was not in a fit condition to give the statements to ASI Madan Lal and the Judicial Magistrate R.S Bagri. Mr Sharma also relied on the evidence of PW 5 that the appellant used to give beatings to the deceased and demand more and more dowry. He submitted that the trial court and the High Court were therefore right in holding the appellant guilty of the offence under Section 304-B IPC.

13. Mr Sharma cited the decision of this Court in Bansi Lal v. State of Haryana (2011) 11 SCC 359 in which it has been held that while considering a case under Section 304-B IPC, cruelty in connection with demand of dowry has to be proved in close proximity to the time of death because of the expression “soon before her death” in Section 304-B IPC, and the Court has to analyse the facts and circumstances of each case leading to the death of the victim and decide if there is such proximate connection between the act of cruelty in connection with demand of dowry and death of the woman. He also cited the decision of this Court in Shanti v. State of Haryana (1991) 1 SCC 371, AIR 1991 SC 1226 for the proposition that once the death of a woman is found to be unnatural, either homicidal or suicidal, Section 304-B IPC has to be attracted.

Findings of the Court

14. The first question that we have to decide is whether the deceased was in a condition to make the dying declarations (Exts. PG and PN) before ASI Madan Lal and the Judicial Magistrate R.S Bagri when her larynx and trachea had been affected by burns:

14.1 PW 2 Dr R.C Chaudhary, has stated in his evidence that on 26-2-1991, on the application of the police (Ext. PD), he gave his opinion in Ext. PD-1 to the effect that the patient was fit to give her statement and this opinion was given at 10.30 p.m

14.2 PW 9 ASI Madan Lal, has deposed in his evidence that the doctor vide his endorsement (Ext. PD-1) declared that Vandana was fit to give her statement and then he recorded the statement of Vandana (Ext. PG) correctly and after Vandana admitted the contents of the statement to be correct, she gave her thumb impression in Ext. PG in token of its correctness. PW 9 has further stated that at that time Vandana was living and taking long sigh and she remained conscious at the time of giving her statement (Ext. PG). PW 9 has also stated that he then went to the Judicial Magistrate R.S Bagri (PW 8) whose residence was near the hospital and R.S Bagri accompanied him to the hospital and recorded the statement of Vandana.

14.3 The Judicial Magistrate R.S Bagri has accordingly deposed that ASI Madan Lal had approached him in person at his residence at 10.40 p.m along with application (Ext. PM) and he came to the hospital and moved an application (Ext. PM-1) to the medical officer concerned and thereafter he recorded her statement and at the time of recording the statement, Dr R.C Chaudhary was not present but he had given a certificate (Ext. PM-2) on the application (Ext. PM-1) that Vandana was in a fit state to make a statement and she continued to be so during the making of the statement.

14.4 It is thus clear from the evidence of the aforesaid three witnesses PW 2, PW 8 and PW 9 that at the time the statements of Vandana were recorded by ASI Madan Lal (PW 9) and the Judicial Magistrate R.S Bagri (PW 8), she was in a fit condition to make the statement.

14.5 When, however, the post-mortem was carried out on 27-2-1991 by Dr S.S Bansal (PW 7) at 4.00 p.m he found that the larynx and trachea of the deceased were charred by heat. On questions being put to him whether a person will be able to speak when her larynx and trachea were charred by heat, PW 7 has clarified that when the larynx and trachea are charred, the person cannot speak, but when the larynx and trachea are in the process of being charred, the person can speak. Dr J.L Bhutani, DW 5, has given his opinion that if the vocal chord of larynx is charred, such person may be able to speak, but not clearly, and it will be difficult to understand. The opinions of the two medical experts, therefore, are not in variance of the ocular evidence of PW 2, PW 8 and PW 9 that Vandana was in a position to speak when her dying declarations were recorded on the night of 26-2-1991. Hence, the two dying declarations (Ext. PG and Ext. PN) can be relied on by the Court.

15. The next question which we have to decide is whether the prosecution has been able to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the appellant has committed the offence of dowry death under Section 304-B IPC.

16. The two dying declarations are similarly worded. We, therefore, extract hereinbelow only the dying declaration which was recorded by the Judicial Magistrate (Ext. PN):

“Statement of Vandana w/o Rajiv Singla, age 23 years, occupation housewife, r/o Dabwali, under Section 164 CrPC
I was married to Dr Rajiv Singla 2 years back. My husband used to get upset on petty issues. My in-laws lived separately. They are living after the 6 months of my marriage (sic). My daughter is of 2 months. Today about 7.30 p.m, in evening I was fed up with activities of my husband and put on kerosene oil and burnt myself. Earlier my husband used to taunt me for dowry. Action should be taken against my husband.
sd/-
R.C Bangri

RO & AC JMIC

Dabwali, 26-2-1991
RTI of Vandana
Identified
sd/-
Madan Lal, ASI
PC, City Dabwali,
Dated: 26-2-1991”

It will be clear from the contents of the dying declaration (Ext. PN) that the deceased was fed up with the activities of her husband and she poured kerosene oil on herself and burnt herself. What those activities of the appellant were which prompted her to commit suicide have not been clearly stated, but she has stated that her husband used to get upset on petty issues and earlier her husband used to taunt her for dowry.

17. When, however, we scrutinise the evidence of PW 5, the father of the deceased, we find that soon before the death of the deceased, the appellant had subjected the deceased to cruelty which was not in any way connected with the demand of dowry. The relevant part of the evidence of PW 5 is quoted hereinbelow:

“Smt Vandana, deceased was my daughter. I had married my daughter Vandana with Rajiv Kumar, the accused now present in the court on 28-1-1989 at Kartarpur. From her wedlock with the accused Rajiv Kumar, a female child was born on 2-7-1990. Vandana, the deceased and Rajiv Kumar, the accused, her husband used to reside/live in Mandi Dabwali. After marriage, whenever Vandana used to come to tell us, she used to tell me that her husband Rajiv Kumar gives her beating and demands more and more dowry. We used to fulfil the demand of Rajiv Kumar, the accused in the shape of dowry put forward before us by my daughter and used to send her back after advising her that she is to live with her husband and should try to adjust with him. On 19-2-1991 Vandana came to me at Kartarpur and told me that two days prior to 19-2-1991, Rajiv Kumar, the accused, her husband gave her merciless beating. She narrated this to me in the presence of my wife, Smt Pushpa Rani and Bhupinder Singh, my brother in fact, he is my friend. On the night of 24-2-1991, I had received anonymous telephone call on Telephone No. 242 that Rajiv Kumar has fled away leaving his minor daughter alone. On hearing this, my daughter Vandana got perturbed and wanted us to leave her at Mandi Dabwali immediately. On 25-2-1991 (25-2-1991) we left Vandana at Mandi Dabwali. I was accompanied by my wife Pushpa Rani and Bhupinder Kumar. On reaching at Dabwali we found Rajiv Kumar present in his clinic and later on he came to the house. We told Rajiv Kumar that he should not repeatedly give beating to Vandana. We told him that it was not proper for him to do so. We also advised our daughter Vandana to adjust with her husband and to remain calm and quiet and not to speak. On 25-2-1991 itself after advising Rajiv Kumar and Vandana we came back to Kartarpur after staying at night at Bhatinda. On 27-2-1991, I received a telephonic message that Vandana after sprinkling kerosene oil on her body has put herself on fire and that she is dead and no longer alive.”

18. From the aforesaid evidence of PW 5, it is clear that the marriage between the appellant and the deceased took place on 28-1-1989 and the demand of dowry by the appellant and the beatings for more dowry was after the marriage. PW 5 has also stated that on 19-2-1991 the deceased came to him at Kartarpur and told him that two days prior to 19-2-1991, the appellant gave her merciless beating. PW 5 has, however, not stated that the beating that the appellant gave to the deceased on 19-2-1991 was in connection with demand of dowry. One of the essential ingredients of the offence of dowry death under Section 304-B IPC is that the accused must have subjected a woman to cruelty in connection with demand of dowry soon before her death and this ingredient has to be proved by the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt and only then the court will presume that the accused has committed the offence of dowry death under Section 113-B of the Evidence Act. As this ingredient of Section 304-B IPC has not been established by the prosecution, the trial court and the High Court were not correct in holding the appellant guilty of the offence of dowry death under Section 304-B IPC.

19. We have perused the decision of this Court in Shanti v. State of Haryana (1991) 1 SCC 371, AIR 1991 SC 1226 cited by Mr Sharma and we find that in the aforesaid case the facts were that Smt Shanti was the mother-in-law of the deceased and Smt Krishna was another inmate in the matrimonial home in which the deceased was living and it was alleged that both Smt Shanti and Smt Krishna were harassing the deceased all the while after the marriage for not bringing a scooter and television as part of the dowry and she was treated cruelly. On 26-4-1988 at about 11.00 p.m, the father of the deceased came to know that the deceased had been murdered and was cremated by the two ladies and he filed a report accordingly before the police.

20. Both the courts below held that the two ladies did not send the deceased to her parents house and drove out the brother and father of the deceased complaining that a scooter and a television has not been given as dowry. The evidence of the father, mother and brother of the deceased was that they were not even informed soon after the death of the deceased and the appellants had hurriedly cremated the dead body. In these circumstances, this Court in Shanti case (1991) 1 SCC 371, AIR 1991 SC 1226 held that the presumption under Section 113-B of the Evidence Act that the two ladies have committed the offence under Section 304-B IPC, was attracted. This was, therefore, a case where the evidence clearly disclosed that the deceased had been subjected to harassment or cruelty committed by the appellants soon before her death.

21. We have also examined the decision of this Court in Bansi Lal v. State of Haryana (2011) 11 SCC 359, cited by Mr Sharma, and we find that the facts in that case were that the appellant Bansi Lal was married to Sarla on 4-4-1988. She was subjected to cruelty, harassment and demand of dowry and on 25-6-1991 she died. After investigation of the case, the prosecution filed a charge-sheet against Bansi Lal and his mother Smt Shanti Devi and charges were framed against them under Sections 498-A, 304-B and 306 IPC, and they were convicted for the said charges by the trial court. The High Court, however, acquitted Smt Shanti Devi, but convicted Bansi Lal because of demand of dowry and cruelty in connection with demand of dowry to which the deceased was subjected to by him. Bansi Lal had made a statement under Section 313 CrPC that Sarla was in love with some other person but she was forced to marry Bansi Lal against her will due to which she felt suffocated and committed suicide, leaving a suicide note to that effect.

22. On these facts, this Court in Bansi Lal case (2011) 11 SCC 359 held that once it is shown that soon before her death the deceased has been subjected to cruelty or harassment for or in connection with the demand for dowry, the Court shall presume that such person has caused the dowry death under Section 113-B of the Evidence Act, and if the case of Bansi Lal was that Sarla has committed suicide, the onus was on him to establish his defence by leading sufficient evidence to rebut the presumption that he has not caused the dowry death, but Bansi Lal has failed to discharge that onus.

23. On the evidence on record, though the appellant is not guilty of the offence under Section 304-B IPC, he is certainly guilty of offences of abetment of suicide and cruelty. Section 113-A of the Evidence Act states as follows:

“113-A. Presumption as to abetment of suicide by a married woman.—When the question is whether the commission of suicide by a woman had been abetted by her husband or any relative of her husband and it is shown that she had committed suicide within a period of seven years from the date of her marriage and that her husband or such relative of her husband had subjected her to cruelty, the court may presume, having regard to all the other circumstances of the case, that such suicide had been abetted by her husband or by such relative of her husband.
Explanation.—For the purposes of this section, ‘cruelty’ shall have the same meaning as in Section 498-A of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860).”

The language of Section 113-A of the Evidence Act makes it clear that if a woman has committed suicide within a period of seven years from the date of her marriage and that her husband had subjected her to cruelty, the court may presume, having regard to all the other circumstances of the case, that such suicide had been abetted by her husband. The Explanation to Section 113-A of the Evidence Act states that for the purpose of Section 113-A “cruelty” shall have the same meaning as in Section 498-A IPC. The Explanation to Section 498-A IPC defines “cruelty” and clause (a) of the Explanation states that cruelty means any wilful conduct which is of such nature as likely to drive a woman to commit suicide. The dying declaration of the deceased (Ext. PN) as well as the evidence of PW 5 extracted above are sufficient to establish that the appellant used to fight on petty issues and give beatings to the deceased, which drove the deceased to commit suicide. This is, therefore, a clear case where the appellant had committed offences under Sections 498-A and 306 IPC.

24. In K. Prema S. Rao v. Yadla Srinivasa Rao (2003) 1 SCC 217 this Court on similar facts has held that:

“16. … To attract the provisions of Section 304-B IPC, one of the main ingredients of the offence which is required to be established is that ‘soon before her death’ she was subjected to cruelty and harassment ‘in connection with the demand for dowry’.”

and this ingredient of the offence was not there in that case. This Court, however, held that it was not necessary to remit the matter to the trial court for framing a charge under Section 306 IPC, and the accused also cannot complain for want of opportunity to defend the charge under Section 306 IPC, if the facts found in evidence justify the conviction of the appellant under Sections 498-A and 306 IPC instead of the graver offence under Section 304-B IPC. In that case, the three-Judge Bench of this Court held the appellant guilty of the offences under Sections 498-A and 306 IPC instead of the graver offence under Section 304-B IPC.

25. In this case also, we hold the appellant guilty of offences under Sections 498-A and 306 IPC. Considering the particular conduct of the appellant which drove the deceased to commit suicide, we impose a sentence of one year imprisonment and a fine of Rs 1000 for the offence under Section 498-A IPC and impose a sentence of three years' imprisonment and a fine of Rs 2000 for the offence under Section 306 IPC, and direct that in case of failure to pay the fine for either of the two offences, the appellant shall undergo a further imprisonment for a period of six months. We make it clear that the sentences of imprisonment for the two offences will run concurrently. If the appellant has already undergone the punishment imposed by this judgment, his bail bonds shall stand discharged.

26. The appeal is allowed to that extent.