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Mahanagar Telephone Nigam Limited v. State Of Maharashtra And Others
MTNL v. State of Maharashtra & Others – Supreme Court of India
Factual and Procedural Background
The Government of Maharashtra initiated land‐acquisition proceedings in 1973–1975 for four plots (including Final Plot No. 1088, Town Planning Scheme IV, Mahim) for use by the Posts and Telegraph Department. An award was passed on 31-3-1982 fixing compensation for Plots 1087 and 1088, and the amount was deposited on 9-8-1982. Possession, however, could not be delivered because the land was occupied by a large number of slum dwellers. Over the next two decades:
- 1983–1992: sporadic correspondence took place between Bombay Telephones/Posts and Telegraph officials and the State authorities seeking vacant possession or rehabilitation of hutment dwellers.
- 23-6-1998: MTNL sought possession within three months or refund of the compensation with interest.
- 2003–2009: A Slum Rehabilitation Scheme (SRS) was sanctioned. The Prabhadevi Cooperative Housing Society and developer Shree Ahuja Properties signed a development agreement covering Plots 1087 and 1088. Buildings for 495 slum dwellers were completed, and occupation certificates were issued in December 2009. By order dated 8-8-2008 the Slum Rehabilitation Authority (SRA) earmarked 1,706 sq m of built-up area to be handed over to MTNL free of cost.
- 2010: MTNL filed Writ Petition (OS) No. 1517 of 2010 before the Bombay High Court seeking delivery of vacant possession of the entire 5,723.10 sq m and an injunction restraining further development. By order dated 30-7-2010 (corrected on 13-8-2010) the High Court directed Respondent 5 (developer) to hand over 1,706 sq m built-up area to MTNL and disposed of the writ petition.
- October 2010 – October 2011: MTNL’s advocate and officers exchanged letters with the developer regarding execution of an MoU and building plans for the 1,706 sq m area.
- 2012: After a delay of 401 days, MTNL filed a Special Leave Petition (SLP) challenging the High Court’s order and sought condonation of delay.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the Supreme Court should condone a 401-day delay in filing the SLP when MTNL claimed its senior management was unaware of the High Court’s order.
- Whether the High Court erred in limiting relief to directing hand-over of 1,706 sq m built-up area instead of ordering delivery of vacant possession of the whole acquired plot.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant (MTNL)
- Claimed senior management was unaware of the High Court order until November 2011; delay should be condoned in public interest.
- Contended that larger public interest required recovery of the entire acquired land or compensation equivalent thereto.
- Relied on State of Karnataka v. Y. Moideen Kunhi (2009) 13 SCC 192 to urge liberal condonation where public interest is involved.
Respondents (State of Maharashtra, Slum Authorities & Developer)
- Opposed condonation, arguing MTNL suppressed material facts and approached the Court with “unclean hands.”
- Pointed to letters exchanged between MTNL’s counsel/officers and the developer, demonstrating MTNL’s knowledge of the High Court order soon after its pronouncement.
- Asserted that laches of nearly three decades and completed rehabilitation works made MTNL’s broader relief untenable.
- Cited precedents emphasising candour and timely action, including Dalip Singh v. State of U.P. and Oswal Fats & Oils Ltd. v. Commr. (Admn.).
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Dalip Singh v. State of U.P. (2010) 2 SCC 114 | Litigants must approach the Court with clean hands; suppression of facts disentitles relief. | Used to hold MTNL guilty of suppression and to justify refusal to condone delay. |
| Oswal Fats & Oils Ltd. v. Commissioner (Admn.) (2010) 4 SCC 728 | Duty of full disclosure; concealment warrants denial of equitable relief. | Reinforced finding that MTNL’s concealment of correspondence warranted dismissal. |
| Postmaster General v. Living Media India Ltd. (2012) 3 SCC 563 | Stringent scrutiny of delay-condonation requests; government agencies not entitled to special indulgence. | Supported rejection of MTNL’s plea that institutional delay should be condoned automatically. |
| Hari Narain v. Badri Das AIR 1963 SC 1558 | Inaccurate statements in an SLP can lead to revocation of leave; obligation of candour. | Cited to emphasise seriousness of inaccurate or misleading pleadings. |
| Udai Chand v. Shankar Lal (1978) 2 SCC 209 | Consequence of suppressing material facts in writ proceedings. | Relied upon to underline that non-disclosure is fatal to discretionary relief. |
| State of M.P. v. Bhailal Bhai AIR 1964 SC 1006 | Doctrine of laches; delay can bar relief even absent statutory limitation. | Applied to show MTNL’s 30-year inaction barred mandamus for possession. |
| State of Karnataka v. Y. Moideen Kunhi (2009) 13 SCC 192 | Liberal approach to delay where larger public interest is evident. | Distinguished; Court said doctrine could not aid a party guilty of suppression. |
Court’s Reasoning and Analysis
The Court first addressed condonation of delay. It examined MTNL’s affidavit attributing ignorance of the High Court order to a retired officer and concluded the explanation was “patently incorrect.” Correspondence dated October 2010 to October 2011 showed MTNL’s advocate and Class-I officers negotiating hand-over of the 1,706 sq m area, proving knowledge of the order soon after it was passed. Failure to disclose these communications amounted to deliberate suppression.
Invoking Dalip Singh, Oswal Fats and other precedents, the Court held that a litigant who approaches with “unclean hands” is not entitled to discretionary relief. Consequently, the prayer for condonation of 401 days’ delay was rejected.
Even on merits, the Court found:
- MTNL waited nearly three decades after the award and allowed redevelopment to be completed; its writ petition would have been barred by laches under Bhailal Bhai.
- The High Court’s order appeared to have been consented to by counsel, as evidenced by MTNL’s subsequent conduct seeking execution of an MoU for the 1,706 sq m built-up area.
- If MTNL believed the High Court had overlooked its wider prayer, the proper course was to seek review, not to approach the Supreme Court belatedly.
Accordingly, the Court dismissed the appeal both on limitation and on the underlying claims.
Holding and Implications
Appeal dismissed as barred by time and on merits; application for condonation of delay rejected.
Immediate Effect: The High Court’s direction requiring the developer to provide 1,706 sq m built-up area to MTNL stands; MTNL obtains no further relief.
Broader Implications: The judgment reiterates that parties—government bodies included—must act with candour and diligence. Suppression of material facts and prolonged inaction will bar equitable relief, reinforcing existing jurisprudence rather than creating new precedent.
G.S Singhvi, J.— Leave granted. Feeling dissatisfied with the order dated 30-7-2010 read with the order dated 13-8-2010 passed by the Division Bench of the Bombay High Court in MTNL v. State of Maharashtra WP (OS) No. 1517 of 2010, WP (OS) No. 1517 of 2010 for issue of a mandamus to Respondents 2 to 4 to hand over vacant possession of final plot bearing No. 1088, Town Planning Scheme IV (City) (Mahim) situated at Kashinath Dhuruwadi, Standard Mill Lane, Rajabhau Desai Marg, New Prabhadevi, Mumbai and for restraining Respondent 5 from carrying out further development on that plot or creating third-party rights, the appellant has sought intervention of this Court.
2. By Notification dated 24-9-1973 issued under Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (for short “the Act”) the Government of Maharashtra proposed the acquisition of four plots of the Town Planning Scheme as described hereinabove for Posts and Telegraph Offices. After considering the report submitted by the Collector under Section 5-A(2), the State Government issued a Declaration dated 7-11-1975 under Section 6(1) of the Act. The Special Land Acquisition Officer (Respondent 2) passed an award dated 31-3-1982 and fixed market value of Plots Nos. 1087 and 1088 as Rs 14,14,282 and Rs 13,29,897, respectively. The Assistant Engineer (Phones) (LA, Mumbai Telephones) deposited the amount of compensation on 9-8-1982.
3. Since some portions of the acquired land were occupied by slum dwellers, Respondent 2 sent letters dated 10-2-1983 and 22-3-1983 to the officers of Bombay Telephones to rehabilitate the hutment dwellers or pay rehabilitation compensation and deposit the establishment and service charges. Between 9-6-1983 and 3-8-1992 the officers of Bombay Telephones and Posts and Telegraph Department exchanged correspondence inter se and sent communications to the Bombay Housing and Area Development Board, Department of Housing and Special Assistance, Government of Maharashtra and other functionaries of the State Government for delivery of possession of the two plots but did not get desired response apparently because more and more persons had encroached and occupied the acquired land. After about 6 years, the Deputy General Manager (Planning), Mahanagar Telephone Nigam Ltd., sent a letter dated 23-6-1998 to Respondent 2 to either hand over vacant possession of the two plots or refund the amount of compensation with interest. That letter reads as under:
“Mahanagar Telephone Nigam Ltd., Mumbai
O/o Deputy General Manager (Planning),
3rd Floor, Telephone House,
V.S Marg, Dadar (West),
Mumbai 400 028,
No. PELA-1-166/98-99 Dated: 23-6-1998
To,
Special Land Acquisition Officer,
Old Custom House, 1st Floor,
Fort, Mumbai.
Subject: Acquisition of Plots Nos. 1087 and 1088 in TPS-IV of Mahim, Prabhadevi.
Sir,
Award for the above Plots Nos. 1087 and 1088 was declared on 1-6-1979 and 31-3-1982 respectively. Accordingly, this Department paid compensation amount of Rs 14,14,282 on 26-7-1979 and Rs 13,29,897 on 30-3-1982 totalling to Rs 27.65 lakhs including establishment charges. In spite of voluminous correspondences and frequent visuals and meetings with you to get the vacant possession of the plots, the plot is not yet made over to MTNL. At present the plot is fully encroached and you are not in a position to give vacant possession of the said plots.
It is once again requested to hand over the vacant possession within three months, failing which you are requested to refund the compensation paid by us with interest.
sd/-
Deputy General Manager (Plg.)
MTNL, Mumbai”
(emphasis supplied)
4. For the next about 8 years the officers of Bombay Telephones, Posts and Telegraph Department and the appellant are not shown to have sent any communication to the functionaries of the State Government including Respondent 2 in the matter of delivery of possession of the acquired land. They woke up from slumber in 2006. Between 1-1-2006 and 4-8-2006, about 20 communications were sent to Respondent 2 and others to deliver possession of Plot No. 1088. In those communications, no mention was made about Plot No. 1087 because compensation deposited in respect of that plot had been withdrawn.
5. In the meanwhile, Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai sanctioned redevelopment of Plot No. 1088 for rehabilitation of slum dwellers numbering 495, who formed Prabhadevi Cooperative Housing Society (proposed). The Society signed development agreement dated 16-11-2003 with M/s Shree Ahuja Properties (Respondent 5) for development of Plots Nos. 1087 and 1088. More than 70% of the eligible slum dwellers (352) gave consent affidavits for redevelopment under the Slum Rehabilitation Scheme, which was approved by the Additional Municipal Commissioner and competent authority vide order dated 17-9-2004 passed under Section 4(1) of the Maharashtra Slum Areas (Improvement, Clearance and Redevelopment) Act, 1971 (for short “the 1971 Act”). After two months, Executive Engineer III, SRA issued an order dated 6-11-2004 for execution of the scheme by Respondent 5. On 8-4-2005 SRA granted commencement certificate to Respondent 5. After about three years, SRA passed an order dated 8-8-2008 and directed Respondent 5 to allot built-up area measuring 1706 sq m to the appellant free of cost.
6. Respondent 5 completed Rehabilitation Buildings 1 and 2 on Plot No. 1088 sometime in 2009. The Executive Engineer, SRA issued occupation certificates dated 1-12-2009 and 4-12-2009 and approximately 600 units were handed over to the slum dwellers for permanent residence. The status of the buildings is revealed from 21 photographs produced by Respondent 5, which have been marked as Annexure R-1.
7. After 37 years of initiation of the acquisition proceedings and 28 years of the pronouncement of award by Respondent 2, the appellant filed a writ petition with the prayers about which reference has been made hereinabove. The Division Bench of the High Court disposed of the writ petition vide order dated 30-7-2010 WP (OS) No. 1517 of 2010. Due to some mistake, that order was recalled on 13-8-2010 WP (OS) No. 1517 of 2010 and was substituted with the impugned order, the relevant portions of which are extracted below:
“1. In this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, Mahanagar Telephone Nigam Ltd. has prayed for a writ of mandamus to direct Respondents 2 to 4 to hand over vacant possession of the land admeasuring 5723.10 sq m situated at Mahim bearing FP No. 1088, TPS-IV.
2. The learned counsel for Respondent 5, in whose favour the Slum Development Authority has sanctioned the slum rehabilitation scheme in question, states that as per the order dated 8-8-2008 of the Slum Rehabilitation Authority, the built-up area admeasuring 1706 sq m is allotted under Item 10 to MTNL. The said built-up area will be handed over to the appropriate authority free of cost. It is stated that since the Posts and Telegraph Department of the Union of India is not a party to this proceeding, Respondent 1 may not be held liable if Mahanagar Telephone Nigam Ltd. is given the above built-up area free of cost.
3. Since the Slum Development Authority itself has indicated in the scheme itself, that the built-up area admeasuring 1706 sq m is to be handed over to MTNL, no prejudice would be caused if Respondent 5 is directed to hand over the built-up area of 1706 sq m to MTNL free of cost. We accordingly direct Respondent 5 to hand over the above built-up area to MTNL. A copy of this order be served upon the Post Master General at Mumbai. In case, the Post Master General of Mumbai has any claim over the built-up area in question, it will be open to the said authority to take up the matter with MTNL and with the Union of India in the Ministry concerned. Since MTNL has been allotted only built-up area admeasuring 1706 sq m, we are not called upon to examine the claim of 5723.10 sq m made by the petitioner MTNL in this petition. Any further claim of the petitioner MTNL with regard to additional built-up area, the petitioner MTNL will be entitled to get the same adjudicated by the appropriate authority. The writ petition stands disposed of.”
8. Soon after disposal of the writ petition Ms S.I Shah, who had appeared on behalf of the appellant before the High Court, on instructions from her client, sent a letter dated 12-10-2010 to Wadia Ghandy and Co., Advocate for Respondent 5, to execute separate MoU for 1706 sq m built-up area. That letter reads as under:
“S.I Shah & Co.
Advocates & Notary
Office: Residence: S.I SHAH Navjivan Cooperative Advocate & Notary Housing Society Ltd., ‘Veet-Rag Chambers’ Bldg. No. 9, Flat No. 51, (Old Cama House) Lamington Road, 38, Cawasji Patel Street, Mumbai 400 008 Fort, Mumbai 400 001 Tel.: 23010306, 23010700 Tel.: 22022928, 22852759 12-10-2010
To
Wadia Ghandy & Co.,
Advocates & Solicitors,
N.M Wadia Buildings,
123 Mahatma Gandhi Road,
Mumbai 400 001
Subject: Bombay High Court, OOCJ Writ Petition No. 1517 of 2010.
Mahanagar Telephone Nigam Ltd. … Petitioner
v.
State of Maharashtra & Others … Respondents
Dear Sir,
We are concerned for MTNL in the above matter. You have represented Respondent 5 i.e M/s Shree Ahuja Properties in the above matter. The above petition is disposed of vide an order dated 30-7-2010 WP (OS) No. 1517 of 2010 and subsequent order dated 13-8-2010 WP (OS) No. 1517 of 2010 by Their Lordships Mr Chief Justice and Mr Justice S.C Dharmadhikari.
Your clients are aware that as per an order dated 8-8-2008 of the Slum Rehabilitation Authority, MTNL is entitled to 1706 sq m built-up area free of cost. We are instructed by our clients to inform your clients that the separate building of the said 1706 sq m built-up area be constructed by your clients with separate gate/entrance as per the specification to be given by our clients. It is therefore necessary to execute separate MoU for the said purpose. Your clients be informed accordingly and let our clients know the specific time-limit during which the said construction work will be completed and handed over to our client.
Kindly do the needful for execution of MoU in the matter and hand over the draft agreement to be executed between MTNL and your client.
Thanking you,
Yours faithfully,
sd/-
S.I Shah & Co.
CC to MTNL”
(emphasis supplied)
9. Between 29-12-2010 and 31-10-2011 the officers of the appellant and Respondent 5 exchanged several communications on the issue of construction of separate building on 1706 sq m area, which was to be handed over to the appellant free of cost in terms of the order passed by SRA and the direction given by the High Court. Those communications are also reproduced below:
“Mahanagar Telephone Nigam Limited, Mumbai
From: 0/0 DGM, Plg.
3rd Floor, Telephone House,
Veer Savarkar Marg,
Prabhadevi, Dadar (W),
Mumbai 400 028
No. PELA-1-691/F.P 1088/2010-11 Dated: 29-12-2010
To,
M/s Shree Ahuja Properties,
A-1, Rajpipla,
Opp. Standard Chartered Bank,
Linking Road,
Santacruz (W), Mumbai 400 054
Sub: Bombay High Court OOCJ WP No. 1517 of 2010.
Mahanagar Telephone Nigam Ltd. … Petitioner
v.
State of Maharashtra & Others … Respondents
Dear Sir,
With reference to the above subject, as per Order No. SRA/Eng/940.GS/ML&STG/LOI dated 8-8-2008 of SRA, MTNL is entitled to 1706 sq m built-up area free of cost. Nothing is heard from you after the Hon'ble High Court's judgment dated 13-8-2010 WP (OS) No. 1517 of 2010.
It is to inform you that a separate building is to be constructed with separate gate/entrance as per the specifications to be given by MTNL. It is therefore necessary to execute a separate MoU for the said purpose.
You are hereby requested to intimate the time-limit during which the said construction work will be completed and handed over to MTNL.
Thanking you,
Assistant General Manager (Plg.)
MTNL, Mumbai 28.
(24228977)
Enclosed: The order copy dated 13-8-2010.”
_______________________________________________________
“Mahanagar Telephone Nigam Limited, Mumbai
From: O/O. D.G.M (Plg.)
3rd Floor, Telephone House,
Veer Savarkar Marg,
Prabhadevi, Dadar (W),
Mumbai 400 028
No. PELA-1-691/F.P.1088/2010-11 Dated: 2-2-2011
To,
M/s Shree Ahuja Constructions,
3rd Floor, V.N Sphere,
199, Linking Road,
Opp. Shoppers Stop,
Bandra (W), Mumbai 400 050
Sub: High Court Mumbai OOCJ WP No. 1517 of 2010
Mahanagar Telephone Nigam Ltd. … Petitioner
v.
State of Maharashtra & Others … Respondents
Dear Sir,
With reference to the above subject, as per Order No. SRA/Eng/940.GS/ML&STG/LOI dated 8-8-2008 of SRA, MTNL is entitled to 1706 sq m built-up area free of cost. Nothing is heard from you after the Hon'ble High Court's judgment dated 13-8-2010 WP (OS) No. 1517 of 2010. It is to inform you that a separate building is to be constructed with separate gate/entrance as per the specifications to be given by MTNL. It is therefore necessary to execute a separate MoU for the said purpose.
You are hereby requested to intimate the time-limit during which the said construction work will be completed and handed over to MTNL.
MTNL, Mumbai Deputy General Manager (Planning) desires to have a meeting with you regarding the above issue. Please fix a convenient day and time for the meeting at the earliest.
Thanking you,
sd/-
Assistant General Manager (Plg.)
MTNL, Mumbai 28
(24228977)”
_______________________________________________________
“Shree Ahuja Properties and Realtors (P) Ltd.
Flat No. 301/302/303/304, 3rd Floor, 190 Linking Road, V.N
Sphere Building, Bandra (West), Mumbai 400 050, Tel. 66285000
(10 Lines) Fax: 66285050
Dated : 12-7-2011
To,
The Divisional Manager, MTNL,
MTNL Building
Prabhadevi, Mumbai 400 025
Subject: Submission of MTNL building plan.
Ref: CTS Nos. 1087 and 1088, Mahim Division, Rejabhau Desai Marg, Prabhadevi, Mumbai 400 025.
Dear Sir,
We are submitting the MTNL building plan for your record and future advice. Please acknowledge the same.
Thanking You,
Yours Faithfully,
For Shree Ahuja Properties and Realtors (P) Ltd.
Authorised signatory
Enclosed: MTNL building plan.”
_______________________________________________________
“Shree Ahuja Properties and Realtors (P) Ltd.
Corporate Office: V.N Sphere, Level Three, 199 Linking Road,
Opp. Shoppers Stop, Bandra (W), Mumbai 400 050 Tel.: +91 22 66285000 Fax: +91 22 66285050
Dated: 14-9-2011
To,
The Divisional Manager, MTNL,
MTNL Building,
Prabhadevi, Mumbai 400 025
Subject: Submission of MTNL Building Plan.
Ref: CTS Nos. 1087 and 1088, Mahim Division, Rejabhau Desai Marg, Prabhadevi, Mumbai 400 025.
Dear Sir,
With reference to the captioned subject and our letter dated 12-7-2011, in compliance with Condition 23 of Letter of Intent No. ‘SRA/Eng/940.GS/ML & STOL/LOI’ dated 8-8-2008; please find enclosed the detailed building plan showing your building on the same. As per your Letter No. PELA/1/691/F.P No. 1088/2020-11, dated 2-2-2011 where you asked us for separate building compound and access all these requirements are satisfied in our plan.
Please arrange to send the details of specification and necessary approvals to enable us to take approvals from the Slum Rehabilitation Authority at the earliest.
Thanking you,
Yours faithfully,
For Shree Ahuja Properties and Realtors (P) Ltd.
Authorised signatory
Enclosed: MTNL building plan.”
_______________________________________________________
“Mahanagar Telephone Nigam Limited, Mumbai
(A Government of India Enterprise)
O/o. The Deputy General Manager (Plg.), 3rd Floor, Telephone House,
V.S Marg, Dadar (W), Mumbai 28.
Tel. No. 2436 2333.Fax 2437 5252
No. PELA-1-691/Standard Mills Compound/2011-12
Dated: 31-10-2011
To,
M/s Shree Ahuja Properties and Realtors (P) Ltd.
V.N Sphere, Level Three,
199, Linking Road, Opp. Shoppers Stop,
Bandra (W), Mumbai 400 050
Sub: Proposed building for MTNL, plan and layout.
Ref: Compliance of Condition No. 23 of LoI.
Sir,
With reference to your letter dated 14-9-2011, it is brought to your kind notice that in compliance with Condition 23 of Letter of Intent No. SRA/ENG/1940.GS/ML&STOL/LOI dated 8-8-2008, it was required that the planning and specification for the said buildable reservation shall be obtained from us.
However, the building plan and layout proposed by you indicates that the proposed building for MTNL is sandwiched between SRA and saleable building. The building is not suitable with regard to its size mentioned, apart from the other difficulties such as separate building compound, a good and proper access for the members of public to proposed MTNL building. Thus the proposed dimensions in the layout building are not acceptable to us.
In view of the above, kindly re-examine the case and submit your proper proposal to have easy access, prominence and a good and usable layout for the proposed MTNL building.
Senior Manager (LA)
MTNL, Mumbai”
10. After having virtually agreed to take 1706 sq m built-up area free of cost, the appellant filed special leave petition questioning the order of the High Court. It also filed an application for condonation of 401 days' delay.
11. We have heard Shri Harin P. Raval, learned Senior Counsel for the appellant; S/Shri Mukul Rohatgi, P.P Rao, Gopal Subramanium, Dr A.M Singhvi and Shri Shekhar Naphade, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the State of Maharashtra and others and carefully scrutinised the records including the files made available by the counsel assisting Shri Raval.
12. Shri Rohatgi argued that the appellant's prayer for condonation of delay should not be entertained because it has not approached the Court with clean hands and the explanation given for condonation of more than one year's delay is wholly unsatisfactory. He pointed out that Shri Dnyaneshwar Konde, who has filed affidavit in support of the special leave petition, has verified the contents of the special leave petition, synopsis and list of dates and interlocutory applications on the basis of knowledge derived from the records and an attempt has been made to show that senior management was not aware of the High Court's order till November 2011 but the appellant has deliberately omitted to make a mention of the letter sent by its own advocate to the advocate of Respondent 5 and the correspondence exchanged between the officers of the appellant and Respondent 5 on the issue of providing 1706 sq m built-up area free of cost.
13. Shri Rohatgi submitted that even though the officers of the rank of Assistant General Manager (Planning), Divisional Manager and Senior Manager (LA) were very much aware that Writ Petition No. 1517 of 2010 had been disposed of by the High Court vide order dated 30-7-2010 WP (OS) No. 1517 of 2010, which was corrected on 13-8-2010 WP (OS) No. 1517 of 2010 and direction was given to Respondent 5 to deliver 1706 sq m of built-up area free of cost, but a misleading and false statement has been made in Paras 2 and 3 of the application for condonation of delay that Shri V.T Dhere, Senior Manager (LA) did not bring the High Court's order to the notice of the senior management till his retirement on 31-5-2011 and the order came into the knowledge of the senior management during the pendency of SLP (C) No. 22747 of 2010 filed by three occupants of Tenements Nos. 591, 592 and 593 in respect of the adjoining plot. The learned Senior Counsel emphasised that the theory of the Additional Solicitor General becoming aware of order dated 13-8-2010 WP (OS) No. 1517 of 2010 from the file summoned on 7-11-2011 is clearly an afterthought and a patently incorrect statement has been made to persuade this Court to entertain the special leave petition by condoning the unexplained delay of more than one year.
14. Shri Rohatgi also invited the Court's attention to Para 5(vii) of the rejoinder filed by the appellant to the counter-affidavit of Respondent 5 to show that as early as in February 2011 officers of the appellant became aware about the order passed by the High Court. Shri Rohatgi submitted that the conduct of the appellant in seeking the intervention of the Court with unclean hands is sufficient for non-suiting it. In support of his submissions, Shri Rohatgi relied upon the judgments of this Court in Dalip Singh v. State of U.P (2010) 2 SCC 114, Oswal Fats and Oils Ltd. v. Commr. (Admn.) (2010) 4 SCC 728 and Postmaster General v. Living Media India Ltd. (2012) 3 SCC 563 and order dated 16-2-2012 passed in Kushal K. Rana v. State of U.P IAs Nos. 3-5 in SLP (C) No. 4810 of 2012
15. Shri P.P Rao, Shri Gopal Subramanium and Dr A.M Singhvi, learned Senior Counsel appearing for other respondents supported Shri Rohatgi and argued that the appellant is not entitled to be heard on the merits of the case because it deliberately withheld several facts from this Court. Shri P.P Rao relied upon the judgment in Hari Narain v. Badri Das AIR 1963 SC 1558, (1964) 2 SCR 203, AIR pp. 1559-60 : SCR at pp. 207-209. Dr Singhvi relied upon the judgment in Udai Chand v. Shankar Lal (1978) 2 SCC 209.
16. Shri Harin P. Raval, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the appellant invited our attention to an affidavit dated 17-2-2012 filed by the Executive Director of the appellant and some portions of the rejoinder filed to the counter-affidavits of Respondents 5 and 6 and argued that the appellant cannot be accused of concealment of material facts because none of the senior officers was aware about the disposal of the writ petition by the High Court till November 2011. Shri Raval emphasised that the correspondence exchanged between the counsel for the appellant and the counsel for Respondent 5 or between Respondent 5 and the officers of the rank of Assistant General Manager, Divisional Manager and Senior Manager (LA) cannot lead to an inference that senior management of the appellant was having knowledge about the High Court order. Shri Raval relied upon the judgment in State of Karnataka v. Y. Moideen Kunhi (2009) 13 SCC 192 and argued that in matters like the present one in which larger public interest is involved, this Court should overlook small aberrations in the pleadings or delay in filing the special leave petition.
17. We have considered the respective submissions. In Paras 2 and 3 of the application for condonation of delay, the appellant has tried to explain the delay by making following averments:
“2. That it is submitted that the writ petition was being pursued by the Land Acquisition Department of MTNL, Mumbai and was entrusted to Shri V.T Dhere, Senior Manager (Land Acquisition), ST No. 71898. The said officer attended the court hearings regularly during pendency of the petition before the Hon'ble High Court. However, the passing of the order dated 13-8-2010 WP (OS) No. 1517 of 2010 by the Hon'ble High Court was not brought to the knowledge of the senior management of the petitioner by Mr V.T Dhere, Senior Manager. In the meanwhile, Shri V.T Dhere retired from the services of the petitioner w.e.f 31-5-2011.
3. That the order dated 13-8-2010 WP (OS) No. 1517 of 2010 came to the knowledge of the senior management of the petitioner during the pendency of SLP (C) No. 22747 of 2010 filed by three occupants of Tenements Nos. 591, 593 and 592 in respect of adjoining Plot No. FP No. 1087, TPS-IV, Mahim, Mumbai, before this Hon'ble Court. While defending the said SLP, the learned ASG, called for the file from the Legal Cell pertaining to the impugned order in the present case relating to Plot No. 1088 on 7-11-2011. On perusing the file the learned ASG became aware of the order dated 13-8-2010 passed in respect of Plot No. 1088 in MTNL v. State of Maharashtra WP (OS) No. 1517 of 2010 and sought the comments from the Ministry regarding order dated 13-8-2010 WP (OS) No. 1517 of 2010. On this the petitioner came to know about the order dated 13-8-2010 WP (OS) No. 1517 of 2010 and it was advised to the petitioner to take appropriate steps for challenging the order dated 13-8-2010 in MTNL v. State of Maharashtra WP (OS) No. 1517 of 2010. It is also relevant to note that the Ministry of Environment and Forest and the Ministry of Communication and Information Technology had vehemently defended SLP (C) No. 22747 of 2010 before this Hon'ble Court and had vehemently opposed the action of the State Government of Maharashtra in taking away the land bearing Plots Nos. 1087 and 1088 under the ‘Slum Rehabilitation Scheme’, which belongs to the petitioner and was acquired for public purposes of the petitioner. However, the said SLP was dismissed SLP (C) No. 22747 of 2010 as withdrawn in view of settlement of disputes between the petitioners in that SLP and the developer concerned. However, while allowing the petitioners in the said SLP the Hon'ble Court had observed that the rights of the Ministry of Communication and Information Technology and the Ministry of Environment and Forest would not be effected and they were granted liberty to take appropriate steps. It is submitted that the present case is being filed on the ground that public interest and exchequer has been defrauded to benefit private individuals.”
18. At the cost of repetition, we deem it proper to observe that the averments contained in the application for condonation of delay have been verified by Shri Dnyaneshwar Konde, who filed an affidavit in support of the special leave petition, on the basis of knowledge derived by him from the record. He is an officer of the rank of Divisional Engineer. Therefore, it is reasonable to presume that before filing the affidavit he must have gone through the entire record including the letter dated 12-10-2010 sent by Ms S.I Shah, Advocate for the appellant to Wadia Ghandy and Co., who represented Respondent 5 before the High Court and the correspondence exchanged between the officers of the appellant and the respondent. A reading of that letter shows that Ms S.I Shah had written to the advocate for Respondent 5 on the basis of the instructions given by the officers concerned that separate MoU is required to be executed in respect of 1709 sq m constructed area, which was handed over to the appellant. This inference is strengthened by the letters of the Assistant General Manager (Planning), Divisional Manager and Senior Manager (LA), which were sent to Respondent 5.
19. However, with a view to keep this Court in dark about the correspondence exchanged on the issue of allotment of 1706 sq m of built-up area by Respondent 5 to the appellant free of cost, the officer concerned made a patently incorrect statement that order dated 13-8-2010 WP (OS) No. 1517 of 2010 was not brought to the knowledge of the senior management of the appellant by Mr V.T Dhere. In our view, Ms S.I Shah could not have written the letter to the advocate of Respondent 5, on her own, on the issue of signing of MoU for transfer of 1706 sq m of built-up area by Respondent 5. Any person of ordinary prudence is entitled to assume that she must have done so under the instructions of the officers concerned. The three officers who exchanged letters with Respondent 5 were Class I officers of the appellant. They must have written to Respondent 5 on the basis of instructions given by the higher officers. Therefore, the mere fact that the file notings do not contain a corresponding entry cannot lead to an inference that the senior management of the appellant was not aware of the High Court's order. If Ms S.I Shah and three officers of the appellant had exceeded their brief and unauthorisedly exchanged communications with Respondent 5 and its advocate, then the senior officers of the appellant would have certainly taken action against them. However, it is neither the pleaded case of the appellant nor has it been suggested that Ms S.I Shah and three officers had acted unauthorisedly. The averments contained in Para 5(vii) of the rejoinder filed by the appellant to the counter of Respondent 5 clearly show that as early as in February 2011, the officers of the appellant knew that the High Court had disposed of the writ petition by directing Respondent 5 to hand over 1706 sq m built-up area to the appellant free of cost. Therefore, the assertion contained in the application for condonation of delay that the senior management did not know of the direction given by the High Court till November 2011 cannot but be treated as a deliberate attempt to mislead the Court and on that ground alone the prayer for condonation of delay is liable to be rejected.
20. In Hari Narain v. Badri Das AIR 1963 SC 1558, (1964) 2 SCR 203 this Court considered the prayer made by the respondent for revocation of leave granted to the appellant who was a tenant in the suit premises. The respondent had sued the appellant for eviction on the ground of default in payment of rent and house tax. The trial court dismissed the suit. The appellate court set aside the judgment of the trial court and decreed the suit. The second appeal filed by the appellant was dismissed by the High Court. In the petition for special leave, the appellant made inaccurate statement about his status as a statutory tenant and on the issue of payment of rent. Shri M.C Setalvad, appearing on behalf of the appellant submitted that he had not urged the particular grounds at the time of grant of leave. While agreeing with Shri Setalvad, this Court refused to accept the explanation given by the appellant for the inaccurate statement made in the special leave petition and revoked the leave. This is evinced from the following observations made in the judgment: (AIR p. 1560, para 9)
“9. … It is true that in the present case, special leave was granted on 26-9-1962 and it is possible for Mr Setalvad to recall what he argued before the Court when special leave was granted. But it is necessary to bear in mind that the appeal may come on for hearing long after special leave is granted, that the counsel appearing at the stage of admission may not be the same as at the stage of final hearing, and the Bench that granted special leave may not necessarily deal with the appeal at the final stage. Therefore, it is no answer to the respondent's contention that though the material statements in the special leave petition may be substantially inaccurate, though not wholly untrue, those statements may not have influenced the Court in granting special leave. Mr Setalvad has also invited our attention to the fact that the impugned statements and grounds are substantially copied from the averments made in the appeal before the High Court. That may be so, but the fact still remains that two important statements which, if true, may have been of considerable assistance to the appellant in invoking the protection of Section 13(1)(a) even on the construction placed by the High Court on that section are found to be untrue, and that, in our opinion, is a very serious infirmity in the petition itself. It is of utmost importance that in making material statements and setting forth grounds in applications for special leave care must be taken not to make any statements which are inaccurate, untrue or misleading. In dealing with applications for special leave, the Court naturally takes statements of fact and grounds of fact contained in the petitions at their face value and it would be unfair to betray the confidence of the Court by making statements which are untrue and misleading.”
(emphasis supplied)
21. In Dalip Singh v. State of U.P (2010) 2 SCC 114 this Court considered the question whether relief should be denied to the appellant who did not state correct facts in the application filed before the prescribed authority and who did not approach the High Court with clean hands. After making a reference to some of the precedents, the Court observed:
“9. … while exercising discretionary and equitable jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution, the facts and circumstances of the case should be seen in their entirety to find out if there is miscarriage of justice. If the appellant has not come forward with clean hands, has not candidly disclosed all the facts that he is aware of and he intends to delay the proceedings, then the Court will non-suit him on the ground of contumacious conduct.”
22. In Oswal Fats and Oils Ltd. v. Commr. (Admn.) (2010) 4 SCC 728 relief was denied to the appellant by making the following observations:
“19. It is quite intriguing and surprising that the lease agreement was not brought to the notice of the Additional Commissioner and the learned Single Judge of the High Court and neither of them was apprised of the fact that the appellant had taken 27.95 acres land on lease from the Government by unequivocally conceding that it had purchased excess land in violation of Section 154(1) of the Act and the same vested in the State Government. In the list of dates and the memo of special leave petition filed in this Court also there is no mention of lease agreement dated 15-10-1994. This shows that the appellant has not approached the Court with clean hands. The withholding of the lease agreement from the Additional Commissioner, the High Court and this Court appears to be a part of the strategy adopted by the appellant to keep the quasi-judicial and judicial forums including this Court in dark about the nature of its possession over the excess land and make them believe that it has been subjected to unfair treatment. If the factum of execution of lease agreement and its contents were disclosed to the Additional Commissioner, he would have definitely incorporated the same in the order dated 30-5-2001. In that event, the High Court or for that reason this Court would have non-suited the appellant at the threshold. However, by concealing a material fact, the appellant succeeded in persuading the High Court and this Court to entertain adventurous litigation instituted by it and pass interim orders. If either of the courts had been apprised of the fact that by virtue of lease deed dated 15-10-1994, the appellant has succeeded in securing temporary legitimacy for its possession over excess land, then there would have been no occasion for the High Court or this Court to entertain the writ petition or the special leave petition.
20. It is settled law that a person who approaches the court for grant of relief, equitable or otherwise, is under a solemn obligation to candidly disclose all the material/important facts which have bearing on the adjudication of the issues raised in the case. In other words, he owes a duty to the court to bring out all the facts and refrain from concealing/suppressing any material fact within his knowledge or which he could have known by exercising diligence expected of a person of ordinary prudence. If he is found guilty of concealment of material facts or making an attempt to pollute the pure stream of justice, the court not only has the right but a duty to deny relief to such person.”
(emphasis supplied)
23. By applying the ratio of the abovenoted judgments to the facts of this case, we hold that the appellant is guilty of not coming to this Court with clean hands and the explanation given by it for 401 days' delay has to be treated as wholly unsatisfactory and the prayer for condonation of delay is liable to be rejected.
24. The judgment in State of Karnataka v. Y. Moideen Kunhi (2009) 13 SCC 192 on which reliance has been placed by Shri Harin P. Raval contains reiteration of the settled principles of law that the Court should be liberal in exercising power under Section 5 of the Limitation Act and cognizance can be taken of the impersonal character of the Government as also inefficiency, lethargy and tardiness in the functioning of the State and its agencies which, at times, results in delay and that while deciding the application for condonation of delay, the Court should keep in mind the larger public interest. However, that proposition cannot be invoked in the appellant's case because it has been found guilty of suppression of facts and making misleading statement.
25. Notwithstanding the above conclusion, we have considered the appellant's challenge to the order of the High Court, the tenor of which gives an impression that the counsel appearing for the parties had agreed to the transfer of 1706 sq m built-up area by Respondent 5 to the appellant. If this was not so, the appellant's counsel would not have written letter dated 12-10-2010 to her counterpart for execution of separate MoU and to indicate the time-limit for completion of the construction and handing over of possession and the officers of the appellant would not have entered into correspondence with Respondent 5 for construction of separate building and providing independent access. Therefore, the appellant cannot be heard to make a grievance against the impugned order.
26. The matter deserves to be considered from another angle. If the appellant was of the view that the High Court had disposed of the writ petition without examining its prayer for issue of a mandamus to the respondents concerned to deliver possession of the acquired land, then it would have filed a petition for review of the impugned order by asserting that even though the grievance made in the writ petition in the matter of non-delivery of possession of the acquired land had been highlighted during the course of hearing, the same has not been decided by the High Court. However, the fact of the matter is that no such petition was filed. The reason for the appellant's omission to adopt that course is not far to see. The appellant knew that it was on a weak wicket. It had filed the writ petition after almost three decades of pronouncement of the award by Respondent 2 and there was no tangible explanation for the delay. We have no doubt that if the appellant had pressed its prayer for issue of a mandamus to the official respondents to deliver possession of the acquired land after evicting the slum dwellers, the High Court would have non-suited it on the ground of laches by taking cognizance of total inaction between 23-6-1998 i.e the date on which the Deputy General Manager (Planning) had written the letter to Respondent 2 to hand over vacant possession of the acquired land or refund the compensation, and January 2006, when exchange of correspondence again started. The High Court would have also taken note of the fact that while the appellant was sleeping over its rights, the Municipal Corporation had sanctioned the Slum Rehabilitation Scheme, the cooperative society formed by the slum dwellers had entered into development agreement with Respondent 5 and the latter had constructed buildings and handed over 600 units to the slum dwellers for permanent residence and dismissed the writ petition by applying the ratio of the judgment of the Constitution Bench in State of M.P v. Bhailal Bhai AIR 1964 SC 1006, the relevant passages of which are extracted below: (AIR pp. 1011-1012, paras 17 & 21)
“17. … It has been made clear more than once that the power to give relief under Article 226 is a discretionary power. This is specially true in the case of power to issue writs in the nature of mandamus. Among the several matters which the High Courts rightly take into consideration in the exercise of that discretion is the delay made by the aggrieved party in seeking this special remedy and what excuse there is for it. Another is the nature of controversy of facts and law that may have to be decided as regards the availability of consequential relief. Thus, where, as in these cases, a person comes to the Court for relief under Article 226 on the allegation that he has been assessed to tax under a void legislation and having paid it under a mistake is entitled to get it back, the Court, if it finds that the assessment was void, being made under a void provision of law, and the payment was made by mistake, is still not bound to exercise its discretion directing repayment. Whether repayment should be ordered in the exercise of this discretion will depend in each case on its own facts and circumstances. It is not easy nor is it desirable to lay down any rule for universal application. It may however be stated as a general rule that if there has been unreasonable delay the court ought not ordinarily to lend its aid to a party by this extraordinary remedy of mandamus.
21. … The learned counsel is right in his submission that the provisions of the Limitation Act do not as such apply to the granting of relief under Article 226. It appears to us however that the maximum period fixed by the legislature as the time within which the relief by a suit in a civil court must be brought may ordinarily be taken to be a reasonable standard by which delay in seeking remedy under Article 226 can be measured. This Court may consider the delay unreasonable even if it is less than the period of limitation prescribed for a civil action for the remedy but where the delay is more than this period, it will almost always be proper for the Court to hold that it is unreasonable. The period of limitation prescribed for recovery of money paid by mistake under the Limitation Act is three years from the date when the mistake is known. If the mistake was known in these cases on or shortly after 17-1-1956 the delay in making these applications should be considered unreasonable.”
(emphasis supplied)
27. Shri Harin P. Raval made a valiant attempt to persuade us to consider the appellant's prayer for directing the respondents to hand over possession of that portion of the acquired land on which construction has not been raised so far, but we are not impressed. The delay of almost three decades stares in the face of the appellant and we do not find any justification for entertaining the prayer for issue of a mandamus at this belated stage by ignoring the developments which have taken place in the intervening period.
28. In the result, the appeal is dismissed as barred by time and also on merits.
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