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Shivdev Kaur (Dead) By Lrs. And Others v. R.S Grewal .

Supreme Court Of India
Mar 20, 2013
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Factual and Procedural Background

Dr. Hira Singh, during his lifetime, owned substantial property. By a will dated 16-9-1944 he created only a “life interest” in a house (kothi on Iqbal Road) in favour of his daughter, Dr. Shivdev Kaur (the present appellant), expressly prohibiting her from alienating it. Dr. Hira Singh died on 11-4-1945.

After the deaths of the appellant’s siblings, the appellant claimed absolute ownership in 1974 and filed Suit No. 161/399 of 1974 seeking a mandatory injunction to evict her nephew from the property. The nephew (respondent) filed Suit No. 80 of 1976 to restrain the appellant from alienating the same property.

The trial court (28-4-1978) held that the appellant had only a life interest, and in the cross-suit (4-6-1979) restrained her from interference with the agricultural lands but protected her possession of the house pending final decision. Appeals and cross-objections followed; on 22-10-1981 the first appellate court partly allowed the appellant’s appeal but confirmed that her life interest did not enlarge into absolute title.

The respondent filed Regular Second Appeals Nos. 257 and 608 of 1982; the appellant filed Cross-Objection No. 14-C of 1982. Pending those proceedings the appellant executed a will dated 28-2-1991 (with codicil 25-8-1995) creating a trust in the disputed property. She died on 15-2-1998 and her executors were impleaded. On 2-7-2004 the High Court allowed the respondent’s second appeals, again rejecting the appellant’s claim of absolute ownership. The present Supreme Court appeals challenge that High Court decision.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the limited “life interest” granted to the appellant under the will dated 16-9-1944 became an absolute estate by virtue of Section 14(1) of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956.
  2. Whether Section 14(2) of the Act operates as an exception preventing such enlargement because the life interest was expressly created by a will prescribing a restricted estate.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant’s Arguments

  • The appellant, becoming a widow at a young age, was allegedly a destitute; her father therefore intended to provide for her and the life interest should, after commencement of the 1956 Act, crystallise into full ownership under Section 14(1).
  • The courts below erred in refusing to recognise this statutory enlargement; consequently the concurrent findings should be set aside.

Respondent’s Arguments

  • The appellant cannot introduce a new plea of being a destitute; she is an MBBS doctor who inherited considerable property from her husband’s family.
  • The will conveyed only a life estate; Section 14(2) squarely applies, barring conversion of that limited estate into absolute ownership.
  • There are concurrent findings of fact against the appellant, which should not be disturbed.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Karmi v. Amru (1972) 4 SCC 86 Life estate created by will does not enlarge into absolute estate under Section 14(1) of the 1956 Act. Relied on to show that the appellant cannot claim rights exceeding the life interest conferred by the will.
Navneet Lal v. Gokul (1976) 1 SCC 630 Reaffirmation that testamentary life estates remain restricted after 1956 Act. Cited in support of the same proposition as Karmi.
Jagan Singh v. Dhanwanti (2012) 2 SCC 628 Continuation of the principle that Section 14(2) preserves restricted estates created by will. Referenced to fortify the view that Section 14(2) prevails.
Sadhu Singh v. Gurdwara Sahib Narike (2006) 8 SCC 75 Explains interplay of Sections 14(1), 14(2) and 30; limited estate by will remains limited. Quoted extensively; court adopts its reasoning that enlarging such estates would make Sections 14(2) and 30 otiose.
Balwant Kaur v. Chanan Singh (2000) 6 SCC 310 Intent of testator must be gathered from the whole will; later clauses may limit earlier absolute words. Used to rebut appellant’s reliance on the case; court clarifies that it in fact supports a limited estate when will so provides.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Supreme Court examined the will’s operative clause, noting its explicit prohibition against alienation and its statement that the son would be sole owner subject to the appellant’s life interest. That language unequivocally conferred only a lifetime right.

Section 14(1) of the Hindu Succession Act does convert certain limited estates into full ownership, but Section 14(2) expressly exempts property acquired “by way of gift or under a will … where the terms … prescribe a restricted estate.” Because the appellant’s interest arose under such a will, the statutory exception applied.

The Court relied on Karmi v. Amru, Sadhu Singh and allied precedents to emphasise that recognising absolute ownership here would render Sections 14(2) and 30 meaningless. It dismissed the appellant’s plea of destitution as factually unsubstantiated and legally irrelevant to the statutory scheme.

Finding no legal error in the concurrent decisions of the trial, first appellate, and High Courts, the Supreme Court refused to disturb their findings.

Holding and Implications

APPEALS DISMISSED.

The appellant’s estate remains a life interest, and the property will devolve in accordance with the terms of Dr. Hira Singh’s 1944 will. The judgment reinforces the settled principle that Section 14(2) preserves restricted estates created by testamentary instruments; it does not create new precedent but affirms existing jurisprudence.

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The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

Dr B.S Chauhan, J.— These appeals have been preferred against the impugned judgment and order dated 2-7-2004 passed by the High Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh in R.S Grewal v. Shivdev Kaur Grewal by which the High Court has affirmed the judgment of the first appellate court as well as the trial court so far as the nature of the rights of the appellant in the suit property are concerned.

2. The facts and circumstances giving rise to these appeals are that: one Dr Hira Singh had acquired huge property in his lifetime. He executed various deeds creating certain rights in favour of his sole son, Dr Shivdev Singh Grewal and two daughters, namely, Smt Dayawant Kaur and Dr Shivdev Kaur including the will dated 16-9-1944, creating certain rights in favour of the appellant. Dr Hira Singh died on 11-4-1945.

3. Shri Shivdev Singh Grewal and Smt Dayawant Kaur died leaving behind their children. Dr Shivdev Kaur claimed certain rights on the basis of the will dated 16-9-1944, and for the same she filed Suit No. 161/399 of 1974 on 4-10-1974 against her nephew for mandatory injunction seeking his eviction from the suit premises claiming absolute right/ownership over the same in view of the provisions of Section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 (hereinafter referred to as “the 1956 Act”). The respondent-defendant contested the suit denying such a right. During the pendency of the said suit, the respondent-defendant also filed Suit No. 80 of 1976, against the appellant-plaintiff for permanent injunction restraining her from transferring/alienating the suit property.

4. The trial court vide judgment and decree dated 28-4-1978 decided Suit No. 161/399 of 1974, holding that the appellant-plaintiff had no absolute right/ownership over the suit property. The trial court vide judgment and decree dated 4-6-1979 passed in Suit No. 80 of 1976 held to the effect that the appellant would not interfere in any manner in respect of the agricultural lands, etc. however, she would not be dispossessed from the suit premises and it would be subject to the final decision of the another suit.

5. Aggrieved, both the parties filed appeals and cross-objections. The appellate court dismissed the appeal filed by the respondent on 22-10-1981. On the same day, the appeal filed by the appellant was allowed to certain extent. However, so far as the issue relating to conversion of the life interest into absolute title is concerned, it was decided against the appellant. Aggrieved, the respondent filed RSAs Nos. 257 and 608 of 1982, and the appellant filed cross-objection bearing No. 14-C of 1982.

6. The appellant executed a will dated 28-2-1991 in respect of the suit property creating a trust in the name of her father and appointing Shri Sudarshan Singh Deol and Brig. Inderjeet Singh Dhillon as the trustees. She further made a codicil dated 25-8-1995. The appellant died on 15-2-1998 and thus the executors of her will got impleaded. The High Court allowed both the RSAs filed by the respondent and dismissed the claim of the appellant. Hence, these appeals.

7. Shri Devender Mohan Verma, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant, has argued that the appellant had become a widow at a very young age. She was maintained by her in-laws, thus, her father took pity on her and as she was a destitute, brought her back and created a “life interest” in her favour in respect of the suit property by executing a will dated 16-9-1944. She started residing in the suit property. Her father died in 1945. After commencement of the 1956 Act, the right of “life interest” stood crystallised into absolute right and title. Therefore, the courts below erred in deciding the issue against her. Thus, the appeals deserve to be allowed. Per contra, Shri R.K Dhawan, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent, has opposed the appeals contending that the appellant cannot be permitted to introduce a new case that the appellant was a destitute. She was a well-qualified person and an MBBS doctor. She had acquired large properties from the family of her late husband. More so, the father of the appellant had created only “life interest” in her favour in the suit property by executing the will. Section 14(2) of the 1956 Act does not provide that such “life interest” would stand converted into absolute ownership on commencement of the said Act. There are concurrent findings of facts on this issue and, thus, the appeals lack merit and are liable to be dismissed.

8. We have considered the rival submissions made by the learned counsel for the parties and perused the records.

9. The document creating a limited right, “life interest” in favour of the appellant i.e will dated 16-9-1944 so far as the relevant part is concerned reads as under:

“I give this kothi situated at Iqbal Road to my daughter Bibi Shivdev Kaur subject to the rights of Bibi Shiv Charan Kaur, mentioned above, for lifetime, who after my death will remain abad in this kothi and get benefit thereof. If she wishes, she can get the benefit of its rent also as per necessity and can use the income of rent. But these rights are only for her lifetime. She cannot alienate this kothi or the site relating thereto, in any way, or create any charge thereon, nor can she mortgage, gift, sell or transfer it. My son Shibdev Singh aforesaid shall also be the sole owner of this kothi subject to the abovementioned rights.”

It is evident from the aforesaid part of the will that only a life interest had been created in favour of the appellant by that will. Therefore, the sole question for our consideration remains as to whether such limited right got converted into absolute right on the commencement of the 1956 Act?

10. Section 14 of the 1956 Act reads as under:

“14. Property of a female Hindu to be her absolute property.—(1) Any property possessed by a female Hindu, whether acquired before or after the commencement of this Act, shall be held by her as full owner thereof and not as a limited owner.
(2) Nothing contained in sub-section (1) shall apply to any property acquired by way of gift or under a will or any other instrument or under a decree or order of a civil court or under an award where the terms of the gift, will or other instrument or the decree, order or award prescribe a restricted estate in such property.”
(emphasis added)

The aforesaid statutory provisions provide for conversion of life interest into absolute title on commencement of the 1956 Act, however, sub-section (2) carves out an exception to the same as it provides that such right would not be conferred where a property is acquired by a Hindu female by way of gift or under a will or any other instrument prescribing a restricted estate in that property.

11. In Karmi v. Amru (1972) 4 SCC 86, AIR 1971 SC 745 a similar issue was considered by this Court and after examining the contents of the will the Court came to the conclusion that where a woman succeeded some property on the strength of a will, she cannot claim any right in those properties over and above what was given to her under that will. The life estate given to her under the will would not become an absolute estate under the provisions of the 1956 Act and, thus, such a Hindu female cannot claim any title to the suit property on the basis of the will executed in her favour. (See also Navneet Lal v. Gokul (1976) 1 SCC 630, AIR 1976 SC 794 and Jagan Singh v. Dhanwanti (2012) 2 SCC 628.)

12. In Sadhu Singh v. Gurdwara Sahib Narike (2006) 8 SCC 75, AIR 2006 SC 3282 this Court again considered the issue and held as under:

“14. When he thus validly disposes of his property by providing for a limited estate to his heir, the wife, the wife or widow has to take it as the estate falls. This restriction on her right so provided, is really respected by the Act. It provides in Section 14(2) of the Act, that in such a case, the widow is bound by the limitation on her right and she cannot claim any higher right by invoking Section 14(1) of the Act. In other words, conferment of a limited estate which is otherwise valid in law is reinforced by this Act by the introduction of Section 14(2) of the Act and excluding the operation of Section 14(1) of the Act, even if that provision is held to be attracted in the case of a succession under the Act. Invocation of Section 14(1) of the Act in the case of a testamentary disposition taking effect after the Act, would make Sections 30 and 14(2) redundant or otiose. It will also make redundant, the expression ‘property possessed by a female Hindu’ occurring in Section 14(1) of the Act. An interpretation that leads to such a result cannot certainly be accepted. Surely, there is nothing in the Act compelling such an interpretation. Sections 14 and 30 both have play. Section 14(1) applies in a case where the female had received the property prior to the Act being entitled to it as a matter of right, even if the right be to a limited estate under the Mitakshara Law or the right to maintenance.”
(emphasis added)

13. Shri Verma, learned counsel for the appellant placed a very heavy reliance on the judgment of this Court in Balwant Kaur v. Chanan Singh (2000) 6 SCC 310, AIR 2000 SC 1908, contending that a destitute Hindu daughter if acquires such a right, it would stand crystallised in absolute title. There is a complete fallacy in his argument. In the said case, this Court held that all the clauses of the will must be read together to find out the intention of the testator. The Court held:

“9. … This is obviously on the principle that the last clause represents the latest intention of the testator. It is true that in the earlier part of the will, the testator has stated that his daughter Balwant Kaur shall be the heir, owner and title-holder of his entire remaining movable and immovable property but in the later part of the same will he has clearly stated that on the death of Balwant Kaur, the brothers of the testator shall be the heirs of the property. This clearly shows that the recitals in the later part of the will would operate and make Appellant 1 only a limited estate-holder in the property bequeathed to her.”
(emphasis added)

14. Thus, in view of the above, the law on the issue can be summarised to the effect that if a Hindu female has been given only a “life interest”, through will or gift or any other document referred to in Section 14 of the 1956 Act, the said rights would not stand crystallised into absolute ownership as interpreting the provisions to the effect that she would acquire absolute ownership/title into the property by virtue of the provisions of Section 14(1) of the 1956 Act, the provisions of Sections 14(2) and 30 of the 1956 Act would become otiose. Section 14(2) carves out an exception to the rule provided in sub-section (1) thereof, which clearly provides that if a property has been acquired by a Hindu female by a will or gift, giving her only a “life interest”, it would remain the same even after commencement of the 1956 Act, and such a Hindu female cannot acquire absolute title.

15. Whether a person is destitute or not, is a question of fact. The expression “destitute” has not been defined under the 1956 Act or under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, or the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. The dictionary meaning is “without resources, in want of necessaries”. A person can be held destitute when no one is to support him and is found wandering without any settled place of abode and without visible means of subsistence. In the instant case, no factual foundation has ever been laid by the appellant before the courts below in this regard. In such a fact situation, the issue does not require consideration.

16. All the courts have taken a consistent view rejecting the claim of the appellant of having acquired an absolute title. We do not see any cogent reason to interfere with the concurrent findings of facts. The appeals lack merit and are accordingly dismissed.