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United India Insurance Company Limited v. Sunil Kumar And Another

Supreme Court Of India
Oct 29, 2013
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Factual and Procedural Background

The respondent was injured in a road accident on 20-11-2006 and filed a claim petition under Section 163-A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, seeking compensation. On 16-8-2011, the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal awarded him ₹3,50,000 with 7% interest from the date of filing. The appellant-Insurance Company challenged that award before the Delhi High Court. Relying on National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Nicolletta Rohtagi (2002) 7 SCC 456, the High Court dismissed the insurer’s appeal because it had not obtained permission under Section 170 of the Act. The insurer then filed the present appeal in the Supreme Court.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether, in light of United India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Shila Datta (2011) 10 SCC 509, the requirement of prior permission under Section 170 for an insurer to file an appeal (as held in Nicolletta Rohtagi) needs reconsideration by a larger Bench.
  2. Whether compensation claims under Section 163-A are governed by the “fault liability” principle, as held in National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Sinitha (2012) 2 SCC 356, or by a “no-fault” principle as suggested by earlier precedent.
  3. Whether an insurer or vehicle owner can defeat a Section 163-A claim by proving contributory negligence or other “fault” on the part of the claimant.

Arguments of the Parties

Respondent’s Arguments

  • Invoked Shila Datta to contend that Points (iii)–(v) therein conflict with Nicolletta Rohtagi, necessitating reference of the present matter to a larger Bench.

Appellant-Insurance Company’s Contentions (as recorded in the lower fora)

  • Opposed the claim under Section 163-A on the grounds that the injured himself was driving the vehicle and had produced no disability certificate.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
United India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Shila Datta (2011) 10 SCC 509 Doubts the correctness of Nicolletta Rohtagi on insurer’s right to appeal (Points iii–v). Relied upon to argue that the question of Section 170 permission should be referred to a larger Bench.
National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Nicolletta Rohtagi (2002) 7 SCC 456 Insurer cannot appeal without permission under Section 170. Basis of High Court’s dismissal; its correctness is questioned in the present opinion.
National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Sinitha (2012) 2 SCC 356 Held that Section 163-A is founded on fault liability; insurer may defeat claim by proving claimant’s fault. The Bench expressly disagrees with its reasoning and seeks reconsideration.
Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Hansrajbhai V. Kodala (2001) 5 SCC 175 Early interpretation of Section 163-A; forms part of the debate on fault vs. no-fault liability. Court states Sinitha mis-appreciated this precedent.
Deepal Girishbhai Soni v. United India Insurance Co. Ltd. (2004) 5 SCC 385 Section 163-A is a complete code; remedies under Sections 163-A and 166 are independent and cannot be pursued simultaneously. Quoted to show legislative intent that Section 163-A provides predetermined compensation without proof of negligence.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court embarks on an extensive examination of Section 163-A:

  • Notes that both Sections 140 and 163-A contemplate “no-fault” liability and that inquiry into negligence is “foreign” to claims under these provisions.
  • Critiques the two-Judge ruling in Sinitha for treating Section 163-A as fault-based, stating that such an interpretation defeats the statute’s social-welfare purpose.
  • Explains that permitting insurers to plead contributory negligence under Section 163-A would render the provision redundant, as claimants would instead prefer Section 140 where explicit statutory protection exists.
  • Reaffirms Deepal Girishbhai Soni to show Section 163-A has overriding effect via a broad non-obstante clause and is designed to provide predetermined compensation irrespective of fault.
  • Concludes that liability under Section 163-A is indeed on a no-fault basis; therefore, Sinitha’s contrary view and related issues require authoritative resolution by a larger Bench.

Holding and Implications

ORDER: The matter is referred to the Hon’ble Chief Justice of India for assignment to a larger Bench.

Immediate Effect: No final adjudication on compensation; the questions regarding (i) insurer’s right to appeal without Section 170 permission and (ii) the fault or no-fault nature of Section 163-A await determination by a larger Bench. The present decision sets no new precedent but signals a potential shift toward reaffirming Section 163-A as a true “no-fault” provision.

Show all summary ...

K.S.P Radhakrishnan, J.— Leave granted. Heard the learned counsel for the parties.

2. The learned counsel appearing for the respondent submitted that in view of the judgment of this Court in United India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Shila Datta (2011) 10 SCC 509, this matter will have to be referred to a larger Bench, especially with regard to Points (iii) to (v) referred to in the abovementioned judgment, which are in conflict with the judgment of this Court in National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Nicolletta Rohtagi (2002) 7 SCC 456. The impugned order MAC Appeal No. 900 of 2011, we notice, is based on the principle laid down in Nicolletta Rohtagi case (2002) 7 SCC 456, the correctness of which is doubted in Shila Datta case (2011) 10 SCC 509.

3. In the present case, the claim petition was filed by the respondent under Section 163-A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, claiming compensation for the injury sustained by him in a road accident occurred on 20-11-2006. The Tribunal after recording the evidence and after hearing the parties, vide its order dated 16-8-2011 passed an award for a sum of Rs 3,50,000 along with interest at the rate of 7% per annum from the date of the filing of the petition till realisation. Aggrieved by the same, the Insurance Company filed an appeal before the High Court of Delhi. The High Court placing reliance on the judgment in Nicolletta Rohtagi case (2002) 7 SCC 456 dismissed the appeal since the Insurance Company failed to comply with Section 170 of the Motor Vehicles Act and the Insurance Company has come up with this appeal. The learned counsel for the respondent contended that the question whether permission is required or not under Section 170 stands referred to a larger Bench.

4. We have yet another issue to be examined. As already indicated that in the instant case, the claim petition was filed under Section 163-A of the Motor Vehicles Act, which was resisted by the Insurance Company contending that the same is not maintainable since the injured himself was driving the vehicle and that no disability certificate was produced.

5. A two-Judge Bench of this Court in National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Sinitha (2012) 2 SCC 356 examined the scope of Section 163-A of the Motor Vehicles Act and took the view that Section 163-A of the Act has been founded on “fault liability principle”. Referring to another judgment of a co-equal Bench in Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Hansrajbhai V. Kodala (2001) 5 SCC 175, the learned Judges took the view that while determining whether Section 163-A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 is governed by the fault or the no-fault liability principle, Sections 140(3) and (4) are relevant. The Bench noticed that under Section 140(3), the burden of pleading and establishing whether or not wrongful act, neglect or default was committed by the person (for or on whose behalf) compensation is claimed under Section 140, would not rest on the shoulders of the claimant. The Court also noticed that Section 140(4) of the Motor Vehicles Act further reveals that a claim for compensation under Section 140 of the Act cannot be defeated because of any of the fault grounds (wrongful act, neglect or default).

6. The Division Bench in Sinitha case (2012) 2 SCC 356 then took the view that under Section 140 of the Act so also under Section 163-A of the Act, it is not essential for a claimant seeking compensation to plead or establish that the accident out of which the claim arises suffers from wrongful act or neglect or default of the offending vehicle. The Bench then expressed the view that the legislature designedly included the negative clause through Section 140(4) of the Motor Vehicles Act, but consciously omitted the same in the scheme of Section 163-A of the Act intentionally and purposefully. The Court also concluded, on a conjoint reading of Sections 140 and 163-A, that the legislative intent is clear, namely, that a claim for compensation raised under Section 163-A of the Act need not be based on pleadings or proof at the hands of the claimants showing absence of wrongful act, being neglect or default, but the Bench concluded that it is not sufficient to determine whether the provision falls under the fault liability principle. The Court held that to decide whether the provision is governed by the fault liability principle, the converse has to be established i.e whether a claim raised thereunder can be defeated by the party concerned (the owner or the insurance company) by pleading and proving wrongful act, neglect or default.

7. Interpreting Section 163-A of the Act, the Judges in Sinitha case (2012) 2 SCC 356 held that:

“33. … it is open to the owner or the insurance company, as the case may be, to defeat a claim under Section 163-A of the Act by pleading and establishing through cogent evidence a ‘fault’ ground (‘wrongful act’ or ‘neglect’ or ‘default’).”

The Court concluded that Section 163-A of the Act is founded on the fault liability principle.

8. We find difficult to accept the reasoning expressed by the two-Judge Bench in Sinitha case (2012) 2 SCC 356. In our view, the principle laid down in Hansrajbhai V. Kodala case (2001) 5 SCC 175 has not been properly appreciated or applied by the Bench. In fact, another Division Bench of this Court vide its order dated 19-4-2002 SLP (C) No. 16133 of 2001, (2001) 5 SCC 175 had doubted the correctness of the judgment in Hansrajbhai V. Kodala case (2001) 5 SCC 175 and referred the matter to a three-Judge Bench to examine the question whether the claimant could pursue the remedies simultaneously under Sections 166 and 163-A of the Act.

9. The three-Judge Bench of this Court in Deepal Girishbhai Soni v. United India Insurance Co. Ltd. (2004) 5 SCC 385 made a detailed analysis of the scope of Sections 166 and 163-A and held that:

“57. … the remedy for payment of compensation both under Sections 163-A and 166 being final and independent of each other as statutorily provided, a claimant cannot pursue his remedies thereunder simultaneously.”

The Court also extensively examined the scope of Section 163-A and held that Section 163-A was introduced in the Act by way of a social security scheme and is a code by itself. The Court also held that:

“41. Section 140 of the Act [deals] with interim compensation but by inserting Section 163-A, Parliament intended to provide for the making of an award consisting of a predetermined sum without insisting on a long-drawn trial or without proof of negligence in causing the accident.”

The Court noticed that Section 163-A was inserted making a deviation from the common law liability under the law of torts and also in derogation of the provisions of the Fatal Accidents Act.

10. The three-Judge Bench in Deepal Girishbhai Soni (2004) 5 SCC 385 also held that Section 163-A has an overriding effect and provides for special provisions as to payment of compensation on structured formula basis. Sub-section (1) of Section 163-A contains a non obstante clause, in terms whereof the owner of the motor vehicle or the authorised insurer is liable to pay, in the case of death or permanent disablement due to accident arising out of the use of motor vehicle, compensation, as indicated in the Second Schedule, to the legal heirs or the victim, as the case may be. The Court also held that the scheme of the provisions of Section 163-A and Section 166 are distinct and separate in nature. In Section 163-A, the expression “notwithstanding anything contained in this Act or in any other law for the time being in force” has been used, which goes to show that Parliament intended to insert a non obstante clause of wide nature which would mean that the provisions of Section 163-A would apply despite the contrary provisions existing in the said Act or any other law for the time being in force. Section 163-A of the Act covers cases where even negligence is on the part of the victim. It is by way of an exception to Section 166 and the concept of social justice has been duly taken care of. The abovementioned three-Judge Bench judgment (2004) 5 SCC 385 was not placed before the learned Judges who decided Sinitha case (2012) 2 SCC 356.

11. We find both Sections 140 and 163-A deal with the case of death and permanent disablement. The expression “permanent disablement” has been defined under Section 142, so far as Section 140 is concerned. So far as Section 163-A is concerned, the expression “permanent disability” shall have the same meaning and extent as in the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923. Both Sections 140 and 163-A deal with cases of no-fault liability. In order to prefer a claim under Section 140(2), the claimant need not plead or establish that death or permanent disablement, in respect of which claim has been made, was due to any wrongful act, neglect or default of the deceased or the disabled person. Similarly, under Section 163-A also, the claimant shall not be required to plead or establish that death or permanent disablement, in respect of which claim has been made, was due to any wrongful act, neglect or default of the deceased or the injured, as the case may be. In other words, an enquiry as to who is at fault is foreign to the determination of a claim under Section 140 as well as Section 163-A. A claim under Section 140 as well as Section 163-A shall not be defeated by the insurance company or the owner of the vehicle, as the case may be, by reason of any wrongful act, neglect or default of the person in respect of whose death or permanent disablement claim has been made. So also, the quantum of compensation recoverable in respect of such death or permanent disablement be reduced on the basis of share of such person in the responsibility for his death or permanent disablement.

12. We find, in Sinitha case (2012) 2 SCC 356, one of the factors which weighed with the learned Judges was the absence of a similar provision like sub-section (4) of Section 140 in Section 163-A which, according to the learned Judges, has been intentionally and purposefully done by the legislature. We find it difficult to accept that view. We are of the view that if such an interpretation is given, the very purpose and object of Section 163-A would be defeated and render the provision otiose and a claimant would prefer to make a claim under Section 140, rather than under Section 163-A of the Act by exercising option under Section 163-B of the Act. Because, if a claim under Section 140 is raised because of Section 140(4), such a claim would not be defeated by the owner of the vehicle or the insurance company, as the case may be, and the claimant may get a fixed sum prescribed under Section 140(2). Sub-section (4) of Section 140 has been introduced by the legislature since claim under Section 140 would be followed by Section 166. So far as Section 163-A is concerned, claim is restricted on the basis of predetermined formula, unlike in the case of application under Section 166.

13. We are, therefore, of the view that liability to make compensation under Section 163-A is on the principle of no fault and, therefore, the question as to who is at fault is immaterial and foreign to an enquiry under Section 163-A. Section 163-A does not make any provision for apportionment of the liability. If the owner of the vehicle or the insurance company is permitted to prove contributory negligence or default or wrongful act on the part of the victim or claimant, naturally it would defeat the very object and purpose of Section 163-A of the Act. The legislature never wanted the claimant to plead or establish negligence on the part of the owner or the driver. Once it is established that death or permanent disablement occurred during the course of the user of the vehicle and the vehicle is insured, the insurance company or the owner, as the case may be, shall be liable to pay the compensation, which is a statutory obligation.

14. We, therefore, find ourselves unable to agree with the reasoning of the two-Judge Bench in Sinitha case (2012) 2 SCC 356. Consequently, the matter is placed before the learned Chief Justice of India for referring the matter to a larger Bench for a correct interpretation of the scope of Section 163-A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, as well as Points (iii) to (v) referred to in Shila Datta case (2011) 10 SCC 509.