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Ajay Pandit Alias Jagdish Dayabhai Patel And Another v. State Of Maharashtra .

Supreme Court Of India
Jul 17, 2012
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Factual and Procedural Background

The appellant, Dr. Ajay Pandit alias Jagdish Dayabhai Patel, a Gujarat-based dentist, duped several individuals by claiming influential contacts at the American Embassy and promising overseas employment. Two separate homicidal incidents arose from this scheme:

  • Murder of Nilesh Bhailal Patel (8-9 February 1994) – The accused lured the 25-year-old victim to Mumbai, booked Room 103 in Hotel Aradhana, and was last seen with him. Nilesh’s body was discovered the next day.
  • Murder of Jayashree and attempted murders of Kaushikbhai and Jagdish (2 November 1994) – In Mumbai’s Hotel Kemps Corner, the accused administered sedatives and an injection, killing Jayashree and nearly killing the other two victims.

The Sessions Court convicted the appellant on multiple counts under the Indian Penal Code, awarding life imprisonment for each murder. When the matter reached the Bombay High Court in Criminal Appeals 46 of 2000 and 789 of 2001, the convictions were affirmed and the sentence in the Nilesh case was suo motu enhanced to the death penalty. The present Supreme Court appeal challenges that enhancement.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the Bombay High Court complied with the mandatory hearing requirement under Section 235(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 before enhancing the appellant’s life sentence to a sentence of death.
  2. Consequently, whether the death penalty could validly be sustained in light of the “rarest of rare” doctrine formulated in Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant’s Arguments

  • The High Court violated Section 235(2) CrPC by merely recording a perfunctory statement from the accused without affording a genuine opportunity to present mitigating evidence.
  • Non-compliance with Section 235(2) vitiates the sentence, relying on Santa Singh v. State of Punjab and Rajesh Kumar v. State.

State’s Arguments

  • The double murders, coupled with attempted murders, satisfy the “rarest of rare” test; the death sentence is therefore justified under Bachan Singh.
  • The High Court had, in fact, complied with Section 235(2) by issuing a show-cause notice and recording the accused’s response.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Santa Singh v. State of Punjab (1976) 4 SCC 190 Section 235(2) hearing is mandatory; non-compliance vitiates sentence. Used to show that the High Court’s cursory hearing was insufficient.
Dagdu v. State of Maharashtra (1977) 3 SCC 68 Higher courts may cure a Section 235(2) lapse, but remand is preferable. Cited to consider procedural options; Supreme Court chose remand on sentence.
Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab (1980) 2 SCC 684 “Rarest of rare” doctrine for awarding death penalty. Bench examined whether the High Court correctly applied this test.
Muniappan v. State of Tamil Nadu (1981) 3 SCC 11 Judge must make genuine effort to elicit mitigating circumstances at sentencing. Supported finding that High Court’s effort was inadequate.
Allauddin Mian v. State of Bihar (1989) 3 SCC 5 Section 235(2) satisfies natural justice; strictly mandatory. Relied upon to underscore the mandatory nature of the provision.
Malkiat Singh v. State of Punjab (1991) 4 SCC 341 Need for adjournment and opportunity to adduce evidence on sentence. Illustrated procedural safeguards missing in the High Court proceedings.
Rajesh Kumar v. State (2011) 13 SCC 706 Effective Section 235(2) hearing is integral to recording “special reasons” under Section 354(3). Applied to demonstrate that proper hearing is prerequisite for imposing death penalty.

Court’s Reasoning and Analysis

The Supreme Court meticulously reviewed the original High Court record, including the show-cause notice dated 1 December 2005 and the statement recorded on 13 December 2005. It found:

  • The High Court merely informed the appellant of the proposed enhancement and recorded a brief denial; it made no attempt to solicit mitigating facts or allow evidentiary material.
  • Section 235(2) CrPC, as interpreted in a series of decisions (Santa Singh, Dagdu, Muniappan, etc.), obliges the sentencing court to actively elicit relevant information and, where necessary, permit evidence on sentence.
  • Awarding death is an exceptional measure; failure to conduct a meaningful sentencing hearing frustrates both natural justice and the statutory scheme.
  • The procedural lapse could not be treated as inconsequential because the penalty involved deprivation of life. Consequently, the sentence but not the conviction stood vitiated.

Holding and Implications

The Supreme Court set aside the death sentence imposed by the Bombay High Court and remitted the matter to the High Court for fresh sentencing proceedings strictly in accordance with Section 235(2) CrPC. The convictions on all counts were affirmed.

Implications: The decision reinforces the mandatory nature of a full and fair post-conviction hearing on sentence, particularly before the irreversible penalty of death is considered. While no new legal test was created, the judgment underscores that even appellate courts must rigorously comply with Section 235(2) and cannot rely on perfunctory hearings when contemplating capital punishment.

Show all summary ...

K.S.P Radhakrishnan, J.— Death sentence has been awarded by the High Court of Bombay to Ajay Pandit alias Jagdish Dayabhai Patel for double murder, in separate incidents, one for the murder of Nilesh Bhailal Patel and another for the murder of Jayashree. The Bombay High Court heard both the appeals Criminal Appeal No. 46 of 2000 and Criminal Appeal No. 789 of 2001 together and rendered a common judgment Criminal Appeal No. 46 of 2000 on 22-12-2005 confirming the order of conviction and enhancing the sentence of life imprisonment to death and ordered to be hanged till death against which this appeal has been preferred.

2. The accused Ajay Pandit alias Jagdish Dayabhai Patel was a dentist by profession, known as Dr Jagdish Patel at his Dhabasi Mohalla, District Kheda, Gujarat. He possesses a degree in Dental Hygienist and Dental Mechanic (DHDM) from the Gujarat University. The professional income was not sufficient for him to lead a lavish and luxurious life, he had other evil and demonic ideas in mind to make quick and easy money. Self-publicity was given of his make-belief contacts with the officials of the American Embassy by which he lured the vulnerable into his net, for sending them to America for better prospects in life. Several persons fell in his net like Nilesh and Jayashree and few others narrowly escaped from the clutches of death.

3. We may first deal with the facts arising out of the judgment of the Bombay High Court in Criminal Appeal No. 46 of 2000 in which the High Court, convicted the accused under Section 419 of the Penal Code, 1860 (for short “IPC”) and sentenced to suffer RI for one year, under Section 420 IPC, RI for two years and fine, under Section 302 IPC life imprisonment with fine which was converted to death.

4. Dr Jagdish Patel, the accused, had developed contacts with a family of one Dilip Manilal Patel and he used to visit their house at Bhayandar and Kandivali since 1993. During those visits, the accused used to boast that he had contacts with the officials of the American Embassy which kindled hopes in the minds of Dilip Patel and his family members and they decided to send Nilesh Bhailal Patel, cousin brother of Smt Sarala Patel, wife of Dilip Patel, to America using the accused's alleged influence in the American Embassy. A deal was struck and the accused demanded an amount of Rs 2,50,000 for realisation of their dream. Negotiations took place and the amount was reduced to Rs 1,10,000 as an initial payment, and the balance was to be paid after getting Nilesh employment in America. Dilip Patel in October 1993 paid Rs 60,000 to the accused and the balance amount of Rs 50,000 was paid by Mahendra Bhailal Patel, brother of the deceased Nilesh to the accused.

5. Noticing that even after payment of money, the accused was not fulfilling his promises, various meetings and phone calls took place between the accused and the family of Nilesh. The accused reiterated his promise and later asked Dilip Patel to send Nilesh to Bombay Central Railway Station on 8-2-1994 with return ticket of the accused. The accused had also requested Dilip Patel a further amount of Rs 3500 towards medical expenses and also for arranging visa. Dilip Patel had assured the accused that he himself would be coming to Bombay with the required amount. As promised, Dilip Patel reached Bombay in the afternoon of 8-2-1994 and found the accused waiting at Bhulabhai Desai Road near the American Consulate. The accused told Dilip Patel that the necessary papers had been submitted to the Consulate and asked to leave the place. Dilip Patel accordingly left the place and that was the last time, Dilip Patel saw Nilesh in the company of the accused that was around 3 o'clock.

6. In the evening of 8-2-1994 at about 5 o'clock, Dilip Patel received a phone call from the accused stating that the formalities had been completed and Nilesh would be coming home late in the night. Dilip Patel reached home but not Nilesh. Dilip Patel contacted the accused in the morning of 9-2-1994 and he was informed by the accused that Nilesh was waiting up to 5.30 p.m on the previous day at Bombay Central Railway Station and that he would be back. Dilip Patel contacted the accused on several occasions to know whereabouts of Nilesh. Meanwhile an attempt was made by the accused through one Tikabhai to inform Dilip Patel that Nilesh had already left for America.

7. Dilip Patel in November 1994 read in a local newspaper Sandhya Jansatta of a news item of an incident of attempt to murder and murder by administering some tablets to three persons by one doctor by name Jagdish. Dilip Patel also read in Mid-Day, an evening daily dated 5-11-1994 about arrest of Dr Jagdish Patel, the accused. On the basis of this information, Dilip Patel approached Gamdevi Police Station on 13-11-1994 and narrated the entire story to the police. The statement was accordingly recorded and a photograph of the dead body of unidentified person found in Room No. 103 of Hotel Aradhana at Nana Chowk in the evening of 9-2-1994 was also shown.

8. In the evening of 8-2-1994, the accused had booked Room No. 103 on the first floor of that hotel. The accused left the hotel at about 7.45 p.m in the evening of 8-2-1994 keeping the room locked and he did not return. On 9-2-1994, for the purpose of cleaning the room, it was opened with a duplicate key and the dead body of Nilesh was found. The dead body was sent for post-mortem but prior to that police completed other formalities, fingerprint experts also did their job, articles received were sent to the forensic laboratory, CA report was obtained. Till August 1994, there was no trace of the suspect and the investigation was continuing. In fact on 30-8-1994, case was classified as true but not detected. The accused was, however, arrested by Malabar Hill Police in CR No. 278 of 1994 for murdering one woman Jayashree and for the attempted murder of two other persons at Hotel Kemps Corner. The accused was identified by Dilip Patel, his wife Sarala Patel and Mahendra Patel, brother of the deceased Nilesh. This was the brief background of the first case.

9. We will now refer briefly to the facts of the second case which came up before the Bombay High Court vide Criminal Appeal No. 789 of 2001. In the second case, Dr Jagdish Patel had three persons in his net aspiring for better prospects in America. One Kaushikbhai Sanabhaiu Patel was leading a normal family life with his wife Jayashree at Labhvel, District Anand, in the State of Gujarat. One Jagdish alias Harishbhai Patel was the cousin brother of Jayashree. All the three were also dreaming of better prospects in America. In fact, they had contacted Joy Travel Agency for the said purpose in October 1994. Kaushikbhai was told by the owner of Joy Travels that the expenses of sending one person to America would be around Rs 7,23,000. Kaushikbhai paid Rs 20,000 to the travel agent for himself and Jagdish. While he was nurturing the idea of going to America, the accused seized that opportunity and got acquainted with Kaushikbhai and Jagdish. The accused promised that he would realise their dreams for which he demanded a huge sum. Kaushikbhai expressed his inability to the accused to pay such huge amount for a person to go to America and consequently withdrew his request. The accused, however, could prevail upon him by suggesting that he would arrange a loan for him for the time being through one Ramchandra and he only need to purchase the tickets. On the accused's initiative, Ramchandra visited the house of Kaushikbhai on 1-11-1994 and gave Rs 4,00,000 to him, as instructed by the accused, by way of loan.

10. Kaushikbhai, his wife Jayashree and Jagdish then boarded the train to Bombay Central from Baroda Railway Station. A few of their relatives were present at Railway Station Baroda to see them off to Bombay. The accused reached Bombay Central Railway Station in the early hours of 2-11-1994 and all the three along with the accused went to Hotel Kemps Corner and two Rooms Nos. 202 and 206 were booked in the name of the accused. The accused informed them that all the requisite formalities had been completed and a doctor, who was supposed to issue the medical certificate, would be coming at 4.30 p.m on the same day to the hotel for medical check-up. The accused demanded money for completing other formalities, Rs 60,000 was received from Kaushikbhai and Rs 40,000 was received from Jagdish. A cheque drawn on Punjab National Bank, Anand for Rs 14,50,000, one promissory note of Rs 8,50,000 and Rs 4,37,000 were given to the accused by Kaushikbhai. Later, the accused gave one capsule and two tablets each to Kaushikbhai, Jayashree and Jagdish which they were asked to take before the medical check-up, which they did. Later, Jayashree went to Room No. 202 and Kaushikbhai and Jagdish remained in Room No. 206. Kaushikbhai and Jagdish started feeling drowsiness and a sleeping sensation and they lied down on the bed. The accused then administered an injection on the abdomen of Kaushikbhai who went fast asleep. Jagdish by that time was already fast asleep and that was the last time, they saw the accused. In the midnight, Kaushikbhai regained consciousness, he felt some foul play and alerted the Hotel Manager and they went to the room of Jayashree and got the room opened, but Jayashree was found dead. Intimation was given to Malabar Hill Police Station and the complaint of Kaushikbhai was recorded. The police arrested the accused in November 1994.

11. The trial court as well as the High Court had elaborately discussed the various steps taken by the investigating agency to unravel the truth and hence, we are not dealing with those facts in detail. The prosecution in the case of death of Nilesh examined 17 witnesses. PW 1 to PW 4 are the employees of the hotel and PW 5 and PW 6 are the relatives of the deceased Nilesh. We have also gone through the evidence of other witnesses critically and it is unnecessary to repeat what they have said, since the trial court as well as the High Court had elaborately discussed the evidence given by those witnesses.

12. So far as the death of Nilesh is concerned, there was no eyewitness to the incident and the guilt of the accused could be brought out by the prosecution only by circumstantial evidence. The direct evidence of PW 5 and PW 6 preceded the death of Nilesh. Therefore, it is necessary to deal with their evidence.

13. PW 5 is the sister of the deceased Nilesh by name Sarala Dilip Patel. She had deposed that she knew the accused since 1991. Further, she had deposed that in January 1993, the accused made a proposal about sending the deceased Nilesh to America for which he demanded Rs 3,50,000. The evidence clearly indicates what had happened from 1993 till the death of Nilesh. She stated that after Nilesh had gone to Bombay, his whereabouts were not known. She had also deposed that on 27-3-1994, her husband lodged a complaint at Kandivali Police Station since Nilesh was found missing. Further, they had also noticed the news item which appeared in various newspapers about the arrest of the accused in respect of some other case. On 13-11-1994, her husband had again lodged a complaint as to missing of Nilesh. She had also narrated the steps they had taken on coming to know that her brother Nilesh was missing. The evidence given by this witness is consistent with the case of the prosecution and there is no reason to disbelieve the version of this witness.

14. PW 6 Dilip Patel, the husband of PW 5, had deposed that he knew the accused since 1991 and the accused had come with the proposal for sending Nilesh to America stating that he had good connections with the officials of the American Embassy. The details of the amounts paid for the said purpose was also given, in detail, in his deposition. The details of the various telephone calls he had with the accused before the incident as well as after the incident were minutely stated in his oral evidence.

15. PW 6 had also deposed that he had also gone to Bombay with cash as directed by the accused. Further, he had also deposed that on 8-2-1994, Nilesh had left his house for Bombay and that PW 6 had also gone to Bombay since the accused asked him to meet at Opera House at 11.30 a.m on 8-2-1994. PW 6, it was stated, saw the accused and Nilesh near the bus-stop of Blobe Radio. The accused told him that at about 3.00 p.m on 8-2-1994 he had submitted the papers before the Embassy and asked PW 6 to leave the place stating that the Consulate would not like the presence of too many persons. PW 6, therefore, left the place leaving behind the accused and Nilesh. Nilesh did not return home, search was made and a complaint was lodged on 28-3-1994 at Kandivali Police Station. On 6-9-1994, notice was sent through advocate to Kandivali Police Station.

16. PW 6 also stated that he had met the accused at Village Borsad Chaukadi and the accused gave evasive answers. Later, PW 6 came across a news item in Sandhya Jansatta wherein reference was made to one Dr Jagdish who had committed murder and attempted to commit murder of few other persons. The news item also appeared in other newspapers as well. PW 6 was cross-examined at length but the defence could not demolish his evidence or the evidence of other witnesses including that of PW 5.

17*. The evidence, in this case, proved beyond reasonable doubt that it was the accused who lured Nilesh for sending him to America. The facts would clearly indicate that it was the accused who had extracted money giving false hopes. The deceased was also seen by PW 6 last in the company of the accused. PW 6 had also made payment to the accused for medical expenses. PW 5 and PW 6, therefore, proved the chain and links from the stage of acquaintance with the accused till the stage of Nilesh being seen in the custody or company of the accused, for the purpose of sending Nilesh to America.

18. The prosecution had examined PW 1 to PW 4 to prove the subsequent events and the steps taken. PW 1 to PW 4 were all attached to Hotel Aradhana or guest house of Aradhana. PW 1 is an independent witness — manager of the Hotel Aradhana. He narrated what had happened at his hotel. PW 1 also saw the deceased in the company of the accused. He saw the accused taking Nilesh in Room No. 103 and later coming back alone leaving the hotel without handing over the key at the reception counter. Nothing had been brought out in the cross-examination of these witnesses to contradict what he had stated.

19. The sister of the accused was also examined in this case as PW 14. She had narrated, in detail, the professional and other details of the accused.

20. The evidence of the rest of the witnesses had also been elaborately dealt with by the High Court. The learned counsel appearing for the accused had also not seriously attacked the findings and reasoning given by the trial court as well as the High Court in ordering conviction and his thrust was on the quantum of sentence awarded, and later the death penalty.

21. We have already indicated the modus operandi adopted by the accused in the second case was also almost the same. Few facts of this case have already been dealt in the earlier paragraphs of this judgment and hence, we may directly come to the evidence of the key witnesses in this case. Jayashree, the victim, was poisoned by the accused at Hotel Kemps Corner. PW 1 and PW 5 were direct victims of the accused who fortunately survived. PW 1 was the husband and PW 5 was the brother of Jayashree, the deceased. PW 1 and PW 5 had narrated, in detail, what transpired prior to the incident. The details of the money paid to the accused for sending them to America had been elaborately stated in their oral evidence and the same had been extensively dealt with by the trial court as well as by the High Court, hence, we are not repeating the same. They were cross-examined, at length, by the defence. Nothing was brought out to discredit their version. There was no reason for these witnesses to depose falsely against the accused and they have no motive in doing so. The evidence of PW 1 and PW 5 is consistent and has not been shaken at all by the defence. No doubt has been created about the veracity of their testimony. PW 1 and PW 5 were the direct victims and were also the eyewitnesses to the entire transaction and we have critically gone through the evidence adduced by PW 1 and PW 5 and nothing was brought out to discredit their evidence.

22. The prosecution examined sixteen witnesses, PW 2, PW 4, PW 14 were the staff members of Hotel Kemps Corner. They had narrated, in detail, the manner in which the accused booked the room, paid the amount, took the three witnesses to both the rooms. The hotel witnesses identified the accused in the court as well as in the identification parade. The prosecution examined PW 8, panch witness before whom the accused voluntarily gave statement under Section 27 of the Evidence Act which led to the discovery of huge cash amount, cheques, promissory notes and various articles like passports, rubber stamps, etc.

23. PW 6 was a doctor who examined PW 1 and PW 5 and found they were under the influence of sedatives and in a drowsy condition.

24. We have also gone through, critically, the oral evidence and the documents produced in this case and found no reason to take a different view from that of the trial court and the High Court on conviction. We have also gone through the statement under Section 313 CrPC made by the accused in both the cases which was of total denial of the crime. The accused, a professional, wanted to make quick and easy money and in that process lured people giving false hopes of sending them to America utilising his alleged contacts with the American Embassy. The accused, though educated, brought discredit to his profession and to the dentist community in general. The education and professional standing had no influence on the accused and his only motto was to make quick money and for achieving the same, he would go to any extent and the dentist turned killer gave no value to the human life. The dentist took away the life of two human beings as if he was uprooting two teeth.

25. Nilesh, the deceased, victim in the first case was an unmarried boy of 25 years and yet to become mature enough to know the world around him. All the hopes dashed on the eventful day when he was murdered in a brutal manner not only by inflicting injuries by deadly weapon on vital parts of the body but also injuries on the testis causing him immense suffering and pain.

26. Jayashree, the deceased victim was administered excessive tablets by the dentist turned killer and Jayashree died of that in the night of that fateful day. The medical evidence clearly indicates that Kaushikbhai, Jayashree and Jagdish had taken one capsule and two tablets. The accused had advised them to take the tablets prior to medical check-up so that they must get favourable medical certificates. Kaushikbhai and Jagdish started feeling drowsiness. Kaushikbhai was about to regain consciousness but the accused gave an injection on his abdomen. Kaushikbhai tried to avoid the injection but could not resist due to drowsiness and injection was administered due to which he went fast asleep. Unfortunately, Jayashree succumbed to the poison administered and died.

27. The Bombay High Court noticing the ghastly manner in which the accused had murdered Nilesh as well as Jayashree and poisoned PW 1 and PW 5, considered it as the rarest of rare cases warranting death sentence.

28. The High Court heard the arguments of the advocate for the accused as well as the prosecutor on the point as to whether the High Court could enhance the sentence of the accused from life to death. Having noticed that the High Court has the power to enhance the sentence from life imprisonment to death, the High Court issued a notice on 1-12-2005 Criminal Appeal No. 46 of 2000 to the accused to show cause why the sentence of life imprisonment be not enhanced to death sentence. The operative portion of the order reads as follows:

“We have heard the arguments of the learned advocate for the petitioner as well as the learned APP for the State for quite some time on two occasions. In exercise of suo motu powers and on the basis of the judgment of the Supreme Court, it will be necessary to hear the accused as to why his sentence should not be enhanced from life imprisonment to death. Therefore, the accused be produced by the Kalyan District Prison Authorities before this Court on 12-12-2005. The learned counsel to inform the Jailor, Kalyan District Prison Authorities that the matter is kept on 12-12-2005.”
(emphasis supplied)

29. The accused was produced before the Court on 12-12-2005 but the advocate representing the accused was absent. Consequently, the matter was adjourned to 13-12-2005. On 13-12-2005, the accused as well as his advocate were present and the Court on 13-12-2005 recorded the following statement of the accused which reads as follows:

“(The accused understands English. He gives the statement in English. We are recording the same in his own language.) I am not involved in the case. The travel agent should also have been implicated in this case. I am not involved. I am not guilty. (Repeatedly the accused was informed by us about the nature of the show-cause notice given. He made the aforesaid statement and he does not want to say any more.
Matter adjourned to 22-12-2005 at 3.00 p.m for judgment. The accused to be produced on that day.”
(emphasis supplied)

30. Mr Sushil Karanjakar, learned advocate appearing for the accused submitted that the High Court has not followed the procedure laid down under Section 235(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (for short “CrPC”) before enhancing the sentence of life imprisonment to death. The learned counsel pointed out that having regard to the object and the setting in which the new provision of Section 235(2) was inserted in the 1973 Code, there can be no doubt that it is one of the most fundamental parts of the criminal procedure and non-compliance therewith will ex facie vitiate the order. In support of his contention, the learned counsel placed reliance on the judgment of this Court in Santa Singh v. State of Punjab (1976) 4 SCC 190 and a recent judgment in Rajesh Kumar v. State (2011) 13 SCC 706.

31. Mr Shankar Chillarge, learned counsel appearing for the State, submitted that in the facts and circumstances of this case, the High Court was justified in according maximum sentence of death penalty, since on facts, it was found to be the rarest of rare cases and the test laid down by this Court in Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab (1980) 2 SCC 684 has been fully satisfied.

32. The learned prosecutor submitted that this is a case of double murder and attempt to commit murder of two others and the manner in which the same was executed was gruesome. Further, it was pointed out that the procedure laid down under Section 235(2) CrPC was fully complied with and there is no reason to upset the conviction/sentence awarded by the High Court.

33. We heard the learned counsel on either side on this point at length. The original file made available to this Court did not contain the copy of the show-cause notice dated 1-12-2005 Criminal Appeal No. 46 of 2000 issued by the High Court as well as the full text of the order passed by the High Court on 13-12-2005 Criminal Appeal No. 46 of 2000 recording the statement of the accused. We passed an order on 11-4-2012 Criminal Appeal No. 864 of 2006 to produce the original files to examine whether the High Court had followed the procedure laid down under Section 235(2) CrPC. The records were made available and we went through those records with great care. We have also perused the full text of the show-cause notice dated 1-12-2005 Criminal Appeal No. 46 of 2000 issued by the High Court and the statement recorded by the High Court under Section 235(2) CrPC after summoning the accused.

34. We have to examine whether the High Court has properly appreciated the purpose and object of Section 235(2) CrPC and applied the same bearing in mind the fact that they are taking away the life of a human being.

35. Section 235 CrPC in its entirety is extracted for reference:

“235. Judgment of acquittal or conviction.—(1) After hearing arguments and points of law (if any), the Judge shall give a judgment in the case.
(2) If the accused is convicted, the Judge shall, unless he proceeds in accordance with the provisions of Section 360, hear the accused on the question of sentence, and then pass sentence on him according to law.”

36. The necessity of inserting sub-section (2) was highlighted by the Law Commission in its 48th Report which reads as follows:

It is now being increasingly recognised that a rational and consistent sentencing policy requires the removal of several deficiencies in the present system. One such deficiency is the lack of comprehensive information as to the characteristics and background of the offender. The aims of sentencing become all the more so in the absence of information on which the correctional process is to operate. The public as well as the courts themselves are in the dark about the judicial approach in this regard. We are of the view that the taking of evidence as to the circumstances relevant to sentencing should be encouraged, and both the prosecution and the accused should be allowed to cooperate in the process.
(emphasis supplied)

37. The Law Commission in its Report had opined that the taking of evidence as to the circumstances relevant to sentencing should be encouraged in the process. Parliament, it is seen, has accepted the recommendation of the Law Commission fully and has enacted sub-section (2).

38. The scope of the abovementioned provision has come up for consideration before the Apex Court on various occasions. Reference to few of the judgments is apposite. The courts are unanimous in their view that sub-section (2) of Section 235 clearly states that the hearing has to be given to the accused on the question of sentence, but the question is what is the object and purpose of hearing and what are the matters to be elicited from the accused. Of course, full opportunity has to be given to produce adequate materials before the court and, if found necessary, the Court may also give an opportunity to lead evidence. Evidence on what, the evidence which has some relevance on the question of sentence and not on conviction. But the further question to be examined is whether, in the absence of adding any materials by the accused, has the court any duty to elicit any information from whatever sources before awarding sentence, especially capital punishment? The psychological trauma which a convict undergoes on hearing that he would be awarded capital sentence, that is, death, has to be borne in mind by the court. The convict could be a completely shattered person, may not be in his normal senses, may be dumbfounded, unable to speak anything. Can, in such a situation, the court presume that he has nothing to speak or mechanically record what he states, without making any conscious effort to elicit relevant information, which has some bearing in awarding a proper and adequate sentence? Awarding death sentence is always an exception, only in the rarest of rare cases.

39. In Santa Singh (1976) 4 SCC 190, this Court has extensively dealt with the nature and scope of Section 235(2) CrPC stating that such a provision was introduced in consonance with the modern trends in penology and sentencing procedures. The Court noticed that today more than ever before, sentencing has become a delicate task, requiring an interdisciplinary approach and calling for skills and talents very much different from those ordinarily expected of lawyers. In Santa Singh (1976) 4 SCC 190, the Court found that the requirements of Section 235(2) were not complied with, inasmuch as no opportunity was given to the appellant, after recording his conviction, to produce material and make submissions in regard to the sentence to be imposed on him. The Court noticed in that case that the Sessions Court chose to inflict death sentence on the accused and the possibility could not be ruled out that if the accused had been given an opportunity to produce material and make submissions on the question of sentence, as contemplated by Section 235(2), he might have been in a position to persuade the Sessions Court to impose a lesser penalty of life imprisonment. The Court, therefore, held that the breach of the mandatory requirement of Section 235(2) could not, in the circumstances, be ignored as inconsequential and it can vitiate the sentence of death imposed by the Sessions Court. The Court, therefore, allowed the appeal and set aside the sentence of death and remanded the case to the Sessions Court with a direction to pass appropriate sentence after giving an opportunity to the accused to be heard.

40. Further, in Santa Singh (1976) 4 SCC 190, the Court also held as follows:

“4. … the hearing contemplated by Section 235(2) is not confined merely to hearing oral submissions, but it is also intended to give an opportunity to the prosecution and the accused to place before the court facts and material relating to various factors bearing on the question of sentence and if they are contested by either side, then to produce evidence for the purpose of establishing the same.”
(emphasis supplied)

41. The above issue again came up before this Court in Dagdu v. State of Maharashtra (1977) 3 SCC 68 wherein the three-Judge Bench, referring to the judgment in Santa Singh (1976) 4 SCC 190, held as follows: (Dagdu case (1977) 3 SCC 68)

“79. … The Court, on convicting an accused, must unquestionably hear him on the question of sentence. But if, for any reason, it omits to do so and the accused makes a grievance of it in the higher court, it would be open to that court to remedy the breach by giving a hearing to the accused on the question of sentence.”

It further held as follows: (Dagdu case (1977) 3 SCC 68)

“80. … for a proper and effective implementation of the provision contained in Section 235(2), it is not always necessary to remand the matter to the court which has recorded the conviction. … Remand is an exception, not a rule, and ought therefore to be avoided as far as possible in the interests of expeditious, though fair, disposal of cases.”

42. Again in Muniappan v. State of T.N (1981) 3 SCC 11, AIR 1981 SC 1220 this Court held as follows:

“2. … The obligation to hear the accused on the question of sentence which is imposed by Section 235(2) of the Criminal Procedure Code is not discharged by putting a formal question to the accused as to what he has to say on the question of sentence. The Judge must make a genuine effort to elicit from the accused all information which will eventually bear on the question of sentence.”

43. Later, in Allauddin Mian v. State of Bihar (1989) 3 SCC 5, this Court also considered the effect of non-compliance with Section 235(2) CrPC and held that the provision is mandatory. The operative portion of the judgment reads as follows:

“10. … The requirement of hearing the accused is intended to satisfy the rule of natural justice. It is a fundamental requirement of fair play that the accused who was hitherto concentrating on the prosecution evidence on the question of guilt should, on being found guilty, be asked if he has anything to say or any evidence to tender on the question of sentence. This is all the more necessary since the courts are generally required to make the choice from a wide range of discretion in the matter of sentencing. To assist the court in determining the correct sentence to be imposed the legislature introduced sub-section (2) to Section 235. The said provision therefore satisfies a dual purpose; it satisfies the rule of natural justice by according to the accused an opportunity of being heard on the question of sentence and at the same time helps the court to choose the sentence to be awarded. Since the provision is intended to give the accused an opportunity to place before the court all the relevant material having a bearing on the question of sentence there can be no doubt that the provision is salutary and must be strictly followed. It is clearly mandatory and should not be treated as a mere formality.”

44. Later, the three-Judge Bench in Malkiat Singh v. State of Punjab (1991) 4 SCC 341 indicated the necessity of adjourning the case to a future date after convicting the accused and held as follows:

“18. On finding that the accused committed the charged offences, Section 235(2) of the Code empowers the Judge that he shall pass sentence on him according to law on hearing him. Hearing contemplated is not confined merely to oral hearing but also intended to afford an opportunity to the prosecution as well as the accused to place before the court facts and material relating to various factors on the question of sentence, and if interested by either side, to have evidence adduced to show mitigating circumstances to impose a lesser sentence or aggravating grounds to impose death penalty. Therefore, sufficient time must be given to the accused or the prosecution on the question of sentence, to show grounds on which the prosecution may plead or the accused may show that the maximum sentence of death may be the appropriate sentence or the minimum sentence of life imprisonment may be awarded, as the case may be.”

45. This Court in a recent judgment in Rajesh Kumar (2011) 13 SCC 706 examined at length the evaluation of sentencing policy and the concept of mitigating circumstances in India relating to the death penalty. The meaning and content of the expression “hearing the accused” under Section 235(2) and the scope of Sections 354(3) and 465 CrPC were elaborately considered. The Court held that the object of hearing under Section 235(2) CrPC being intrinsically and inherently connected with the sentencing procedure, the provisions of Section 354(3) CrPC which call for recording of special reason for awarding death sentence, must be read conjointly. The Court held that such special reasons can only be validly recorded if an effective opportunity of hearing as contemplated under Section 235(2) CrPC is genuinely extended and is allowed to be exercised by the accused who stands convicted and is awaiting the sentence.

46. In our view, the principles laid down in the above-cited judgments squarely apply to the question of awarding of sentence and we find from the records that the High Court has only mechanically recorded what the accused has said and no attempt has been made to elicit any information or particulars from the accused or the prosecution which are relevant for awarding a proper sentence. The accused, of course, was informed by the Court of the nature of the show-cause notice. What was the nature of the show-cause notice? The nature of the show-cause notice was whether the life sentence awarded by the trial court be not enhanced to death penalty. No genuine effort has been made by the High Court to elicit any information either from the accused or the prosecution as to whether any circumstance exists which might influence the High Court to avoid and not to award death sentence.

47. Awarding death sentence is an exception, not the rule, and only in the rarest of rare cases, the court could award death sentence. The state of mind of a person awaiting death sentence and the state of mind of a person who has been awarded life sentence may not be the same mentally and psychologically. The court has got a duty and obligation to elicit relevant facts even if the accused has kept totally silent in such situations. In the instant case, the High Court has not addressed the issue in the correct perspective bearing in mind those relevant factors, while questioning the accused and, therefore, committed a gross error of procedure in not properly assimilating and understanding the purpose and object behind Section 235(2) CrPC.

48**. In such circumstances, we are inclined to set aside the death sentence awarded by the High Court and remit the matter to the High Court to follow Section 235(2) CrPC in accordance with the principles laid down. The conviction awarded by the High Court, however, stands confirmed. The High Court is requested to pass fresh orders preferably within a period of six months from the date of the receipt of the copy of this order. The appeal is allowed to that extent.