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Ram Dhan v. State Of Uttar Pradesh And Another

Supreme Court Of India
Apr 10, 2012
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Factual and Procedural Background

In 1995 the petitioner, Ram Dhan, lodged an FIR alleging that his son, Dinesh, had been kidnapped. After investigation, Balraj @ Billu and others were tried under Section 364 read with Section 149 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) and, on 11-5-2005, were convicted and sentenced to nine years’ rigorous imprisonment with a fine of ₹5,000.

During the pendency of the convicts’ appeal, Dinesh returned home and publicly stated that he had never been kidnapped but had voluntarily gone to Punjab for work. Balraj then lodged an FIR on 29-8-2009 against the petitioner under Sections 177, 181, 182, 195 and 420 IPC for furnishing false information and fabricating evidence. A charge-sheet was filed on 23-11-2009.

The petitioner applied for discharge under Section 239 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC), contending that the prosecution was barred by Sections 195 and 340 CrPC because no complaint had been filed by the court itself. The Chief Judicial Magistrate, Baghpat, rejected the application on 3-9-2011. A criminal revision (No. 4259/2011) was dismissed by the Allahabad High Court on 14-11-2011. The petitioner then approached the Supreme Court by way of the present petition.

The Supreme Court noted that the petitioner had earlier invoked Section 482 CrPC to quash the same charge-sheet and that the High Court had dismissed that petition on 3-2-2010—an order the petitioner failed to disclose in the current proceedings.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether prosecution of the petitioner under Sections 177, 181, 182 and 195 IPC is barred by Sections 195 and 340 CrPC in the absence of a complaint by the concerned court.
  2. Whether the petitioner was entitled to discharge under Section 239 CrPC despite the prior High Court order refusing to quash the charge-sheet.
  3. Whether suppression of the earlier Section 482 CrPC order constituted an abuse of the process of the court warranting dismissal of the petition.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments

  • The offences alleged arose out of statements made in court; therefore, under Sections 195 and 340 CrPC, proceedings could be initiated only on a complaint by the court, not by a private party (the convict Balraj).
  • Consequently, the FIR and the subsequent charge-sheet were void ab initio and the petitioner was entitled to be discharged under Section 239 CrPC.

The opinion does not record separate arguments on behalf of the State or the respondents.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Sachida Nand Singh v. State of Bihar, (1998) 2 SCC 493 Section 195 CrPC is not attracted when fabrication of evidence occurs outside the court, even if later used in court. Relied upon to hold that offences under Sections 177 and 182 IPC lie wholly outside the court’s confines; hence, a court complaint is unnecessary and the petitioner’s Section 195/340 argument fails.
Balasubramaniam v. State, (2002) 7 SCC 649 Reaffirmed the principle that an offence of fabricating evidence outside the court does not mandate a prior court complaint. Cited as additional authority reinforcing the view taken in Sachida Nand Singh.
Abdul Rehman v. K.M. Anees-Ul-Haq, (2011) 10 SCC 696 Considered by the petitioner to support the necessity of a court complaint. The Court distinguished this decision, noting that it did not consider the larger-Bench ruling in Sachida Nand Singh, and therefore found it unpersuasive.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Supreme Court first observed that the petitioner suppressed the material fact that his earlier Section 482 CrPC petition to quash the charge-sheet had been dismissed on 3-2-2010 and had attained finality. This non-disclosure alone, in the Court’s view, justified dismissal of the current petition for abuse of process.

On the substantive issue, the Court examined the statutory framework and precedent. Sections 177 and 182 IPC criminalise the furnishing of false information and do not require that such acts occur in court. Section 195 IPC (giving or fabricating false evidence) may also involve conduct outside the courtroom. Consequently, the bar under Sections 195 and 340 CrPC—which applies only when the offence is committed in or relates directly to proceedings of a court—was deemed inapplicable.

Relying on the larger-Bench decision in Sachida Nand Singh, the Court concluded that a court complaint was unnecessary for offences alleged to have been committed extraneously. The petitioner’s reliance on Abdul Rehman was rejected because that judgment had not considered Sachida Nand Singh and thus lacked precedential weight on this point.

Given these findings, and the prior High Court order dismissing the Section 482 petition, the Court held that the Chief Judicial Magistrate and the High Court were correct in refusing discharge under Section 239 CrPC.

Holding and Implications

The petition is dismissed.

Immediate Effect: The criminal proceedings based on the 23-11-2009 charge-sheet will continue against the petitioner and the co-accused.

Broader Implications: The decision re-affirms the principle that offences under Sections 177, 181 and 182 IPC do not attract the procedural bar of Sections 195 and 340 CrPC when the wrongful act occurs outside court proceedings. No new legal precedent is created; rather, existing precedent in Sachida Nand Singh is reiterated.

Show all summary ...

Dr B.S Chauhan, J.— This petition has been filed against the judgment and order dated 14-11-2011 passed by the High Court of Judicature of Allahabad in Ramdhan v. State of U.P Criminal Revision No. 4259 of 2011 by which the High Court has rejected the said revision petition against the impugned order dated 3-9-2011 passed by the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Bagpat, rejecting the application under Section 239 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (hereinafter called “CrPC”).

2. The facts and circumstances giving rise to this petition are that the present petitioner Ram Dhan lodged an FIR dated 4-6-1995 alleging that his son Dinesh had disappeared and, subsequently, filed a complaint against Balraj alias Billu and others (the respondents) under Section 364 of the Penal Code, 1860 (hereinafter called “IPC”). The investigating agency concluded the investigation and filed a charge-sheet on the basis of which trial commenced against the respondents Balraj, etc. and the trial court vide judgment and order dated 11-5-2005 convicted Respondent 2, Balraj and others for the offences punishable under Section 364 read with Section 149 IPC and awarded sentence of 9 years' rigorous imprisonment and imposed a fine of Rs 5000.

3. Being aggrieved, Balraj, Respondent 2 and others preferred an appeal before the High Court of Allahabad which was admitted and Respondent 2 and other convicts were granted bail by the High Court. The petitioner's son for whose kidnapping Balraj, Respondent 2 and others had been convicted, came back home and disclosed to the public as well as to the police that he had not been kidnapped, rather had voluntarily gone to Punjab, where he had worked for several years. Balraj, Respondent 2 realised that he had been wrongly enroped and convicted in the offence by the petitioner. Thus, he filed an FIR on 29-8-2009 under Sections 177, 181, 182, 195 and 420 IPC. After investigating the case, charge-sheet was filed against the petitioner and others under Sections 177, 181, 182 and 195 IPC on 23-11-2009.

4. The petitioner filed an application under Section 239 CrPC before the Chief Judicial Magistrate contending that the FIR at the behest of Respondent 2, Balraj was not maintainable in view of the provisions of Section 195 read with Section 340 CrPC. The Chief Judicial Magistrate rejected the said application vide order dated 3-9-2011. The petitioner challenged the said order dated 3-9-2011 by filing a criminal revision before the High Court which has been dismissed vide impugned order dated 14-11-2011 Criminal Revision No. 4259 of 2011. Hence, this petition.

5. Shri Ashok Kumar Sharma, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, has vehemently contended that the prosecution of the petitioner is illegal and liable to be quashed in view of the provisions of Sections 195 and 340 CrPC, for the reason that as the offence has been committed in the court, such a drastic action can be taken against the petitioner only on a complaint lodged by the court and not by the convict/Respondent 2.

6. We find no merit in the petition. After investigation, charge-sheet has been filed against the petitioner and others under Sections 177, 181, 182 and 195 IPC. The petitioner has suppressed the material fact and has not disclosed anywhere in this petition that he had approached the High Court under Section 482 CrPC for quashing of the charge-sheet, which stood rejected vide order dated 3-2-2010 and the said order attained finality as has not been challenged any further. Thus, he is guilty of suppressing the material fact which makes the petition liable to be dismissed only on this sole ground.

7. We are of the view that it was necessary for the petitioner to disclose such a relevant fact. The learned Chief Judicial Magistrate while deciding the application under Section 239 CrPC has made reference to the said order of the High Court dated 3-2-2010. We had been deprived of the opportunity to scrutinise the charge-sheet as well as the order of the High Court dated 3-2-2010 and to ascertain as to whether the grievance of the petitioner in respect of the application of the provisions of Section 195 read with Section 340 CrPC had been raised in that petition and as to whether even if such plea has not been taken whether the petitioner can be permitted to raise such a plea subsequently.

8. In such a fact situation, the courts below may be right to the extent that the question of discharge under Section 239 CrPC was totally unwarranted in view of the order passed by the High Court on 3-2-2010. For the reasons best known to the petitioner, neither the copy of the charge-sheet nor of the order dated 3-2-2010 passed by the High Court have been placed on record.

9. Be that as it may, the charge-sheet has been filed under Sections 177, 181, 182, 195 and 420 IPC. Section 177 IPC deals with an offence furnishing false information. Section 181 IPC deals with false statement on oath. Section 182 IPC deals with false information with intent to cause public servant to use his lawful power to the injury of another person. Section 195 IPC deals with giving or fabricating false evidence with intent to procure conviction of offence punishable with imprisonment for life or imprisonment.

10*. At least the provisions of Sections 177 and 182 deal with the cases totally outside the court. Therefore, the question of attracting the provisions of Sections 195 and 340 CrPC does not arise. Section 195 IPC makes the fabrication of false evidence punishable. It is not necessary that the fabrication of false evidence takes place only inside the court as it can also be fabricated outside the court though has been used in the court. Therefore, it may also not attract the provisions of Section 195 CrPC. (See Sachida Nand Singh v. State of Bihar (1998) 2 SCC 493.)

11. Mr Ashok Kumar Sharma, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, has placed a very heavy reliance on the judgment of this Court in Abdul Rehman v. K.M Anees-Ul-Haq (2011) 10 SCC 696, JT (2011) 13 SC 271. However, it is evident from the judgment relied upon that the judgment in Sachida Nand Singh (1998) 2 SCC 493, which is of a larger Bench, has not been brought to the notice of the Court. (See also Balasubramaniam v. State (2002) 7 SCC 649.)

12. The petitioner is guilty of suppressing the material fact. Admittedly, filing of successive petitions before the court amounts to abuse of the process of the court. Thus, we are not inclined to examine the issue any further.

13. Considering the composite nature of the offences, we do not see any cogent reason to interfere with the impugned order. The petition lacks merit and is, accordingly, dismissed.