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Subhash Krishnan v. State Of Goa .
Factual and Procedural Background
On 10-10-2003 six accused (A-1 to A-6) allegedly abducted, wrongfully confined and murdered Shanu Komarpant at Galjibaga, South Goa. Witnesses stated that after a public assault involving a sword, knife and bamboo stick, the unconscious victim was placed in a Maruti van driven by the assailants; his body was found the next morning hanging from a cashew tree. A crime was registered on the basis of a telephonic message and a written complaint (Exh. 96) by PW-2. A-1 to A-4 were convicted by the trial court for conspiracy and murder (Sections 120-B, 302/34 IPC) but acquitted of charges under Sections 342, 504 and 364/34 IPC; A-5 and A-6 were acquitted altogether.
The State and the convicted accused filed cross-appeals. By a common judgment the High Court of Bombay at Goa dismissed the defence appeals and partly allowed the State appeal, additionally convicting A-1 to A-4 under Sections 342 and 364/34 IPC. A-3’s special leave petition was earlier dismissed. The present Supreme Court appeals were filed solely by A-2, challenging both the trial and High Court judgments.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the conviction of A-2 was sustainable despite the absence of cross-examination of PW-2, the author of the FIR (Exh. 96).
- Whether the Test Identification Parade (TIP) and in-court identifications were reliable and conducted in accordance with law.
- Whether discrepancies between medical and ocular evidence, especially regarding injuries to co-accused A-4, undermined the prosecution case.
- Whether the ingredients of abduction and wrongful confinement under Sections 342 and 364/34 IPC were made out against A-2.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant A-2
- Exh. 96 was unproved because PW-2 was not cross-examined; therefore the entire genesis of the prosecution case collapsed.
- Name of A-2 was absent from the FIR; he was a “total stranger” and should have been acquitted like A-5 and A-6.
- No cut injuries were found on the deceased, contradicting the alleged use of a talwar by A-2.
- TIP was belated and procedurally flawed: non-similar dummies, prior exposure to police, and witnesses observed the assault from 70 metres away for only 4-5 minutes.
- Medical/ocular conflict: witnesses failed to mention the grievous head injury actually suffered by A-4.
State Respondent
- TIP was properly conducted; the Magistrate allowed A-2 to change his shirt to eliminate prejudice, and no cross-examination suggested procedural defects.
- PWs 14 and 33 had not seen A-2 or his photograph before TIP; additional witnesses (PWs 16, 23, 26, 27, 34) made dock identifications.
- Independent evidence connected A-2: PW-21 (owner) proved he borrowed the Maruti van; PW-25 saw him in the van during the initial search for the deceased; police intercepted the van with weapons and blood-stained clothes.
- Forensic report showed blood group “A” of the deceased on A-2’s red shirt whereas A-2’s blood group is O+.
- High Court correctly applied Sections 342 and 364 IPC because the unconscious victim was forcibly taken away and later killed.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Mohanlal Gangaram Gehani v. State of Maharashtra (1982) 1 SCC 700 | Delay or shortcomings in TIP may render identification unreliable. | Distinguished; Court held the gap between incident (10-10-2003) and TIP (3-11-2003) was not excessive. |
| Manzoor v. State of U.P. (1982) 2 SCC 72 | General propositions on identification evidence. | Referred by defence; not accepted as facts differed. |
| Raju @ Rajendra v. State of Maharashtra (1998) 1 SCC 169 | TIP held 1½ years after incident unreliable. | Held inapplicable because present TIP occurred within about three weeks. |
| Kanan v. State of Kerala (1979) 3 SCC 319 | Necessity of TIP where witness had no prior acquaintance. | Found inapplicable; witnesses had prior acquaintance or timely TIP. |
| Ganga Prasad v. State of U.P. (1987) 2 SCC 232; Balaka Singh v. State of Punjab (1975) 4 SCC 511; State of U.P. v. Abdul Karim (2007) 13 SCC 569; Animireddy V. Ramana v. Public Prosecutor (2008) 5 SCC 368 | Various principles on appreciation of identification and eyewitness testimony. | Cited by defence; Court did not find the factual matrix comparable. |
| Sayed Darain Ahsan v. State of W.B. (2012) 4 SCC 352; Dana Yadav v. State of Bihar (2002) 7 SCC 295; Manu Sharma v. State (NCT of Delhi) (2010) 6 SCC 1 | Weight to be given to identification evidence and corroborative circumstances. | Supported prosecution’s view that TIP and corroboration sufficed. |
| Pramod Mandal v. State of Bihar (2004) 13 SCC 150; Pravin v. State of M.P. (2008) 16 SCC 166; Ashok Kumar v. State (Delhi Admn.) 1995 Supp (3) SCC 626 | General credibility of eyewitnesses. | Cited to bolster prosecution stance; court agreed. |
| Satish Narayan Sawant v. State of Goa (2009) 17 SCC 724 | Court not helpless if informant unavailable; investigation can proceed on other evidence. | Relied upon to reject argument that absence of PW-2’s cross-examination vitiated the case. |
| State of U.P. v. Bhagwant Kishore Joshi AIR 1964 SC 221 and H.N. Rishbud v. State of Delhi AIR 1955 SC 196 | Definition and stages of “investigation” under CrPC. | Cited to uphold propriety of investigation initiated on telephonic information and Exh. 96. |
| Simon v. State of Karnataka (2004) 2 SCC 694; Daya Singh v. State of Haryana (2001) 3 SCC 468 | TIP is only a rule of prudence; in-court ID can suffice if credible. | Used to affirm that even without TIP, credible dock identification is admissible; here both existed. |
| Thaman Kumar v. State (UT of Chandigarh) (2003) 6 SCC 380; Khambam Raja Reddy v. Public Prosecutor (2006) 11 SCC 239 | Prosecution’s duty to explain injuries on accused. | Court found injuries on A-4 satisfactorily explained; precedent did not aid appellant. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
1. Validity of FIR and Investigation: Although PW-2 was unavailable for cross-examination, the Court held that Exh. 96 lawfully set the investigative machinery in motion; multiple other eyewitnesses testified and were thoroughly cross-examined. Relying on Satish Narayan Sawant and earlier Supreme Court jurisprudence on “investigation”, the Court found no legal infirmity.
2. Identification Evidence: The Special Judicial Magistrate (PW-30) conducted a TIP on 3-11-2003. Objections raised by A-2 (change of shirt) were accommodated. PWs 14 & 33 unhesitatingly identified A-2; no cross-examination revealed procedural defects. Additional in-court identifications by PWs 16, 23, 26, 27 & 34 provided corroboration. Citing Simon, Dana Yadav and Daya Singh, the Court emphasised that TIP is a safeguard, not a substantive requirement, and that the combined TIP and dock identifications were reliable.
3. Medical and Forensic Corroboration: Post-mortem (PW-9) recorded 36 injuries, most compatible with the blunt side of a talwar (Ext. 12) wielded by A-2. FSL results confirmed the deceased’s blood (Group A) on A-2’s red shirt, while A-2’s own blood group is O+. Apparent discrepancies regarding A-4’s head injury were rationalised: possibility of self-infliction during the melee and absence of contrary evidence from the defence.
4. Distance and Duration Objections: The assault occurred at 4:30 p.m. in daylight; eyewitnesses viewed events from the entrance of Marina Stores (~70 m away). The Court held that a violent group assault lasting 4-5 minutes with distinctive weapons would be clearly observable, rejecting conjectures about visual impossibility.
5. Offences under Sections 342 & 364 IPC: By rendering the victim unconscious and forcibly transporting him in a van, the assailants curtailed his liberty and abducted him to facilitate murder. The Court, echoing the High Court’s analysis, found that all statutory ingredients of wrongful confinement and abduction with intent to murder were satisfied.
6. Cumulative Assessment: The independent testimonies, corroborative medical and forensic evidence, proper identification, and ownership/travel of the Maruti van together established A-2’s participation with common intention under Sections 120-B, 302, 342 & 364 read with Section 34 IPC. Defence precedents were either distinguishable on facts or did not negate the prosecution’s case.
Holding and Implications
Appeals Dismissed. The Supreme Court affirmed the High Court’s judgment, upholding A-2’s convictions for conspiracy, murder, wrongful confinement and abduction, and his sentence of life imprisonment plus fine.
Implications: The decision brings finality to the litigation for A-2 and reiterates established principles on (i) the non-fatal effect of an unavailable informant when other evidence exists, and (ii) the evidentiary value of combined TIP and in-court identifications. No new legal precedent was created beyond application of existing doctrine.
F.M Ibrahim Kalifulla, J.— Leave granted in SLP (Crl.) No. 3966 of 2010. These appeals have been preferred by the second accused (A-2). Though in all eight persons were accused of the alleged offences, records reveal that A-7 and A-8 were absconding even at the time of filing of the charge-sheet and hence as many as six accused persons were charge-sheeted for the offences under Section 120-B read with Section 302 IPC, Sections 342, 364, 504 read with Section 34 IPC for the alleged abduction, wrongful confinement and killing the deceased, Shanu Komarpant on 10-10-2003. A-5 and A-6 were acquitted by the trial court giving benefit of doubt while A-1 to A-4 were acquitted of charges under Sections 342, 504 and 364 read with Section 34 IPC. A-1 to A-4 were, however, convicted for offences under Sections 120-B, 302 read with Section 34 IPC and were imposed with the sentence of life imprisonment apart from a fine of Rs 5000 each, in default to undergo further three months' rigorous imprisonment.
2. A-1 to A-4 preferred individual appeals being Criminal Appeals Nos. 7, 12 and 13 of 2007. The appeal preferred by A-2 was Criminal Appeal No. 13 of 2007. The State preferred Criminal Appeal No. 6 of 2008 against the acquittal of charges under Sections 342, 504 and 364 read with Section 34 IPC and the total acquittal of A-5 and A-6. All the appeals were tried together and by a common judgment 12 and 13 of 2007 and 6 of 2008 impugned in these appeals, the High Court dismissed the appeal filed by the accused and the State appeal being Criminal Appeal No. 6 of 2008 was partly allowed, whereunder, A-1 to A-4 were also convicted for offences under Sections 342 and 364 read with Section 34 IPC. The High Court held that the conviction of the said accused would, therefore, be for all the offences including offences under Sections 342, 364 read with Section 34 IPC.
3. At the outset, it has to be mentioned that as against the common judgment of the High Court, an appeal was stated to have been preferred by A-3. However, it was dismissed at the stage of preliminary hearing. The review preferred by A-3 in Sanjay Gadekar v. State of Goa Review Petition (Cri) No. 115 of 2011 was also dismissed on 9-3-2011.
4. According to the case of the prosecution, on 10-10-2003, A-1 to A-6 went to the garage of Shanu Komarpant (hereinafter called “the deceased”) in a white-coloured Maruti van and enquired about his whereabouts. The friend of the deceased by name Alex Viegas who was present at that time in the auto garage noticed the belligerent behaviour of the accused persons, and informed about the same to his cousin, the complainant, Avelino Viegas (PW 2) and proceeded to the house of the deceased, that there they met the deceased and informed him about the anxious enquiries made by the accused about his whereabouts. It is stated that the deceased himself wanted to straightaway go and meet A-1 with a view to arrive at some settlement relating to an issue relating to a love affair and in that view the deceased along with PW 2 and Alex Viegas went to the place of occurrence on two motorcycles, one driven by PW 2 along with the deceased and the other hired by Alex Viegas and that after reaching the place of occurrence when the deceased asked A-1 as to what purpose he was searching for him, the accused persons are stated to have assaulted the deceased with knife, sword and bamboo stick (danda) and gave kick-blows by hand (sic fist-blows) in the middle of the road viewed by persons standing nearby. It is further stated that PW 2 was held by A-1 from extending any help to the deceased and save him from the assault by the other accused while Alex Viegas is stated to have been directed by PW 2 to fetch other people for saving the deceased from the severe onslaught meted out to him. The said assault is stated to have taken place at 4.30 p.m on 10-10-2003 on the road at Galjibaga in the vicinity of Saint Anthony's High School within the limits of Canacona Police Station of South Goa District.
5. After the severe assault on the deceased, it is stated that A-2 brought a white-coloured Maruti van to the spot in which the deceased was stated to have been placed in the dicky and the van proceeded towards Talpona side. Based on a telephonic information about the above incident recorded by PW 35 and at his instance, the crime was stated to have been registered which was subsequently registered based on the complaint of PW 2 for offences under Sections 302, 342, 504, 364 and 120-B IPC read with Section 34 IPC in Crime No. 32 of 2003. Based on the information received and the registration number of the Maruti van in which the deceased was carried, the police is stated to have alerted the check-post and that the Maruti van was intercepted at Assolna around 5.45 p.m to 6 p.m on the same day when accused A-1 was found driving the vehicle with the other accused persons in the van in which the knife, sword, bamboo stick (danda) and a right foot chappal with bloodstains were recovered. Shailesh Gadekar (A-4) had an injury on his forehead who was sent to Primary Health Centre, Bali along with A-5 and A-6 and that from there he was shifted to Hospicio Hospital of Margao. All of them were subsequently arrested by the police.
6. At the instance of A-1, the body of the deceased was discovered in the morning of 11-10-2003 which was found hanging to the branch of a cashew tree in an isolated place alongside the road at Village Onshi. The bloodstained clothes of the deceased and his left foot chappal with bloodstains were stated to have been recovered along with his belongings, as well as the nylon rope with which the body was found hanging. After holding the inquest on the body of the victim the body was stated to have been sent for post-mortem. PW 9 was the post-mortem doctor who noted the injuries on the deceased numbering 36. PW 15 examined A-4 for the injuries sustained by him and issued the certificate about the nature of the injuries found on him.
7. The prosecution examined 35 witnesses. The FSL report relating to the bloodstains found on the various articles seized revealed the blood group of the deceased as A.
8. When the accused were questioned under Section 313 CrPC A-4 stated that 4 to 5 persons and two other motorcyclists assaulted him with a sword when he was waiting at a bus-stop at Canacona at 4.30 p.m on 10-10-2003, that pursuant to the said assault he fell unconscious on the spot and thereafter regained consciousness only at the hospital at Margao. A-3, A-5 and A-6 stated that they went to see A-4 in the hospital on the evening of 10-10-2003 where they were stated to have been taken into custody by the police. A-1 and A-2 made total denial of the offence in their questioning under Section 313 CrPC. As stated earlier, the trial court acquitted A-5 and A-6 and convicted A-1 to A-4 for offences under Sections 302 and 120-B read with Section 34 IPC and acquitted them for the offences under Sections 342, 504 and 364 read with Section 34 IPC.
9. Assailing the judgment 12 and 13 of 2007 and 6 of 2008 of the High Court as well as of the trial court, Mr Jaspal Singh, learned Senior Counsel made elaborate submissions. The sum and substance of the submissions of the learned Senior Counsel was as under:
(a) Ext. 96, complaint of PW 2 was not proved;
(b) PW 2 having not offered himself for cross-examination, his examination-in-chief was of no value and the High Court rightly ignored the evidence of PW 2.
(c) Though there was a specific overt act alleged against the appellant with the aid of talwar, Ext. 12, the medical evidence to the effect that there was no cut injury on the body of the deceased goes to show that the appellant had nothing to do with the killing of the deceased.
(d) The name of the appellant was not mentioned in Ext. 96.
(e) The appellant was a total stranger. The appellant's case should have, therefore, been equated to that of A-5 and A-6 and he should have been acquitted on that basis.
(f) The test identification parade was not held immediately after the occurrence apart from the fact that the procedure in holding the test identification parade was not duly followed. The identification of the appellant by PWs 14 and 33 should not have, therefore, been relied upon.
(g) According to PW 35, the investigating officer, the place from where the eyewitnesses are stated to have seen the occurrence, namely, Marina Store was admittedly 70 m away from the place of occurrence and, therefore, the eyewitnesses could not have seen the participation of the accused, in particular the appellant, in the crime.
(h) There was total repugnancy in the ocular vis-à-vis the medical evidence as regards the use of the weapon, having regard to the nature of injuries found on the body of the deceased. Even according to the eyewitnesses, the occurrence took place only for 4-5 minutes and from a distance of 70 m, the eyewitnesses could not have noted the persons with any certainty in order to identify them with regard to specific part played by them.
(i) In the test identification parade, identical persons were not kept and that a wrong procedure was followed in the holding of test identification parade.
(j) There were improvements in the statements of the eyewitnesses as compared to the statements made under Section 161 CrPC.
(k) PW 23 referred to the bleeding injuries on A-2 in definite terms, whereas according to PW 9 as well as PW 15, no injury was found on A-2 and the only accused on whom knife injury was found was A-4. Therefore, the presence of the appellant and his involvement in the crime was not made out.
10. The learned counsel relied upon the decisions of this Court in Mohanlal Gangaram Gehani v. State of Maharashtra (1982) 1 SCC 700, Manzoor v. State of U.P (1982) 2 SCC 72, Raju v. State of Maharashtra (1998) 1 SCC 169 and Kanan v. State of Kerala (1979) 3 SCC 319 in support of his submission as regards the infirmities in holding the test identification parade (TIP). The learned counsel also relied upon the decisions in Ganga Prasad v. State of U.P (1987) 2 SCC 232, Balaka Singh v. State of Punjab (1975) 4 SCC 511, State of U.P v. Abdul Karim (2007) 13 SCC 569 and Animireddy Venkata Ramana v. Public Prosecutor (2008) 5 SCC 368.
11. As against the above submissions, the learned counsel appearing for the State submitted as under:
(a) That the test identification parade was held in accordance with law.
(b) That PWs 14 and 33 who participated in the test identification parade stated that they had never seen A-2 or his photograph immediately before the holding of the TIP.
(c) When the appellant raised objection at the time of holding of TIP and wanted to change his shirt, PW 30 who held the TIP allowed the appellant to change his shirt and thereby whatever objection he had was also duly set right.
(d) The appellant and other accused never cross-examined the witnesses about any shortcoming in the holding of the TIP and, therefore, they cannot now be heard to complain about the procedure followed in the holding of TIP.
(e) PW 14 who was one of the witnesses, who identified the appellant in the TIP also made it clear that she had earlier seen him in her village though she did not know his name.
(f) As far as the distance factor was concerned, the learned counsel submitted that PW 35 clarified that the witnesses viewed the occurrence from the entrance of Marina Stores and, therefore, they had a clear view of what was taking place when the assailants were assaulting the deceased.
(g) Apart from the identification of the appellant by PWs 14 and 33 in the test identification parade, the other witnesses, namely, PWs 16, 23, 26, 27 and 34 identified the appellant in the court and thereby corroborated the version of PWs 14 and 33.
(h) The evidence of PW 21, the owner of Maruti van who made a categorical statement that it was the appellant who took his Maruti van which was later on found to have been used in the crime for which he applied for the return of the vehicle.
(i) The evidence of PW 25 who was a worker in the garage also proved the presence of the appellant in the Maruti van earlier in the day when the accused persons went to the garage of the deceased enquiring about the whereabouts of the deceased.
(j) The subsequent interception of the said Maruti van by the police, PWs 13 and 18 and the presence of the appellant along with other accused and their subsequent arrest support the case of the prosecution.
(k) The evidence of the post-mortem doctor, PW 9 about the nature of injuries, namely, Injuries 2 to 36 except Injuries 21, 22, 23, 32, 33, 34 which according to PW 9 could have been caused by Ext. 12 from its blunt side and that the said injuries collectively could have caused the death of the deceased.
(l) The evidence of PW 16 as well as other witnesses, namely, PWs 14, 33, 23 and 27 in having made specific reference to the red-coloured shirt worn by the appellant while indulging in the crime was never disputed.
(m) The said witnesses specifically attributed the over act played by the appellant. The medical evidence, therefore, was in tune with the ocular evidence.
(n) The evidence of PWs 14, 33, 16 and 23 in having specifically referred to the removal of the deceased in the Maruti van and the subsequent recovery of the body of the deceased at the instance of A-1 on the next day when the body was found hanging on a cashew tree in Village Onshi established the offence of abduction and the killing of the deceased as per Sections 342, 362, 364 read with Section 34 IPC.
(o) The FSL report confirmed the presence of Blood Group A belonging to the deceased on the red shirt worn by the appellant while the blood group of the appellant was O+.
(p) The version of PW 35 was truthful when he stated about the telephonic message which was received by him about the ongoing assault on a person at Galjibaga in the vicinity of Saint Anthony's High School and the subsequent complaint, Ext. 96 received by him on the basis of which he commenced the investigation which resulted in the filing of the final report against the accused.
12. The learned counsel appearing for the State relied upon the decisions of this Court in Sayed Darain Ahsan v. State of W.B (2012) 4 SCC 352, Dana Yadav v. State of Bihar (2002) 7 SCC 295, Manu Sharma v. State (NCT of Delhi) (2010) 6 SCC 1, Pramod Mandal v. State of Bihar (2004) 13 SCC 150, Pravin v. State of M.P (2008) 16 SCC 166, Ashok Kumar v. State (Delhi Admn.) 1995 Supp (3) SCC 626 and Satish Narayan Sawant v. State of Goa (2009) 17 SCC 724 in support of his submissions.
13. Having heard the learned counsel for the appellant as well as the learned counsel for the State and having perused the judgment 12 and 13 of 2007 and 6 of 2008 impugned as well as that of the trial court and the other material papers, at the outset we wish to deal with the submission regarding the registration of the FIR and the alleged shortcomings. According to the learned counsel, the author of the complaint, Ext. 96 having abstained from offering himself for cross-examination, the said document ceased to have any effect. The learned Senior Counsel would, therefore, contend that once Ext. 96 and the evidence of PW 2 goes out of picture and since he was not named in the FIR, there was no possibility of implicating the appellant to the offence alleged against him. According to him if Ext. 96, the complaint ceases to exist, what remained was the prior telephonic information received by PW 35, based on which the appellant could not have been convicted.
14. When we examine the said submission, it is true that PW 2, the author of the complaint did not offer himself for cross-examination. The High Court 12 and 13 of 2007 and 6 of 2008 in para 37 made extensive reference to the circumstances, namely, the non-availability of PW 2 who was abroad at the relevant point of time, when his cross-examination was fixed and that no fault can be found with the prosecution since in spite of its best efforts, the witness could not be produced. The High Court also noted that the trial court, therefore, had no option than to ignore his evidence. The High Court then rightly pointed out that the whole purpose of the complaint was to ignite the investigation, that PW 35, the investigating officer after receipt of the complaint, Ext. 96 set the law in motion, sent the record of the complaint to the Canacona Magistrate on the morning of 11-10-2003 itself apart from the commencement of the investigation based on the telephonic message regarding the ongoing assault at Galjibaga without reference to either the victim or the accused involved in the assault. We fully agree with the approach of the trial court as confirmed by the High Court in proceeding with the case of the prosecution, ignoring the evidence of PW 2 while at the same time the factum of the nature of offence alleged in the complaint, Ext. 96 as proceeded with by the prosecution deserved to be considered in accordance with law.
15. As rightly pointed out by the courts below, apart from PW 2 who was the author of the complaint and also eyewitness, there were nine other witnesses in the case who fully supported the case of the prosecution. Those witnesses were cross-examined in detail on behalf of the accused. In the abovestated background when the law was set in motion by PW 35, the investigating officer who initially received a telephonic message regarding the occurrence allegedly from the local MLA about a serious crime taking place at Galjibaga in which somebody was being assaulted, PW 35 is stated to have sent his staff who brought PW 2 to the police station through whom Ext. 96 came to be received and Crime No. 32 of 2003 was subsequently registered for offences under Sections 302, 342, 504, 364, 120-B read with Section 34 IPC. Closely followed by the said act it is in evidence that police in the district was alerted which resulted in PWs 13 and 18 apprehending the accused along with the Maruti van bearing Registration No. GA 02 J 7230 along with the weapons used. Therefore, taking the totality of the above facts, it will be futile on the part of the appellant to contend that PW 2 did not offer himself for cross-examination and, therefore, the whole genesis of the case should be thrown out of board. In the said background, the submission of the learned counsel about the non-reference of the name of the appellant in Ext. 96 pales into insignificance especially, when the complicity of the appellant in the commission of the crime was otherwise fully established by the prosecution. Therefore, the claim that the case of the appellant should be equated to that of A-5 and A-6 does not merit any consideration. Consequently, the submission of the learned counsel based on the failure of PW 2 in offering himself for cross-examination and non-mentioning of the name of the appellant in Ext. 96 also stands rejected.
16. In this respect the reliance placed upon by the learned counsel for the State on the decision of this Court in Satish Narayan Sawant v. State of Goa (2009) 17 SCC 724 can be usefully referred to. In paras 22 to 27, this Court while dealing with such a situation has noted that the Court will not become helpless. Inasmuch as any crime alleged is against the society, it is the bounden duty of the Court to find out the truthfulness or otherwise of the prosecution case allegedly based on initial information received and the steps taken in furtherance of its investigation for acceptance or otherwise of such information in order to determine the further course of action to be taken to unearth the details of the crime, the persons involved in the crime and ultimately ensure that the guilty are brought to book. In that respect, in our view, there is every responsibility on the police as a law enforcing machinery and as saviour of the society from the unlawful elements indulging in crimes, take necessary steps based on the information collected by it in the first instance and set the law in motion and proceed with its action as prescribed under the provisions of law. When the case of the prosecution is brought to court by placing all the materials, it is for the court to examine the action taken by the investigating machinery on the anvil of the law in force and on being satisfied with the correctness of the procedure followed can proceed to find the proof of guilt and pass its judgment. In other words, the courts should examine and find out whether the story of the prosecution as projected before the court trying the offence merits acceptance.
17. This Court in Satish Narayan case (2009) 17 SCC 724 has noted with approval the earliest case reported in State of U.P v. Bhagwant Kishore Joshi AIR 1964 SC 221, (1964) 1 Cri LJ 140 wherein while explaining what is investigation which is not defined in the Code of Criminal Procedure, the Court placed reliance upon an earlier decision of this Court in H.N Rishbud v. State of Delhi AIR 1955 SC 196, 1955 Cri LJ 526, in which it was held that the investigation consisted of five steps, namely, proceeding to the spot, ascertainment of facts and circumstances of the case, discovery and arrest of the suspected offender, collection of evidence relating to the commission of the offence which may consist of examination of various persons including the accused and reducing them into writing, proceed with the search of places or seizure of things considered necessary for the investigation and to be produced at the time of trial and formation of the opinion as to whether on the material collected there is a case to place the accused before a Magistrate for trial and, thereafter, taking necessary steps for the said purpose by filing the charge-sheet under Section 173.
18. In Satish Narayan case (2009) 17 SCC 724, according to PW 1 the investigating officer received information about the death of a person through PSI of another police station without any details as to how the incident happened and as to the cause of the incident and with that cryptic information regarding the death of a person who was residing within the jurisdiction of the investigating officer, in an incident alleged to have taken place on the date and time informed to him, and without making any entry in the general diary or getting any FIR lodged, the IO is stated to have gone to the place of occurrence and noted certain blood marks with his torchlight where even the complaining party was not present. Thereafter by bringing the persons present at the place of occurrence to the police station and after collecting necessary information, the FIR was recorded.
19. Keeping the principles laid down in H.N Rishbud v. State of Delhi AIR 1955 SC 196, 1955 Cri LJ 526 as noted by this Court in the later decision in State of U.P v. Bhagwant Kishore Joshi AIR 1964 SC 221, (1964) 1 Cri LJ 140 and further referred to in the recent decision in Satish Narayan Sawant v. State of Goa (2009) 17 SCC 724, we hold that the procedure followed by PW 35 in having commenced the investigation based on Ext. 96 along with site inspection, the prior information received by him through phone about the alleged occurrence and every further step taken by him in having recorded the statements of the other eyewitnesses, the initiation taken by him for apprehending the vehicle in which the accused were alleged to have travelled, recovery of weapons from the vehicle, arrest of the accused including the appellant, the recovery of the dead body at the instance of A-1 from Village Onshi, the step taken for getting the dead body examined through PW 9, the ascertainment of the injuries sustained by the accused themselves, gathering of the FSL reports on the materials seized from the accused as well as the deceased, considered in a sequence, disclose that the case of the prosecution as projected based on Ext. 96 even in the absence of the cross-examination of PW 2, in the peculiar facts and circumstances of this case was perfectly in order and we do not find any good ground to reject the case of the prosecution based on the present submission of the learned counsel for the appellant.
20. With this, when we come to the alleged participation of A-2 in the offence, there are overwhelming evidence to implicate him in the death of the deceased by sharing the common intention along with the other accused who were convicted of the various offences as set out in the earlier part of this judgment. In the first instance, there was a clear-cut evidence of PW 21, the owner of the Maruti van whose evidence was not controverted in any manner relating to the fact that it was the appellant who took the Maruti van from him which was identified by PW 21 which was used for the crime. PW 25, the mechanic who was working in the garage of the deceased made a specific reference to the presence of the appellant in the van when the accused persons visited the garage of the deceased to enquire about his whereabouts. PWs 14, 33, 16, 23 and 27 made specific reference to the overt act played by the appellant in the assault on the deceased with a big knife (talwar). Talwar is a long knife with sharp edge on the one side and blunt edge on the other. PW 9, the post-mortem doctor stated that Injuries 2 to 20, 24 to 31, 35 and 36 were caused by a hard and blunt weapon. Of the above injuries, Injuries 2 to 12 were on the face itself. Injuries 13 to 20 were on the arms and shoulder. Injuries 24 to 31 were on the leg and in the buttocks. Injuries 35 and 36 were on the back side of the body. To a specific query put to him, the doctor opined that except Injuries 21, 22, 23, 32, 33 and 34, other Injuries 2 to 36 found on the body of the deceased could have been caused by Ext. 12 which is the sword and knife (Ext. 13) while Injuries 21, 22, 23, 32, 33 and 34 on the deceased could have been caused by Ext. 14, the danda. Therefore, the extensive part played by the appellant in the crime using the talwar, Ext. 12 was conclusively made out and the submission of the learned counsel on this aspect is grossly futile.
21. The appellant was identified by at least two of the witnesses, PWs 14 and 33 in the TIP held on 3-11-2003 at the behest of PW 30, the Special Judicial Magistrate. Though it was contended that the appellants raised an objection to the effect that they were already shown by the police officials to the said witnesses, in order to rule out any hazard on that score, the accused himself suggested that he be permitted to change his shirt which PW 30 allowed and, thereafter, he subjected himself to the TIP in which he was identified by PWs 14 and 33 without any hesitation. As pointed out by the learned counsel for the State with regard to the holding of the TIP nothing was elicited in the cross-examination in order to hold that the whole of the TIP was not conducted in the manner it was to be held and that the identification of the appellant was not proved in the manner known to law. PW 14 also stated in her evidence that she had seen the appellant in the village earlier though she did not know his name. Therefore, when such identification of the appellant was proved to the satisfaction of the court, there was nothing more to be proved about the manner in which it was held or to find any flaw in the holding of the TIP.
22. At the risk of repetition it will have to be stated that the witnesses were not questioned as to the manner in which they were asked to identify the appellant in the TIP or the alleged defect in the holding of the said parade when the witnesses were examined before the court. Therefore, it is too late in the day for the appellant to contend that the identification parade was not carried out in the manner known to law. Coupled with the above, the evidence of other eyewitnesses, namely, PWs 16, 23, 26, 27 and 34 in having identified him in the court by making specific reference to the red-coloured shirt worn by him at the time of the occurrence fully corroborated the version of PWs 14 and 33.
23. It will be appropriate to refer to the decisions of this Court in Simon v. State of Karnataka (2004) 2 SCC 694, Dana Yadav v. State of Bihar (2002) 7 SCC 295 and Daya Singh v. State of Haryana (2001) 3 SCC 468, AIR 2001 SC 1188. The following passages in the abovereferred decisions can usefully be referred as under.
23.1 Simon v. State of Karnataka (2004) 2 SCC 694:
“14. … mere identification of an accused person at the trial for the first time is from its very nature inherently of a weak character. The purpose of a prior test identification parade is to test and strengthen the trustworthiness of that evidence. The courts generally look for corroboration of the sole testimony of the witnesses in court so as to fix the identity of the accused who are strangers to them in the form of earlier identification proceedings. This rule of prudence, however, is subject to exceptions, when, for example, the court is impressed by a particular witness on whose testimony it can safely rely, without such or other corroboration. It has also to be borne in mind that the aspect of test identification parade belongs to the stage of investigation, and there is no provision in the Code of Criminal Procedure which obliges the investigating agency to hold, or confers a right upon the accused to claim, a test identification parade. Mere failure to hold a test identification parade would not make inadmissible the evidence of identification in court. What weight is to be attached to such identification is a matter for the courts of fact to examine. In appropriate cases, it may accept the evidence of identification even without insisting on corroboration….”
23.2 Dana Yadav v. State of Bihar (2002) 7 SCC 295:
“38. … (a)-(e)***
(f) In exceptional circumstances only, as discussed above, evidence of identification for the first time in court, without the same being corroborated by previous identification in the test identification parade or any other evidence, can form the basis of conviction.
(g)***”
23.3 Daya Singh v. State of Haryana (2001) 3 SCC 468, AIR 2001 SC 1188:
“13. … For this purpose, it is to be borne in mind that the purpose of test identification is to have corroboration to the evidence of the eyewitnesses in the form of earlier identification and that substantive evidence of a witness is the evidence in the court. If that evidence is found to be reliable then absence of corroboration by test identification would not be in any way material. Further, where reasons for gaining an enduring impress of the identity on the mind and memory of the witnesses are brought on record, it is no use to magnify the theoretical possibilities and arrive at conclusion—what in present-day social environment infested by terrorism is really unimportant. In such cases, not holding of identification parade is not fatal to the prosecution.”
24. With this, when we examine the reliance placed on the decision in Mohanlal Gangaram Gehani v. State of Maharashtra (1982) 1 SCC 700 wherein it was held that without knowing the accused beforehand the identification made by a witness, in the absence of any TIP would be valueless and unreliable, the said decision does not apply to the facts of this case. In the decision reported as Mohanlal Gangaram Gehani v. State of Maharashtra (1982) 1 SCC 700, it was only held that where at the earliest opportunity the eyewitness failed to mention any identifying feature of the accused persons, the identification of the accused by one of the witnesses nearly two months later in TIP cannot be accepted. In the case on hand while the occurrence took place on 10-10-2003 the TIP was held on 3-11-2003, therefore, it cannot be held that there was a long gap in between in order to state that the witnesses could not have identified the appellant-accused. On the other hand, PW 14 stated that she had already seen the appellant in the village though she did not know his name.
25. In the decision reported as Raju v. State of Maharashtra (1998) 1 SCC 169 it was held that a TIP after about 1½ years after the incident was not reliable. We do not find any support from the said decision to the facts of this case. Equally, we do not find any scope to apply the decision in Kanan v. State of Kerala (1979) 3 SCC 319 where no TIP was held in respect of the witness who did not know the accused earlier. Therefore, the submission based on the alleged defect in the TIP does not merit any consideration.
26. According to the learned Senior Counsel, the version of the eyewitnesses is not reliable inasmuch as none of the witnesses had anything to say about the severe injury suffered by A-4 on his forehead. PW 9, the post-mortem doctor has referred to the injuries sustained by A-4. Before that on 10-10-2003 itself, at 7 p.m he was examined by PW 15, doctor who noted the injuries and opined that they were caused by a sharp weapon less than six hours before examination. There was a visible fracture of skull and it was grievous in nature. A-4 was referred to Hospicio Hospital, Margao. Ext. 12 was shown to PW 15 who opined that there was every possibility of the injury being caused by the said weapon. She stated that though A-4 complained that he was assaulted by fist-blows all over his body, she did not notice any injury or marks on his body. The learned counsel would contend that when such specific injuries on A-4 to A-6 were spoken to by PW 15 and PW 9, none of the eyewitnesses referred to that in their evidence and thereby they were suppressing the truth. The learned counsel, therefore, contended that their whole version cannot be believed.
27. In this respect, it will be worthwhile to refer to the approach of the High Court where it has taken pains to analyse the crime threadbare and found that there was no evidence led as regards the alleged assault on him by sword, that not even a suggestion was put to any of the prosecution witnesses to state that there was assault by anyone and the trial court, therefore, noted that there was every possibility of A-4 having sustained the injures with Ext. 12 which was very widely used by the appellant on the deceased in which occurrence A-4 also fully participated. Such an approach of the trial court in the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case cannot be held to be wholly improbable.
28. A-4 except making a statement in the Section 313 CrPC questioning, that he was assaulted by 4 to 5 persons along with two other motorcyclists with a sword when he was waiting at Canacona Bus-stop at 4.30 p.m on 10-10-2003, there was no supporting material placed before the Court in the form of legally acceptable evidence and further in the absence of any cross-examination on that aspect to any of the witnesses examined in support of the prosecution, there is no scope to consider the said submission of the learned counsel to grant any relief to the appellant. The learned counsel relied upon Thaman Kumar v. State (UT of Chandigarh) (2003) 6 SCC 380, SCC para 16 and Khambam Raja Reddy v. Public Prosecutor (2006) 11 SCC 239. We do not find any support from the said decisions to the case before us. Therefore, the submission of the learned counsel that the prosecution failed to explain the grievous injury found on A-4 or other accused does not in any way support the case of the appellant and the said submission, therefore, stands rejected.
29. It was then contended that none of the ingredients of Section 364 IPC were made out for the High Court to find the appellant guilty of the said offence along with A-1, A-3 and A-4. In this context, it is sufficient to refer to what has been stated by the High Court. In para 87, the High Court has observed 12 and 13 of 2007 and 6 of 2008 on this aspect which reads as under:
“87. The learned trial court, however, erred in acquitting Accused 1, Valeriano Barretto; Accused 2, Subhash Krishnan; Accused 3, Sanjay Gadekar; Accused 4, Shailesh Gadekar under Sections 342, 364 read with Section 34 of the Penal Code, 1860. The view taken by the learned trial court for acquitting the said accused persons proceeded from the fact that the victim Shanu fell unconscious and thereafter, he was put in a dicky of the Maruti van. This fact, the learned trial court reasoned, did not further materialise into his prevention from proceeding in any direction and/or his abduction in order to murder him or to put him in danger of being murdered. Essentially both the offences i.e wrongful confinement and abduction are the offences which are committed as a result of curtailment of personal liberty. The offence of wrongful confinement as defined under Section 340 of the Code occurs when an individual is wrongfully restrained in such a manner as to prevent him/her from proceeding beyond certain circumscribing limits. The offence of abduction under Section 362 of the Code involves use of force or deceit to compel or induce any person to go from any place. Evidence clearly shows that the victim Shanu by use of criminal force i.e the assault was made to lose his consciousness. Even if the victim would have wished to proceed in any one direction, he would not have been in a position to do so for the reason of his unconsciousness. Certainly, Shanu never wished to go with his assailants in the Maruti van, but was compelled by the said accused persons to go from the place of incident to the place where he ultimately met his death. Deceit involves tricking away of individual from reality. Unconsciousness paralysed the mental faculties of the victim and freezed (sic froze) his perception as regards the place. Virtually, the victim was, thereafter, tricked away from the reality while in unconscious state and made to go from one place to another. Thus, the learned trial court grossly misinterpreted the facts and recorded manifestly illegal finding.”
30. As rightly pointed out by the High Court, under Section 362 IPC when by force or deceit if any person is compelled or induced to go from any place and such an abduction takes place in order to ultimately eliminate him, the offence would be made out under Section 364 IPC. As rightly pointed out by the High Court, examining the conduct of the appellant along with the other accused in wrongfully restraining the deceased by inflicting severe injuries on the body of the deceased i.e by causing as many as 36 injuries in which process the person lost his consciousness whereafter he was shifted to a different place, where it ultimately came to light that the person was killed by hanging, every description of the offence under Sections 342 and 364 with the aid of Section 34 IPC was clearly made out. Therefore, we do not find any fault in the said conclusion of the High Court in having reversed the judgment of the trial court for convicting the appellant for the offence under the said sections.
31. The submission of the learned counsel for the appellant about the impossibility of the eyewitnesses in having noted the participation of the appellant and the other accused in the crime was on the basis that according to PW 35 the distance between the place of occurrence and the point from which the eyewitnesses are stated to have seen the occurrence was more than 70 m. In the first place, when the occurrence had taken place at 4.30 in the evening there would be no difficulty for anyone to have a clear view of what was happening before them. Even in the vicinity of 70 m when about 8 persons were assaulting the deceased with sword, knife and danda on the road, in full public gaze, it would have definitely caught the eye of everyone standing thereat. The presence of the eyewitnesses at the place of occurrence was not in dispute. The witnesses made it clear that they were seeing the occurrence from the shop called Marina Stores. It is not as if they were not looking at the occurrence. According to the witnesses, as well as the prosecution, the eyewitnesses were viewing the occurrence from the entrance of Marina Stores. Therefore, the version of the eyewitnesses that they were able to see the specific part played by different accused and, in particular, the appellant who was using a talwar, in the absence of any mala fides attributed to the witnesses, their version cannot be rejected. We, therefore, do not find any substance in the said submission of the learned counsel.
32. As regards the time factor, it cannot be held that since the incident happened within 4-5 minutes, it was not possible for the witnesses to have noted the participation of the accused in the crime. It is relevant to note that according to PW 9, as many as 36 injuries were found on the body of the deceased which were caused by the blunt side of the talwar, knife as well as danda. In inflicting so many injuries, the time taken would have been sufficient enough for the witnesses to have made an observation as to the role played by the accused in the crime. Therefore, on that score as well there is no scope for doubting the version of the witnesses as regards the participation of the appellant in the crime.
33. It is true that PW 23 in his evidence stated that he saw the appellant having suffered bleeding injury which was not proved. It was also true that it was A-4 who suffered the bleeding injuries on his forehead which was caused with the aid of a knife. We have already concurred with the conclusion of the courts below about the possibility of A-4 having suffered the injury with the aid of Ext. 12 (talwar) which was widely used by the appellant and inasmuch as A-4 was also actively involved in the crime. Since the appellant used Ext. 12 extensively, there was every possibility of A-4 having suffered the injury. In the light of the overwhelming evidence of the other eyewitnesses, the medical evidence and the forensic reports, the wrong statement of PW 23 cannot be said to have caused any serious dent in the case of the prosecution. Therefore, on that score, we do not find any scope to interfere with the impugned judgment 12 and 13 of 2007 and 6 of 2008.
34. Having regard to our above conclusions, we do not find any merit in these appeals. The judgment 12 and 13 of 2007 and 6 of 2008 impugned in these appeals does not call for any interference. The appeals fail and the same are dismissed accordingly.
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