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State Of Madhya Pradesh And Others v. Sandhya Tomar And Another

Supreme Court Of India
Dec 13, 2012
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Factual and Procedural Background

The Central Government launched a scheme for elimination of child labour. To implement it, the “Child Labour Elimination and Rehabilitation Society” was created on 12-4-1996 with the Collector, Khargone (West Nimar) as ex-officio Chairman. Pursuant to names received from the employment exchange, Respondent 1 (Sandhya Tomar) was appointed temporarily as Project Director on 8-11-1996 at a fixed salary, later raised to Rs 8000 per month.

On 29-7-2003 the State Government posted Respondent 1 to Zila Panchayat, Indore (Panchayat & Rural Development Department). When that department later dispensed with her services (order dated 29-3-2004), she was repatriated but not allowed to re-join the Society. Meanwhile, the post of Project Director was advertised afresh on 16-5-2005. Respondent 1 filed Writ Petition No. 1007 of 2006 challenging the advertisement and claiming a right to re-join.

The learned Single Judge quashed the advertisement on 17-7-2006. A writ appeal (No. 86 of 2007) by the Collector failed on 5-11-2008 before a Division Bench of the Madhya Pradesh High Court (Indore Bench). The Collector and others appealed to the Supreme Court, resulting in the present judgment.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether Respondent 1, a temporary appointee who had left the Society and joined another department, possessed any lien or legal right to re-join the post of Project Director.
  2. Whether the original appointment of Respondent 1—made solely through names called from the employment exchange—was constitutionally valid under Articles 14 and 16.
  3. Whether the High Court erred in quashing the advertisement dated 16-5-2005 for filling the post of Project Director.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellants’ Arguments (Collector & Others)

  • Respondent 1 was only a temporary employee; she acquired no lien on the post.
  • She left the Society without prior sanction and voluntarily joined another department, thereby abandoning her post.
  • The writ petition was filed belatedly—more than one year after her repatriation—and should have been dismissed for delay and laches.
  • Having no subsisting right to the post, Respondent 1 lacked standing to challenge the fresh advertisement.

Respondent 1’s Arguments

  • Her posting to the Panchayat & Rural Development Department was on deputation ordered by the Government; she had no control over it.
  • Consequently she retained a right to return to the Society and continue as Project Director; quashing the advertisement was therefore justified.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Excise Supdt. (1996) 6 SCC 216 Calling names only from the employment exchange does not satisfy Articles 14 & 16. Used to hold that Respondent 1’s initial appointment was constitutionally infirm.
Veer Kunwar Singh University Ad Hoc Teachers Assn. v. Bihar State University Service Commission (2009) 17 SCC 184 Same principle regarding inadequacy of employment-exchange-only recruitment. Reinforced the invalidity of the initial appointment process.
Union of India v. Pritilata Nanda (2010) 11 SCC 674, AIR 2010 SC 2821 Regular recruitment must meet constitutional equality requirements. Further authority for holding the appointment void ab initio.
State of Orissa v. Mamata Mohanty (2011) 3 SCC 436 Emphasises fair, transparent recruitment process. Cited in the same context as above cases.
State of Punjab v. Surinder Kumar (1992) 1 SCC 489 Temporary employees are governed strictly by terms of appointment letter. Applied to conclude Respondent 1 had no rights beyond those terms.
Parshotam Lal Dhingra v. Union of India AIR 1958 SC 36 Concept and prerequisites of “lien” on a post. Used to determine that Respondent 1 had no lien.
Pratap Singh v. State of Punjab AIR 1964 SC 72 Further elaboration on lien and substantive appointment. Same application as above.
T.R. Sharma v. Prithvi Singh (1976) 1 SCC 226 Criteria for acquiring lien. Reinforced that temporary service confers no lien.
Ramlal Khurana v. State of Punjab (1989) 4 SCC 99 Permanent appointment prerequisite for lien. Relied on for denying Respondent 1 any continuing right.
Triveni Shankar Saxena v. State of U.P. 1992 Supp (1) SCC 524 Lien arises only from lawful, substantive appointment. Cited to negate Respondent 1’s claim.
S.K. Kacker v. AIIMS (1996) 10 SCC 734 Same lien principles. Supported the overall conclusion.
S. Narayana v. Mohd. Ahmedulla Khan (2006) 10 SCC 84 Continuation in service and lien requirements. Used similarly to previous cases.
State of Rajasthan v. S.N. Tiwari (2009) 4 SCC 700 Clarification of lien as a civil right flowing from substantive appointment. Final authority confirming absence of lien for Respondent 1.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Supreme Court held that Respondent 1’s initial engagement was unconstitutional because selection was based solely on names supplied by the employment exchange, depriving other eligible candidates of equal opportunity as mandated by Articles 14 and 16. Consequently, her appointment never vested any substantive right or lien in her favour.

The Court emphasised the settled law that a temporary employee whose service is not governed by statutory rules is bound exclusively by the conditions in the appointment letter. Respondent 1’s voluntary departure to another department on 29-7-2003 amounted to abandonment of her temporary post. Upon termination from the new department, she could not assert a right to re-enter the Society.

Because she had no subsisting right to the post, Respondent 1 lacked standing to challenge the advertisement dated 16-5-2005. Any grievance regarding her termination from the Panchayat & Rural Development Department should have been pursued separately, a course she never adopted.

The High Court, in quashing the advertisement, was found to have focussed on irrelevant considerations and ignored the constitutional and service-law principles governing temporary appointments and lien. Accordingly, both the Single Judge and Division Bench decisions were set aside.

Holding and Implications

The appeal is ALLOWED; the judgments of the Single Judge and the Division Bench are set aside; no costs.

Immediate Effect: The advertisement dated 16-5-2005 for the post of Project Director stands revived, and Respondent 1 has no right to re-join the Society. She may apply afresh only if otherwise eligible. The decision turns solely on established constitutional and service-law principles and does not create a new precedent.

Show all summary ...

Dr B.S Chauhan, J.— Leave granted. This appeal has been preferred against the judgment and order dated 5-11-2008, passed by the High Court of Madhya Pradesh (Indore Bench) in Collector v. Sandhya Tomar Writ Appeal No. 86 of 2007, by which it has affirmed the judgment and order of the learned Single Judge dated 17-7-2006, passed in Writ Petition No. 1007 of 2006, by which the learned Single Judge quashed the advertisement dated 16-5-2005, inviting the applications for appointment on the post of Project Director.

2. Facts and circumstances giving rise to this appeal are: that the Central Government introduced a scheme for elimination of child labour with respect to which, the Director General of Employment and Training wrote a letter dated 15-7-1995, to the Collector, Khargone (West Nimar) to implement the aforesaid scheme. In order to give effect i.e to implement the said scheme, a society, namely, the Child Labour Elimination and Rehabilitation Society (hereinafter referred to as “the Society”), was formed on 12-4-1996 and the Collector became the ex-officio Chairman of the said Society. It appears that in order to appoint the Project Director, certain names requisitioned from the employment exchange were considered and Respondent 1 was selected and appointed temporarily, vide Letter dated 8-11-1996 on a fixed salary of Rs 4000 per month. Salary of Respondent 1 was increased from Rs 4000 to Rs 8000 per month vide Order dated 16-7-1999.

3. Respondent 1 joined a post in the Panchayat and Rural Development Department in Zila Panchayat, Indore in pursuance of the Order dated 29-7-2003, passed by the Government of Madhya Pradesh. Her services in the Panchayat and Rural Development Department were not required, and she was repatriated vide Order dated 29-3-2004 to her parent department. However, Respondent 1 was not permitted to join the Society. The post of Project Director was advertised on 16-5-2005. Thus, Respondent 1 filed a writ petition on 26-5-2005, challenging the advertisement dated 16-5-2005, claiming her right to join the said post.

4. The appellants contested the writ petition on various grounds, however, the writ petition was allowed by the learned Single Judge vide order dated 17-7-2006. Aggrieved, the appellants filed a writ appeal, which stood dismissed vide impugned judgment and order dated 5-11-2008 Writ Appeal No. 86 of 2007. Hence, this appeal.

5. Shri B.S Banthia, learned counsel for the appellants has submitted that the High Court committed an error in allowing the said writ petition as Respondent 1 was merely a temporary employee, and had joined another post under the alleged order of deputation, and had worked there for a period of 9-10 months. She could not join as a Project Director in the Society as she had no lien therein. She had also left the Society without obtaining any previous sanction from the appointing authority i.e the District Collector. She had further voluntarily abandoned the services of the Society on 29-7-2003 and thereafter, she filed the said writ petition on 26-5-2005, only challenging the advertisement dated 16-5-2005. Hence, even though her services in the Panchayat and Rural Development Department were terminated on 29-3-2004, she approached the High Court only after lapse of a period of one year and two months. Thus, the High Court ought not to have entertained the writ petition at all. The appeal deserves to be allowed.

6. Per contra, Shri Niraj Sharma, learned counsel appearing for Respondent 1 has strived to defend the impugned order passed by the High Court, contending that she had been sent on deputation by the Government, and over this, she had no control. Therefore, she had a right to join the said Society. Thus, the appeal is liable to be dismissed.

7. We have considered the rival submissions made by the learned counsel for the parties and perused the record.

8. Initial appointment of Respondent 1 was not made on the basis of any advertisement in any newspaper whatsoever. Hence, applications for the post were not invited. It is a settled legal proposition that considering the candidature of persons by mere calling of names from the employment exchange does not meet the requirement of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India. (Vide Excise Supt. (1996) 6 SCC 216, Veer Kunwar Singh University Ad Hoc Teachers Assn. v. Bihar State University (C.C) Service Commission (2009) 17 SCC 184, Union of India v. Pritilata Nanda (2010) 11 SCC 674, AIR 2010 SC 2821 and State of Orissa v. Mamata Mohanty (2011) 3 SCC 436.) Thus, in view of the above, we are of the considered opinion that Respondent 1 was not appointed following the procedure mandatorily required by law, and that such appointment was admittedly in violation of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India, as several other eligible candidates have been deprived of their right to be considered for the post.

9. There can be no dispute with respect to the settled legal proposition that in the event that a person is not appointed on a regular basis, and if his service is not governed by any statutory rules, he shall be bound by the terms and conditions that have been incorporated in his appointment letter. (Vide State of Punjab v. Surinder Kumar (1992) 1 SCC 489, (1992) 19 ATC 345, AIR 1992 SC 1593.) In such an eventuality, there can be no reason with respect to why the terms and conditions incorporated in the appointment letter should not be enforced against such an employee. In the instant case, Respondent 1 was temporarily appointed in a project and thus, she had at no point of time, been appointed on a regular basis, owing to which, she cannot claim any lien with respect to the said post.

10. “Lien” connotes the civil right of a government servant to hold the post “to which he is appointed substantively”. The necessary corollary to the aforesaid right is that such appointment must be in accordance with law. A person can be said to have acquired lien as regards a particular post only when his appointment has been confirmed, and when he has been made permanent to the said post. “The word ‘lien’ is a generic term and, standing alone, it includes lien acquired by way of contract, or by operation of law.” Whether a person has lien, depends upon whether he has been appointed in accordance with law, in substantive capacity and whether he has been made permanent or has been confirmed to the said post. (Vide Parshotam Lal Dhingra v. Union of India AIR 1958 SC 36, Pratap Singh v. State of Punjab AIR 1964 SC 72, T.R Sharma v. Prithvi Singh (1976) 1 SCC 226, AIR 1976 SC 367, Ramlal Khurana v. State of Punjab (1989) 4 SCC 99, (1989) 11 ATC 841, AIR 1989 SC 1985, Triveni Shankar Saxena v. State of U.P 1992 Supp (1) SCC 524, (1992) 19 ATC 931, AIR 1992 SC 496, S.K Kacker v. All India Institute of Medical Sciences (1996) 10 SCC 734, S. Narayana v. Mohd. Ahmedulla Khan (2006) 10 SCC 84, AIR 2006 SC 2224 and State of Rajasthan v. S.N Tiwari (2009) 4 SCC 700, AIR 2009 SC 2104.)

11. It is not the case of the learned counsel for Respondent 1 that she had any lien with respect to the post. Respondent 1 voluntarily abandoned her job in the Society and joined another post, in another department on 29-7-2003. Therefore, her temporary employment in the Society came to an end automatically. She had chosen better employment under the Government of Madhya Pradesh, as opposed to continuing her employment in the Society on a project. Her employment in the Government of Madhya Pradesh was terminated after serving therein for a period of eight months, vide order dated 29-3-2004. In such a fact situation, the Society was not bound to permit Respondent 1 to join the post of Project Director. As a consequence thereof, she has no right to challenge the advertisement dated 16-5-2005. At the most, if Respondent 1 was eligible for appointment as per the said advertisement, she can apply for fresh appointment. In case Respondent 1 felt that she had a right to join the services of the Government of Madhya Pradesh and that her service from there was wrongly terminated, she could have challenged the said order dated 29-3-2004, which has in fact, never been challenged by her, for reasons best known to her.

12. In view of the above, the learned Single Judge, as well as the Division Bench have misdirected themselves with respect to the actual issues involved in the case, and have decided the case upon totally irrelevant issues. The appeal therefore succeeds and is allowed. The judgment and order of the learned Single Judge, as well as that of the Division Bench, are hereby set aside. No costs.