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Karuna Singh v. State (Nct Of Delhi) And Another

Supreme Court Of India
Apr 10, 2012
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Supreme Court of India – Writ Petition under Article 32

Factual and Procedural Background

Respondent 2, Mrs Veena Solanki, lodged FIR No. 13/2004 at Police Station Lodhi Colony on 13-4-2004 against the petitioner Ms Karuna Singh and five others alleging offences under Sections 420, 468, 471 read with 120-B IPC. A charge-sheet was filed on 16-4-2007; charges have yet to be framed by the Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, South, Saket, New Delhi.

On 24-9-2004 the petitioner filed a complaint against Respondent 2 under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (“NI Act”), tendering her evidence by affidavit. The Magistrate (NI Act) allowed Respondent 2 to cross-examine her on 25-9-2006, and that cross-examination has continued for more than five years, largely concerning the above FIR.

By order dated 9-9-2009 the Magistrate summoned the FIR charge-sheet. The petitioner challenged that order through Criminal M.C. No. 3668/2009 under Sections 482/483 CrPC in the Delhi High Court. A later order dated 2-5-2011 imposing Rs 20,000 costs on the petitioner was also challenged via a writ petition; the High Court stayed only the costs.

Alleging infringement of Articles 20(3) and 21 and ineffective relief from the High Court, the petitioner invoked Article 32 directly before the Supreme Court, seeking directions to restrain or control her cross-examination.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether a writ petition under Article 32 is maintainable when the petitioner is already pursuing alternative remedies before the High Court on the same grievance.
  2. Whether the protracted cross-examination and related Magistrate orders violate the petitioner’s fundamental rights under Articles 20(3) and 21.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner’s Arguments

  • The NI Act contemplates a speedy trial; five-plus years of cross-examination constitutes harassment and denial of a speedy trial, offending Articles 20(3) and 21.
  • The Magistrate exceeded his powers by summoning the criminal charge-sheet and permitting cross-examination based on it.
  • High Court proceedings have not yielded effective relief; therefore direct Supreme Court intervention is warranted.
  • Exhaustion of alternative remedies is only a rule of convenience (relying on Baburam, Kuntesh Gupta, Ram & Shyam).
  • On merits, reliance was placed on Mandvi Coop. Bank and Rajesh Aggarwal to limit the scope of cross-examination in NI Act cases.

No specific arguments of Respondent 2 or the State are recorded in the opinion.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Baburam Prakash Chandra Maheshwari v. Antarim Zila Parishad, AIR 1969 SC 556 Exhaustion of alternative remedies is a discretionary rule. Cited by petitioner; Court refused intervention, holding the case inapplicable given pending High Court proceedings.
Kuntesh Gupta v. Hindu Kanya Mahavidyalaya, (1987) 4 SCC 525; AIR 1987 SC 2186 Same principle on alternative remedies. Relied on by petitioner; not accepted by Court for similar reasons.
Ram and Shyam Co. v. State of Haryana, (1985) 3 SCC 267 Extraordinary writ jurisdiction despite alternative remedy. Advanced by petitioner; Court distinguished the circumstances and declined relief.
Rajesh Aggarwal v. State, (2010) 7 AD 576 (Del) Controls on cross-examination in NI Act cases. Merely noted as cited before Magistrate; Supreme Court made no ruling on it.
Mandvi Coop. Bank Ltd. v. Nimesh B. Thakore, (2010) 3 SCC 83; AIR 2010 SC 1402 Affidavit evidence under Section 145 NI Act need not be repeated orally. Petitioner cited; Court held it wholly inapplicable to present facts.

Court’s Reasoning and Analysis

The Court focused on maintainability, emphasising that the petitioner had already invoked adequate remedies in the High Court, which remain pending. Simultaneously seeking relief under Article 32 constituted “gross misuse” and an “abuse of the process of law.”

Distinguishing the cases cited by the petitioner, the Court observed that those decisions apply where no efficacious remedy exists, whereas in the present case multiple effective avenues are already being pursued.

The alleged breaches of Articles 20(3) and 21 were deemed unsubstantial; accepting such claims would open Article 32 jurisdiction to every routine Magistrate order. The Court also criticised the petitioner for attempting to manipulate proceedings and for casting aspersions on the High Court.

Holding and Implications

Writ Petition Dismissed with Costs. The petitioner must deposit Rs 20,000 with the Supreme Court Legal Services Authority within four weeks, failing which the matter will be listed for recovery directions.

Implications: No directives are issued to the Magistrate; the petitioner must pursue her pending remedies in the Delhi High Court. The ruling reiterates that Article 32 cannot be used to bypass or duplicate efficacious alternative remedies and that such duplicative litigation attracts judicial censure.

Show all summary ...

J.S Khehar, J.— Respondent 2, Mrs Veena Solanki got FIR No. 13 of 2004 registered at Police Station Lodhi Colony on 13-4-2004. Therein she made allegations against the petitioner, Ms Karuna Singh and five others. On 16-4-2007 i.e more than three years after the registration of the aforesaid FIR, a charge-sheet was filed against the petitioner (and five others), under Sections 420, 468 and 471 read with Section 120-B of the Penal Code, 1860. Though a period of more than five years has elapsed after the filing of the charge-sheet, we are informed, that charges are yet to be framed by the Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate (South), Saket, New Delhi.

2. Soon after the registration of the FIR referred to in the foregoing paragraph, the petitioner filed a complaint under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 on 24-9-2004. The aforesaid complaint was made against Respondent 2 Mrs Veena Solanki. Along with her complaint, the petitioner claims to have filed her evidence by way of a personal affidavit. Thereafter on 25-9-2006, the Magistrate (Negotiable Instruments Act) trying the complaint allowed Respondent 2 to cross-examine the petitioner. Even after five years, the cross-examination which commenced in 2006 is stated to be continuing.

3. It is submitted, that the cross-examination of the petitioner, at the behest of Respondent 2, is mainly with reference to FIR No. 13 of 2004 registered on 13-4-2004. This, according to the petitioner amounts to a gross abuse of (sic the process of) law by Respondent 2, and as such, violates the fundamental rights of the petitioner vested in her under Articles 20(3) and 21 of the Constitution of India.

4. In this behalf, it is the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner, that the provisions of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 contemplate a speedy and swift trial. Referring to the proceedings initiated by the petitioner under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, it is submitted that the cross-examination of the petitioner at the hands of Respondent 2 has lasted for more than five years. Denial of a speedy and expeditious trial constitutes an act of harassment of the petitioner, and as such the violation of the petitioner's fundamental rights.

5. At the very inception, we expressed our views about the maintainability of the instant writ petition under Article 32 of the Constitution of India. We, therefore, called upon the learned counsel for the petitioner to assist us as to whether it is desirable to entertain a petition like the one in hand, directly before the highest court of the land.

6. Insofar as the instant controversy is concerned, it would also be relevant to notice, that in order to facilitate Respondent 2 to cross-examine the petitioner, the Magistrate (Negotiable Instruments Act) trying the complaint filed by the petitioner, vide an order dated 9-9-2009 summoned the charge-sheet filed in case FIR No. 13 of 2004. The petitioner Ms Karuna Singh assailed the aforesaid order dated 9-9-2009 in the High Court at Delhi by filing Criminal Misc. Case No. 3668 of 2009. It is the submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner, that the trial court despite the pendency of Criminal MC No. 3668 of 2009, allowed Respondent 2 to cross-examine the petitioner, even with reference to the charge-sheet in case FIR No. 13 of 2004 (and other documents connected therewith).

7. Insofar as the instant aspect of the matter is concerned, it was the case of the petitioner, that the High Court had failed to take any final decision in the matter. It was also submitted at the behest of the petitioner that the Magistrate (Negotiable Instruments Act) trying the complaint of the petitioner, had unfairly allowed the petitioner to be cross-examined with reference to the said charge-sheet in case FIR No. 13 of 2004. A submission was also advanced at the behest of the petitioner that the Magistrate (Negotiable Instruments Act) had failed to control the cross-examination of the petitioner (at the hands of Respondent 2).

8. In this behalf, it was pointed out that during the process of cross-examination of the petitioner, the petitioner had invited the attention of the Magistrate (Negotiable Instruments Act) to a decision rendered by the Delhi High Court in Rajesh Aggarwal v. State (2010) 7 AD 576 (Del). Despite the aforesaid, the Magistrate (Negotiable Instruments Act), while permitting Respondent 2 to cross-examine the petitioner on 2-5-2011, had imposed costs of Rs 20,000 for wasting court time by making such an intervention.

9. It was also pointed out, that the order dated 2-5-2011 was assailed by the petitioner by filing a writ petition in the High Court at Delhi. It was submitted that the aforesaid writ petition is pending, wherein the High Court has stayed the operation of the order dated 2-5-2011 in respect of payment of costs imposed on the petitioner. It was submitted, that the High Court has however failed to grant any injunction, staying further cross-examination of the petitioner before the Magistrate (Negotiable Instruments Act).

10. In the facts and circumstances narrated hereinabove, in order to respond to the query made by this Court on the issue of maintainability (of the instant writ petition under Article 32 of the Constitution of India), the learned counsel for the petitioner placed reliance on Baburam Prakash Chandra Maheshwari v. Antarim Zila Parishad AIR 1969 SC 556, Kuntesh Gupta v. Hindu Kanya Mahavidyalaya (1987) 4 SCC 525, AIR 1987 SC 2186 and Ram and Shyam Co. v. State of Haryana (1985) 3 SCC 267 and on the basis thereof contended, that the rule which required the exhaustion of alternative remedies, before the High Court concerned or the Supreme Court of India could be approached under their inherent writ jurisdiction, was a rule of convenience and discretion. It was in the nature of a self-imposed restraint of the court, rather than a binding rule of law. It was submitted, that the availability of an alternative remedy could not oust the jurisdiction of a High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, and of this Court under Article 32 of the Constitution of India.

11. It was also submitted, that in cases where the order complained of was illegal or invalid and contrary to law, a petition at the instance of an affected party could be entertained by the jurisdictional High Court or by this Court, and the availability of an alternative remedy would not prevent a High Court or this Court from entertaining a petition, specially in cases where extraordinary relief was prayed for. It was also the case of the petitioner, that in situations where the alternative remedy would not provide an effective relief, the High Court and this Court, as a rule, ought to provide relief to the party concerned.

12. In the facts and circumstances of this case, it is submitted, that this Court should issue appropriate directions to the Magistrate (Negotiable Instruments Act) so as to require him to effectively control the petitioner's cross-examination (at the hands of Respondent 2), as the petitioner's fundamental rights are being violated.

13. We have given our thoughtful consideration to the submissions advanced at the hands of the learned counsel for the petitioner, as also the judgments relied upon by him. We are astonished at the submissions advanced at the hands of the learned counsel for the petitioner. The petitioner herein is seeking directions to the Magistrate concerned, as a matter of first instance at the hands of this Court. The submissions advanced at the hands of the learned counsel for the petitioner by themselves concede, that there is an alternative remedy available to the petitioner, yet he has chosen to come to the highest court of the land, under Article 32 of the Constitution of India. Even though the order passed by the Magistrate (Negotiable Instruments Act) dated 9-9-2009 has been assailed by the petitioner before the High Court at Delhi under Sections 482 and 483 of the Code of Criminal Procedure by filing Criminal MC No. 3668 of 2009, and the said proceedings are still pending, the petitioner has chosen to approach this Court. While doing so, the petitioner has even cast aspersions on the High Court, by pleading and contending that the High Court had, till date, not taken a final decision in the matter.

14. It would also be relevant to mention, that besides filing Criminal MC No. 3668 of 2009, the petitioner has also filed a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India in the High Court at Delhi, wherein she had assailed the order passed by the Magistrate (Negotiable Instruments Act) dated 2-5-2011. In the aforesaid writ petition, the petitioner has admittedly sought directions to the Magistrate (Negotiable Instruments Act) to control the petitioner's cross-examination (at the hands of Respondent 2). The aforesaid writ petition is still pending consideration before the High Court. The High Court has stayed the payment of costs imposed on the petitioner. The grievance of the petitioner is, that the High Court had failed to stay the further cross-examination of the petitioner, with reference to the charge-sheet filed in case FIR No. 13 of 2004.

15. Surprisingly, when the prayers made by the petitioner before this Court are pending adjudication before the High Court at Delhi, the petitioner has approached this Court under Article 32 of the Constitution of India, without assailing any order passed by the High Court. This, in our considered view, amounts to gross misuse of the jurisdiction of this Court. Such a behaviour at the hands of the petitioner cannot be countenanced. The effort of the petitioner seems to be to browbeat either Respondent 2, or the Magistrate (Negotiable Instruments Act), so that the proceedings progress as per the desire of the petitioner. In her aforesaid effort, the petitioner has also cast aspersions against the High Court.

16. This is not a case where despite availability of an alternative remedy, the petitioner has approached this Court under its writ jurisdiction. This is a case where the petitioner has availed of her alternative remedies, and simultaneously on the same cause of action, she has approached the highest court of the land under Article 32 of the Constitution of India. This constitutes a gross abuse of the process of law. We are satisfied that an efficacious alternative remedy is available to a party which has initiated proceedings under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881.

17. In the present case the petitioner has approached the High Court at Delhi under Sections 482 and 483 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, and through a separate petition under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India. Both the petitions are still pending before the High Court. It is not possible for us to accept that the fundamental rights of the petitioner under Articles 20(3) and 21 of the Constitution of India have been violated in any manner whatsoever, so as to enable her to approach this Court in the manner suggested. If the instant plea of the petitioner is accepted, the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 32 of the Constitution of India will become available against every action of a Magistrate, not only under the Negotiable Instruments Act, but also in respect of criminal proceedings conducted under other statutory provisions.

18. To the benefit of the petitioner, it also needs to be noticed, that reliance was placed on behalf of the petitioner on Mandvi Coop. Bank Ltd. v. Nimesh B. Thakore (2010) 3 SCC 83, AIR 2010 SC 1402. The instant reliance was placed on the basis of the merits of the controversy i.e in support of the merits of the petitioner's cause. Having gone through the judgment relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner, we find that the same is wholly inapplicable to this case.

19. In Mandvi Coop. Bank case (2010) 3 SCC 83, AIR 2010 SC 1402 the accused on being summoned under Section 145(2) of the Negotiable Instruments Act, raised the plea that in spite of the complainant having filed his evidence by way of an affidavit under Section 145(1), the complainant must be orally examined-in-chief all over again, before the accused is summoned or called upon to cross-examine the complainant. This Court while disposing of the aforesaid controversy interpreted Section 145(2) of the Negotiable Instruments Act to conclude that a person who had preferred his evidence on affidavit, need not make an oral deposition in court, before the accused is summoned or is required to cross-examine him. This is not the issue in the present controversy. We are therefore satisfied that the reliance placed by the learned counsel for the petitioner on Mandvi Coop. Bank case (2010) 3 SCC 83, AIR 2010 SC 1402 is wholly misconceived.

20. In view of the above, we are of the view that the petitioner has grossly abused the jurisdiction of this Court by approaching this Court under Article 32 of the Constitution of India. The instant writ petition being devoid of any merit is hereby dismissed. For the abuse of the process of this Court, the petitioner is directed to deposit costs quantified at Rs 20,000 with the Supreme Court Legal Services Authority within four weeks from the date of pronouncement of the instant order failing which the matter be placed before the Court for appropriate direction for recovery of the costs.