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State Of Andhra Pradesh And Others v. D. Raghukul Pershad (Dead) By Lrs. And Others
Factual and Procedural Background
The respondents (plaintiffs) instituted O.S. No. 2379 of 1990 before the V Assistant Civil Judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad, seeking ejectment and resumption of possession of the suit land from the appellants (defendants). The respondents asserted that the appellants had taken the land on lease from their common ancestor, late Shri Dwaraka Pershad, but failed to pay rent or renew the lease after 1986, prompting a notice to vacate on 30-11-1989.
The appellants filed a written statement claiming ownership of the land and contending that both execution of the lease deed and payment of rent were made under a mistake of fact. The trial court decreed eviction, finding that the appellants could not establish title.
On first appeal (A.S. No. 294 of 2005), the III Additional Chief Judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad, affirmed the decree, holding that the appellants were estopped from disputing the respondents’ title until possession was surrendered.
The High Court, in second appeal (S.A. No. 270 of 2009), dismissed the appeal, relying on Section 116 of the Evidence Act and an earlier writ-petition decision concerning the same survey number, to conclude that the appellants could not deny the respondents’ title.
The present judgment of the Supreme Court arises from the appellants’ further appeal challenging these concurrent findings.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether tenants who entered under a lease may, in an eviction suit, deny the lessor’s title on the plea that the lease was executed and rent paid under a mistake of fact.
- Whether, in a suit framed purely for eviction (without a prayer for declaration of title), the courts below were justified in recording findings on the question of title.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellants’ Arguments
- Relied on the Full Bench decision in Venkata Chetty v. Aiyanna Gounden, AIR 1917 Mad 789, to contend that a tenant not let into possession by the plaintiff can dispute the plaintiff’s title and show title in himself.
- Submitted that, under contract law, a transaction vitiated by mistake cannot give rise to an estoppel; hence the lease deed and payment of rent, allegedly executed under a mistake of fact, should not preclude them from asserting ownership.
Respondents’ Arguments
- Maintained that the plaint, though not seeking a declaration, contained clear assertions of ownership entitling them to recovery of possession.
- Emphasised the rule in Section 116 of the Evidence Act, arguing that the appellants, as tenants, were estopped from denying the lessor’s title until they first surrendered possession.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Venkata Chetty v. Aiyanna Gounden, AIR 1917 Mad 789 (FB) | A tenant who was not inducted by the plaintiff can deny the plaintiff’s title and plead mistake. | Cited by appellants; Court declined to apply because no factual issue on “mistake of fact” had been framed or proved. |
| D. Satyanarayana v. P. Jagadish, (1987) 4 SCC 424 | General rule of tenant’s estoppel: a tenant cannot dispute the landlord’s title while in possession. | Relied upon by Supreme Court to affirm eviction and hold that none of the recognised exceptions were established. |
| W.P. No. 9717 of 1993 (High Court) & subsequent dismissal of appeal by the Supreme Court | Held Rayees Yar Jung to be owner of the relevant survey numbers; sales by him valid. | Referenced as part of High Court’s reasoning to estop the appellants from advancing a contrary ownership claim; Supreme Court noted but did not base its ultimate decision on this writ-petition finding. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Supreme Court noted that although the appellants pleaded “mistake of fact” in executing the lease deed, the trial court framed no issue on this plea. Because the issue is factual and no evidence was led, the Court held it could not examine the contention.
Reaffirming the rule in D. Satyanarayana, the Court stated that a tenant in possession is estopped from challenging the landlord’s title until possession is surrendered, and none of the recognised exceptions applied.
The Court observed that the suit was framed solely for eviction based on non-renewal of lease and non-payment of rent, not for declaration of title. Consequently, the trial court, first appellate court, and High Court were not required to adjudicate title. Their findings on ownership were therefore outside the scope of the suit.
Balancing these considerations, the Court set aside the findings on title but maintained the decree for eviction, emphasising that any future suit for declaration of title by the appellants would be maintainable only after they first vacate and hand over possession.
Holding and Implications
The appeal is allowed in part. The findings of the courts below on title are set aside, but the decree for eviction is affirmed. The appellants must vacate the suit land within six months, and no suit for declaration of title brought by them will be entertained unless they first surrender possession.
Implications: The judgment reiterates the statutory estoppel embodied in Section 116 of the Evidence Act and clarifies that in a pure eviction suit the court should not render findings on title. While reaffirming existing precedent, the decision leaves open the appellants’ right to litigate title after vacating, thus producing no new rule of substantive law but reinforcing procedural boundaries in landlord-tenant disputes.
Order
1. Leave granted.
2. The facts briefly are that the respondents herein filed OS No. 2379 of 1990 in the Court of the Vth Assistant Civil Judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad against Appellants 1 to 4 for ejectment and resumption of possession of the suit land. The case of the respondents in the plaint was that the appellants had taken lease of the suit land from their common ancestor, late Shri Dwaraka Pershad who had purchased the suit land from Nawab Rayees Yar Bahadur. The further case of the respondents in the plaint was that as the appellants failed to pay any rent from 1986 and renewed the lease after 1986, the respondents gave a notice to the appellants on 30-11-1989 to vacate the suit land. The appellants filed a written statement pleading, inter alia, that the suit land actually belonged to the appellants and the lease deed had been executed and the rent had been paid to the respondents by mistake of fact. The learned Civil Judge decreed the suit for eviction after recording a finding, inter alia, that the appellants have not been able to prove the title to the land.
3. The appellants filed a first appeal before the IIIrd Additional Chief Judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad which was numbered as AS No. 294 of 2005. The first appellate court held that the appellants were estopped from setting up title in them so long as they have not surrendered possession of the land to the lessees, namely, the respondents and further held that the appellants have not been able to establish their title to the suit land.
4. Aggrieved, the appellants filed second appeal SA No. 270 of 2009 before the High Court and by the impugned order Second Appeal No. 270 of 2009, the High Court has dismissed the second appeal after holding that the appellants cannot be permitted to deny the title of the respondents under the provisions of Section 116 of the Evidence Act and also holding that the appellants have not been able to adduce any evidence to prove that the suit land belonged to the appellants. The High Court also held in the impugned order Second Appeal No. 270 of 2009 that in a writ petition WP No. 9717 of 1993 filed before the High Court, one Mohammed Khasim and Ameena Begum had challenged the entries with regard to Survey No. 58 (Old) of Bahloolkhanguda Survey No. 127 (New) and the High Court had observed that Rayees Yar Jung was the owner and sales made by Rayees Yar Jung were, therefore, valid. The High Court further observed that the order WP (C) No. 9717 of 1993 passed by the High Court in Writ Petition No. 9717 of 1993 was challenged before this Court by the Government but this Court had dismissed the appeal and therefore, the appellants were estopped from taking a different stand with regard to the ownership of the land. With the aforesaid findings, the High Court dismissed the second appeal of the appellants.
5. Mr P.S Narasimha, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the appellants cited a Full Bench judgment of the Madras High Court in Venkata Chetty v. Aiyanna Gounden AIR 1917 Mad 789 and particularly the observations of Abdul Rahim, J. the Officiating Chief Justice, to the effect that a tenant who was not let into possession by the person seeking to eject him is not estopped from denying the plaintiff's title and he may also show that the title is in some third person or himself. He also relied on the observations of Sheshagiri Aiyar, J. in the aforesaid case that under the Contract Act, it can be shown that any contract into which a party has entered is vitiated by mistake and the principle of estoppel should not be held to override these provisions of law of contract.. He argued, relying on the aforesaid observations in the judgment AIR 1917 Mad 789 of the Madras High Court that the appellants, therefore, were entitled to plead in the written statement that the execution of the lease acknowledging title of the respondents was a mistake of fact and that the appellants were actually the owners of the suit land.
6. We have considered the submissions of Mr P.S Narasimha and we find that although plea was raised by the appellants in their written statement that the execution of the lease deed in the present case, as well as payment of rent pursuant to the lease deed were under mistake of fact, no issue as such was framed by the trial court on whether the lease deed was executed by mistake of fact. This issue is an issue of fact and it is at the stage of trial that this issue will have to be raised and framed by the trial court so that parties could lead evidence on the issue. In this case, as this issue has not been framed, parties have not adduced evidence and no finding as such has been recorded by the trial court on this issue. Hence, we are not in a position to consider the argument of Mr P.S Narasimha that the lease deed was executed and the rent was paid by mistake of fact.
7. The law is settled by this Court in D. Satyanarayana v. P. Jagadish (1987) 4 SCC 424 that the tenant who has been let into possession by the landlord cannot deny the landlord's title however defective it may be, so long as he has not openly surrendered possession by surrender to his landlord. Although, there are some exceptions to this general rule, none of the exceptions have been established by the appellants in this case. Hence, the appellants who were the tenants of the respondents will have to surrender possession to the respondents before they can challenge the title of the respondents.
8. In the plaint as framed by the respondents in the present case, the relief of eviction against the appellants was not based on the title of the respondents. Mr M.L Varma, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the respondents vehemently submitted that on a reading of the plaint, it will appear that the respondents had claimed to be owners of the land. We find that although an averment has been made in the plaint that the respondents were the owners of the suit land, no relief for declaration of title as such has been claimed by the respondents. Only the relief of eviction was sought in the plaint on the ground that the lease had not been renewed after 1986 and the rent had not been paid since 1986. In our considered opinion, therefore, this being not a suit of declaration of title and recovery of possession but only a suit for eviction, the trial court, the first appellate court and the High Court were not called upon to decide the question of title.
9. For the aforesaid reasons, we set aside the findings of the trial court, the first appellate court and the High Court on title, but we maintain the decree for eviction. We, however, order that the appellants will vacate the suit land within six months from today and further make it clear that the suit, if any, filed by the appellants for declaration of title and consequential relief cannot be entertained by the Court unless the appellants first vacate and hand over possession to the respondents.
10. The judgments of the courts below are modified accordingly. The appeal is allowed to the extent indicated above. No costs.
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