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Balaji Gunthu Dhule v. State Of Maharashtra .
Factual and Procedural Background
The appellant was tried alongside two co-accused for the death of one Ranga Rao, allegedly caused during a quarrel involving Smt. Shantabai (who died during trial). Relying on the testimony of six purported eyewitnesses (PWs 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 and 10), the trial court convicted all three accused for an offence under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) and sentenced them to life imprisonment.
On appeal under Section 374(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, the High Court of Bombay, Bench at Aurangabad, re-appreciated the evidence, discarded the testimony of PWs 4, 5, 7 and 8, acquitted the two co-accused, yet affirmed the appellant’s conviction for murder, basing its conclusion largely on:
- PW 10’s alleged presence, inferred from the fact that he took the deceased to hospital; and
- certain answers of the appellant recorded under Section 313 CrPC.
Challenging that decision, the appellant obtained special leave to appeal to the Supreme Court.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the High Court erred in treating the appellant’s Section 313 CrPC statement as incriminatory evidence for concluding that PW 10 was an eyewitness to the incident.
- Whether a conviction for murder can be sustained when the High Court has rejected all but one eyewitness and has relied essentially on a post-mortem report uncorroborated by acceptable ocular testimony.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant's Arguments
- The High Court wrongly used portions of the appellant’s Section 313 statement against him, contrary to settled law that such statements cannot be considered in isolation or treated as substantive evidence of guilt.
- Once the testimonies of PWs 4, 5, 7 and 8 were discarded and PW 10’s presence was doubtful, there was no reliable eyewitness account to sustain a conviction under Section 302 IPC.
- The post-mortem report, standing alone, could not lawfully form the basis of a conviction for murder.
No detailed submission of the respondent’s counsel is recorded in the provided opinion.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Manu Sao v. State of Bihar (2010) 12 SCC 310 | Section 313 statement is not substantive evidence; may be considered only in conjunction with prosecution evidence. | Used to demonstrate that the High Court could not treat the appellant’s answers under Section 313 as independent proof of PW 10’s presence at the scene. |
| Vijendrajit Ayodhya Prasad Goel v. State of Bombay, AIR 1953 SC 247 | Court cannot rely selectively on inculpatory parts of an accused’s statement while ignoring exculpatory portions. | Reinforced the impropriety of employing the appellant’s Section 313 statement as the principal basis for conviction. |
| Ajay Singh v. State of Maharashtra (2007) 12 SCC 341 | Purpose of Section 313 is to allow the accused to explain circumstances; answers must be evaluated fairly and in totality. | Cited to underline the limited evidentiary value of Section 313 answers and the need for correlation with other evidence. |
| Hate Singh Bhagat Singh v. State of Madhya Bharat, AIR 1953 SC 468 | Entire statement under Section 313 must be considered objectively; it cannot, by itself, found a conviction. | Supported the conclusion that selective reliance on the appellant’s statement was legally unsound. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Supreme Court observed that the High Court had accepted none of the primary eyewitnesses except PW 10. To treat PW 10 as an eyewitness, the High Court relied on the appellant’s Section 313 admission that a quarrel occurred and that PW 10 had taken the deceased to hospital. The Supreme Court held:
- A Section 313 statement is not substantive evidence and cannot be used in isolation; prevailing precedent strictly limits its use.
- The appellant’s statement actually contradicted the prosecution version—he claimed the deceased fell accidentally rather than being struck—making it improper to infer PW 10’s eyewitness status from that statement.
- With the testimony of PWs 4, 5, 7 and 8 rejected and PW 10’s presence in doubt, the only remaining support for conviction was the post-mortem report, which, without corroborative ocular evidence, was insufficient to prove murder.
Accordingly, the Court concluded that the conviction could not stand.
Holding and Implications
HELD: The appeal is allowed; the conviction under Section 302 IPC is set aside and the appellant is to be released forthwith, unless required in any other case.
Implications: The judgment reinforces the circumscribed evidentiary role of an accused’s Section 313 CrPC statement and clarifies that medical evidence, absent credible ocular corroboration, cannot by itself ground a conviction for murder. No new legal doctrine is created, but the decision underscores adherence to established principles governing the use of Section 313 statements in criminal trials.
Order
1. This appeal by special leave is directed against the judgment and order passed by the High Court of Judicature of Bombay, Bench at Aurangabad in Balaji Gunthu Dhule v. Hange Criminal Appeal No. 108 of 2004 dated 19-10-2005.
2. The appellant before us is convicted under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the Penal Code, 1860 (“IPC”, for short) and sentenced to imprisonment for life, by the trial court, on the allegation that he has caused the death of one Ranga Rao in a quarrel which ensued between Ranga Rao and one Smt Shantabai (other accused who expired during the trial). The prosecution, in support of its case, had examined several witnesses, including six eyewitnesses, PWs 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 and 10. The trial court, taking into consideration the evidence of PWs 4, 5, 7, 8 and 10, has convicted and sentenced the appellant and two others, as mentioned earlier.
3. Aggrieved by the said judgment and order passed by the trial court, the appellant and two others were before the High Court in an appeal filed under Section 374(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (“the Code”, for short). The High Court, after reappreciation of the evidence on record, has acquitted the two other accused, but has convicted the appellant only for an offence under Section 302 IPC. It is the correctness or otherwise of the said order Criminal Appeal No. 108 of 2004 which is called in question by the appellant before us.
4. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties to the lis.
5. The learned counsel appearing for the appellant has taken us through the judgment and order Criminal Appeal No. 108 of 2004 passed by the High Court. We gather on perusal of the judgment Criminal Appeal No. 108 of 2004 that the High Court after detailed consideration of the evidence of PWs 4, 5, 7 and 8 has rejected the same for the reasons assigned in the judgment. However, it has confirmed the order of the trial court primarily based on the evidence of PW 10, that too by drawing a distinction based on the analysis of the question: “whether PW 10 was present at the time of the incident or at least after the incident.” The High Court comes to the conclusion and records that since PW 10 had taken the deceased to the hospital, he could have been present at least after the incident.
6. To come to a conclusion that PW 10 was present at the time of the incident, strangely, in our opinion, the High Court has relied upon the statement made by the appellant-accused under Section 313 of the Code. In our opinion, first and foremost, as the law stands today, the statement of the accused recorded under Section 313 of the Code cannot be put against the accused person. The courts may rely on a portion of the statement of the accused and find him guilty in consideration of the other evidence against him led by the prosecution. The statement made under this section should not be considered in isolation but in conjunction with evidence adduced by the prosecution.
7. This Court in Manu Sao v. State of Bihar (2010) 12 SCC 310, has examined the vital features of Section 313 of the Code and the principles of law as enunciated by judgments, analysing the guiding factors for proper application and consequences that shall flow from the said provision and has observed:
“14. The statement of the accused can be used to test the veracity of the exculpatory nature of the admission, if any, made by the accused. It can be taken into consideration in any enquiry or trial but still it is not strictly evidence in the case. The provisions of Section 313(4) explicitly provides that the answers given by the accused may be taken into consideration in such enquiry or trial and put in evidence against the accused in any other enquiry or trial for any other offence for which such answers may tend to show he has committed. In other words, the use is permissible as per the provisions of the Code but has its own limitations. The courts may rely on a portion of the statement of the accused and find him guilty in consideration of the other evidence against him led by the prosecution, however, such statements made under this section should not be considered in isolation but in conjunction with evidence adduced by the prosecution.
15. Another important caution that courts have declared in the pronouncements is that conviction of the accused cannot be based merely on the statement made under Section 313 of the Code as it cannot be regarded as a substantive piece of evidence. In Vijendrajit Ayodhya Prasad Goel v. State of Bombay AIR 1953 SC 247, 1953 Cri LJ 1097, the Court held as under: (AIR p. 248, para 3)
‘3. … As the appellant admitted that he was in charge of the godown, further evidence was not led on the point. The Magistrate was in this situation fully justified in referring to the statement of the accused under Section 342 as supporting the prosecution case concerning the possession of the godown. The contention that the Magistrate made use of the inculpatory part of the accused's statement and excluded the exculpatory part does not seem to be correct. The statement under Section 342 did not consist of two portions, part inculpatory and part exculpatory. It concerned itself with two facts. The accused admitted that he was in charge of the godown, he denied that the rectified spirit was found in that godown. He alleged that the rectified spirit was found outside it. This part of his statement was proved untrue by the prosecution evidence and had no intimate connection with the statement concerning the possession of the godown.’
16. On similar lines reference can be made to a quite recent judgment of this Court in Ajay Singh v. State of Maharashtra (2007) 12 SCC 341, where the Court held as under:
‘11. So far as the prosecution case that kerosene was found on the accused's dress is concerned, it is to be noted that no question in this regard was put to the accused while he was examined under Section 313 of the Code.
12. The purpose of Section 313 of the Code is set out in its opening words—“for the purpose of enabling the accused personally to explain any circumstances appearing in the evidence against him”. In Hate Singh Bhagat Singh v. State of Madhya Bharat AIR 1953 SC 468, 1953 Cri LJ 1933 it has been laid down by Bose, J. (AIR p. 469, para 8) that the statements of the accused persons recorded under Section 313 of the Code “are among the most important matters to be considered at the trial”. It was pointed out that: (AIR p. 470, para 8)
“8. … The statements of the accused recorded by the committing Magistrate and the Sessions Judge are intended in India to take the place of what in England and in America he would be free to state in his own way in the witness box [and that they] have to be received in evidence and treated as evidence and be duly considered at the trial.”
This position remains unaltered even after the insertion of Section 315 in the Code and any statement under Section 313 has to be considered in the same way as if Section 315 is not there.
13. The object of examination under this section is to give the accused an opportunity to explain the case made against him. This statement can be taken into consideration in judging his innocence or guilt. Where there is an onus on the accused to discharge, it depends on the facts and circumstances of the case if such statement discharges the onus.’
17. The statement made by the accused is capable of being used in the trial though to a limited extent. But the law also places an obligation upon the court to take into consideration the stand of the accused in his statement and consider the same objectively and in its entirety. This principle of law has been stated by this Court in Hate Singh Bhagat Singh v. State of Madhya Bharat AIR 1953 SC 468, 1953 Cri LJ 1933.”
(emphasis supplied)
8. Herein, the appellant in his statement under Section 313 of the Code admits that there was a quarrel between Shantabai (deceased accused) and PW 10 and while rushing to the spot of quarrel the deceased involuntarily fell on a cement concrete platform, otta and thereby suffered the fatal injury. The prosecution story was that a quarrel between the deceased and Shantabai in fact took place, however, the fatal injury was caused by a deliberate blow by the appellant on the deceased. In our opinion, there is absolute contradiction in the statement made by the appellant in his statement under Section 313 of the Code and that statement could not have been put against the accused in concluding that PW 10 was present at the place of incident at or immediately after the occurrence of the incident. Therefore, the said witness, in our opinion, cannot be considered as eyewitness to the incident as such.
9. The High Court has also relied upon the post-mortem report of the doctor. In our opinion, since the entire evidence of the eyewitnesses has not been accepted by the High Court, it could not have merely relied upon the post-mortem report to convict the appellant for an offence under Section 302 IPC. Further, in our view, the post-mortem report should be in corroboration with the evidence of eyewitnesses and cannot be an evidence sufficient to reach the conclusion for convicting the appellant. In view of the above, we have no other alternative but to allow this appeal and set aside the judgment and order passed by the High Court convicting the appellant for an offence punishable under Section 302 IPC.
10. In the result, the appeal is allowed with a direction that the appellant-accused be released forthwith, if he is not required in any other offence/case. Ordered accordingly.
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