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Rajesh Kumar Srivastava v. State Of Jharkhand And Others
Factual and Procedural Background
The appellant applied for the post of Munsif pursuant to an advertisement issued by the respondents. After clearing the requisite tests and interview in 2001, he completed training and was appointed as a Probationer Munsif by Government notification dated 21-5-2002 and posted at Dhanbad. He assumed charge on 4-6-2002 and was vested with powers of Judicial Magistrate, First Class, on 15-7-2002.
On 6-1-2003 the appellant discharged all accused in GR No. 4698/1995 (Sections 406, 408, 420, 120-B IPC) under Section 239 CrPC. A complaint dated 4-3-2003 alleged that this discharge was contrary to a prior High Court decision and motivated by extraneous considerations. The High Court sought a report from the District & Sessions Judge, obtained the appellant’s remarks, and placed the matter before its Standing Committee and then the Full Court. On 18-7-2003 the Full Court resolved that the appellant’s continuation in service was “no longer required.”
Acting on that resolution, the Government of Jharkhand issued an order dated 31-7-2003 discharging the appellant “in public interest.” His writ petition challenging the order was dismissed by a Division Bench on 4-4-2008. The present civil appeal was filed against that dismissal.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the Government’s order discharging the appellant amounted to punitive removal requiring a formal inquiry and adherence to principles of natural justice.
- Whether the order was stigmatic and thus invalid without an opportunity of hearing, or a termination simpliciter permissible for a probationer.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant's Arguments
- The impugned order is, in substance, a removal for misconduct passed without conducting any inquiry, violating natural justice.
- The discharge casts a stigma on the appellant’s career and is therefore punitive and illegal.
Respondents' Arguments
- The appellant was only a probationer; his services could be terminated in public interest without inquiry.
- The order is non-stigmatic, non-punitive, and a simple discharge based on unsatisfactory performance; hence, no violation of natural justice occurred.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Rajesh Kohli v. High Court of J&K, (2010) 12 SCC 783 | High Courts must rigorously assess a probationary judicial officer’s overall performance and probity before confirmation; unsatisfactory officers may be released. | The Court relied on this authority to affirm that termination of a probationary judicial officer for unsatisfactory service, without stigma or inquiry, is permissible. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court noted that the appellant was a Probationer Munsif at the time of discharge. During probation, an employer evaluates an officer’s suitability for confirmation; if found unsuitable, the service may be discontinued without notice or hearing.
The Full Court of the High Court considered the appellant’s overall performance and conduct, including reports from superiors, and concluded that his continuation was not in the public interest. The Government’s order merely implemented that resolution.
The Court distinguished between punitive dismissal and termination simpliciter. Because the order did not attribute misconduct or impose penalties but cited public interest, it was non-stigmatic. Consequently, principles governing removal for misconduct—including a formal inquiry and opportunity to be heard—were inapplicable.
Relying on Rajesh Kohli, the Court emphasized the judiciary’s need for upright and competent officers and affirmed that discharge of an unsuitable probationer is within the High Court’s supervisory powers over the subordinate judiciary.
Holding and Implications
APPEAL DISMISSED.
The Supreme Court upheld the Government order and the High Court judgment, confirming that a probationary judicial officer may be discharged in public interest on grounds of overall unsuitability without a departmental inquiry. The decision affects only the parties involved and reiterates existing principles; it sets no new precedent beyond affirming established jurisprudence on probationary termination.
Dr. M.K Sharma, J.— Leave granted. The appellant herein submitted his application offering himself as a candidate for the post of Munsif to be recruited by the respondents for which an advertisement was also issued. Pursuant to the aforesaid application filed by the appellant, he was called to appear in the various tests held, including the interview conducted by the High Court. He successfully completed his tests and consequently was declared successful in the year 2001.
2. After completing his training period, a Notification was issued on 21-5-2002, appointing him as a Probationer Munsif. The said notification was issued by the Government of Jharkhand. He was posted at Dhanbad by a notification issued by the High Court. On 4-6-2002, he assumed the charge as Probationer Munsif at Dhanbad. On 15-7-2002, he was conferred with the power of the Judicial Magistrate, First Class. While he was discharging his duties as such, he passed an order on 6-1-2003, discharging all the accused under Section 239 CrPC in GR No. 4698 of 1995 under Sections 406, 408, 420, 120-B IPC.
3. A complaint from one Ram Kumar was received by the High Court on 4-3-2003, wherein it was alleged that the appellant had discharged the said accused persons, despite rejection of revision application by the High Court earlier. It was also alleged that the aforesaid order discharging the accused was passed for extraneous consideration. The High Court on receipt of the aforesaid complaint called for a report from the District and Sessions Judge, Dhanbad. On receipt of the said communication, the District and Sessions Judge, Dhanbad, sent a letter to the appellant directing him to offer his remarks, which were submitted by the appellant. The said remarks and report along with confidential report of the appellant were submitted by the District and Sessions Judge, Dhanbad, before the High Court.
4. On 28-4-2003, the Zonal Judge concerned referred the matter to the Standing Committee for further action. In terms of the decision of the Zonal Judge, the then Chief Justice of the High Court also referred the matter to the Standing Committee by way of recording an order on 1-5-2003. The matter was considered in the meeting of the Standing Committee held on 8-7-2003. After considering the performance and the suitability of the appellant, it was resolved that the matter be referred to the Full Court for consideration, and a decision as to whether or not the continuation of the service of the appellant was required. Consequent thereupon the matter was placed before the Full Court meeting held on 18-7-2003, wherein it was resolved by the Full Court that the continuation of the service of the appellant was no longer required and that he should be discharged. Consequent thereupon the resolution of the Full Court was sent to the Government.
5. The Government of Jharkhand issued an Order dated 31-7-2003, stating that the services of the appellant are no longer required in public interest, and therefore, the appellant stands discharged from service with effect from 31-7-2003. Challenging the said order passed by the State Government, the appellant filed a writ petition before the High Court which was dismissed by the Division Bench of the High Court by a detailed order giving reasons for its decision dated 4-4-2008.
6. The appellant being aggrieved by the aforesaid order passed by the High Court filed the present appeal in this Court, on which we heard the learned counsel appearing for the parties, who had also taken us painstakingly through the records of the case. Having considered the same, we proceed to dispose of the present appeal by recording our reasons for our conclusion.
7. The counsel appearing for the appellant submitted that the order challenged by way of the writ petition was an order of removal and the same having been passed without holding an enquiry amounts to, not only violation of the principles of natural justice but also amounts to casting a stigma in the career of the appellant and, therefore, the order passed by the High Court is illegal and liable to be set aside.
8. The counsel appearing for the respondents, however, refuted the aforesaid submissions. He submitted that the appellant was on probation when a notification removing him from the service in public interest was issued and that the order passed was just and proper. He denied that the impugned order is stigmatic or in any way punitive or that there was any violation of the principles of natural justice.
9. The records placed before us disclose that at the time when the impugned order was passed, the appellant was working as a Probationer Munsif. A person is placed on probation so as to enable the employer to adjudge his suitability for continuation in the service and also for confirmation in service. There are various criteria for adjudging suitability of a person to hold the post on permanent basis and by way of confirmation. At that stage and during the period of probation the action and activities of the probationer (appellant) are generally under scrutiny and on the basis of his overall performance a decision is generally taken as to whether his services should be continued and that he should be confirmed, or he should be released from service. In the present case, in the course of adjudging such suitability it was found by the respondents that the performance of the appellant was not satisfactory and therefore he was not suitable for the job.
10. The aforesaid decision to release him from service was taken by the respondents considering his overall performance, conduct and suitability for the job. While taking a decision in this regard neither is any notice required to be given to the appellant nor is he required to be given any opportunity of hearing. Strictly speaking, it is not a case of removal as sought to be made out by the appellant, but was a case of simple discharge from service. It is, therefore, only a termination simpliciter and not removal from service on the grounds of indiscipline or misconduct. While adjudging his performance, conduct and overall suitability, his performance record as also the report from the higher authorities were called for and they were looked into before any decision was taken as to whether the officer concerned should be continued in service or not.
11. In a recent decision of this Court in Rajesh Kohli v. High Court of J&K (2010) 12 SCC 783, JT (2010) 10 SC 276, almost a similar issue cropped up for consideration, in which this Court has held that the High Court has a solemn duty to consider and appreciate the service of a judicial officer before confirming him in service and for this not only judicial performance but also probity as to how one has conducted himself is relevant and important. It was also held in the same decision that upright and honest judicial officers are needed in the District Judiciary which is the bedrock of our judicial system.
12. The order of termination passed in the present case is a fallout of his unsatisfactory service adjudged on the basis of his overall performance and the manner in which he conducted himself. Such decision cannot be said to be stigmatic or punitive. This is a case of termination of service simpliciter and not a case of stigmatic termination and, therefore, there is no infirmity in the impugned judgment and order passed by the High Court.
13. We do not find any merit in this appeal, therefore, we dismiss the same, but leaving the parties to bear their own costs.
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