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Union Of India v. Giani .
Factual and Procedural Background
The appeals arise out of land acquisition proceedings relating to Village Ziauddinpur, Delhi. A notification under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 was issued on 6 March 1965, followed by a declaration under Section 6 on 7 January 1969. The Collector made Award No. 39/80-81 on 9 July 1980. The respondents were granted, inter alia, additional compensation under Section 23(1-A) of the Act by the High Court. The appellants challenged that award but filed their appeals before the Supreme Court after the expiry of the limitation period. Applications for condonation of delay were therefore filed along with the appeals.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the delay in filing the appeals should be condoned under the “sufficient cause” standard.
- Whether the respondents are entitled to additional compensation under Section 23(1-A) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 when the Section 4 notification was issued in 1965 and the Collector’s award was made on 9 July 1980, i.e., before 30 April 1982, the cut-off date specified in the 1984 amending Act.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellants' Arguments
- The 1984 amendment introducing Section 23(1-A) applies only to acquisition proceedings that were pending on or after 30 April 1982. Because the award in the present case was made on 9 July 1980, the respondents cannot claim the additional amount under Section 23(1-A).
- Reliance was placed on the Constitution Bench decision in K.S. Paripoornan v. State of Kerala, (1994) 5 SCC 593, which interprets Section 23(1-A) read with Section 30(1) of the amending Act to exclude awards made before 30 April 1982.
- The subsequent judgment in Pralhad v. State of Maharashtra, (2010) 10 SCC 458, was cited to reaffirm the Paripoornan principle.
Respondents' Arguments
This information was not available in the provided opinion.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| K.S. Paripoornan v. State of Kerala, (1994) 5 SCC 593 | Section 23(1-A) does not apply to acquisition proceedings in which the Collector’s award was made before 30 April 1982. | Formed the primary basis for denying Section 23(1-A) benefits to the respondents. |
| Pralhad v. State of Maharashtra, (2010) 10 SCC 458 | Reiterated and applied the principle laid down in Paripoornan. | Cited as supporting authority to reinforce the inapplicability of Section 23(1-A) to the present case. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
Condonation of Delay: The Court first examined the applications for condonation of delay. Considering the explanations offered and noting that the appellants had a “strong arguable case,” the Court concluded that “sufficient cause” existed and adopted a pragmatic, justice-oriented approach to condone the delay in all appeals.
Merits of the Appeals: On the substantive issue, the Court conducted a statutory analysis of Section 23(1-A) as introduced by the 1984 amendment together with Section 30(1) of the Amending Act 68 of 1984. Relying heavily on the Constitution Bench ruling in K.S. Paripoornan, the Court observed that Section 23(1-A) applies only where either (a) the Collector’s award was made after 30 April 1982, or (b) the acquisition proceedings were pending on or after that date. Because the present award was passed on 9 July 1980, the respondents’ case fell outside both categories. The subsequent decision in Pralhad was invoked to confirm this interpretation. Consequently, the additional compensation granted by the High Court under Section 23(1-A) was legally unsustainable.
Holding and Implications
PARTLY ALLOWED: The Supreme Court allowed the appeals to the extent of setting aside the grant of compensation under Section 23(1-A) to the respondents. It condoned the delay in filing the appeals and ordered that each party bear its own costs.
Implications: The decision removes the Section 23(1-A) component from the compensation awarded to the respondents. The judgment applies established precedent without creating new law; its effect is confined to the parties involved but reinforces the settled position that Section 23(1-A) cannot be invoked where the Collector’s award predates 30 April 1982.
Dr. M.K Sharma, J.— Leave granted in all the petitions. We propose to dispose of all these appeals by this common judgment and order. In all these appeals not only the issues arising for our consideration on merit are identical but also all these appeals were filed by the appellants herein after considerable delay.
2. Having examined the averments made in the applications for condonation of delay in filing all the appeals and after hearing the learned counsel for the parties, we are satisfied that the applications for condonation of delay in preferring the appeals must be allowed as the statements in the applications for condonation of delay, in our view, do constitute sufficient cause in not preferring the appeals within the period of limitation. We, therefore, condone delay in all the appeals. We have taken such a view in this matter as we feel that there is a strong arguable case on behalf of the appellants and, therefore, it is felt necessary that the Court should decide the matter on merit by giving the expression “sufficient cause” a pragmatic justice-oriented approach.
3. In all these appeals the counsel appearing for the appellant has raised just one issue, namely, that the respondent in each of the appeals is not entitled to receive compensation under Section 23(1-A) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (for short “the Act”) which has been granted in their favour by the orders of the High Court.
4. On 6-3-1995 by issuing a Notification under Section 4 of the Act, land situated in Village Ziauddinpur, Delhi was sought to be acquired for public purpose, namely, planned development of Delhi. The aforesaid notification was followed by issuance of a declaration under Section 6 of the Act which was issued on 7-1-1969. The Collector passed the award on 9-7-1980 vide his Award No. 39/80-81.
5. Section 23(1-A) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 was inserted w.e.f 24-9-1984, by way of amendment to the Act which was made applicable to proceedings pending on or after 30-4-1982. The said sub-section (1-A) provides that in addition to the market value of the land, the court would in every case award an amount calculated at the rate of twelve per centum per annum on such market value for the period commencing on and from the date of the publication of the notification under Section 4 sub-section (1), in respect of such land to the date of the award of the Collector or the date of taking possession of the land, whichever is earlier. In sub-section (2) of Section 23 of the Act the words “thirty per centum” replaced the words “fifteen per centum” w.e.f 24-9-1984 and it was also made applicable to certain awards made and order passed after 30-4-1982.
6. The specific and the only issue which was agitated by the counsel appearing for the appellant before us, during the course of hearing was that, since the aforesaid amendment by Act 68 of 1984 inserted a new provision in the nature of sub-section (1-A), which was inserted w.e.f 24-9-1984 (and was made applicable to proceedings pending on or after 30-4-1982) sub-section (1-A) of Section 23 would not be applicable in the present case.
7. In support of the said contention reference was made to the decision of the Constitutional Bench of this Court in K.S Paripoornan v. State of Kerala (1994) 5 SCC 593 in which this Court upon a combined reading of Section 23(1-A) and Section 30(1) of the Act held as follows:
“74. … A perusal of sub-section (1) of Section 30 of the amending Act shows that it divides the proceedings for acquisition of land which had commenced prior to the date of the commencement of the amending Act into two categories, proceedings which had commenced prior to 30-4-1982 and proceedings which had commenced after 30-4-1982. While clause (a) of Section 30(1) deals with proceedings which had commenced prior to 30-4-1982, clause (b) deals with proceedings which commenced after 30-4-1982. By virtue of clause (a), Section 23(1-A) has been made applicable to proceedings which had commenced prior to 30-4-1982 if no award had been made by the Collector in those proceedings before 30-4-1982. It covers (i) proceedings which were pending before the Collector on 30-4-1982 wherein award was made after 30-4-1982 but before the date of the commencement of the amending Act, and (ii) such proceedings wherein award was made by the Collector after the date of the commencement of the amending Act. Similarly Section 30(1)(b) covers (i) proceedings which had commenced after 30-4-1982 wherein award was made prior to the commencement of the amending Act, and (ii) such proceedings wherein award was made after the commencement of the amending Act. It would thus appear that both clauses (a) and (b) of sub-section (1) of Section 30 cover proceedings for acquisition which were pending on the date of the commencement of the amending Act and to which the provisions of Section 23(1-A) have been made applicable by virtue of Section 30(1). If Section 23(1-A), independently of Section 30(1), is applicable to all proceedings which were pending on the date of the commencement of the amending Act, clauses (a) and (b) of Section 30(1) would have been confined to proceedings which had commenced prior to the commencement of the amending Act and had concluded before such commencement because by virtue of Section 15 the provisions of Section 23(1-A) would have been applicable to proceedings pending before the Collector on the date of commencement of the amending Act. There was no need to so phrase Section 30(1) as to apply the provisions of Section 23(1-A) to proceedings which were pending before the Collector on the date of the commencement of the amending Act. This only indicates that but for the provisions contained in Section 30(1) Section 23(1-A) would not have been applicable to proceedings pending before the Collector on the date of commencement of the amending Act.”
8. A similar issue again came up for consideration before this Court in Pralhad v. State of Maharashtra (2010) 10 SCC 458 wherein reference was made and reliance was placed on the decision of K.S Paripoornan (1994) 5 SCC 593.
9. In the present case the acquisition proceedings commenced with the Notification under Section 4 issued on 6-3-1965 and it culminated in passing of the award by the Collector on 9-7-1980 i.e before 30-4-1982, the date from which the amending Act 68 of 1984 was made applicable to the pending and subsequent proceedings. Therefore, in terms of the law laid down by the Constitution Bench decision of this Court in K.S Paripoornan (1994) 5 SCC 593 the respondents are not entitled to the benefit of Section 23(1-A).
10. All the appeals, therefore, are partly allowed to the aforesaid extent and disposed of leaving the parties to bear their own costs.
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