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Prafull Goradia v. Union Of India .
Factual and Procedural Background
The petitioner, a Hindu citizen, invoked the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction under Article 32 of the Constitution. The writ petition initially assailed the constitutional validity of the Haj Committee Act, 1959, but an amended pleading substituted a challenge to the Haj Committee Act, 2002, which repealed the earlier enactment. The petitioner contended that Government expenditure—including an airfare subsidy—for Muslim pilgrims undertaking the Haj was funded from general tax revenues paid by citizens of all faiths. He alleged that this arrangement infringed his fundamental rights and sought a declaration that the statute was unconstitutional.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the utilisation of tax revenues to facilitate the Haj pilgrimage violates Article 27 of the Constitution, which prohibits compulsion to pay taxes whose proceeds are “specifically appropriated” for promoting or maintaining any particular religion.
- Whether the impugned statutory scheme offends the equality provisions of Articles 14 and 15 of the Constitution.
- Whether Parliament possessed legislative competence under Entry 20, List I (Union List) of the Seventh Schedule—“Pilgrimages to places outside India”—to enact the Haj Committee Act, 2002.
Arguments of the Parties
Petitioner's Arguments
- Article 27 is infringed because direct and indirect taxes collected from him are partly applied to subsidise the Haj, an exclusively Muslim pilgrimage.
- The statutory framework discriminates on religious grounds, violating Articles 14 and 15.
Union of India’s Arguments
- Government facilitates other religious pilgrimages—e.g. Kumbh Mela, Mansarovar Yatra, visits to temples and gurdwaras in Pakistan—so no religion receives exclusive fiscal favour.
- The sums expended on such pilgrimages, including the Haj, form only a minuscule proportion of aggregate tax revenues; therefore Article 27 is not attracted.
- Parliament is empowered by Entry 20, List I to legislate on pilgrimages outside India, rendering the Act intra vires.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Commr., Hindu Religious Endowments v. Shri Lakshmindra Thirtha Swamiar (Shirur Mutt), AIR 1954 SC 282 | Article 27 is not attracted when the statute’s object is proper administration of religious trusts, not promotion of religion. | Used to illustrate limited scope of Article 27 and support the view that incidental expenditure does not violate the provision. |
| Jagannath Ramanuj Das v. State of Orissa, AIR 1954 SC 400 | Same principle as Shirur Mutt regarding Article 27. | Relied upon to affirm that mere regulatory objectives do not breach Article 27. |
| T.M.A. Pai Foundation v. State of Karnataka, (2002) 8 SCC 481 | Referenced for completeness; does not analyse Article 27 in depth. | Court noted it offered limited guidance on the present issue. |
| Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala, (1973) 4 SCC 225 | Constitutional interpretation demands a broad, purposive approach. | Justified reading Article 27 in a manner that safeguards secularism. |
| James v. Commonwealth of Australia, 1936 AC 578 | A Constitution must not be interpreted narrowly or pedantically. | Bolstered the adoption of a flexible standard for Article 27. |
| Central Provinces and Berar Sales of Motor Spirit and Lubricants Taxation Act, 1938, In re, AIR 1939 FC 1 | Follows James on broad constitutional construction. | Cited to reinforce non-pedantic interpretation. |
| British Coal Corporation v. R, AIR 1935 PC 158 | Describes a constitution as an organic statute. | Used to support purposive interpretation of Article 27. |
| M'Culloch v. Maryland, 17 US 316 (1819) | Constitutions are intended to endure; interpretation must be adaptive. | Invoked to avoid rigid reading of Article 27. |
| Missouri v. Holland, 252 US 416 (1919) | Enduring nature of constitutional provisions. | Further authority for flexible approach. |
| Bain Peanut Co. v. Pinson, 282 US 499 (1930) | Governmental machinery requires “a little play in its joints.” | Supported the conclusion that negligible religious expenditure does not offend Article 27. |
| Missouri, Kansas & Texas Railway Co. v. May, 194 US 267 (1903) | Cited alongside Bain Peanut for pragmatic constitutional interpretation. | Reinforced the need for practical flexibility. |
| Transport & Dock Workers Union v. Mumbai Port Trust, (2011) 2 SCC 575 | Article 14 should not be applied in a doctrinaire manner. | Used to rebut the petitioner’s equality argument. |
| Govt. of Andhra Pradesh v. P. Laxmi Devi, (2008) 4 SCC 720 | Court must exercise restraint and favour constitutionality of statutes. | Guided the court toward upholding the Act. |
| Kailas v. State of Maharashtra, (2011) 1 SCC 793 | Importance of tolerance and respect for diversity. | Inserted to emphasise India’s secular ethos. |
| Hinsa Virodhak Sangh v. Mirzapur Moti Kuresh Jamat, (2008) 5 SCC 33 | Need for coexistence in a plural society. | Cited to underline the broader constitutional context. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court identified two possible constructions of Article 27: (i) it applies only where the tax statute expressly earmarks proceeds for a particular religion, or (ii) it also applies if, in fact, a substantial portion of general tax revenues is expended for such purposes. Accepting the broader second view, the Court held that the constitutional prohibition is triggered only when a “substantial part” of tax proceeds is devoted to the promotion or maintenance of a single religion.
Examining the pleadings, the Court found the petitioner had made no concrete averment, nor supplied data, to show that a substantial percentage of any tax was being channelled to the Haj. Conversely, the Union’s counter-affidavit demonstrated that similar, though modest, expenditures are incurred for pilgrimages of other faiths, and that the Haj subsidy constitutes an inconsequential fraction of total tax collections.
Relying on Holmes J.’s metaphor of governmental machinery needing “play in its joints,” the Court observed that absolute rigidity would be impracticable; incidental or minor facilitation of religious activity does not violate Article 27. Because facilities are extended to multiple faiths, the equality clauses (Articles 14 and 15) were likewise unbreached. Finally, legislative competence was affirmed under Entry 20, List I, as the Act concerns pilgrimages outside India.
Holding and Implications
Petition DISMISSED.
The Supreme Court upheld the constitutional validity of the Haj Committee Act, 2002, ruling that:
- No violation of Article 27 arises unless a substantial proportion of tax revenue is dedicated to one religion, a threshold not met on the facts presented.
- Articles 14 and 15 were not infringed because comparable, albeit minimal, support is offered to pilgrims of other faiths.
- Parliament was competent to legislate on the subject under Entry 20, List I.
Although the decision creates no new doctrinal test, it clarifies that “substantial” (rather than de minimis) expenditure is required to trigger Article 27, thus providing guidance for future fiscal measures connected with religious activities.
Order
1. Heard the learned counsel for the parties.
2. This writ petition under Article 32 of the Constitution had been initially filed challenging the constitutional validity of the Haj Committee Act, 1959, but thereafter by an amendment application the Haj Committee Act of 2002 which replaced the 1959 Act, has been challenged. The ground for challenge is that the said Act is violative of Articles 14, 15 and 27 of the Constitution.
3. The grievance of the petitioner is that he is a Hindu but he has to pay direct and indirect taxes, part of whose proceeds go for the purpose of the Haj pilgrimage, which is only done by Muslims. For the Haj, the Indian Government inter alia grants a subsidy in the airfare of the pilgrims.
4. Particular emphasis has been given by the petitioner to Article 27 of the Constitution which states:
“27. Freedom as to payment of taxes for promotion of any particular religion.—No person shall be compelled to pay any taxes, the proceeds of which are specifically appropriated in payment of expenses for the promotion or maintenance of any particular religion or religious denomination.”
The petitioner contends that his fundamental right under Article 27 of the Constitution is being violated. We have, therefore, to correctly understand and interpret Article 27.
5. There are not many decisions which have given an in-depth interpretation of Article 27. The decision in Commr., Hindu Religious Endowments v. Shri Lakshmindra Thirtha Swamiar of Sri Shirur Mutt AIR 1954 SC 282, 1954 SCR 1005, held (vide AIR pp. 296-97 : SCR p. 1045) that since the object of the Madras Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act, 1951 is not to foster or preserve the Hindu religion but to see that religious trusts and institutions are properly administered, Article 27 is not attracted. The same view was taken in Jagannath Ramanuj Das v. State of Orissa AIR 1954 SC 400, 1954 SCR 1046. The decision in T.M.A Pai Foundation v. State of Karnataka (2002) 8 SCC 481, AIR 2003 SC 355 (vide SCC para 85) does not really deal with Article 27 at any depth.
6. There can be two views about Article 27. One view can be that Article 27 is attracted only when the statute by which the tax is levied specifically states that the proceeds of the tax will be utilised for a particular religion. The other view can be that Article 27 will be attracted even when the statute is a general statute, like the Income Tax Act or the Central Excise Act or the State Sales Tax Acts (which do not specify for what purpose the proceeds will be utilised) provided that a substantial part of such proceeds are in fact utilised for a particular religion. In our opinion Article 27 will be attracted in both these eventualities. This is because Article 27 is a provision in the Constitution, and not an ordinary statute. The principles of interpreting the Constitution are to some extent different from those of interpreting an ordinary statute vide the judgment of Hon'ble Sikri, J. in Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala (1973) 4 SCC 225 (vide SCC para 15). The object of Article 27 is to maintain secularism, and hence we must construe it from that angle.
7. As Lord Wright observed in James v. Commonwealth of Australia 1936 AC 578, (1936) 2 All ER 1449 (PC), a Constitution is not to be interpreted in a narrow or pedantic manner (followed in Central Provinces and Berar Sales of Motor Spirit and Lubricants Taxation Act, 1938, In re AIR 1939 FC 1). This is because a Constitution is a constituent or organic statute, vide British Coal Corpn. v. R. AIR 1935 PC 158 and Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala (1973) 4 SCC 225 (vide SCC para 506). While a statute must ordinarily be construed as on the day it was enacted, a Constitution cannot be construed in that manner, for it is intended to endure for ages to come, as Marshal, C.J of the US Supreme Court observed in M'Culloch v. Maryland 17 US 316 (1819), and Holmes, J. in Missouri v. Holland 252 US 416 (1919). Hence a strict construction cannot be given to it.
8. In our opinion Article 27 would be violated if a substantial part of the entire income tax collected in India, or a substantial part of the entire central excise or the customs duties or sales tax, or a substantial part of any other tax collected in India, were to be utilised for promotion or maintenance of any particular religion or religious denomination. In other words, suppose 25% of the entire income tax collected in India was utilised for promoting or maintaining any particular religion or religious denomination, that, in our opinion, would be violative of Article 27 of the Constitution.
9. However, the petitioner has not made any averment in his writ petition that a substantial part of any tax collected in India is utilised for the purpose of Haj. All that has been said in Paras 5(i) and (ii) of the writ petition is:
“5. (i) That the respondent herein has been imposing and collecting various kinds of direct and indirect taxes from the petitioner and other citizens of the country.
(ii) That a part of the taxes so collected have been utilised for various purposes including promotion and maintenance of a particular religion and religious institutions.”
Thus, it is nowhere mentioned in the writ petition as to what percentage of any particular tax has been utilised for the purpose of the Haj pilgrimage. The allegation in Para 5(ii) of the writ petition is very vague.
10. In our opinion, if only a relatively small part of any tax collected is utilised for providing some conveniences or facilities or concessions to any religious denomination, that would not be violative of Article 27 of the Constitution. It is only when a substantial part of the tax is utilised for any particular religion that Article 27 would be violated.
11. As pointed out in Paras 8(iv), (v) and (viii) of the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the Central Government, the State Government incurs some expenditure for the Kumbh Mela, the Central Government incurs expenditure for facilitating Indian citizens to go on pilgrimage to Mansarovar, etc. Similarly in Para 8(vii) of the counter-affidavit it is mentioned that some State Governments provide facilities to Hindu and Sikh pilgrims to visit temples and gurdwaras in Pakistan. These are very small expenditures in proportion to the entire tax collected. Moreover, in Para 8(iii) of the counter-affidavit the Central Government has stated that it is not averse to the idea of granting support to the pilgrimage conducted by any community.
12. In our opinion, we must not be too rigid in these matters, and must give some free play to the joints of the State machinery. A balanced view has to be taken here, and we cannot say that even if one paisa of government money is spent for a particular religion there will be violation of Article 27.
13. As observed by Holmes, J. the celebrated Judge of the US Supreme Court in Bain Peanut Co. v. Pinson 282 US 499 (1930), at L Ed p. 491 : US p. 501 (1931)
“…The interpretation of constitutional principles must not be too literal. We must remember that the machinery of [the] Government would not work if it were not allowed a little play in its joints.”
(See also Missouri, Kansas and Texas Railway Co. v. May 194 US 267 (1903).)
14. Hence, in our opinion, there is no violation of Article 27 of the Constitution. There is also no violation of Articles 14 and 15 because facilities are also given, and expenditures incurred, by the Central and State Governments in India for other religions. Thus there is no discrimination.
15. In Transport & Dock Workers Union v. Mumbai Port Trust (2011) 2 SCC 575, (2010) 12 Scale 217, this Court observed that Article 14 cannot be interpreted in a doctrinaire or dogmatic manner. It is not prudent or pragmatic for the court to insist on absolute equality when there are diverse situations and contingencies, as in the present case (vide paras 39 and 43). Apart from the above, we have held in Govt. of A.P v. P. Laxmi Devi (2008) 4 SCC 720, AIR 2008 SC 1640, that court should exercise great restraint when deciding the constitutionality of a statute, and every effort should be made to uphold its validity.
16. Parliament has the legislative competence to enact the Haj Committee Act in view of Entry 20 to List 1 of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution which states: “Pilgrimages to places outside India”. Thus there is no force in this petition and it is dismissed.
17. Before parting with this case we would like to mention that India is a country of tremendous diversity, which is due to the fact that it is broadly a country of immigrants (like North America) as explained in detail by us in Kailas v. State of Maharashtra (2011) 1 SCC 793, JT (2011) 1 SC 19. As observed in SCC para 32 of the said decision, since India is a country of great diversity, it is absolutely essential if we wish to keep our country united to have tolerance and equal respect for all communities and sects (see also in this connection the decision in Hinsa Virodhak Sangh v. Mirzapur Moti Kuresh Jamat (2008) 5 SCC 33, AIR 2008 SC 1892, vide SCC paras 41 to 60). It is due to the wisdom of our Founding Fathers that we have a Constitution which is secular in character, and which caters to the tremendous diversity in our country.
18. It may be mentioned that when India became Independent in 1947 there were Partition riots in many parts of the subcontinent, and a large number of people were killed, injured and displaced. Religious passions were inflamed at that time, and when passions are inflamed it is difficult to keep a cool head. It is the greatness of our Founding Fathers that under the leadership of Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru they kept a cool head and decided to declare India a secular country instead of a Hindu country. This was a very difficult decision at that time because Pakistan had declared itself an Islamic State and hence there must have been tremendous pressure on Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru and our other leaders to declare India a Hindu State. It is their greatness that they resisted this pressure and kept a cool head and rightly declared India to be a secular State. This is why despite all its tremendous diversity India is still united. In this subcontinent, with all its tremendous diversity (because 92% of the people living in the subcontinent are descendants of immigrants) the only policy which can work and provide for stability and progress is secularism and giving equal respect to all communities, sects, denominations, etc.
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