Login
  • Bookmark
  • PDF
  • Share
  • CaseIQ

Brij Pal Bhargava And Others v. State Of Uttar Pradesh And Others

Supreme Court Of India
Feb 23, 2011
Important Paras
Please sign up to view Important Paras.
Smart Summary (Beta)

Factual and Procedural Background

The State of Uttar Pradesh sought to acquire 6.6 acres of land comprised in Plot Nos. 542, 543 and 544 of Village Jainsinghpura Bangar, Mathura. A notification under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 was issued on 20-3-1991, followed by an enquiry under Section 5-A and a declaration under Section 6 on 28-2-1992. An award was subsequently passed. The appellant-landowners challenged the acquisition before the Allahabad High Court, contending that the Section 5-A enquiry was defective and that possession had never been taken. The High Court dismissed their petition. The present appeal before the Supreme Court seeks reversal of that dismissal.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the enquiry conducted under Section 5-A of the Land Acquisition Act was vitiated for want of a personal hearing to the appellants.
  2. Whether the State had, in fact, taken possession of the acquired land, failure of which would invalidate the acquisition proceedings.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellants’ Arguments

  • No effective personal hearing was afforded under Section 5-A; after the first appearance on 3-5-1991 no further date was communicated, rendering the entire acquisition illegal.
  • An advocate’s affidavit confirmed that no hearing occurred.
  • Physical possession, as required by the majority view in Balwant Narayan Bhagde v. M.D. Bhagwat, was never taken; revenue records and photographs showed continued possession by the appellants.

Respondents’ Arguments

  • The original Section 5-A report and order-sheet showed that objectors were heard on adjourned dates; objections were considered in detail.
  • The possession receipt and on-site photographs evidenced that actual possession was taken and development activities had commenced; courts should adopt a pragmatic approach to “possession”.
  • Reliance was placed on precedents endorsing the validity of proceedings where objections are considered and on decisions favouring a pragmatic view of taking possession.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Jayabheri Properties (P) Ltd. v. State of A.P. (2010) 5 SCC 590 Objections are deemed to have been heard when the authority considers and decides them. Used to support the finding that the appellants were heard and their objections were addressed in the Section 5-A report.
Balwant Narayan Bhagde v. M.D. Bhagwat (1976) 1 SCC 700 Majority view: physical, not merely symbolic, possession is required after acquisition. Cited by appellants; Court distinguished by accepting evidence that actual possession had been taken.
Sita Ram Bhandar Society v. Govt. of NCT of Delhi (2009) 10 SCC 501 Courts should adopt a pragmatic approach in determining whether possession has been taken. Relied upon by respondents and accepted by the Court to conclude that possession was duly taken.
Dahyabhai Ranchhoddas Dhobi v. State of Gujarat (2010) 7 SCC 705 Reiterates pragmatic approach on the question of taking possession. Further supports the Court’s conclusion that possession stood transferred to the State.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

After examining the original Section 5-A report and order-sheet, the Court found explicit references that the objectors were heard and their objections—ranging from alleged non-publication of Section 4 notices to claims of mala fides—were addressed in detail. Missing pages did not undermine the recorded statement that hearings occurred. Consequently, the Court rejected the contention that the enquiry was defective.

On the question of possession, the Court looked at the possession receipt and photographic evidence showing on-going development by the Mathura Vrindavan Development Authority. Consistent with the pragmatic approach endorsed in Sita Ram Bhandar Society and Dahyabhai Dhobi, the Court held that physical entry into every part of the land by officials is unnecessary where the record demonstrates that the State took over and commenced developmental activities. The affidavit filed by the appellants’ lawyer lacked dates and specificity and was not relied upon. Both factual findings of the High Court—validity of the Section 5-A hearing and actual transfer of possession—were affirmed.

Holding and Implications

The appeal is dismissed; the judgment of the Allahabad High Court is affirmed. No costs awarded.

The immediate effect is that the acquisition of the appellants’ land stands confirmed, and developmental activities by the Mathura Vrindavan Development Authority may proceed. The decision applies existing principles and does not establish a new precedent beyond reaffirming the pragmatic assessment of possession and the sufficiency of Section 5-A hearings when objections are demonstrably considered.

Show all summary ...

V.S Sirpurkar, J.— Leave granted. The appellant landowners have challenged the judgment of the Allahabad High Court, challenging the dismissal of their petition, whereby they had challenged the notifications issued under Sections 4 and 6 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter called “the Act”, for short).

2. The lands comprised in Plots Nos. 542, 543 and 544 of Village Jainsinghpura Bangar, Mathura, U.P, measuring 6.6 acres were sought to be acquired by Notification dated 20-3-1991 issued under Section 4 of the Act. Ultimately, after the enquiry under Section 5-A of the Act, the Notification under Section 6 of the Act came to be issued on 28-2-1992. It is an admitted position that in pursuance thereof, the award has also been passed.

3. Shri U.U Lalit, the learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellants urged before us that the High Court has not considered the major defects in the whole proceedings under the Act and more particularly, under Section 5-A of the Act. The learned Senior Counsel vehemently argued that in pursuance of the notice inviting objections under Section 5-A of the Act issued by the Collector, Mathura, published in the newspaper Amar Ujala dated 21-3-1991, the appellants filed their objections under Section 5-A of the Act on 18-4-1991 ventilating their grievances. The appellants had also sought for an opportunity of personal hearing and accordingly, Shri Brij Pal Bhargava had appeared before the Land Acquisition Officer on 3-5-1991; however, on that date, he was informed by the Land Acquisition Officer that no reply was filed by the Land Acquisition Department to the objections filed by the appellants. It was also informed that the officers were busy in election duty and, therefore, no hearing was possible on that date and the next date of hearing would be communicated to the appellants in due course. The learned Senior Counsel pointed out that thereafter, no date was ever informed to the appellants and ultimately, no hearing was given and instead the Government came out with the publication of the Notification dated 28-2-1992 under Section 6 of the Act. The learned Senior Counsel asserted that in the absence of any hearing under Section 5-A of the Act, the whole proceedings under the Act were rendered illegal. The learned Senior Counsel also relied on the affidavit of the lawyer of the appellants in land acquisition proceedings asserting that no hearing opportunity was given to him.

4. This contention was very strongly refuted by Shri Dinesh Dwivedi and Shri Vikas Singh, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the State of U.P and Mathura Vrindavan Development Authority (Respondent 3) respectively. The original report was produced before us. Both the learned Senior Counsel urged that on that day i.e 3-5-1991, a further date was given and the parties were heard and it is only thereafter that an investigation report was prepared under Section 5-A(2) of the Act. We have been taken through the said report wherein the objection on the part of the said Brij Pal Bhargava was the non-publication of the public notices under Section 4 of the Act. That contention was specifically refuted by pointing out that there was proper publication of the notices under Section 4 of the Act.

5. The other objection raised was that the whole acquisition was done with mala fide intentions. It was suggested in the objection that about 150 acres of land for housing development was already acquired about 20 years back and yet no development had been made. It was also urged that the acquisition of the land for the planned housing development is not covered under the public purpose. It is apparent from the report that all these objections were dealt with holding that there was no question of any mala fides in the acquisition. It has also been held that the acquisition for the public purpose of planned housing development is very much a public purpose. The said acquisition has been justified on account of increase in the population and fast industrial development which required the availability of the houses for the persons of middle income group and lower income group, and of Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and Backward Classes.

6. The other objection raised was that the land was not suited for the public purpose since there was 16-year-old village abadi of about one-and-half acre and there were a number of trees on two-and-half acre land. That question has also been dealt with in detail holding that Mathura Vrindavan Development Authority would develop public park, school and playground on the acquired land. Even the objections raised by one Devendra Nath Bhargava have been considered in detail by the Land Acquisition Officer. We are quite convinced that all this could not have been possible unless the appellants were heard and their objections were considered in detail.

7. Shri U.U Lalit, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the appellants urged that this Court had invited the original report and the original report did not show the factum of hearing. We have seen the original report and the order-sheet. Indeed, there are dates given after the first date, on which date some of the objectors were also present. There are some missing pages. However, it is specifically mentioned in the report that the objectors have been heard. In our opinion, once the original report suggests that the objectors were heard, there is no point in urging that the appellants were not heard.

8. Shri Vikas Singh, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of Mathura Vrindavan Development Authority (Respondent 3) relied on the decision in Jayabheri Properties (P) Ltd. v. State of A.P (2010) 5 SCC 590 The observations made in SCC para 42, where this Court had specifically held that the contention raised on behalf of the appellants about hearing not afforded to the objectors was refuted on the ground that the objections filed were duly considered by the Special Deputy Collector and rejected by his order dated 21-7-2006.

9. Since we have seen the original report in this case, we are of the opinion that not only was the hearing afforded, but all the objections have been specifically considered. The counter-affidavit shows a document where the objectors have been invited for the hearing on a fixed date i.e 17-9-1991. We are of the clear opinion that not only the objectors were heard, but their objections were also decided. This contention raised on behalf of the appellants is rejected.

10. As regards the affidavit of the lawyer appearing on behalf of the appellants in land acquisition proceedings, we have gone through the affidavit. It is, however, completely, bereft of the dates and other details. We, therefore, do not find it fit to rely upon the same.

11. The second contention raised by Shri Lalit, learned Senior Counsel is that though the acquisition proceedings are over and the award is also passed, the possession has not been taken at all. The learned Senior Counsel pointed out, relying on the decision in Balwant Narayan Bhagde v. M.D Bhagwat (1976) 1 SCC 700 that as per the majority view expressed by Bhagwati and Gupta, JJ., it is the physical possession which should be taken in pursuance of the land acquisition and not only symbolical possession or paper possession. The learned Senior Counsel also relied on the report to suggest that in spite of the acquisition, still the revenue entries were in favour of the appellants showing their possession and the cultivation by them in respect of the land. Shri Lalit tried to show some photographs suggesting therein that the wicket gate had the lock of the appellants and thus contended that the possession still continues with the appellants. In fact, it is a question of fact as to whether the possession has been taken or not. However, the respondents have produced the possession receipt, where it is suggested that the possession was taken by the officers after going on the spot.

12. Shri Vikas Singh, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of Mathura Vrindavan Development Authority (Respondent 3) pointed out that it would be impossible for the Collector or Revenue Officers to enter each bigha of land for taking possession thereof and, therefore, the pragmatic approach has to be adopted by the court while considering as to whether possession has been taken or not. The learned Senior Counsel also pointed out that the documents show that actual possession was taken. He also tried to point out the photograph suggesting that not only the possession has been taken, but a number of other activities of construction were going on at the land including drawing the layout thereof and building the roads therefor. The learned Senior Counsel relied on the reported decision in Sita Ram Bhandar Society v. Govt. of NCT of Delhi (2009) 10 SCC 501 as also in Dahyabhai Ranchhoddas Dhobi v. State of Gujarat (2010) 7 SCC 705 where the view has been taken about the pragmatic approach to be adopted by the courts in deciding as to whether the possession was taken or not.

13. Seeing the report and the orders passed, we are thoroughly convinced that not only the possession was taken, but there are activities going on at the behest of Mathura Vrindavan Development Authority. This is apart from the fact that this is a pure question of fact which has been answered by the High Court in no uncertain terms. In this view of the matter, we are of the clear opinion that even on this count, the appellants must fail.

14. We are completely satisfied with the judgment of the High Court and the findings therein. We confirm the same. No other question was raised. In result, the appeal fails and is dismissed, but without any costs.