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Fahim Khan v. State Of Bihar Now Jharkhand .

Supreme Court Of India
Apr 21, 2011
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Factual and Procedural Background

On the night of 10-5-1989 at about 11:30 p.m., Sagir Hasan Siddique was sleeping on a cot outside the house of Alamgir (PW 1). When he asked for water, his mother, Mst. Habibul Nisa (PW 4), came out and saw the appellant Fahim Khan along with Chotna @ Karim Khan and Arsad Hussain surrounding her son. The appellant fired a pistol shot at Siddique’s head, killing him instantly.

Sub-Inspector S.N. Das (PW 7) recorded PW 4’s statement at 00:10 hours on 11-5-1989 at the scene. A formal FIR was registered at the police station at 3:00 a.m., and the body reached the hospital at 6:30 a.m. with the requisite papers.

In Sessions Trial No. 122 of 1990, the trial court acquitted all three accused on 15-6-1991. On 13-4-2000 the Patna High Court, in State appeal, set aside the acquittal and remitted the matter for a fresh judgment. The Supreme Court, on 12-5-2001, reversed that remand and directed the High Court to decide the appeal on merits. After rehearing, the High Court convicted Fahim Khan under Section 302 IPC and sentenced him to life imprisonment; the two co-accused had died meanwhile. Fahim Khan sought special leave, leading to the present Supreme Court judgment.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the High Court was justified in reversing the trial court’s acquittal when appellate interference against acquittal is confined to instances of perversity in the trial judgment.
  2. Whether an alleged delay in lodging the FIR and the absence of the FIR number on the inquest report undermined the prosecution case.
  3. Whether the absence of bloodstains on PW 4’s clothes cast doubt on her status as an eyewitness.
  4. Whether the allegedly perfunctory examination of the accused under Section 313 CrPC caused prejudice sufficient to vitiate the conviction.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant’s Arguments

  • The High Court should not have interfered with the trial court’s acquittal because the circumstances did not satisfy the strict standard for appellate reversal.
  • The FIR was lodged belatedly and official papers were interpolated; the missing FIR number on the inquest report proved fabrication.
  • PW 4’s claim that she lifted the deceased was false because her clothes were not bloodstained, casting doubt on her presence at the scene.
  • The Section 313 CrPC examination was cursory, infringing the appellant’s right to explain incriminating circumstances; reliance was placed on Asraf Ali v. State of Assam and Ranvir Yadav v. State of Bihar.

State’s Arguments

  • Supported the High Court’s finding that the trial court’s judgment was perverse, thereby necessitating appellate interference.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Asraf Ali v. State of Assam (2008) 16 SCC 328 Importance of properly recording statements under Section 313 CrPC. Cited by defence; Court acknowledged principle but held no prejudice was shown in the present case.
Ranvir Yadav v. State of Bihar (2009) 6 SCC 595 Consequences of defective Section 313 examinations. Cited by defence; Court held the objection was not raised earlier and no prejudice established.
Shobhit Chamar v. State of Bihar (1998) 3 SCC 455 Requirement that objection to Section 313 defects be taken at the earliest opportunity. Used by Court to emphasise that the appellant never raised the issue in earlier proceedings.
Shivaji Sahabrao Bobade v. State of Maharashtra (1973) 2 SCC 793; AIR 1973 SC 2622 Need to demonstrate actual prejudice before invalidating a trial for procedural lapses. Court applied principle to reject the Section 313 argument.
Santosh Kumar Singh v. State through CBI (2010) 9 SCC 747 Prejudice as a condition for setting aside conviction on procedural grounds. Court relied on this case to conclude that absence of prejudice defeats the appellant’s contention.

Court’s Reasoning and Analysis

The Supreme Court reiterated that while appellate interference with an acquittal is limited, it is obligatory where the trial court’s decision is perverse or unsupported by evidence. After independently re-evaluating the record, the Court found:

  • Delay in FIR: PW 4’s statement was properly recorded at the scene and converted into a formal FIR at the police station at 3:00 a.m. Transport of the body to hospital at 6:30 a.m. with complete papers corroborated prompt action. The absence of the FIR number on the inquest report did not imply fabrication because the FIR is necessarily registered at the station, not at the scene.
  • Credibility of PW 4: Her testimony was consistent and supported by PW 2, who informed the police. The Court held that the absence of visible bloodstains on her clothes did not negate her eyewitness account.
  • Section 313 CrPC Defect: Although the questions were perfunctory, no objection had been taken in prior proceedings or in the special-leave petition. Applying Shobhit Chamar, Shivaji Sahabrao Bobade, and Santosh Kumar Singh, the Court ruled that, absent demonstrated prejudice, the conviction could not be disturbed on this ground.
  • Interference by High Court: Given the deficiencies identified in the trial court’s reasoning, its acquittal was deemed perverse. The High Court was therefore entitled, indeed obliged, to reverse it.

Holding and Implications

Appeal Dismissed; the conviction of Fahim Khan under Section 302 IPC and the sentence of life imprisonment are affirmed.

Immediate effect: the appellant continues to serve a life sentence. Broader implication: the judgment reinforces that appellate courts may overturn acquittals when trial findings are perverse and underscores that procedural lapses—such as an inadequate Section 313 examination—will vitiate a conviction only when actual prejudice is demonstrated.

Show all summary ...

H.S Bedi, J.— The facts leading to this appeal by way of special leave are as under: Fahim Khan, the appellant herein, along with two others Chotna alias Chottu alias Karim Khan and Arsad Hussain alias Arsad alias Arsad Kadri Hussain was put on trial for having committed the murder of Sagir Hasan Siddique. The trial court by its judgment dated 15-6-1991 in Sessions Trial No. 122 of 1990 acquitted all the accused holding that the prosecution story had not been proved. The State of Bihar challenged this judgment in the High Court in appeal. The appeal was allowed by a Division Bench by its judgment dated 13-4-2000 and the matter was remitted to the trial court to pass a fresh judgment on the evidence already adduced by the parties after hearing them de novo.

2. The accused, however, approached this Court in Criminal Appeal No. 661 of 2001. The order of the High Court was set aside on 12-5-2001 (2011) 13 SCC 147 and the matter was sent back with a direction that the High Court should itself go into the merits of the case and take a decision thereon. Pursuant to the orders of the Supreme Court, the matter was heard and the High Court has by the impugned judgment, set aside the acquittal of the appellant herein holding that the trial court's judgment was perverse, and sentenced him to undergo imprisonment for life for the offence punishable under Section 302 of the Penal Code, 1860. It is relevant, that Karim Khan and Arsad Hussain, the accused died during the proceedings before the High Court and as of today we are left with the appellant Fahim Khan alone.

3. The facts of the case are as under: at about 11.30 p.m on 10-5-1989, Sagir Hasan Siddique, deceased, after taking his meal, went to sleep in front of the house of Alamgir (PW 1) on a cot which had been made ready for him. A short time later, he called out to his mother Mst Habibul Nisa (PW 4) asking for some water. As she came out to hand him a glass of water, she saw the three accused Fahim Khan, Chotna and Arsad Kadri surrounding her son. She questioned them as to why they had come to that place whereupon Fahim Khan, the appellant suddenly fired his pistol at the deceased, hitting him on his head and killing him instantaneously.

4. On information received by the police from PW 2, Hanif, a police party reached the place of incident. The statement of PW 4 Habibul Nisa was recorded at the site at 0010 hours on 11-5-1989 whereas the formal FIR was recorded at the police station at 3.00 a.m The accused were arrested in due course and were brought to trial leading to the events already given above.

5. In the course of the hearing of this appeal, Mr Sushil Kumar, the learned Senior Counsel for the appellant, has raised primarily four arguments. He has first submitted that the trial court had acquitted the accused and the High Court, therefore, should not have interfered in an appeal against acquittal as the circumstances of the case did not warrant interference. He has also pleaded that the FIR had apparently been lodged after a delay and the proceedings had been interpolated to cover up the fact of delay. It has been highlighted on this aspect that if the inquest report had been recorded after the registration of the FIR in which case the inquest report ought to have borne the number of the FIR and as this detail was missing, it indicated that the FIR had not been registered at its purported time.

6. It has finally been pleaded by Mr Sushil Kumar that the story given by PW 4 that she had tried to lift her son was wrong as if that had been so, her clothes would have been bloodstained but there was no evidence to that effect, which cast a doubt on her presence.

7. It has finally been pleaded that the statements of the accused under Section 313 CrPC had been recorded in a very perfunctory manner and for this reason as well the appellant was entitled to acquittal. In support of this plea Mr Sushil Kumar has relied on Asraf Ali v. State of Assam (2008) 16 SCC 328 and Ranvir Yadav v. State of Bihar (2009) 6 SCC 595.

8. The learned counsel for the State of Bihar (now Jharkhand) has however supported the judgment of the High Court and has pointed out that the High Court had opined that the judgment of the trial Judge acquitting the accused was perverse and in this situation interference was not only called for but was in fact imperative.

9. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties and gone through the record. It is true that the High Court's interference in an appeal against acquittal is somewhat circumscribed and interference should be made only in a case where the judgment of the trial court was perverse and not based on the evidence. It is, however, well settled that the High Court can reappraise the entire evidence to test the judgment rendered by a trial court and if two views are possible, the one taken by the trial court should not be interfered with. On the contrary, if it is found that the judgment of the trial court was perverse or against the evidence, it would be a travesty of justice if the High Court was to sit back and not interfere in the matter. We have gone through the judgment of the High Court and the Sessions Judge in the light of this broad principle and have accordingly re-examined the evidence in this background.

10. The first argument raised by Mr Sushil Kumar is with regard to the delay in the lodging of the FIR, as the inquest report did not bear the FIR number. This argument however flows from a presumption that the FIR had been lodged at the site. This can never be the position as an FIR is always recorded in the police station.

11. It has come in the evidence that the PW 4's statement had been recorded at the site at about 0010 hours on 11-5-1989 by Sub-Inspector S.N Das, PW 7. This statement had been carried to the police station and the formal FIR was recorded at 3.00 a.m It is significant that as per the post-mortem report the dead body had been received in the hospital at 6.30 a.m on 11-5-1989 i.e within 3 hours of the FIR with all the relevant papers which would include the inquest papers. It is true that the special report under Section 157(3) CrPC had been received by the Magistrate after two days but we are told that in the State of Bihar this is a normal process. We, therefore, find no merit in Sushil Kumar's first argument.

12. The second argument with regard to the lack of blood on the clothes of PW 4 leading to the conclusion that she was not an eyewitness to the incident, is equally without merit. In her evidence PW 4 has categorically stated that when her son had called for a glass of water she had taken out a bottle for him and witnessed the shooting. She also stated that relations between the appellant Fahim Khan and her son-in-law Mahfooz Khan were strained and that her son had been killed on that account. She also explained that she had come to her daughter's house as she was to give birth to a child and in that process she had been present when the incident had been happened. She also identified the three accused in court when questioned. Her evidence also reveals that she had indeed tried to lift her son after he had been shot but from this assertion it cannot be inferred that her clothes would have been heavily bloodstained.

13. It is significant also that the statement of PW 4 is supported by the evidence of Hanif Khan, PW 2. It was this witness who had conveyed the information of the murder to the police station which had brought the police party to the place of incident. Hanif stated that as he returned home after seeing a film, he had seen the dead body of Sagir Hasan Siddique lying there and his mother crying on it. He also stated that the deceased used to live in the house of Mahfooz Ahmed his brother-in-law and that his mother was living with them.

14. The prosecution story is also supported by the evidence of PW 7 Sub-Inspector S.N Das. It was this officer who had recorded the statement of PW 4 at the site and then sent the same to the police station for the registration of the FIR. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the prosecution story given by PW 4 inspires full confidence notwithstanding the fact that Alamgir, PW 1 outside whose house the incident happened, did not support the prosecution.

15. It is indeed true that the statements of the accused recorded under Section 313 CrPC are extremely perfunctory and do not satisfy the requirement of Section 313 CrPC. We, however, find that no argument whatsoever in this regard had been raised at any stage although the matter had travelled up and down the appellate ladder several times earlier. We should not however be held to mean that an argument with regard to a defective Section 313 statement cannot be raised at the SLP stage but we have gone through the grounds of SLP in this matter and find that no ground has been raised even before us in the SLP. In the absence of any complaint on this score, we must assume that the appellant had suffered no prejudice on account of a defective Section 313 statement.

16. The cases cited by Mr Sushil Kumar, undoubtedly talk about the importance of a Section 313 statement and the implications for the prosecution, should there be some defect. It is, however, equally well settled that an objection as to prejudice must be taken at the earliest (see Shobhit Chamar v. State of Bihar (1998) 3 SCC 455) and prejudice must be shown before a trial could be said to be invalidated (see in this connection Shivaji Sahabrao Bobade v. State of Maharashtra (1973) 2 SCC 793, AIR 1973 SC 2622 and Santosh Kumar Singh v. State (2010) 9 SCC 747). No prejudice to the accused has been pointed out even at this belated stage. It must therefore be presumed that no prejudice has in fact occurred.

17. We are, therefore, of the opinion that there is no merit in this appeal. It is accordingly dismissed.