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Ranveer Yadav v. State Of Bihar .
Factual and Procedural Background
The appeal arose out of an incident on 13-2-2008 during Sessions Trial No. 46 of 1993 before the First Additional Sessions Judge, Khagaria. Five accused persons and one witness, Ranveer Yadav (the present appellant), disrupted proceedings by loudly quarrelling, forcing the judge to leave the courtroom. The judge, treating the incident as contempt in the face of the court, made a reference dated 22-4-2008 to the Patna High Court under Section 15(2) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971.
On 3-9-2008, the High Court found all six persons guilty of criminal contempt. It accepted the unconditional apologies of the five accused, warning and admonishing them, but sentenced the appellant to two months’ simple imprisonment and a fine of ₹2,000 (with one month’s further imprisonment in default).
Pursuant to Section 19(1)(b) of the Contempt of Courts Act, the appellant filed a statutory appeal before the Supreme Court. While issuing notice, the Supreme Court also directed the five other contemnors to show cause why the High Court’s lenient treatment of them should not be disturbed. Those contemnors reaffirmed their apologies and reiterated that the appellant was the principal instigator. The present judgment disposes of the appellant’s appeal and the notices to the other contemnors.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the appellant’s conduct on 13-2-2008 constituted “criminal contempt” as defined in Section 2(c)(ii) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971.
- Whether the Patna High Court erred in imposing a custodial sentence on the appellant while releasing the other five contemnors with only a warning, although all were held guilty.
- Whether the show-cause notice served on the appellant was defective for not attributing a distinct role to him, thereby precluding differential punishment.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant’s Arguments
- The High Court could not lawfully punish the appellant more severely than the other five contemnors once all had been found guilty of the same contempt.
- The show-cause notice did not specify a role unique to the appellant; therefore, imposing a harsher sentence on him violated principles of equality and fair notice.
Other Five Contemnors’ Position (via Counter-Affidavit)
- Reiterated unconditional apologies and asserted that the appellant was the prime mover of the disruption.
- Alleged that the appellant had political connections, criminal antecedents, and habitually intimidated lawyers and witnesses.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Julius v. Lord Bishop of Oxford (1880) 5 AC 214 (HL) | A statutory “power” may be coupled with a “duty” when the nature of the power and its object so require. | Used to explain that the High Court, when acting on a reference under Section 15(2), has a duty to protect subordinate courts and uphold the rule of law. |
| Debabrata Bandhopadhyaya v. State of W.B., AIR 1969 SC 189 | An apology in contempt must be offered at the earliest opportunity; a belated apology lacks the contrition necessary to purge contempt. | Cited to reject the appellant’s late apology, noting it was tendered only after initial justification of his conduct. |
| Rajni Parekh College v. Mahendra Ambalal Shah (1986) 2 SCC 560 | Late apologies encourage litigants to flout court orders; such apologies may be refused. | Reinforced the proposition that a delayed apology should not automatically mitigate punishment. |
| Hailakandi Bar Assn. v. State of Assam (1996) 9 SCC 74 | Belated apologies in criminal contempt are often not bona fide and can be rejected. | Further support for dismissing the appellant’s belated apology as lacking good faith. |
| Chandra Shashi v. Anil Kumar Verma (1995) 1 SCC 421 | An apology without real contrition, tendered merely as a defence tactic, may be rejected. | Invoked to emphasise that the appellant’s apology lacked genuine remorse. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Supreme Court held that the appellant’s acts fell squarely within Section 2(c)(ii) of the Contempt of Courts Act because they interfered with the “due course” of a judicial proceeding. Emphasising that every word of the statute must be given full effect, the Court noted that even an attempt to interfere is sufficient for criminal contempt.
The Court found that, on the materials before it, the appellant played the dominant role in orchestrating the disturbance: he regularly arrived with supporters, intimidated lawyers and witnesses, and had previously delayed his cross-examination. Consequently, his position was materially different from that of the other contemnors.
Regarding the adequacy of the show-cause notice, the Court observed that all constituents of the charge were clearly stated; the appellant never claimed vagueness before the High Court and fully understood the allegations when responding.
On the question of unequal punishment, the Court held that contempt jurisprudence permits differential sentencing based on each contemnor’s specific conduct. The High Court’s acceptance of the other contemnors’ early, unqualified apologies and its harsher treatment of the appellant—whose apology was belated and self-serving—were therefore justified.
Finally, the Court reviewed the law on apologies in contempt proceedings, relying on multiple precedents to affirm that a late or insincere apology need not be accepted.
Holding and Implications
Appeal Dismissed; High Court judgment affirmed.
The appellant must undergo two months’ simple imprisonment and pay a fine of ₹2,000 (with one month’s additional imprisonment in default) as directed by the High Court. The Supreme Court discharged the notices issued to the other five contemnors, thereby upholding the High Court’s decision to warn but not punish them further. While the judgment reiterates established principles on criminal contempt—particularly the breadth of Section 2(c)(ii) and the limited value of belated apologies—it sets no new precedent beyond reinforcing existing jurisprudence.
A.K Ganguly, J.— This is a statutory appeal under Section 19(1)(b) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 read with Order 21 Rule 15(1)(e) of the Supreme Court Rules, 1966 from the final judgment and sentence dated 3-9-2008 of the High Court of Patna in Original CR Misc. (DB) No. 8 of 2008. The said Original CR Misc. (DB) No. 8 of 2008 was a reference through a communication dated 22-4-2008 by the First Additional Sessions Judge, Khagaria about an incident which happened in his Court on 13-2-2008. The High Court treated the same as a reference made under Section 15(2) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 (hereinafter “the Act”) made by the First Additional Sessions Judge, Khagaria (hereinafter “the Judge”).
2. The reference by the Judge was made for the reason that during the course of Sessions Trial No. 46 of 1993 on 13-2-2008, five of the alleged contemnors were on one side and the sixth contemnor, the appellant, Ranveer Yadav, on the other side, and all of them disrupted the proceedings by aggressively exchanging heated words and creating unpleasant scenes in court. The decorum and dignity of the court was so much threatened that the Judge was forced to rise.
3. Out of the six contemnors, Bharat Yadav, Bimal Yadav, Ajay Yadav, Pandav Yadav and Madan Yadav are accused in Sessions Trial No. 46 of 1993. The appellant Ranveer Yadav, is a witness in the case and was due to be cross-examined on that day i.e 13-2-2008.
4. The High Court on the basis of such reference issued notice on 11-7-2008 to show cause why the alleged contemnors should not be held guilty of criminal contempt for their acts set out in the reference.
5*. In the joint affidavits filed by the first five contemnors, they tendered their apologies for creating the disturbance and stated that the main person responsible for the ruckus was the appellant, Ranveer Yadav. They stated that the scene was created by him to delay his cross-examination.
6. The show cause submitted by Madan Yadav, who is 76 years old and is one of the accused in Sessions Trial No. 46 of 1993, is a crucial one. Madan Yadav stated that the appellant is the prime accused in a case of murder of Madan's son in 1998. In that case the appellant could be produced before the trial court for the purpose of framing charges only on the orders of the High Court. Madan further stated that he had been falsely implicated in the criminal case which was pending before the court on the basis of a police complaint containing false allegations made by the brother of the appellant. The main reason for Madan's implication is to pressurise him to withdraw the earlier case relating to the murder of his son and which is pending against the appellant.
7. The High Court after noting these facts observed that the appellant, on many occasions came to the trial court with followers who helped him in creating a nuisance in court. It also observed that several Additional Public Prosecutors had withdrawn themselves from criminal cases against the appellant in view of threats and intimidation they received from the appellant. On the date of incident, even the defence counsel was not spared as is apparent from the letter written by the defence counsel to the Presiding Officer. The High Court found that the appellant had also managed to postpone and delay his cross-examination on various occasions on the pretext of illness and non-appearance on the fixed dates.
8. It was also brought to the notice of the High Court that a case under Section 302 IPC in which the appellant was an accused had to be transferred to another district in view of threats and intimidation given out by the appellant.
9*. In the show cause submitted by the appellant Ranveer Yadav, he tried to justify his behaviour on 13-2-2008 by stating that on 12-12-2007, in the court he had been informed that there would be a compromise. But he got miffed when the Additional Public Prosecutor made an appearance before the court and he thought that the latter had appeared without the orders of the Public Prosecutor. On such justification of the appellant, the High Court held that the appellant being a witness had nothing to do with the appearance of the Public Prosecutor and held that the appellant's misbehaviour was not justified.
10. With regard to his failure to appear before the court on 1-3-2008, the appellant stated that he was not provided the police protection which he had asked for.
11. The High Court held that all the contemnors were guilty of having committed criminal contempt and it relied on the letters of the two prosecution counsel as well as the defence counsel and came to the conclusion that the main person responsible for the disruption was the appellant who acted in a motivated and high-handed manner to interfere in the due conduct of the proceeding. The High Court further held that the main culprit for the disruption in court was the appellant. While accepting the unqualified apology of the other five contemnors and letting them off with admonition and severe warning, the appellant was sentenced to a simple imprisonment for two months with a fine of Rs. 2000 and in default the appellant was to undergo a further imprisonment of one month.
12. This Court while issuing notice in this appeal passed an order dated 28-8-2009 asking the other five contemnors to show cause why the order of the High Court accepting their unconditional apology and directing them to be let off be not set aside. In the meantime, a further stay on the arrest of the appellant was ordered extending the order whereby the appellant was given exemption from surrendering.
13. The five contemnors who were let off by the High Court filed their joint counter-affidavit on 28-1-2010. While tendering their unqualified apology, they have given the same explanation as given before the High Court that the main person responsible for the disruptions was the appellant. In Paras IV as well as V of the counter-affidavit, they have stated that the appellant behaved in an audacious manner and abused the counsel for the both sides and refused to be examined. They have also made allegations that the appellant is a very well connected person and has a political background with criminal antecedents.
14. In this case learned counsel for the appellant sought to argue that in a contempt proceeding, the High Court cannot take a different stand by punishing the appellant and letting the other appellants go unpunished even after holding that they are guilty of contempt. Learned counsel also argued that in the show-cause notice which was given to the appellant, no different role has been attributed to him so he cannot be treated differently by the High Court in the matter of awarding punishment.
15. This Court is unable to appreciate the above contention of the learned counsel for the appellant. In the facts of the case and on the materials on record, it is clear that the case of the appellant stands on a different footing. In fact the appellant took the main role in causing disruption and there has been no lack of opportunity on his part in answering the charges against him. The charges put against him must be read in a practical sense and cannot be read in a pedantic manner. All the constituents of the charges were stated in the show-cause notice and the appellant has understood the charges and has given the reply. Nowhere in the reply has the appellant raised any difficulty in understanding the charges. It does not appear that any contention was raised by the appellant before the High Court about any vagueness in the charges or about furnishing inadequate particulars in the charges. This argument of the learned counsel for the appellant only before this Court and that too without a proper factual basis cannot be entertained.
16. “Criminal contempt” has been defined under Section 2(c) of the Act. The said definition is very wide. For a proper appreciation of the questions involved in this case the said definition is set out below:
“2. (c) ‘criminal contempt’ means the publication (whether by words, spoken or written, or by signs, or by visible representations, or otherwise) of any matter or the doing of any other act whatsoever which—
(i) scandalises or tends to scandalise, or lowers or tends to lower the authority of any court; or
(ii) prejudices, or interferes or tends to interfere with, the due course of any judicial proceeding; or
(iii) interferes or tends to interfere with, or obstructs or tends to obstruct, the administration of justice in any other manner;”
From the facts of the case it is clear that in this case the offending acts of the appellant are specifically coming under Section 2(c)(ii).
17. Due conduct of any judicial proceeding is a matter of high public importance as it is inextricably connected with the rule of law on which is based the constitutional mode of governance in this country. That is why the framers of the Act preceded the expression “interfere” with the words “tends to” and it has been further emphasised by addition of the word “due” before “course of any judicial proceeding”.
18. We must remember that the legislature does not waste words. Therefore, every word used in Section 2(c)(ii) must be given its proper and natural meaning. Thus read, Section 2(c)(ii) must be given a broad sweep so as to include within it even any attempt to interfere with the due course of a judicial proceeding. The word “due” is very crucial in this context and must mean a natural and proper course of judicial proceeding.
19. This Court, therefore, holds that Section 2(c)(ii) has been enacted to protect apart from sanctity, the regularity and purity of a judicial proceeding. This, we repeat, is based on the principles of high public policy. That is why contempt power is said to be an inherent attribute of a superior court of record. This power has not been given to the subordinate judiciary, but in an appropriate case, the subordinate judiciary can make a reference to the High Court under Section 15(2) of the Act, as has been done in this case.
20. Thus when the High Court exercises its power on a reference under Section 15(2) of the Act, it is virtually exercising the same as a guardian of the subordinate judiciary to protect its proceedings against an outrage and affront. In exercising such power, the High Court being a “court of record” and the highest judicial authority in the State is discharging its jurisdiction in loco parentis over the subordinate judiciary in that State. Therefore, there is something in the nature of the High Court's power under Section 15(2) of the Act which couples it with a duty. The duty is obviously to uphold the rule of law. Here we may remember the views of Lord Chancellor Earl Cairns, who gave the concept of power coupled with duty, the most graceful articulation and which I quote:
“… But there may be something in the nature of the thing empowered to be done, something in the object for which it is to be done, something in the conditions under which it is to be done, something in the title of the person or persons for whose benefit the power is to be exercised, which may couple the power with a duty, and make it the duty of the person in whom the power is reposed to exercise that power when called upon to do so.”
(Julius v. Lord Bishop of Oxford (1880) 5 AC 214, (1874-80) All ER Rep 43 (HL), AC at pp. 222-23 : All ER p. 47 I)
These words resonate with a strange poignancy even today. But there is a rider. Contempt power has to be exercised with utmost caution and in an appropriate case and that is why the High Court has been entrusted with it.
21. The offending acts of the appellant constitute contempt in the face of court. When contempt takes place in the face of the court, peoples' faith in the administration of justice receives a severe jolt and precious judicial time is wasted. Therefore, the offending acts of the appellant certainly come within the ambit of interference with the due course of judicial proceeding and are a clear case of criminal contempt in the face of the court.
22. The High Court, in the impugned judgment, therefore was correct in holding the appellant guilty and also in punishing him with the sentence it has imposed. It appears in the show-cause notice, which was given by the appellant, initially he did not offer any apology. Rather the appellant tried to justify. The apology was offered in a subsequent show-cause reply. Therefore, it is a belated apology.
23. It may be noted that under the Explanation to Section 12(1) of the Act, the court may reject an apology if the court finds that it was not made bona fide. Under Section 12 it has been made very clear that the apology must be to the satisfaction of the court. Therefore, it is not incumbent upon the court to accept the apology as soon as it is offered. Before an apology can be accepted, the court must find that it is bona fide and is to the satisfaction of the court. However, the court cannot reject an apology just because it is qualified and conditional provided the court finds it is bona fide.
24. An apology in a contempt proceeding must be offered at the earliest possible opportunity. A belated apology hardly shows the “contrition which is the essence of the purging of a contempt”.
25. This Court in Debabrata Bandhopadhyaya v. State of W.B AIR 1969 SC 189, 1969 Cri LJ 401 observed
“an apology must be offered and that too early and at the earliest opportunity. A person who offers a belated apology runs the risk that it may not be accepted for such an apology hardly shows the contrition which is the essence of the purging of a contempt.” (see AIR para 7, p. 193 of the Report).
26. Apart from belated apology in many cases such apology is not accepted unless it is bona fide.
27. Even in a case of civil contempt this Court held in Rajni Parekh College v. Mahendra Ambalal Shah (1986) 2 SCC 560, (1986) 1 ATC 28 that an apology offered at a late stage would encourage the litigants to flout the orders of courts with impunity and accordingly the Court refused to accept the apology (see SCC para 7, p. 566 of the Report).
28. Equally in Hailakandi Bar Assn. v. State of Assam (1996) 9 SCC 74 this Court in a case of criminal contempt refused to accept an apology which was belated. The Court held that such belated apology cannot be accepted because it has not been given in good faith (see SCC para 24, p. 82).
29. Even if it is not belated where apology is without real contrition and remorse and was merely tendered as a weapon of defence, the Court may refuse to accept it. (See Chandra Shashi v. Anil Kumar Verma (1995) 1 SCC 421.)
30. For the reasons aforesaid, the appeal fails, the judgment of the High Court is affirmed. The appellant is to serve the sentence in terms of the High Court order. Notices issued on other respondents, namely, Bharat Yadav, Bimal Yadav, Ajay Yadav, Pandav Yadav and Madan Yadav are discharged.
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