- Bookmark
- Share
- CaseIQ
Sawaran Lata And Others v. State Of Haryana And Others
Factual and Procedural Background
The petitioners’ lands were included in a large acquisition undertaken by the State of Haryana. A notification under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 was issued on 2 May 2001, followed by a Section 6 declaration on 30 April 2002. The Land Acquisition Collector passed an award on 27 April 2004 and possession was thereafter taken, including removal of trees standing on the petitioners’ land.
More than five years later, on 28 May 2009, the petitioners filed Civil Writ Petitions Nos. 8794 and 8761 of 2009 in the Punjab and Haryana High Court seeking to quash the Section 4 and Section 6 notifications. The High Court dismissed the writ petitions solely on the ground of delay. Time-barred review petitions (delayed by 48 days) were also dismissed on 25 September 2009.
The present Special Leave Petitions (SLPs) were lodged in the Supreme Court with an admitted delay of 172 days, plus a further 37-day delay in refiling. They challenge the High Court’s refusal to interfere with the acquisition proceedings.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether long-concluded land acquisition proceedings can be challenged after an inordinate and unexplained delay.
Arguments of the Parties
Petitioners' Arguments
- The substance of the Section 4 notification and Section 6 declaration was published in newspapers that allegedly had no wide circulation, and therefore the petitioners lacked knowledge of the acquisition in time to mount a prompt challenge.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Hari Singh v. State of U.P., (1984) 2 SCC 624 | Section 4 notifications must be challenged within a reasonable period; belated challenges merit dismissal. | Cited to show that delay alone is sufficient ground to reject challenges to acquisition. |
| Aflatoon v. Lt. Governor of Delhi, (1975) 4 SCC 285 | Sitting on the fence until acquisition is complete and then attacking the process amounts to laches. | Quoted passage emphasised to underline that dilatory tactics cannot be rewarded. |
| State of Mysore v. V.K Kangan, (1976) 2 SCC 895 | Acquisition must be challenged before it attains finality. | Relied on as reaffirmation of the necessity of prompt action. |
| Girdharan Prasad Missir v. State of Bihar, (1980) 2 SCC 83 | Delay defeats claims against completed acquisitions. | Cited in support of dismissing stale claims. |
| Bhoop Singh v. Union of India, (1992) 3 SCC 136 | Courts should not interfere once acquisition proceedings have concluded. | Used to bolster the proposition that finalised proceedings ought not be unsettled. |
| State of Orissa v. Dhobei Sethi, (1995) 5 SCC 583 | Same principle of delay barring relief. | Referenced as further authority. |
| State of Maharashtra v. Digambar, (1995) 4 SCC 683 | Challenges must be prompt; laches fatal. | Relied upon for consistency with earlier cases. |
| State of T.N. v. L. Krishnan, (1996) 1 SCC 250 | Inordinate delay disentitles a petitioner to relief. | Referenced to reinforce settled law. |
| C. Padma v. Government of T.N., (1997) 2 SCC 627 | Same rule regarding delay in acquisition matters. | Cited as part of the line of authorities. |
| Municipal Corpn. of Greater Bombay v. Industrial Development Investment Co. (P) Ltd., (1996) 11 SCC 501 | A “slumbering” interested person will be turned away; courts should be loath to quash notifications when there is inordinate delay. | Quoted (paras 19 & 29) to stress that completed acquisitions should not be disturbed. |
| State of Rajasthan v. D.R. Laxmi, (1996) 6 SCC 445 | Even void orders need not be set aside if approached after unreasonable delay; judicial review may be declined. | Relied upon to justify refusal of relief despite allegations of invalidity. |
| Northern Indian Glass Industries v. Jaswant Singh, (2003) 1 SCC 335 | Reaffirmation of the laches principle. | Cited to underscore continuity of the doctrine. |
| Haryana State Handloom & Handicrafts Corpn. Ltd. v. Jain School Society, (2003) 12 SCC 538 | Delay bars invocation of extraordinary jurisdiction. | Cited to buttress the dismissal on grounds of delay. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Supreme Court noted the undisputed chronology: Section 4 notification (2001), Section 6 declaration (2002), award (2004) and possession thereafter. The writ petitions were instituted only in 2009, and the present SLPs were themselves filed belatedly with an additional delay in refiling.
After surveying a consistent line of authorities, the Court held that a person seeking to impugn land acquisition must act within a reasonable time. Allowing the Government to complete the process and then challenging it would “put a premium on dilatory tactics”. Even where the underlying order might be void, relief can be refused when sought after an unreasonable lapse of time.
The petitioners’ sole plea—limited newspaper circulation—did not persuade the Court. Given the size of the acquisition and the fact that possession had been taken, it was inconceivable that the petitioners lacked knowledge for several years. Consequently, the High Court’s dismissal on the ground of delay was upheld.
Holding and Implications
The Special Leave Petitions were dismissed on the ground of delay.
Immediate Effect: The acquisition proceedings and the award dated 27 April 2004 remain undisturbed, and the petitioners receive no relief.
Broader Implications: The decision reiterates that the Supreme Court will not entertain stale challenges to completed land acquisitions, reinforcing the doctrine of laches without laying down any new legal rule.
Dr. B.S Chauhan, J.— These special leave petitions reveal a very sorry state of affairs and make it evident that the litigants are eager to abuse the process of the court, having no idea of the law of limitation/delay and laches.
2. These special leave petitions have been filed against the judgment and order of the Punjab and Haryana High Court dated 30-5-2009 by which Civil Writ Petitions Nos. 8794 of 2009 and 8761 of 2009 have been dismissed only on the ground of delay. The review petitions were filed which were also time-barred by 48 days. The same stood dismissed vide order dated 25-9-2009. These special leave petitions have been filed with an inordinate delay of 172 days. The petitioners sought relief of quashing the land acquisition proceedings in respect of which the award had been made under Section 11 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter called as “the 1894 Act”) on 27-4-2004.
3. The facts and circumstances giving rise to these petitions are that the respondent State of Haryana issued a Notification under Section 4 of the 1894 Act in respect of a huge chunk of land including some land of the petitioners on 2-5-2001. Substance of the said notification was published in two newspapers on 5-5-2001. The respondents issued a declaration under Section 6 of the 1894 Act on 30-4-2002 and the substance thereof was also published in local newspapers immediately thereafter. The Land Acquisition Collector made an award on 27-4-2004 and in pursuance thereof, the respondents took possession of the land and removed the trees from the land of the petitioners.
4. The petitioners approached the High Court by filing Writ Petitions Nos. 8794 of 2009 and 8761 of 2009 on 28-5-2009 praying for quashing the Notification dated 2-5-2001 under Section 4 and declaration dated 30-4-2002 under Section 6 of the 1894 Act. The High Court dismissed both the petitions on the ground of delay observing that the award under Section 11 of the 1894 Act had already been made on 27-4-2004. Being aggrieved, the petitioners filed review petitions with 48 days' delay which have also been dismissed vide order dated 25-9-2009. These petitions have been filed with 172 days' delay. There is further delay of 37 days' in refiling of the same.
5. The issue involved in these petitions is as to whether the acquisition proceedings can be challenged at a belated stage. The issue is no more res integra as the issue has been considered by this Court time and again.
6. When a person challenges Section 4 notification on any ground, it should be challenged within a reasonable period, and if the acquisition is challenged at a belated stage, the petition deserves to be dismissed only on this count. (Vide Hari Singh v. State of U.P (1984) 2 SCC 624, AIR 1984 SC 1020)
7. A Constitution Bench of this Court in Aflatoon v. Lt. Governor of Delhi (1975) 4 SCC 285, AIR 1974 SC 2077 while dealing with the issue, observed as under:
“11. … To have sat on the fence and allowed the Government to complete the acquisition proceedings on the basis that the notification under Section 4 and the declaration under Section 6 were valid and then to attack the notification on grounds which were available to them at the time when the notification was published would be putting a premium on dilatory tactics. The writ petitions are liable to be dismissed on the ground of laches and delay on the part of the petitioners.”
8. Same view has been reiterated by this Court observing that acquisition proceedings should be challenged before the same attain finality, in State of Mysore v. V.K Kangan (1976) 2 SCC 895, AIR 1975 SC 2190; Girdharan Prasad Missir v. State of Bihar (1980) 2 SCC 83; Bhoop Singh v. Union of India (1992) 3 SCC 136, (1992) 21 ATC 675, AIR 1992 SC 1414; State of Orissa v. Dhobei Sethi (1995) 5 SCC 583; State of Maharashtra v. Digambar (1995) 4 SCC 683, AIR 1995 SC 1991; State of T.N v. L. Krishnan (1996) 1 SCC 250, AIR 1996 SC 497; and C. Padma v. Govt. of T.N (1997) 2 SCC 627
9. In Municipal Corpn. of Greater Bombay v. Industrial Development Investment Co. (P) Ltd. (1996) 11 SCC 501, AIR 1997 SC 482 this Court observed as under:( & 520, paras 19 & 29)
“19. … If the interested person allows the grass to grow under his feet by allowing the acquisition proceedings to go on and reach its terminus in the award and possession is taken in furtherance thereof and vested in the State free from all encumbrances, the slumbering interested person would be told off the gates of the Court that his grievance should not be entertained….
29. … when there is inordinate delay in filing the writ petition and when all steps taken in the acquisition proceedings have become final, the Court should be loath to quash the notifications.”
(emphasis added)
10. Similar view has been reiterated in State of Rajasthan v. D.R Laxmi (1996) 6 SCC 445 wherein this Court has held that even the void proceedings need not be set at naught if the party has not approached the court within reasonable time, as judicial review is not permissible at a belated stage. This Court held as under:
“9. … Delay in challenging the notification was fatal and writ petition entails with dismissal on grounds of laches. It is thus, well-settled law that when there is inordinate delay in filing the writ petition and when all steps taken in the acquisition proceedings have become final, the Court should be loath to quash the notifications….
10. The order or action, if ultra vires the power, becomes void and it does not confer any right. But the action need not necessarily be set at naught in all events. Though the order may be void, if the party does not approach the Court within reasonable time, which is always a question of fact and have the order invalidated or acquiesced or waived, the discretion of the Court has to be exercised in a reasonable manner. When the discretion has been conferred on the Court, the Court may in appropriate case decline to grant the relief, even if it holds that the order was void. The net result is that extraordinary jurisdiction of the Court may not be exercised in such circumstances.”
(emphasis added)
Similar view has been reiterated by this Court in Northern Indian Glass Industries v. Jaswant Singh (2003) 1 SCC 335, AIR 2003 SC 234 and Haryana State Handloom & Handicrafts Corpn. Ltd. v. Jain School Society (2003) 12 SCC 538, AIR 2004 SC 850.
11. In the instant case, it is not the case of the petitioners that they had not been aware of the acquisition proceedings as the only ground taken in the writ petition has been that substance of the notification under Section 4 and declaration under Section 6 of the 1894 Act had been published in the newspapers having no wide circulation. Even if the submission made by the petitioners is accepted, it cannot be presumed that they could not be aware of the acquisition proceedings for the reason that a very huge chunk of land belonging to a large number of tenure-holders had been notified for acquisition. Therefore, it should have been the talk of the town. Thus, it cannot be presumed that the petitioners could not have knowledge of the acquisition proceedings.
12. In such circumstances, we do not find any fault with the impugned judgment and order. The petitions are dismissed on the ground of delay.
Alert