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D. Hanumanth Sa And Others v. State Of Karnataka And Others

Supreme Court Of India
Oct 27, 2010
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Factual and Procedural Background

The appellants’ land measuring 3 acres and 34 guntas in Kengeri Village and Hobli, Bangalore (Karnataka) was notified for acquisition under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. The purpose stated was “for the benefit of Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation (KSRTC).”

Initially, the appellants filed Writ Petition Nos. 20083-85 of 1993 challenging the Section 4 notification, particularly the invocation of the emergency clause (Section 17(4)). The Karnataka High Court granted a stay, and the State later agreed not to proceed under the emergency provision, giving the appellants an opportunity to object.

After filing objections—contending, inter alia, that KSRTC already possessed ample vacant land—the State nevertheless issued a final notification under Section 6 (dated 28-3-1994) specifying the land was needed for a workshop and residential quarters for KSRTC employees. The appellants then filed Writ Petition Nos. 25361-64 and 25264 of 1994 challenging both notifications.

The Single Judge (judgment dated 1-2-2000) allowed the writ petitions and quashed both notifications, holding that the stated purpose had shifted from a link road to other KSRTC facilities, rendering the acquisition unjustified. On appeal, a Division Bench (judgment dated 2-7-2003) reversed the Single Judge, upholding the acquisition as a valid public purpose without ambiguity.

The present civil appeals before the Supreme Court arise from that Division Bench decision.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether an alleged inconsistency between the purposes stated in the Section 4 and Section 6 notifications invalidates the acquisition.
  2. Whether the State proved the acquisition was genuinely required for a “public purpose” within the meaning of the Act, given KSRTC’s existing vacant lands.
  3. Whether subsequent or parallel notifications issued by the Karnataka Industrial Areas Development Board (KIADB) affected the validity of the earlier acquisition, particularly where Government-owned land is concerned.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellants’ Arguments

  • The Section 4 notification was vague, and the purpose stated therein (construction of a link road) differed from that in the Section 6 notification (workshop and residential quarters), rendering the process invalid.
  • The State failed to demonstrate compelling reasons for acquiring privately owned land when KSRTC already possessed large tracts of unused government land.
  • Portions of the same land were later included in KIADB notifications for the Bangalore-Mysore Infrastructure Corridor Project, suggesting the original acquisition lacked bona fides and was for a different purpose.

Respondent-State’s Arguments

  • The notifications consistently reflected a single overarching public purpose: facilitating KSRTC operations through a workshop, depot, approach road and housing for employees.
  • The affidavits and acquisition proceedings demonstrate the land forms part of a comprehensive plan and remains necessary for KSRTC.
  • Where any overlap exists with KIADB notifications, land already vested in the Government cannot be reacquired, making the appellants’ objections untenable.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
State of Orissa v. Brundaban Sharma, 1995 Supp (3) SCC 249 The Land Acquisition Act does not contemplate acquisition of an interest already belonging to the Government. Cited to show that once land vests in the Government, it cannot be acquired again; used to dismiss the argument based on overlapping KIADB notifications.
Meher Rusi Dalal v. Union of India, (2004) 7 SCC 362 Reiterated that Government cannot acquire its own interest and that courts should not interfere on that basis. Relied on to reinforce the principle stated in Brundaban Sharma.
Collector of Bombay v. Nusserwanji Rattanji Mistri, AIR 1955 SC 298; (1955) 1 SCR 1311 Early affirmation that the Government cannot acquire land in which it already holds an interest. Referenced as part of the settled “catena of cases” supporting the same principle.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

After examining the Section 4 notification (dated 14-10-1992), the Court found an explicit statement that the land was needed “for the benefit of KSRTC,” satisfying the public-purpose requirement. The emergency clause portion had already been set aside and was no longer in issue.

The Court reviewed the acquisition proceedings for 7 acres 15 guntas and the State’s affidavit. Both demonstrated a unified plan encompassing an approach road, workshop, depot and residential quarters, thereby negating the alleged inconsistency between the two notifications.

Regarding the KIADB notifications cited by the appellants, the Court observed: (a) land in Survey No. 128/2—covered by KIADB—was never part of the impugned acquisition; (b) land in Survey No. 128/1, though originally in the Section 4 notification, was excluded from the later KIADB final notification. Consequently, no part of the land validly vested in the Government under one scheme was subject to a second acquisition under another, and the principle that the Government cannot acquire its own property did not assist the appellants.

The Court emphasized that the purposes outlined—traffic decongestion, public transport facilitation, and employee housing—are inherently public. Finding no ambiguity or mala fides, it declined to interfere with the Division Bench’s judgment.

Holding and Implications

Appeals Dismissed / DISPOSED OF.

The Supreme Court affirmed the Division Bench’s decision upholding the Section 4 and Section 6 notifications. The acquisition thus stands, and the appellants’ land remains validly acquired for KSRTC’s public-purpose projects. Each party will bear its own costs. The ruling applies existing precedent rather than establishing new legal doctrine.

Show all summary ...

Dr. M.K Sharma, J.— By filing the present appeals the appellants have challenged the validity of the notification issued under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter referred to as “the Act”) and also the notification issued under Section 6 of the Act whereby the respondents sought to acquire land admeasuring 3 acres 34 guntas situated in Kengeri Village and Hobli, Bangalore, Karnataka.

2. Initially the appellants filed writ petitions registered as Writ Petitions Nos. 20083-85 of 1993 before the Karnataka High Court challenging the validity of the notification issued under Section 4 invoking the emergency clause. The High Court of Karnataka, while issuing notice, granted stay. Subsequently, an order dated 30-8-1993 was passed in the writ petition regarding the statement/submission on behalf of the State Government that they would not proceed with the acquisition proceeding of invoking the emergency provision under the Act. Consequent to the same, the appellants herein were given opportunity to file objections.

3. The appellants thereafter filed detailed objections contending inter alia that the vast extent of land that is already possessed by Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation (for short “Ksrtc”) and some of the State-owned land is still laying vacant and, therefore, the purpose of acquiring the land of the appellants for formation of link road is unjustified and that the same cannot be said to be required for formation of link road. The appellants also contended that despite the aforesaid objection filed and a report submitted by the Land Acquisition Officer in favour of the claimants, the State Government issued a final notification under Section 6(1) of the Act by holding that the land belonging to the appellants are required for the purpose of workshop and providing residential quarters to its employees.

4. Being aggrieved by the aforesaid action on the part of the State Government in issuing a notification under Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act, the appellants filed Writ Petitions Nos. 25361-64 of 1994 and 25264 of 1994 before the Karnataka High Court challenging the legality and the validity of the preliminary and final notifications.

5. The Single Judge of the Karnataka High Court, by his judgment and order dated 1-2-2000, allowed the said writ petitions holding that in the proceedings prepared by the State Government, the purpose of acquisition was stated to have a link road and in the final notification under Section 6 of the Act, the purpose of acquisition having been shown as completely different, the entire purpose was not justified and tenable. The said fact was also stated to be so, and had been held as unjustified by the Land Acquisition Officer. By so holding the learned Single Judge of the Karnataka High Court allowed the writ petitions and quashed the said notifications issued under Section 4 and Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act.

6. Being aggrieved by the said judgment and order the respondent filed a writ appeal before the High Court of Karnataka. By judgment and order dated 2-7-2003 the Division Bench of the Karnataka High Court allowed the appeal filed by the State Government and set aside the judgment and order of the learned Single Judge holding that the acquisition of the land was for a public purpose and that there was no ambiguity in the two notifications issued under Sections 4 and 6 of the Act.

7. Being aggrieved by the said judgment and order passed by the Division Bench of the High Court the present appeals have been filed by the appellant claimants on which we have heard the learned counsel appearing for the parties.

8. In the light of the submissions made before us we now proceed to decide the contentions raised before us by the counsel appearing for the parties.

9. The counsel appearing for the appellants submitted that the notification issued by the respondent under Section 4 was vague and the purpose for which the land was sought to be acquired as disclosed from the entire records of the proposed acquisition including the said notification was different than what was sought to be stated in the notification under Section 6. It was also submitted that the Government had failed to give detailed reasons for issuing the said notifications to satisfy that the land was required for public purpose, particularly when the Land Acquisition Officer had given his reasons to indicate that the purpose for which the land is sought to be acquired was not justified in the facts and circumstances of the case.

10. In order to appreciate the aforesaid contentions raised, we have considered all the notifications relevant to the facts and circumstances of the case and also relevant records useful for our purpose.

11. In the Notification issued under Section 4(1) which is dated 14-10-1992, it is specifically stated that the State of Karnataka required the land under acquisition for a specific public purpose viz. for the benefit of Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation. The part of the notification invoking the provisions of Section 17(4) i.e applying the urgency requirement of the Government was set aside by the writ court which became final and binding and we are not required to address the aforesaid issue. But, so far as the requirement of the land for public purpose is concerned, the same was necessarily for a public purpose viz. for the benefit of Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation.

12. The counsel appearing for the appellants, however, drew our attention to the proceedings regarding acquisition of 7 acres 15 guntas of land. We have perused the said copies of the proceedings also. In the said proceedings, it was stated that in order to meet the increasing traffic in the surrounding area of Bangalore City, and also with a view to provide better transport service to the public, it is proposed by the Government to establish a large workshop and city bus depot in the said land and also for establishment of residences to workers, training centre and others are also proposed to be undertaken and in order to construct/form the road the said land is required. The said proceedings on careful analysis would also indicate that the land which was sought to be acquired also figured in a comprehensive plan for construction of a road as also workshop and residential building of the staff of Ksrtc. The said fact also came to be reiterated by the State Government by filing an affidavit wherein it is stated that the entire land in dispute is in fact required not only for making an approach road but also for building a workshop and staff residential quarters.

13. The aforesaid reasons and the purpose for which the land was sought to be acquired is definitely of a public character and therefore, the respondent State Government, in our considered opinion, is fully competent to issue such a notification under Section 4 as also under Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act.

14. The counsel appearing for the appellant at one stage also drew our attention to the fact that subsequently, another notification came to be issued by the Karnataka Industrial Areas Development Board stating that the land as mentioned in the Letter dated 16-12-2004 which is annexed as Annexure R-5 is being acquired by the Karnataka Industrial Areas Development Board. The said land was sought to be acquired by issuing notification under the State Act viz. under Section 28(1) and Section 28(4) of the State Act.

15. A preliminary notification was issued by the said authority viz. the Development Board, including land admeasuring 39 guntas from Survey No. 128/1 and 34 guntas from Survey No. 128/2. The said letter itself also indicates that subsequently, a final notification came to be issued under Section 28(4) of the State Act only for 34 guntas covered by Survey No. 128/2. Incidentally, the land falling under Survey No. 128/2 was not notified either under Section 4 or under Section 6 under the Notifications dated 14-10-1992 and 28-3-1994, respectively.

16. So far as 39 guntas covered by Survey No. 128/1 is concerned, which is sought to be acquired as indicated from Letter dated 10-12-2004, we find that the same is not included in the final notification. A bare perusal of the notifications issued under Sections 4(1) and 6 of the Act would indicate that the land covered by Survey No. 128/1 was a part of the said notification but since the same came to be excluded in the final notification under Section 28(4), the contentions raised by the counsel appearing for the appellants that the said land stood acquired for a different purpose and, therefore, the purpose for which the land was sought to be acquired under Sections 4 and 6 was unjustified, is not tenable.

17. Even otherwise, if land already stands acquired by the Government and if the same stands vested in the Government there is no question of acquisition of such a land by issuing a second notification, for the Government cannot acquire its own land. The same is by now settled by various decision of this Court in a catena of cases.

18. In State of Orissa v. Brundaban Sharma 1995 Supp (3) SCC 249, this Court has held that the Land Acquisition Act does not contemplate or provide for the acquisition of any interest belonging to the Government in the land on acquisition. This position was reiterated in a subsequent decision of this Court in Meher Rusi Dalal v. Union of India (2004) 7 SCC 362. In paras 15 and 16 of the said judgment, this Court has held that the High Court clearly erred in setting aside the order of the Special Land Acquisition Officer declining a reference since it is settled law that in land acquisition proceedings the Government cannot and does not acquire its own interest. While laying down the aforesaid law, this Court has referred to its earlier decision in Collector of Bombay v. Nusserwanji Rattanji Mistri AIR 1955 SC 298, (1955) 1 SCR 1311.

19. However, on a close scrutiny of the records we find that same is not the case in the present case at hand. It cannot be said that the land which stood acquired under the notification issued under Sections 4 and 6 of the Act is in any manner connected with the notifications issued by the State Government for the Karnataka Industrial Areas Development Board for Bangalore Mysore Infrastructure Corridor Project and even assuming a part of the said land is now sought to be acquired for a different purpose to that extent, the same cannot be said to be a proper acquisition as the land already stands acquired under a different notification issued by a separate authority under separate provisions of law.

20. In that view of the matter, we find no merit in these appeals and the same are disposed of by this common judgment and order. Parties are left to bear their own costs.