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Jitendra Singh Alias Babboo Singh And Another v. State Of Uttar Pradesh .
Factual and Procedural Background
The appellants were convicted of offences under Sections 304-B and 498-A of the Indian Penal Code and sentenced, respectively, to seven years and two years of imprisonment (with a fine of Rs 100 on each count). While their appeal by special leave was pending before the Supreme Court, appellant Jitendra Singh filed Criminal Miscellaneous Petition No. 16974 of 2010 seeking permission to raise an additional ground—namely, that he was a juvenile under Section 2(k) of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000 on the date of the alleged incident (24-5-1988).
To substantiate this claim, the appellant produced a school-leaving certificate and marksheet indicating a birth-date of 3-8-1974, which would make him 13 years, 8 months and 23 days old at the time of the offence. The record also shows that, during bail proceedings in 1988, a medical examination assessed his age to be about 17 years, and the High Court had granted bail partly on that basis. The present opinion addresses whether the Supreme Court should allow the juvenility plea at this late stage and what procedural steps must follow.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether an accused can raise a plea of juvenility for the first time before the Supreme Court after conviction and dismissal of appeal in the High Court.
- Whether the material produced (school-leaving certificate, marksheet, and earlier medical report) establishes a prima facie case warranting a judicial enquiry into the appellant’s age at the time of the offence.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant's Arguments
- The Juvenile Justice Act and Section 7-A permit a claim of juvenility to be raised at any stage, even before the Supreme Court.
- Precedents such as Jayendra, Gopinath Ghosh, Bhoop Ram, Brij Lal, Bhola Bhagat, and Hari Ram recognise the beneficial nature of the Act and hold that delay alone cannot defeat such a claim.
- The school documents and the High Court’s earlier reliance on a medical report constitute sufficient prima facie evidence that he was a minor on 24-5-1988.
- Even though the offence predates the 2000 Act, the ruling in Hari Ram (2009) 13 SCC 211 extends the Act’s benefit to such situations.
Respondent's Arguments
- While delay is not per se fatal, the appellant must adduce strong prima facie evidence before an enquiry can be ordered.
- Reliance was placed on Pawan v. State of Uttaranchal (2009) 15 SCC 259, where the Court emphasised the need for credible supporting material when a juvenility plea is raised belatedly.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Jayendra v. State of U.P. (1981) 4 SCC 149 | Plea of juvenility can be entertained at any stage of proceedings. | Cited to support the appellant’s right to raise the claim before the Supreme Court. |
| Gopinath Ghosh v. State of West Bengal 1984 Supp SCC 228 | Beneficial nature of juvenile legislation; delay not a bar to raising juvenility. | Relied on in recognising that technical delay should not defeat consideration of age. |
| Bhoop Ram v. State of U.P. (1989) 3 SCC 1 | Same principle as above—delay not fatal; protective intent of the Act. | Used to reinforce that the Court can still direct an enquiry despite the late stage. |
| Brij Lal v. Prem Chand 1989 Supp (2) SCC 680 | Plea of juvenility permissible even if not raised earlier. | Supports the appellant’s contention to raise the issue now. |
| Bhola Bhagat v. State of Bihar (1997) 8 SCC 720 | Delay in claiming juvenility not decisive; emphasis on welfare of the child. | Invoked to underline the welfare principle behind directing an enquiry. |
| Hari Ram v. State of Rajasthan (2009) 13 SCC 211 | 2000 Act applies even to offences committed before its commencement; juvenility plea maintainable later. | Basis for extending statutory benefit to the appellant whose offence predates 1-4-2001. |
| Pawan v. State of Uttaranchal (2009) 15 SCC 259 | Claim of juvenility must be backed by prima facie evidence despite delay. | Cited by respondent; Court accepted that requirement but found sufficient prima facie material here. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Supreme Court acknowledged that, while accused persons should ordinarily assert juvenility at the earliest opportunity, the failure to do so does not automatically bar the claim. Drawing upon a line of precedents emphasising the protective purpose of juvenile legislation, the Court held that a delayed plea can still be considered if supported by credible evidence.
Examining the documents produced, the Court found that the school-leaving certificate, marksheet, and previous medical opinion together satisfied the “prima facie” threshold required under Pawan. Nonetheless, the Court observed certain irregularities—such as the late issuance of the school certificate and discrepancies with electoral and panchayat records—that warranted independent verification.
Consequently, the Court decided to order a factual enquiry rather than accept the documents at face value. It directed the trial court to scrutinise school, panchayat, electoral and any other relevant records, and to constitute a medical board of at least three experts to determine the appellant’s age scientifically. The Court explicitly refrained from expressing any conclusive opinion on the merits of the age claim, emphasising that its direction was limited to ensuring a proper fact-finding process.
Holding and Implications
ORDER: The Supreme Court allowed the appellant to raise the additional ground of juvenility and directed the trial court to conduct a comprehensive enquiry into his age, to be completed within four months. The main criminal appeal was adjourned, with the matter to be listed in April 2011. The appellant was ordered to appear before the trial court on 6-12-2010 and cooperate with the enquiry.
Implications: The decision does not resolve the appellant’s guilt or sentence but ensures that, if he is ultimately found to have been a juvenile at the time of the offence, he will be dealt with under the Juvenile Justice Act. The order reinforces the principle that courts must give full effect to the protective purpose of juvenile legislation, even at an advanced stage of proceedings, provided a credible prima facie case is shown.
T.S Thakur, J.— The appellants in this appeal by special leave have assailed their conviction for offences punishable under Sections 304-B and 498-A IPC and sentence of imprisonment of seven years under the former and two years under the latter provision besides a fine of Rs. 100 each. Criminal Miscellaneous Petition No. 16974 of 2010 filed by appellant, Jitendra Singh prays for permission to raise an additional ground in support of the appeal to the effect that he was a minor within the meaning of Section 2(k) of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000 on the date of the commission of offence and that he ought to have been dealt with under the said Act.
2. The case of the appellant as set out in the application is that he was born on 3-8-1974 meaning thereby that he was just about 13 years 8 months and 23 days old on 24-5-1988, the date when the alleged incident is said to have taken place. In support of his assertion that he was a minor on the date of the incident, the appellant has placed on record along with his application a copy of School Leaving Certificate No. 46 and Marksheet No. 6031, both dated 17-11-2009 issued by Poorav Madhyamik Vidyalaya, Sohayee Bagh, Rai Bareilly.
3. The application points out that the question whether he was minor on the date of the incident had been raised by the appellant at the earliest available opportunity when an application for bail was moved on his behalf. It is alleged that the appellant had been got medically examined to determine his age which was certified to be around 17 years only. The medical report was then made a basis by the High Court for grant of bail to him in terms of order dated 25-11-1988. Relying upon the provisions of Section 7-A of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000 the appellant seeks permission to raise the question of his juvenility in the present proceedings and contends that the provisions of Section 7-A and the pronouncements of this Court entitle him to raise a plea regarding his age at any stage of the proceedings including the proceedings before this Court. The averments made in the application are supported by an affidavit filed along with the application.
4. When the application came up for hearing before this Court, Mr Sushil Kumar Jain, learned counsel for the appellant argued that the question whether or not the appellant was a juvenile within the meaning of the Act aforementioned could be raised and shall have to be determined by this Court, no matter no such plea was taken at the trial or even in appeal before the High Court on behalf of the appellant. Reliance in support of that submission was placed by Mr Jain on the decisions of this Court in Jayendra v. State of U.P (1981) 4 SCC 149, Gopinath Ghosh v. State of W.B 1984 Supp SCC 228, Bhoop Ram v. State of U.P (1989) 3 SCC 1, Brij Lal v. Prem Chand 1989 Supp (2) SCC 680, Bhola Bhagat v. State of Bihar (1997) 8 SCC 720 and Hari Ram v. State of Rajasthan (2009) 13 SCC 211.
5. It was further argued that the material placed on record by the appellant in the form of school leaving certificate and the marksheet as also the order passed by the High Court granting bail to the applicant in which the medical examination of the appellant and the determination of his age have been referred to, sufficiently establish on a prima facie basis the case of the appellant that he was a minor on the date of the incident. It was submitted, even when the offence was committed before the commencement of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000 the question whether benefit under the said Act could be extended to cases where the offences were committed prior to 1-4-2001, the date when the said Act came into force, stands concluded in favour of the appellant by the decision of this Court in Hari Ram case (2009) 13 SCC 211.
6. On behalf of the respondent it was argued that although delay in making a claim of juvenility was not by itself enough to justify refusal of an enquiry into the matter, the appellant had to establish a strong prima facie case in support of his claim to persuade this Court to direct an enquiry into the determination of his age on the date of the incident. Reliance in support was placed upon a decision of this Court in Pawan v. State of Uttaranchal (2009) 15 SCC 259.
7. Having given our careful consideration to the submissions made at the Bar we are of the opinion that in the facts and circumstances of this case an enquiry for determining the age of the appellant Jitendra Singh alias Babboo Singh on the date of the commission of the offence shall have to be directed. It is true that in the ordinary course anyone claiming to be a minor on the date of the incident ought to make such a claim at the earliest available opportunity before the trial court or at least before the High Court, but the very fact that no such claim is for any reason made, may not by itself disentitle him to do so before the Apex Court.
8. The decision of this Court in Gopinath Ghosh 1984 Supp SCC 228, Bhoop Ram (1989) 3 SCC 1 and Bhola Bhagat (1997) 8 SCC 720 cases and in Hari Ram case (2009) 13 SCC 211 have recognised the beneficial nature of the provisions enacted by Parliament and held that a technical plea based on delay in the making of the claim of juvenility would not itself disable the person concerned from making such a claim. In Pawan case (2009) 15 SCC 259 reliance whereupon was placed on behalf of the respondent, the delay in the making of claim to juvenility was not held to be fatal provided the claim was supported by evidence that would prima facie establish that the claimant was a juvenile on the date of the commission of the offence.
9. The burden of making out a prima facie case for directing an enquiry has been in our opinion discharged in the instant case inasmuch as the appellant has filed along with the application a copy of the school leaving certificate and the marksheet which mentions the date of birth of the appellant to be 24-5-1988. The medical examination to which the High Court has referred in its order granting bail to the appellant also suggests the age of the appellant being 17 years on the date of the examination. These documents are sufficient at this stage for directing an enquiry and verification of the facts.
10. We may all the same hasten to add that the material referred to above is yet to be verified and its genuineness and credibility determined. There are no doubt certain telltale circumstances that may raise a suspicion about the genuineness of the documents relied upon by the appellant. For instance, the deceased Asha Devi who was married to the appellant was according to Dr. Ashok Kumar Shukla, Pathologist, District Hospital, Rae Bareilly aged 19 years at the time of her death. This would mean as though the appellant husband was much younger to his wife which is not the usual practice in the Indian context and may happen but infrequently. So also the fact that the appellant obtained the school leaving certificate as late as on 17-11-2009 i.e after the conclusion of the trial and disposal of the first appeal by the High Court, may call for a close scrutiny and examination of the relevant school record to determine whether the same is free from any suspicion, fabrication or manipulation. It is also alleged that the electoral rolls showed the age of the accused to be around 20 years while the extract from the panchayat register showed him to be 19 years old.
11. All these aspects would call for close and careful scrutiny by the court below while determining the age of the appellant. The date of birth of appellant Jitendra Singh's siblings and his parents may also throw considerable light upon these aspects and may have to be looked into for a proper determination of the question. Suffice it to say while for the present we consider it to be a case fit for directing an enquiry, that direction should not be taken as an expression of any final opinion as regards the true and correct age of the appellant which matter shall have to be independently examined on the basis of the relevant material.
12. In the result we allow the appellant to urge the additional ground regarding juvenility of the appellant on the date of the commission of the offence and direct the trial court to hold an enquiry into the said question and submit a report as expeditiously as possible, but not later than four months from today. We make it clear that the trial court shall be free to summon the school, panchayat or the electoral office record or any other record concerned from any other source which it considers necessary for a proper determination of the age of the appellant. We also make it clear that in addition to the above, the trial court shall be free to constitute a Medical Board comprising at least three experts on the subject for determination of the age of the appellant, based on medical tests and examination.
13. The hearing of the appeal shall in the meantime stand adjourned and the case listed in the month of April 2011. A copy of this order shall be dispatched to the trial court for compliance forthwith. The appellant shall appear before the trial court on 6-12-2010 and associate with the enquiry. A copy of the application and the accompanying documents shall also be forwarded to the trial court along with a copy of this order.
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