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Rajeev Kumar And Another v. Hemraj Singh Chauhan And Others
Factual and Procedural Background
The appellants are Non-State Civil Service (non-SCS) officers who sought to be impleaded in Writ Petitions Nos. 19103-04 of 2006 (Hemraj Singh Chauhan & Ors.) pending before the Delhi High Court. On 23-4-2008 the High Court allowed their intervention, permitted them to file affidavits, and to address the court at the time of final hearing.
Earlier, two Original Applications (OA 1097/2006 and OA 1137/2006) had been decided together by the Central Administrative Tribunal (CAT) on 15-12-2006. CAT dismissed OA 1097/2006, partly allowed OA 1137/2006, and directed that Departmental Promotion Committee/Selection Committee meetings be convened to fill unfulfilled vacancies of the years 2001, 2002 and 2004 within four months.
Hemraj Singh Chauhan challenged CAT’s decision before the High Court, which set aside CAT’s order and directed the Central and State Governments to undertake cadre review on the vacancy position as on 1-1-2004 within eight weeks. After that judgment (dated 14-11-2008), the present appellants filed special leave petitions before the Supreme Court challenging the High Court’s decision.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether non-SCS officers who were not parties before CAT possess locus standi to intervene in the High Court proceedings and agitate their service grievances without first approaching CAT.
- Whether, in light of the Constitution Bench ruling in L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India (1997) 3 SCC 261, the High Court could act as a court of first instance for such service disputes.
- Consequently, whether the special leave petitions filed by the appellants are maintainable before the Supreme Court.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellants' Arguments
- Relied on paragraph 99 of L. Chandra Kumar, contending that the judgment allows them to approach the High Court directly to protect their interests adversely affected by CAT’s order, even though they had not been parties before CAT.
- Maintained that their intervention in the High Court was necessary because CAT’s decision impacted their promotional prospects.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India (1997) 3 SCC 261 | Tribunals constituted under Arts. 323-A & 323-B are courts of first instance for their subject-matter; High Courts’ and Supreme Court’s powers of judicial review remain, but litigants cannot bypass tribunals. | The Court held that the appellants could not treat the High Court as the first forum for their service disputes and should have approached CAT; therefore their appeals were not maintainable. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
1. The Supreme Court examined paragraphs 78, 79, 93 and 99 of L. Chandra Kumar to reaffirm that:
- Tribunals are the exclusive courts of first instance for matters within their jurisdiction.
- Even constitutional challenges (other than to the parent statute of the tribunal) must first be raised before the tribunal.
- Litigants cannot “overlook the jurisdiction of the tribunal” and directly approach the High Court.
2. Applying these propositions, the Court held that the appellants, although aware of the CAT proceedings, chose not to participate. They therefore could not later enter the litigation at the High Court stage and were obliged to seek relief before CAT, including the remedy of review under Rule 17 of the Central Administrative Tribunal (Procedure) Rules, 1987.
3. The Division Bench of the High Court erred in allowing the impleadment and in treating the writ petitions as a permissible first forum for the appellants’ service grievances, contrary to the binding ratio of L. Chandra Kumar.
4. Because the approach to the High Court was impermissible, the special leave petitions predicated on that approach were also incompetent.
Holding and Implications
Appeals DISMISSED as not maintainable.
Immediate Effect: The non-SCS officers receive no relief from the Supreme Court and must seek any remedy, if still available, before CAT. Broader Implication: The judgment reinforces the binding authority of L. Chandra Kumar and the requirement that service matters within CAT’s domain must originate there, thus preventing High Courts from being used as first-instance forums in such disputes.
A.K Ganguly, J.— Leave granted. The appellants in these appeals are non-State Civil Service Officers (hereinafter referred to as “the non-SCS Officers”). They filed an impleadment application in the Delhi High Court for being impleaded as the respondents in Writ Petitions Nos. 19103-04 of 2006 filed by Hemraj Singh Chauhan and others before the High Court whereupon the High Court by an order dated 23-4-2008 allowed them to intervene and further allowed them to make submissions at the time of hearing of the writ petition. They were also given liberty to file affidavits.
2. Pursuant to the said order of the Hon'ble High Court, these appellants filed affidavits. After the High Court passed its impugned judgment dated 14-11-2008 they have filed these appeals assailing the said judgment.
3. At the outset of their arguments this Court wanted the learned counsel for the appellants to satisfy this Court about their locus to participate in the controversy at the stage when the matter was before the High Court in view of the fact that admittedly these appellants were not parties before the Central Administrative Tribunal (hereinafter “CAT”).
4. Before CAT there were three applicants, namely, Hemraj Singh Chauhan, Anwarul Haque and Ram Nawal Singh who were common both in OA No. 1097 of 2006 and OA No. 1137 of 2006. Apart from these three persons, Ramesh Chandani and K.K Shukla were also applicants in OA No. 1137 of 2006. Both the original applications were heard together.
5. CAT in its judgment dated 15-12-2006 held that OA No. 1097 of 2006 was without merit and dismissed the same and OA No. 1137 of 2006 was partly allowed and the respondents were directed to convene the meeting of DPC/Selection Committee to fill up the posts which ultimately remained unfulfilled in 2001, 2002 and 2004 and to consider all eligible SCS Officers in the zone of consideration in the respective years including the Officers who were put in the select list of those years but could not be appointed in the absence of integrity certificate. CAT directed that the said order be complied within a period of four months.
6. However, on the said judgment being challenged before the High Court by Hemraj Singh Chauhan, the High Court set aside the judgment of CAT and the Central Government and the State Government were directed to undertake the cadre reviewing exercise with reference to the vacancy position as on 1-1-2004 in the manner indicated in the High Court judgment within eight weeks from date.
7. However, while answering the objection on their locus standi, the appellants referred to the decision of the Constitution Bench of this Court in L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India (1997) 3 SCC 261 and in particular to para 99, p. 311 at placita f and g of the Report and contended that in view of the law declared in L. Chandra Kumar (1997) 3 SCC 261, they can come before the High Court and raise their grievances against the judgment of CAT as their interests have been affected by that judgment even though they were not parties to the proceedings in which the said judgment was rendered.
8. This Court is of the view that the understanding of the ratio in L. Chandra Kumar (1997) 3 SCC 261 by the learned counsel for the appellants in this case is not correct and the ratio in L. Chandra Kumar (1997) 3 SCC 261 is just to the contrary.
9. The Constitution Bench in L. Chandra Kumar (1997) 3 SCC 261 held that the power of the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution and of this Court under Article 32 of the Constitution is a part of the basic structure of our Constitution (see paras 78 and 79, pp. 301 and 302 of the Report). The Constitution Bench also held that various tribunals created under Articles 323-A and 323-B of the Constitution, will function as court of first instance and are subject to the power of judicial review of the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution. The Constitution Bench also held that these tribunals are empowered even to deal with constitutional questions and can also examine the vires of statutory legislation, except the vires of the legislation which creates the particular tribunal.
10. In para 93, at p. 309 of the Report, the Constitution Bench specifically held: (L. Chandra Kumar case (1997) 3 SCC 261)
“93. … We may add that the Tribunals will, however, continue to act as the only courts of first instance in respect of the areas of law for which they have been constituted.”
(emphasis added)
The Constitution Bench explained the said statement of law by reiterating in the next sentence: (L. Chandra Kumar case (1997) 3 SCC 261)
“93. … By this, we mean that it will not be open for litigants to directly approach the High Courts even in cases where they question the vires of statutory legislations (except, as mentioned, where the legislation which creates the particular Tribunal is challenged) by overlooking the jurisdiction of the Tribunal concerned.”
11. On a proper reading of the abovequoted two sentences, it is clear:
(a) The tribunals will function as the only court of first instance in respect of the areas of law for which they have been constituted.
(b) Even where any challenge is made to the vires of legislation, excepting the legislation under which tribunal has been set up, in such cases also, litigants will not be able to directly approach the High Court “overlooking the jurisdiction of the tribunal”.
12. The aforesaid propositions have been repeated again by the Constitution Bench (in L. Chandra Kumar case (1997) 3 SCC 261) in the penultimate para 99 at p. 311 of the Report in the following words:
“99. … The Tribunals will, nevertheless, continue to act like courts of first instance in respect of the areas of law for which they have been constituted. It will not, therefore, be open for litigants to directly approach the High Courts even in cases where they question the vires of statutory legislations (except where the legislation which creates the particular Tribunal is challenged) by overlooking the jurisdiction of the Tribunal concerned.”
13. In view of such repeated and authoritative pronouncement by the Constitution Bench of this Court, the approach made to the High Court for the first time by these appellants in respect of their service disputes over which CAT has jurisdiction, is not legally sustainable. The Division Bench of the High Court, with great respect, fell into an error by allowing the appellants to treat the High Court as a court of first instance in respect of their service disputes for adjudication of which CAT has been constituted.
14. The grievances of the appellants in this appeal are that they were not made parties in proceedings before the Tribunal. But in the impleadment application filed before the High Court it was not averred by them that they were not aware of the pendency of the proceedings before the Tribunal. Rather from the averments made in the impleadment petition it appears that they were aware of the pendency of the proceedings before the Tribunal. It was therefore, open for them to approach the Tribunal with their grievances. Not having done so, they cannot, in view of the clear law laid down by the Constitution Bench of this Court in L. Chandra Kumar (1997) 3 SCC 261, approach the High Court and treat it as the court of first instance in respect of their grievances by “overlooking the jurisdiction of the Tribunal”. CAT also has the jurisdiction of review under Rule 17 of the Central Administrative Tribunal (Procedure) Rules, 1987. So, it cannot be said that the appellants were without any remedy.
15. As the appellants cannot approach the High Court by treating it as a court of first instance, their special leave petition before this Court is also incompetent and not maintainable.
16. The principles laid down in L. Chandra Kumar (1997) 3 SCC 261 virtually embody a rule of law and in view of Article 141 of the Constitution the same is binding on the High Court. The High Court fell into an error by allowing the appellants to approach it in clear violation of the Constitution Bench judgment of this Court in L. Chandra Kumar (1997) 3 SCC 261.
17. For the reasons aforesaid the appeals are dismissed as not maintainable. No costs.
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