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Uma Shankar Singh v. State Of Bihar And Another
Factual and Procedural Background
On 17-2-2000, Vijay Singh lodged an FIR alleging that his brother Bharat Singh was abducted and later found murdered during Bihar Assembly elections. The FIR initially invoked Sections 364/34 IPC; after the body was recovered, Sections 302, 291/34 IPC and Section 27 of the Arms Act were added. Because of political sensitivity, the investigation was transferred to the Crime Investigation Department (CID), while the local police continued inquiries pursuant to a Patna High Court order dated 9-4-2001 directing both agencies to file final reports.
Both CID and the local police submitted final form reports that exonerated the present petitioner, Jitendra Swami (son of rival candidate Uma Shankar Singh). Disagreeing with those reports, the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Siwan, took cognizance of offences under Sections 302/379 IPC and Section 27 of the Arms Act against the petitioner, without holding any further inquiry.
The petitioner’s application for discharge under Section 227 CrPC was rejected by the First Additional Sessions Judge, Siwan, on 9-3-2007. His challenge to that order (Criminal Misc. Case No. 18909 of 2007) was dismissed by the Patna High Court on 12-5-2009. The present Special Leave Petition (SLP) was filed on 17-7-2009 before the Supreme Court.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether a Magistrate, acting under Section 190(1)(b) CrPC, can take cognizance of offences against a person whom the police have exonerated in their final report, without conducting a separate inquiry and before the stage contemplated by Section 319 CrPC.
- Whether the orders of the Magistrate, the Sessions Court, and the High Court refusing to discharge the petitioner suffer from legal infirmity warranting intervention under Article 136 of the Constitution.
Arguments of the Parties
Petitioner’s Arguments
- Because the petitioner was not named as an accused in the police charge-sheet, the Magistrate lacked authority to take cognizance against him; any such inclusion should await the evidence stage and be routed through Section 319 CrPC.
- Section 209 CrPC mandates that a Magistrate, in a sessions-triable case instituted on a police report, must commit the case without conducting a separate inquiry; the 1973 Code removed the earlier power to hold an independent inquiry upon disagreement with the police report.
- Reliance was placed on Raj Kishore Prasad v. State of Bihar (1996) 4 SCC 495 and Ranjit Singh v. State of Punjab (1998) 7 SCC 149, which hold that a court can add new accused only under Section 319 CrPC after evidence is recorded.
Respondents’ Arguments
- The Magistrate is not bound by the police’s final report and may, on the materials contained in that report, independently take cognizance under Section 190(1)(b) CrPC—even against persons whom the police have exonerated—without a separate inquiry.
- The controversy referred to a larger Bench in Dharam Pal v. State of Haryana (2004) 13 SCC 9 regarding the Magistrate’s power of inquiry is irrelevant here because the Magistrate in this case acted solely on the police report.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Raj Kishore Prasad v. State of Bihar (1996) 4 SCC 495 | Section 319 CrPC can be invoked only after evidence is recorded; proceedings under Section 209 are not "trial". | Relied on by petitioner; Court noted but did not find it controlling. |
| Ranjit Singh v. State of Punjab (1998) 7 SCC 149 | Sessions Court cannot add new accused before evidence; only Section 319 CrPC permits such joinder. | Relied on by petitioner; Court observed that its correctness is under reference in Dharam Pal. |
| Kishun Singh v. State of Bihar (1993) 2 SCC 16 | Sessions Court may take cognizance under Section 193 CrPC independently of Section 319. | Cited to show conflicting views on the issue. |
| Kishori Singh v. State of Bihar (2004) 13 SCC 11 | Followed Ranjit Singh on limitations of adding accused. | Referenced in discussion of divergent lines of authority. |
| India Carat (P) Ltd. v. State of Karnataka (1989) 2 SCC 132 | Magistrate may take cognizance under Section 190(1)(b) even when police file a negative report. | Treated as governing precedent; Court applied it to uphold the Magistrate’s action. |
| Dharam Pal v. State of Haryana (2004) 13 SCC 9 | Reference made to larger Bench on the scope of Magistrate’s inquiry powers when disagreeing with a police report. | Court held that resolution of the reference is unnecessary for deciding the present SLP. |
| Abhinandan Jha v. Dinesh Mishra AIR 1968 SC 117 | Magistrate can disagree with a final report and take cognizance. | Reaffirmed lineage of authority supporting Magistrate’s power. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Supreme Court observed that the Magistrate did not conduct any independent or fresh inquiry; rather, he evaluated the materials contained in the police report itself. Consistent with India Carat and Abhinandan Jha, Section 190(1)(b) authorises such cognizance even when the investigating agency advises closure. Therefore, the Magistrate’s action was legally permissible.
The Court further noted that charges have already been framed by the Sessions Court, rendering the SLP largely academic. The reference pending in Dharam Pal concerning the breadth of a Magistrate’s inquiry power was held irrelevant because, in the instant matter, the Magistrate had not embarked upon any additional inquiry.
Holding and Implications
SLP DISMISSED AS INFRUCTUOUS.
The immediate effect is that the criminal trial against the petitioner proceeds on the charges already framed; no relief is available to him in this SLP. The decision reiterates—without creating new precedent—that a Magistrate may, under Section 190(1)(b) CrPC, take cognizance against a person notwithstanding a police report recommending exoneration.
Altamas Kabir, J.— On 17-2-2000, one Vijay Singh, brother of Bharat Singh (deceased) and Damodar Singh, who was an independent candidate in the elections to the Bihar Assembly, lodged a first information report with Maharajganj Police Station which was recorded as Maharajganj PS Case No. 14 of 2000.
2. In the said FIR it was indicated that Damodar Singh, the informant's brother, was contesting the elections to the Bihar Assembly as an independent candidate. While the polling of votes was in progress, Bharat Singh was sitting in the election office when he received information that bogus votes were being cast at a particular booth and upon hearing a bomb explosion at about 11.30 a.m, he proceeded to the place where the incident was taking place.
3. According to the FIR version, the informant reached the place in a jeep while Bharat Singh followed him on a motorcycle. On reaching the place they were informed that a boy had sustained injuries and had been rushed to Maharajganj State Hospital for treatment. When they were leaving the hospital premises, Uma Shankar Singh, who was a candidate of the Samata Party in the Assembly election, and his son Jitendra Swami, accompanied by some unknown persons armed with different weapons, arrived at the place of occurrence and on the orders of Uma Shankar Singh, his son Jitendra Swami pulled down Bharat Singh from his motorcycle, pushed him into his car and drove out to an unknown destination.
4. Initially, the FIR was lodged under Sections 364/34 IPC, but after the body of Bharat Singh was found, Sections 302, 291/34 IPC and Section 27 of the Arms Act were also added.
5. The matter created a lot of turmoil which resulted in the investigation being transferred to CID. The informant, Vijay Singh, becoming unnerved by the said decision of the State Government, challenged the same in Criminal WJC No. 288 of 2000, which was disposed of by the High Court on 9-4-2001, upon observing that the matter appeared to be a fight between two political personalities and when investigation had already been completed by one agency and was also to be completed by CID, the question would arise as to whether the investigation report under Section 173(2) CrPC would have to be filed both by the first investigating agency and also by CID?
6. The High Court directed CID and the Superintendent of Police, Siwan to submit their reports to the Chief Judicial Magistrate concerned within two months from the date of the order and upon such report being submitted, the Chief Judicial Magistrate was directed to proceed according to law after considering both the reports and the case diary.
7. By virtue of the order of the High Court, the investigation continued both by CID and the local police and it was decided to file a report in final form against the petitioner, though some other accused were charge-sheeted. However, after examining the materials in the case diary, the Chief Judicial Magistrate differed with the final report submitted by the investigating agency to take cognizance against Jitendra Swami and some other accused persons. This led the petitioner to file an application under Section 227 CrPC for discharge from the case. The said application was taken up for consideration by the First Additional Sessions Judge, Siwan, who by his order dated 9-3-2007 rejected the petitioner's prayer for discharge under Section 227 CrPC and fixed a date for framing of charge.
8. The petitioner thereupon filed Criminal Miscellaneous Case No. 18909 of 2007 in the Patna High Court for quashing the order passed by the First Additional District and Sessions Judge, Siwan, on 9-3-2007, rejecting the petitioner's prayer for discharge from the case. The High Court dismissed the criminal miscellaneous case vide its order dated 12-5-2009. This special leave petition was filed on 17-7-2009 against the said judgment and order of the High Court.
9. On behalf of the petitioner it was urged that when he was not named as an accused in the charge-sheet filed by the investigating agency, the Magistrate could not have taken cognizance as far as he was concerned and the trial court should have waited till the stage of Section 319 CrPC if at all the petitioner was to be arrayed as an accused. Mr P.S Mishra, learned Senior Advocate, reiterated the oft-repeated saying that cognizance is taken of an offence and not the offender. Mr Mishra submitted that the case was also investigated by CID on the directions of the High Court and, although the alleged offence was triable by a Court of Session, the learned Magistrate erroneously took cognizance thereof.
10. Mr Mishra urged that one of the modes of taking cognizance of an offence by the Magistrate under Section 190 CrPC is upon a police report of facts constituting the offence. Mr Mishra submitted that prior to the enactment of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, which replaced the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, if the Magistrate disagreed with the final report filed by the investigating agency, he was at liberty to hold a separate enquiry and to take cognizance thereafter. Under the new Code, however, such a procedure was eliminated by virtue of the amended provisions of Section 209 which made it quite clear that when in a case instituted on a police report or otherwise, the accused appears or is brought before the Magistrate who is of the view that the offence is triable exclusively by the Court of Session, he shall, after complying with the provisions of Sections 207 and 208, as the case may be, commit the accused to the Court of Session.
11. It was urged that the Magistrate was left with no choice to hold an enquiry but to make an order of commitment when the facts disclosed an offence triable by the Court of Session. In other words, if the final report under Section 173(2) CrPC exonerated an accused, there was no scope for the Magistrate to hold an inquiry for the purpose of taking cognizance, but to wait for the stage of Section 319 CrPC if at all cognizance was to be taken in respect of such accused on material that may have surfaced during the trial.
12. In support of the said proposition reliance was placed on the decision of this Court in Raj Kishore Prasad v. State of Bihar (1996) 4 SCC 495 wherein this Court when confronted with a similar question held that in order to apply Section 319 CrPC against any person other than the accused, it would depend on the evidence recorded in the course of any inquiry or trial and that the proceedings before a Magistrate under Section 209 CrPC are not trial proceedings nor were they ever meant to be.
13. Reference was then made to a decision of a three-Judge Bench of this Court in Ranjit Singh v. State of Punjab (1998) 7 SCC 149 wherein the Hon'ble Judges took the view that when a case is committed to the Court of Session under Section 209, the Court of Session has no jurisdiction to include a new person as an accused before evidence was led on behalf of the prosecution and that there was no power other than the power conferred under Section 319 CrPC by which the Court of Session could join a new person as an accused. It was held that there is no intermediary stage between committal under Section 209 CrPC and Section 319 CrPC for the aforesaid purpose.
14. Mr Mishra submitted that the views expressed in Ranjit Singh case (1998) 7 SCC 149 were contrary to those expressed by this Court in Kishun Singh v. State of Bihar (1993) 2 SCC 16 where, although 20 persons had been named in the FIR, the Magistrate had committed 18 to the Court of Session under Section 209 CrPC to stand trial. On an application made under Section 319 CrPC indicating the involvement of the other two accused as well, a prayer was made that they should also be summoned and arraigned before the court as accused persons along with the 18 other accused already named in the charge-sheet. Despite objections raised on behalf of the said two persons, the Sessions Judge, in exercise of his discretion, added the said persons as accused along with the 18 others. The criminal revision preferred from the order of the learned Sessions Judge was dismissed by the High Court. This Court while granting special leave held that although the stage of Section 319 had not been reached, on the materials available, the Sessions Judge was within his jurisdiction in taking cognizance against the said two persons under Section 193 of the Code.
15. The same question once again fell for consideration in Kishori Singh v. State of Bihar (2004) 13 SCC 11 where the decision rendered by this Court in Ranjit Singh case (1998) 7 SCC 149 was followed, although another decision in India Carat (P) Ltd. v. State of Karnataka (1989) 2 SCC 132 was also cited wherein another Bench of three Judges of this Court had held that despite the police report that no case had been made out against the accused, the Magistrate can take cognizance of the offence under Section 190(1)(b), taking into account the statement of witnesses made under police investigation and issue process.
16. Ultimately, Dharam Pal v. State of Haryana (2004) 13 SCC 9 came up for consideration before a Bench of two Judges when on account of the different views expressed by different Benches of this Court, the case was directed to be heard by a three-Judge Bench. After considering the various decisions in connection with the said issue, the three-Judge Bench observed that prima facie it did not think that the interpretation reached in Ranjit Singh case (1998) 7 SCC 149 was correct and that the law was clearly enunciated in Kishun Singh case (1993) 2 SCC 16. Further, having regard to the fact that the decision in Ranjit Singh case (1998) 7 SCC 149 was by a three-Judge Bench, the learned Judges directed that the matter be placed before the Hon'ble the Chief Justice of India for placing the matter before a larger Bench.
17. Mr Nagendra Rai, learned Senior Advocate appearing for some of the respondents, on the other hand, submitted that the question referred to the larger Bench in Dharam Pal case (2004) 13 SCC 9 is not really material for a decision in this case where the fact situation is different. Mr Rai urged that the law was well settled that the Magistrate was not bound to accept the final report filed by the investigating authorities under Section 173(2) CrPC and was entitled to issue process against an accused even though exonerated by the said authorities, without holding any separate enquiry, on the basis of the police report itself.
18. There is substance in Mr Rai's submission that for a decision in the facts of the case, it is not necessary to wait for the outcome of the result of the reference made to a larger Bench in Dharam Pal case (2004) 13 SCC 9. The reference is with regard to the Magistrate's power of enquiry if he disagreed with the final report submitted by the investigating authorities. The facts of this case are different and are covered by the decision of this Court in India Carat (P) Ltd. (1989) 2 SCC 132 following the line of cases from Abhinandan Jha v. Dinesh Mishra AIR 1968 SC 117, 1968 Cri LJ 97, (1967) 3 SCR 668 onwards.
19. The law is well settled that even if the investigating authority is of the view that no case has been made out against an accused, the Magistrate can apply his mind independently to the materials contained in the police report and take cognizance thereupon in exercise of his powers under Section 190(1)(b) CrPC. That is precisely what has happened in the present case.
20. In the instant case the investigation had been handed over to CID and both CID and the local police had submitted their reports in final form exonerating the petitioner of the allegations made against him in the FIR. However, the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Siwan took cognizance of the offence under Sections 302/379 IPC and Section 27 of the Arms Act against the petitioner. This is not a case where the Magistrate took recourse to any further inquiry but took cognizance on the police report itself, which he was entitled to do under Section 190(1)(b) CrPC.
21. Even otherwise, the petitioner thereafter filed an application for discharge before the First Additional District and Sessions Judge, Siwan in Sessions Trial No. 281 of 2006, but such prayer under Section 227 CrPC was dismissed and a date was fixed for framing of charge.
22. We have been informed that charges have since been framed against the petitioner which has rendered the present proceedings infructuous and the petitioner's remedy, if any, will no longer be available therein. The special leave petition is, therefore, dismissed in the light of the aforesaid observations.
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