- Bookmark
- Share
- CaseIQ
R.B Ramlingam v. R.B Bhvaneswari .
Factual and Procedural Background
The petitioner, who was the original plaintiff, challenges the judgment and final order dated 18-09-2006 passed by the Madras High Court in CRP (NPD) No. 896 of 2006. Instead of approaching the Supreme Court immediately, the petitioner filed Review Application No. 85 of 2007 in the High Court within the period prescribed by the Limitation Act, 1963. The High Court dismissed that review application on 27-03-2008. Subsequently, the petitioner filed the present Special Leave Petition (SLP) in the Supreme Court on 07-07-2008—resulting in a delay of 568 days in challenging the main judgment. An interlocutory application (IA No. 1 of 2008) seeking condonation of this delay was also filed.
When the matter first came up before the Supreme Court on 25-11-2008, the Bench posed a specific query: whether the time spent prosecuting the review application could constitute “sufficient cause” under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 for condoning delay in filing the SLP. Because courts have expressed divergent views on this question, the Bench requested assistance from learned senior counsel (amicus curiae) Shri Shyam Divan.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the petitioner’s prosecution of Review Application No. 85 of 2007 constitutes “sufficient cause” under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 for condoning a 568-day delay in filing the Special Leave Petition.
- More broadly, whether, in principle, the pendency of review proceedings in the High Court is a valid ground for seeking enlargement of time under Section 5 when the litigant seeks to invoke the Supreme Court’s discretionary jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution.
Arguments of the Parties
The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the parties' legal arguments.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Kunhayammed v. State of Kerala (2000) 6 SCC 359 | Distinction between the Court’s appellate jurisdiction and its discretionary jurisdiction under Article 136; filing a review petition is not an impediment to filing an SLP. | The Court relied on this decision to underscore that an SLP can be filed even while review proceedings are pending and that the mere fact of having pursued a review does not automatically excuse delay; each case must still satisfy the “sufficient cause” test. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
1. The Court recognised a “dichotomy” between its ordinary appellate jurisdiction and its special, discretionary jurisdiction under Article 136. Hence, doctrines developed for appeals are not mechanically applicable to SLPs.
2. Section 5 of the Limitation Act sets out the elastic standard of “sufficient cause,” which the Court described as “delightfully undefined.” The provision intentionally leaves room for judicial discretion, and no exhaustive categories can be laid down.
3. The Bench observed that divergent judicial opinions exist on whether time spent pursuing a review application can per se amount to sufficient cause. The Court rejected any categorical rule, holding that the question must be decided case-by-case, guided by whether the litigant acted with reasonable diligence.
4. Applying these principles to the present case, the Court noted that the review application had been filed within limitation and was duly numbered; the High Court had re-examined the matter after issuing notice to the respondent. These facts were relevant to determining diligence.
5. The Court thus concluded that the delay-condonation application required detailed consideration on merits rather than outright rejection based on a blanket rule.
Holding and Implications
Order: The Registry is directed to list the Special Leave Petition along with IA No. 1 of 2008 (application for condonation of 568 days’ delay) for admission on 16-02-2009.
Implications: The order clarifies that the pursuit of a review petition in the High Court may, depending on the facts, constitute “sufficient cause” under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. The decision does not set a rigid precedent but reinforces a flexible, fact-specific approach, emphasizing reasonable diligence as the guiding criterion. Immediate effect is limited to scheduling the matter for admission; no substantive rights of the parties have yet been adjudicated.
Order
1. The present special leave petition has been filed by the petitioner (the original plaintiff) against the judgment and final order dated 18-9-2006 passed by the Madras High Court in CRP (NPD) No. 896 of 2006. Subsequent to the passing of the impugned order dated 18-9-2006 in CRP No. 896 of 2006, the petitioner herein filed Review Application No. 85 of 2007. This application was filed in time prescribed for filing the review petition under the Limitation Act, 1963. However, vide order dated 27-3-2008 the said Review Application No. 85 of 2007 stood rejected.
2. This special leave petition is filed against the main judgment and final order dated 18-9-2006 in CRP No. 896 of 2006 on 7-7-2008. In the process, there is a delay of 568 days in filing the special leave petition against the main judgment and order dated 18-9-2006. The delay, therefore, in filing this special leave petition was on account of pendency of Review Application No. 85 of 2007 before the Madras High Court. Consequently, vide IA No. 1 of 2008, the petitioner herein prays for condonation of delay of 568 days in filing this SLP against the main judgment and final order dated 18-9-2006.
3. When this special leave petition came up for hearing before the earlier Division Bench on 25-11-2008, a query was raised by the Court as to whether prosecution of review proceedings would be sufficient cause for the purposes of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963. This query was raised by the Court because in numerous matters, this Court finds enormous delay in the filing of special leave petitions on the ground that the petitioner has been prosecuting review proceedings on which count there was delay in filing the special leave petition.
4. There is one more reason why this Court raised the above query. There is divergence of opinion among the courts whether the prosecution of review proceedings would be sufficient cause at all for the purposes of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963. For this purpose we requested Shri Shyam Divan, learned Senior Counsel, to assist us in answering the query raised hereinabove.
5. On the question as to whether the prosecution of a review application would be a sufficient cause for not filing the special leave petition in time for the purposes of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 we are of the view that there is a dichotomy between the appellate jurisdiction of this Court and discretionary jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution. (See Kunhayammed v. State of Kerala (2000) 6 SCC 359.) Reading the said judgment, it also becomes clear that filing of review petition is no impediment to the filing of the special leave petition.
6. A large number of judgments were cited before us by learned counsel. It is not necessary at this stage to discuss each and every judgment cited before us for the simple reason that Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 does not lay down any standard or objective test. The test of “sufficient cause” is purely an individualistic test. It is not an objective test. Therefore, no two cases can be treated alike. The statute of limitation has left the concept of “sufficient cause” delightfully undefined, thereby leaving to the court a well-intentioned discretion to decide the individual cases whether circumstances exist establishing sufficient cause. There are no categories of sufficient cause. The categories of sufficient cause are never exhausted. Each case spells out a unique experience to be dealt with by the court as such.
7. For the aforestated reasons, we hold that in each and every case the court has to examine whether delay in filing the special leave petition stands properly explained. This is the basic test which needs to be applied. The true guide is whether the petitioner has acted with reasonable diligence in the prosecution of his appeal/petition. In exercise of discretion under Article 136 to decide whether delay should be condoned or not, this Court is not bound by considerations applicable to an appellate court but nonetheless general principles which would weigh with the appellate court in determining sufficient cause can be the guiding factor/guideline. Therefore, it cannot be stated as a proposition per se that the prosecution of review proceedings would not be a sufficient cause at all for the purposes of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963.
8. In the present case, as stated above, what is challenged is the main judgment and order dated 18-9-2006. As stated above, IA No. 1 of 2008 is for condonation of delay in filing the special leave petition. It is important to note that the review application was filed within time in April 2007, therefore, it was duly numbered. The High Court re-examined the entire case after issuing notice to the respondent herein (the defendant).
9. In view of what is stated above, we now direct the office to list the present matter for admission along with IA No. 1 of 2008 on 16-2-2009.
10. We hereby record our appreciation for the assistance rendered by learned amicus curiae, Shri Shyam Divan.
Alert