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Santoshkumar Shivgonda Patil And Others v. Balasaheb Tukaram Shevale And Others
Factual and Procedural Background
Takawade Gat No. 1157 (Old Survey No. 201/1) measuring 6H 65R was originally inam land belonging to N.R. Deshpande. Upon resumption on 1-8-1955, four tenants, including Tukaram Sakharam Shevale, each held a one-quarter share. The landlord paid the required occupancy price only for the three-quarter portion held by tenants other than Tukaram, leading to its re-grant and subsequent sale to those tenants. The remaining one-quarter portion occupied by Tukaram was resumed by the State, although Tukaram continued in possession until 1974-1975.
On 30-3-1976 the Tahsildar, Shirol granted three-quarters of Tukaram’s former holding to Shivgonda Satgonda Patil on the basis of cultivation, leaving Tukaram with one-quarter. Tukaram did not challenge this order during his lifetime (he died in 1990). In 1993 his legal heirs (Respondents 1-5) sought revision before the Sub-Divisional Officer (SDO) under Section 257 of the Maharashtra Land Revenue Code. On 16-8-1994 the SDO revised the Tahsildar’s order, declaring Tukaram entitled to the full one-quarter share and terming the entries in favour of Shivgonda unauthorised. The Additional Collector (1995), the Commissioner (Pune Division), a Single Judge of the Bombay High Court (1996), and a Division Bench in letters patent appeal (2004) all upheld the SDO.
The present appellants approached the Supreme Court by special leave. The delay in SLP (C) No. 22662 of 2009 was condoned and leave granted. The appeal focuses on the timeliness of the SDO’s revisionary power.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the revisional power under Section 257 of the Maharashtra Land Revenue Code, 1966, can be exercised at any time in the absence of an express statutory limitation period, or must it be exercised within a “reasonable time”?
Arguments of the Parties
The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the parties' legal arguments.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| State of Gujarat v. Patil Raghav Natha (1969) 2 SCC 187 | Revisional power without a prescribed limitation must be exercised within a reasonable time, inferred from the statutory context. | Used as foundational authority to conclude that the absence of an express time-bar does not allow indefinite exercise of revision. |
| Mohd. Kavi Mohamad Amin v. Fatmabai Ibrahim (1997) 6 SCC 71 | Statutory powers lacking a time-limit should generally be exercised within a reasonable period. | Reinforced the requirement of reasonable timeliness; supported the view that 17-year delay was excessive. |
| State of Punjab v. Bhatinda District Coop. Milk Producers Union Ltd. (2007) 11 SCC 363 | Even without explicit limitation, revisional jurisdiction should ordinarily be invoked within three years and in any case not beyond five years. | Helped the Court articulate a benchmark—three years ordinarily, five years at most—for reasonable exercise of revisional power. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
1. Section 257 confers wide revisional powers on specified revenue authorities but prescribes no time-limit. The Court examined whether this absence permits action “at any time”.
2. Relying on Patil Raghav Natha, Mohd. Kavi, and Bhatinda District Coop. Milk Producers Union, the Court reiterated the principle that when the legislature omits a limitation period, the power must still be exercised within a “reasonable time”.
3. The concept of “reasonable time” is contextual; however, precedents suggest that three years is ordinarily reasonable, with an outer ceiling of about five years for revenue matters.
4. In the present case, the SDO invoked Section 257 after a lapse of 17 years from the Tahsildar’s order. Such a delay far exceeds any notion of reasonableness and undermines certainty of land titles.
5. The Court noted that Tukaram himself never contested the 1976 order during his lifetime, and there was no finding of fraud or lack of knowledge. Therefore, disturbing settled rights after 17 years was unjustifiable and constituted an abuse of process.
Holding and Implications
Appeals Allowed; impugned orders of the Sub-Divisional Officer, Additional Collector, Commissioner, and High Court are quashed and set aside as against Respondents 1-5.
Implications: The judgment clarifies that revisional authority under Section 257 of the Maharashtra Land Revenue Code should ordinarily be exercised within three years, and certainly within a period that can be deemed reasonable in the circumstances. Exercising such power after 17 years is impermissible. Although grounded in the specific statute, the reasoning reinforces a broader principle applicable to other statutory schemes lacking explicit limitation periods.
R.M Lodha, J.— Delay condoned in SLP (C) No. 22662 of 2009 CC 2563. Leave granted in both the matters. The short question that arises for consideration in this appeal by special leave is whether power of revision in Section 257 of the Maharashtra Land Revenue Code, 1966 can be exercised at any time although no time has been prescribed for exercise of such power.
2. Takawade Gat No. 1157 (Old Survey No. 201/1) admeasuring 6H 65R originally belonged to one N.R Deshpande. The land was an inam land which was resumed on 1-8-1955. On the date of resumption, there were four tenants holding 1/4th share each. Tukaram Sakharam Shevale, predecessor-in-title of Respondents 1 to 5, one of such tenants, thus, held land admeasuring 1H 66R.
3. The original landlord, N.R Deshpande, was required to pay occupancy price before 31-7-1965 which he did only to the extent of 3/4th portion in respect of lands possessed by three tenants other than Tukaram Sakharam Shevale. The 3/4th portion was, thus, regranted and later on sold to the tenants occupying such portion. As regards 1/4th portion occupied by Tukaram Sakharam Shevale, it appears that no occupancy price was paid and this portion was resumed to the State. Tukaram is, however, said to have continued to remain in possession of 1/4th portion of the land till 1974-1975.
4. The Tahsildar, Shirol, on 30-3-1976, passed an order whereby 3/4th portion of land earlier in occupation of Tukaram was granted in favour of Shivgonda Satgonda Patil on the basis of his occupation as cultivator and 1/4th remained in favour of Tukaram Sakharam Shevale. Tukaram Sakharam Shevale, until his death in 1990, did not challenge the Tahsildar's order dated 30-3-1976 in any proceeding. It was only after the death of Tukaram that his legal heirs, namely, Respondents 1 to 5 herein, made an application before the Sub-Divisional Officer, Ichalkaranji in 1993 seeking revision of the order of the Tahsildar, Shirol passed on 30-3-1976.
5. The Sub-Divisional Officer, Ichalkaranji invoked his revisional power under Section 257 of the Maharashtra Land Revenue Code and after hearing the parties and getting the report from the Tahsildar, Shirol vide his order dated 16-8-1994 allowed the revision application and set aside the order dated 30-3-1976 giving 3/16th share in RS No. 201/1 to Shivgonda Satgonda Patil. The Sub-Divisional Officer, Ichalkaranji declared that 1/4th share in RS No. 201/1 admeasuring 1H 66R shall be deemed to have been granted to Tukaram Shevale and pik-pahani entries made in favour of Shivgonda Satgonda Patil shall be treated as unauthorised and illegal. Upset by the order dated 16-8-1994, the present appellants preferred appeal before the Additional Collector, Kolhapur who agreed with the view of the Sub-Divisional Officer, Ichalkaranji and rejected the appeal on 16-9-1995.
6. The present appellants carried the matter before the Commissioner, Pune Division, Pune but without any success. The present appellants then filed a writ petition before the High Court of Judicature at Bombay (Appellate Side). The Single Judge dismissed the writ petition on 20-6-1996. The appellants preferred a letters patent appeal before the Division Bench of the High Court which also came to be rejected on 1-9-2004.
7. Section 257 of the Maharashtra Land Revenue Code empowers the State Government and certain Revenue and Survey Officers to call for and examine records and proceedings of subordinate officers. Thus, a power of revision is conferred on the State Government and certain Revenue and Survey Officers under Section 257. Section 257 reads thus:
“257. Power of State Government and of certain Revenue and Survey Officers to call for and examine records and proceedings of subordinate officers.—(1) The State Government and any Revenue or Survey Officer, not inferior in rank to an Assistant or Deputy Collector or a Superintendent of Land Records, in their respective departments, may call for and examine the record of any inquiry or the proceedings of any subordinate Revenue or Survey Officer, for the purpose of satisfying itself or himself, as the case may be, as to the legality or propriety of any decision or order passed, and as to the regularity of the proceedings of such officer.
(2) A Tahsildar, a Naib Tahsildar, and a District Inspector of Land Records may in the same manner call for and examine the proceedings of any officer subordinate to them in any matter in which neither a formal nor a summary inquiry has been held.
(3) If in any case, it shall appear to the State Government, or to any officer referred to in sub-section (1) or sub-section (2) that any decision or order or proceedings so called for should be modified, annulled or reversed, it or he may pass such order thereon as it or he deems fit:
Provided that, the State Government or such officer shall not vary or reverse any order affecting any question of right between private persons without having given to the parties interested notice to appear and to be heard in support of such order:
Provided further that, an Assistant or Deputy Collector shall not himself pass such order in any matter in which a formal inquiry has been held, but shall submit the record with his opinion to the Collector, who shall pass such order thereon as he may deem fit.”
A close look at the aforesaid provision would show that there is no time-limit fixed for exercise of power of revision by the revisional authority. The question is, could it be exercised at any time.
8. While dealing with the question like the present one, a three-Judge Bench of this Court in State of Gujarat v. Patil Raghav Natha (1969) 2 SCC 187, with reference to Sections 65 and 211 of the Bombay Land Revenue Code, 1879, held thus:
“11. The question arises whether the Commissioner can revise an order made under Section 65 at any time. It is true that there is no period of limitation prescribed under Section 211, but it seems to us plain that this power must be exercised in reasonable time and the length of the reasonable time must be determined by the facts of the case and the nature of the order which is being revised.
12. It seems to us that Section 65 itself indicates the length of the reasonable time within which the Commissioner must act under Section 211. Under Section 65 of the Code if the Collector does not inform the applicant of his decision on the application within a period of three months the permission applied for shall be deemed to have been granted. This section shows that a period of three months is considered ample for the Collector to make up his mind and beyond that the legislature thinks that the matter is so urgent that permission shall be deemed to have been granted. Reading Sections 211 and 65 together it seems to us that the Commissioner must exercise his revisional powers within a few months of the order of the Collector. This is reasonable time because after the grant of the permission for building purposes the occupant is likely to spend money on starting building operations at least within a few months from the date of the permission. In this case the Commissioner set aside the order of the Collector on 12-10-1961 i.e more than a year after the order and it seems to us that this order was passed too late.”
9. While dealing with the suo motu revisional power under Section 84-C of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1976, this Court in Mohd. Kavi Mohamad Amin v. Fatmabai Ibrahim (1997) 6 SCC 71 held that generally where no time-limit is prescribed for exercise of power under a statute, it should be exercised within a reasonable time. This is what this Court said:
“2. … Section 84-C of the Act does not prescribe any time for initiation of the proceeding. But in view of the settled position by several judgments of this Court that wherever a power is vested in a statutory authority without prescribing any time-limit, such power should be exercised within a reasonable time. In the present case the transfer took place as early as in the year 1972 and suo motu enquiry was started by the Mamlatdar in September 1973. If sale deeds are declared to be invalid the appellant is likely to suffer irreparable injury, because he has made investments after the aforesaid purchase. In this connection, on behalf of the appellant reliance was placed on a judgment of Justice S.B Majmudar (as he then was in the High Court of Gujarat) in State of Gujarat v. Jethmal Bhagwandas Shah where in connection with Section 84-C itself it was said that the power under the aforesaid section should be exercised within a reasonable time. This Court in connection with other statutory provisions, in State of Gujarat v. Patil Raghav Natha (1969) 2 SCC 187 and in Ram Chand v. Union of India (1994) 1 SCC 44 has impressed that where no time-limit is prescribed for exercise of a power under a statute it does not mean that it can be exercised at any time; such power has to be exercised within a reasonable time. We are satisfied that in the facts and circumstances of the present case, the suo motu power under Section 84-C of the Act was not exercised by the Mamlatdar within a reasonable time.”
10. Recently, in State of Punjab v. Bhatinda District Coop. Milk Producers Union Ltd. (2007) 11 SCC 363 while dealing with the power of revision under Section 21 of the Punjab General Sales Tax Act, 1948, it has been held:
“17. A bare reading of Section 21 of the Act would reveal that although no period of limitation has been prescribed therefor, the same would not mean that the suo motu power can be exercised at any time.
18. It is trite that if no period of limitation has been prescribed, statutory authority must exercise its jurisdiction within a reasonable period. What, however, shall be the reasonable period would depend upon the nature of the statute, rights and liabilities thereunder and other relevant factors.
19. Revisional jurisdiction, in our opinion, should ordinarily be exercised within a period of three years having regard to the purport in terms of the said Act. In any event, the same should not exceed the period of five years. The view of the High Court, thus, cannot be said to be unreasonable. Reasonable period, keeping in view the discussions made hereinbefore, must be found out from the statutory scheme. As indicated hereinbefore, maximum period of limitation provided for in sub-section (6) of Section 11 of the Act is five years.”
11. It seems to be fairly settled that if a statute does not prescribe the time-limit for exercise of revisional power, it does not mean that such power can be exercised at any time; rather it should be exercised within a reasonable time. It is so because the law does not expect a settled thing to be unsettled after a long lapse of time. Where the legislature does not provide for any length of time within which the power of revision is to be exercised by the authority, suo motu or otherwise, it is plain that exercise of such power within reasonable time is inherent therein.
12. Ordinarily, the reasonable period within which the power of revision may be exercised would be three years under Section 257 of the Maharashtra Land Revenue Code subject, of course, to the exceptional circumstances in a given case, but surely exercise of revisional power after a lapse of 17 years is not a reasonable time. Invocation of revisional power by the Sub-Divisional Officer under Section 257 of the Maharashtra Land Revenue Code is plainly an abuse of process in the facts and circumstances of the case assuming that the order of the Tahsildar passed on 30-3-1976 is flawed and legally not correct.
13. Pertinently, Tukaram Sakharam Shevale, during his lifetime never challenged the legality and correctness of the order of the Tahsildar, Shirol although it was passed on 30-3-1976 and he was alive up to 1990. It is not even in the case of Respondents 1 to 5 that Tukaram was not aware of the order dated 30-3-1976. There is no finding by the Sub-Divisional Officer either that the order dated 30-3-1976 was obtained fraudulently.
14. In what we have discussed above, the appeals deserve to be allowed against Respondents 1 to 5 and are allowed and the impugned orders are quashed and set aside as against them. Parties will bear their own costs.
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