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Sime Darby Engineering Sdn. Bhd. v. Engineers India Limited .

Supreme Court Of India
Jul 22, 2009
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Factual and Procedural Background

Oil and Natural Gas Corporation Limited (ONGC) issued a tender on 17-11-2003 for extensive offshore works at Bombay High. The respondent, an Indian company providing engineering and technical services, bid for the tender with the petitioner, a Malaysian fabrication company, as its designated sub-contractor pursuant to a business agreement dated 22-01-2004. ONGC awarded the turnkey contract to the respondent on 10-03-2004 for US $623,000,000, and the respondent in turn executed a sub-contract with the petitioner on 29-10-2004 for US $20,162,460 covering fabrication, load-out and transportation of specified structures.

The petitioner fulfilled its contractual scope but alleged non-payment of certain dues amounting to US $14,244,812.02 and other consequential losses. After failed negotiations, the petitioner invoked the arbitration clause on 19-02-2008. The respondent questioned the timing of the invocation and sought amicable settlement, but ultimately conceded that the dispute was arbitrable. Unable to agree on the number of arbitrators, the petitioner filed the present Section 11 petition under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, seeking constitution of the Arbitral Tribunal.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether, in the absence of an express stipulation in Clause 12 of the sub-contract, the Arbitral Tribunal must comprise a sole arbitrator pursuant to Section 10(2) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, or a panel of three arbitrators as urged by the respondent.
  2. Whether the respondent’s internal post-contract “policy” requiring three arbitrators for disputes exceeding ₹10 crore can override the parties’ contractual agreement and the statutory default rule.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments

  • Clause 12.2 of the sub-contract refers disputes to arbitration “in accordance with” the 1996 Act but is silent on the number of arbitrators; therefore Section 10(2) mandates a sole arbitrator.
  • Appointing three arbitrators would unnecessarily delay proceedings and escalate costs; judicial decisions have recognised these practical drawbacks.
  • The expression “arbitrator(s)” in Clause 12.3 merely anticipates the possibility of more than one arbitrator if the parties so agree later; it does not itself prescribe a panel.

Respondent's Arguments

  • The use of the term “arbitrator(s)” in Clause 12.3 implies contemplation of more than one arbitrator; since an even number is barred, the minimum odd number is three.
  • Clause 12.2 states that arbitration shall be “generally in accordance with the UNCITRAL Rules,” under which the default, failing party agreement, is three arbitrators.
  • The respondent follows a policy that contracts involving amounts above ₹10 crore must be referred to a three-member tribunal; standard contract clauses reflecting this policy were produced.
  • Complex, high-value international engineering disputes are better adjudicated by a three-member tribunal, as recognised in academic commentary (Redfern & Hunter).

Table of Precedents Cited

No precedents were cited in the provided opinion.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court focussed on harmonising Clause 12 of the sub-contract with Section 10 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996:

  • Section 2(1)(d) defines an “Arbitral Tribunal” as “a sole arbitrator or a panel of arbitrators.”
  • Section 10(1) grants parties freedom to determine the number of arbitrators, subject to it not being an even number. Section 10(2) provides that, in the absence of such determination, the tribunal “shall consist of a sole arbitrator.”
  • Clause 12.2 is silent on the number of arbitrators; therefore, by the statutory default in Section 10(2), a sole arbitrator must be appointed.
  • The UNCITRAL Model Law provisions cited by the respondent do not alter this result because the Indian statute expressly modifies the UNCITRAL default by substituting a sole arbitrator for the absence of party determination.
  • The respondent’s post-contract internal policy cannot override the contractual clause agreed in 2004, nor can it displace the statutory scheme.
  • The plural reference “arbitrator(s)” in Clause 12.3 merely ensures that, should the parties later agree to multiple arbitrators, the clause remains functional; it does not by itself create such an agreement.
  • Scholarly writings favouring three-member tribunals were not decisive, and the extract relied on by the respondent was found to be inaccurately quoted.
  • The Court noted that a sole arbitrator retains the power under Section 27 to obtain expert assistance if required in technically complex matters.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The petition is allowed; Justice D.P. Wadhwa, former Judge of the Supreme Court of India, is appointed as the sole arbitrator. The arbitrator is requested to conclude the proceedings preferably within six months of entering reference. No order as to costs.

Implications: The decision reaffirms that when an arbitration clause is silent on tribunal size, Section 10(2) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 defaults to a sole arbitrator, emphasising party autonomy and statutory primacy over subsequent unilateral policies. The ruling directly affects the parties by expediting dispute resolution and does not purport to set a new legal precedent beyond applying the clear statutory default.

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Order

1. This petition has been filed under Section 11 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (hereinafter referred to as “the said Act”) by the petitioner praying for appointment of an Arbitral Tribunal to adjudicate the claims and disputes between the petitioner and the respondent.

2. The petitioner is a company incorporated and existing under the laws of Malaysia and is engaged in the business of fabrication of all types of offshore and onshore structures and complexes. The respondent on the other hand is a company incorporated under the (Indian) Companies Act, 1956 and is inter alia engaged in the business of providing engineering and related technical services for petroleum refineries and other industrial projects.

3. The necessary facts of the case are that Oil and Natural Gas Corporation Limited (ONGC) invited a tender vide Notification dated 17-11-2003 for carrying out work of survey, design, engineering, procurement, fabrication, anti-corrosion and weight coating, laying of submarine pipeline, installation of SPM, load-out, tie-down/sea-fastening and various other jobs in respect of Bombay High, South Field Offshore Site. In connection with the said tender issued by ONGC, the respondent and the petitioner entered into a business agreement on 22-1-2004 by which it was agreed that the respondent shall quote as a bidder against the said tender with the petitioner as a sub-contractor for identified scope of work.

4. The tender was awarded by ONGC to the respondent by notice dated 10-3-2004 for the said fabrication and installation of D-1 well-cum-water injection platform at Bombay High, South Field Offshore Site on a turnkey basis for a sum of US $623,000,000 and thereafter an agreement between the respondent and ONGC was entered into.

5. Then, the respondent entered into a sub-contract with the petitioner which was signed on 29-10-2004 and for fabrication, load-out and transportation of jacket, piles, conductors and deck for D-1 Well-cum-Water Injection Platform Project of ONGC at Bombay High, South Field Offshore Site for a lump sum sub-contract price of US $20,162,460.

6. In terms of the said sub-contract the petitioner carried out its scope of work in terms of its contractual obligations. As it did not receive the full payment from the respondent, disputes and differences between them cropped up. These disputes between the parties remained unresolved despite some joint negotiations between them.

7. The petitioner by its advocate's notice on 19-2-2008 invoked the arbitration clause and referred all disputes and differences between them and the respondent to arbitration including its claim of US $14,244,812.02 and claim for loss and damage on account of financing charges and foreign exchange and such other damages. In the said letter the petitioner also suggested the names of a few arbitrators.

8. The respondent by its letter dated 26-2-2008 did not accept the stand of the petitioner and stated that the petitioner's stand to proceed with arbitration is premature and the respondent requested the petitioner to withdraw the notice invoking arbitration and come out with a viable proposal to create a joint settlement mechanism to settle the dispute amicably.

9. However, the learned counsel for the petitioner tried to show before this Court that several meetings were held between the parties for settling the dispute amicably but the said efforts ultimately did not succeed. However, before this Court the learned counsel for the respondent fairly accepted the position but disputes between the parties virtually cannot be resolved amicably any more and the matter should be resolved through arbitration.

10. Learned counsel for the respondent submitted that he does not dispute that there are arbitrable disputes between the parties. Nor does he dispute that the petitioner has invoked the arbitration clause between the parties. The only point on which the case is argued is that in this case the arbitration panel must consist of three arbitrators, one is to be nominated by each party and the third arbitrator is to be chosen by the nominated arbitrators.

11. Learned counsel for the petitioner on the other hand did not accept the said stand of the learned counsel for the respondent and submitted that in terms of the agreement in this case the dispute can be decided by the sole arbitrator. The matter was actually heard before this Court on the aforesaid controversy.

12. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that admittedly the arbitration clauses in the contract which govern the rights of the parties in the matter of arbitration are as follows:

“12.1 This sub-contract shall be governed by and construed in accordance with the laws of India. The courts at Delhi shall have sole jurisdiction.
12.2 The parties shall endeavour to resolve any dispute or difference amicably through joint negotiation and when necessary by reference to the Chief Executive of EIL and SSE. If any dispute or difference, which cannot be mutually resolved by the parties, the same shall be referred to arbitration in accordance with the provisions contained in the Indian Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 which is generally in accordance with the Uncitral Rules.
12.3 The arbitrator(s) shall give reasoned award in respect of each dispute or difference referred to him. The award as aforesaid shall be final, conclusive and binding on all the parties of this sub-contract in accordance with the law.
12.4 The venue of the arbitration shall be at New Delhi, India.”

By relying on Clause 12.2, learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the said clause does not indicate about the number of arbitrators to be appointed while reciting that the matter be referred to arbitration in accordance with the provisions contained in the Indian Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, which is generally in accordance with the Uncitral Rules.

13. Learned counsel for the petitioner also referred to and relied on Section 10 of the said Act which deals with the composition of Arbitral Tribunals under Chapter III of the said Act. Sections 10(1) and 10(2) are as under:

“10. Number of arbitrators.—(1) The parties are free to determine the number of arbitrators, provided that such number shall not be an even number.
(2) Failing the determination referred to in sub-section (1), the Arbitral Tribunal shall consist of a sole arbitrator.”

Relying on Clause 12.2 and Section 10, learned counsel submits that it is clear that arbitration in this case shall be held by a sole or a single arbitrator. He particularly emphasised Clause 12.2 of the agreement and Section 10(2) of the Act which says that failing the determination referred to in sub-section (1), the Arbitral Tribunal shall consist of a sole arbitrator.

14. Learned counsel submits that in the instant case Clause 12.2 does not indicate the number of arbitrators and in that event sub-section (2) of Section 10 would apply. Learned counsel further submits that the matter should not be referred to three arbitrators as that would prolong the arbitration proceedings as three arbitrators would have to adjust their timings. Apart from that the same would result in considerable escalation of cost. Learned counsel has referred to a judgment of this Court in support of his contention that it has been judicially recognised that reference of a dispute to a panel of three arbitrators escalates the cost and more so it is very time consuming.

15. Learned counsel for the respondent on the other hand submits that reference of the matter to a panel of three arbitrators is not ruled out if the arbitration clause is properly construed along with Section 10 of the said Act. Learned counsel admitted that Clause 12.2 is silent about the number of arbitrators but Clause 12.3 refers to an expression “arbitrator(s)”. By relying on the said expression in Clause 12.3 learned counsel submits that the arbitration clause thus postulates the appointment of more than one arbitrator. As there cannot be two arbitrators which is an even number, the minimum number of arbitrators other than one would be three. Learned counsel also submitted that while Clause 12.2 stipulates that the arbitration between the parties would be governed under the said Act it also says in Clause 12.2 that it shall generally be in accordance with the Uncitral Rules.

16. Learned counsel also submitted that they have a policy that in matters involving high stakes above rupees ten crores, it should be referred to a committee or panel of arbitrators. In support of this submission, learned counsel referred to standard contract clauses which have been disclosed in the counter-affidavit filed by the respondent and reliance was placed on the following clause:

“The arbitration shall be conducted in accordance with the Indian Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. For contracts costing up to Rs 10 crores, a sole arbitrator should be appointed. For contracts costing over Rs 10 crores, a committee of arbitrators should be appointed composed of one arbitrator to be nominated by the contractor, one to be nominated by the owner and the third arbitrator, who will act as a Chairman but not as umpire, to be chosen jointly by the two nominees. The decision of majority of arbitrators shall be final and binding on both the parties.”

17. Learned counsel also relied on a passage from Redfern and Hunter, Law and Practice of International Commercial Arbitration, 4th Edn., 2004, p. 185, which is as under:

“In modern practice, despite the advantages of a sole arbitrator, particularly in arbitrations involving heavy stakes, preference is for appointment of three arbitrators, albeit not without rationale. Particularly, in the area of ‘international commercial arbitration’ involving complex problems peculiar to special types of disputes e.g engineering, construction, maritime and international trading disputes, a sole arbitrator, many a time may not be suitable for resolution of such disputes. In such situations, the common practice is to appoint a tribunal comprising of three arbitrators. Even though it may involve more expense and delay than a sole arbitrator arbitration, it is still preferred as it is more effective. An Arbitral Tribunal of three arbitrators is likely to prove more satisfactory to the parties, and the ultimate award is more likely to be acceptable to them.”

18. The learned counsel argued if the aforesaid stipulations in Clauses 12.2 and 12.3 of the agreement and Sections 10(1) and 10(2) are read harmoniously with the Uncitral Model Rules, the appointment of a panel of three arbitrators in this case cannot be ruled out.

19. These being the rival contentions of the parties, I am unable to accept the contentions put forth by the learned counsel for the respondent for the reasons discussed hereinbelow.

20. If one looks at Clause 12.2 of the agreement it should be clear if the disputes and differences are not resolved mutually, the same shall be referred to arbitration in accordance with the provisions of the said Act. Clause 12.3 stipulates the requirement on the part of the arbitrator(s) to give reasons.

21. The Arbitral Tribunal as defined under Section 2(1)(d) of the Act means “a sole arbitrator or a panel of arbitrators”. Section 10(2) of the Act is very relevant in order to resolve the controversy in this case inasmuch as Section 10(2) makes it very clear where the number of arbitrators is not determined, the Arbitral Tribunal shall consist of a sole arbitrator. In this connection if the Uncitral Rules are referred the position will remain the same. The Uncitral Model Law on international commercial arbitration also accepts the same definition of Arbitral Tribunal in Article 2(b). Article 10 of those Rules is almost identical with Section 10 of the said Act.

22. Article 2(b) and Article 10 of those Rules are extracted hereinbelow:

“2. Definition and rules of interpretation.—For the purposes of this law:
(a)***
(b) ‘arbitral tribunal’ means a sole arbitrator or a panel of arbitrators.
10. Number of arbitrators.—(1) The parties are free to determine the number of arbitrators.
(2) Failing such determination, the number of arbitrators shall be three.”

Therefore, the definition of Arbitral Tribunal in Section 2(1)(d) of the said Act is verbatim the same as in Article 2(b). Article 10 of the Uncitral Model Law has close similarity with Section 10 of the said Act.

23. Section 10 deviates from Article 10 of the Uncitral Model Law only in the sense that Section 10(1) of the Act provides that despite the freedom given to the parties to determine the number of arbitrators such numbers shall not be even number. But in default of determination of the number, Section 10(2) provides that the Tribunal is to consist of a sole arbitrator. Therefore, scheme of Section 10(2) of the Act is virtually similar to Article 10(2) of the Uncitral Model Law.

24. In the instant case Clause 12.2 of the arbitration clause is silent about the number of arbitrators. Therefore, Section 10(2) of the said Act squarely applies.

25. The learned counsel for the respondent has referred to a passage at p. 185, Paras 4-18 of Redfern and Hunter, Law and Practice of International Commercial Arbitration, 4th Edn. But looking at the said book this Court finds that the said passage was (sic has) not been properly quoted. In Paras 4-15 of the said book it has been provided as follows:

“A sole arbitrator shall be appointed unless the parties have agreed in writing otherwise, or unless the LCIA Court determines that in view of all the circumstances of the case a three-member tribunal is appropriate.”

In the said paragraph it has also been stated that there are distinct advantages of referring a dispute to a sole arbitrator on grounds of speed and economy:

“A sole arbitrator does not need to ‘deliberate’ with others, without having to spend time in consultation with colleagues in an endeavour to arrive at an agreed or majority determination of the matters in dispute.” (p. 184)

26. Similar opinion has been expressed in Russell on Arbitration, 23rd Edn. at p. 129, Paras 4-35 with reference to arbitration it has been said: “Where no choice is made, the law implied a reference to a tribunal consisting of a sole arbitrator.” In fact Section 15(3) of the (English) Arbitration Act, 1996 provides for the same. Mustil and Boyd on Commercial Arbitration, 2nd Edn. also contains the same statement of law. At p. 174 of the said book it has been provided that

“an arbitration agreement calls for a reference to a single arbitrator, either if it contains an express stipulation to that effect, or if it is silent as to the mode of arbitration”.

27. In the instant case, the arbitration Clause 12.2 is silent as to the number of arbitrators. The said clause read with Section 10(2) of the Act makes it very clear that the Arbitral Tribunal in the instant case would be consisting of a sole arbitrator.

28. The learned counsel for the respondent has referred to its policy decision which has been quoted hereinabove. Such policy decision cannot change the contractual clause. In any event the contract between the parties was entered into in 2004. The said policy decision came into effect in 2005. Therefore, the said policy decision cannot in any way override the contract between the parties. The parties' autonomy in the arbitration agreement must be given due importance in construing the intention of the parties.

29. Insofar as reference to the expression “arbitrator(s)” in Clause 12.3 is concerned, the same does not in any way affect the intention of the parties in Clause 12.2 It is noted in this connection that the parties have freedom to change the number of arbitrators even after the contract has been entered and by mutual consent the parties may amend the contract. If that takes place, in such an eventuality Clause 12.3 provides that the arbitrator or arbitrators have to give reasoned award in respect of each dispute and difference referred. Here also the expression which has been used is “him” which also points to a sole arbitrator.

30. It is clearly provided in the said Act that an Arbitral Tribunal can, if necessary, take the help of experts in terms of Section 27 of the said Act. If the sole arbitrator requires the assistance of an expert he can always take such assistance.

31. Mr Mukul Rohatgi, learned counsel for the respondent has fairly submitted that if his argument is not accepted by the Court then his client has no objection to the appointment of Hon'ble Mr Justice D.P Wadhwa, a former Judge of this Court, to be the sole arbitrator in this case. The name of Justice Wadhwa also finds place in the list of names suggested by the petitioner. Therefore, appointment of Justice Wadhwa is fairly by consensus.

32. Since I am unable to accept the argument of learned counsel for the respondent, I accordingly appoint Justice D.P Wadhwa, a former Judge of this Court, the sole arbitrator in this case. The Hon'ble arbitrator is requested to decide the dispute as early as possible and preferably within a period of six months from the date of entering upon the reference. The terms of arbitration proceeding are left to be decided by the learned arbitrator.

33. The petition is allowed accordingly. No order as to costs.