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Vishal Singh v. State Of Rajasthan .
Factual and Procedural Background
On the night of 5 December 1996, at about 10:15 p.m., the deceased Kaluram, accompanied by his son Mukesh (PW 6) and nephew Chetan Prakash (PW 7), was returning home on bicycles after collecting discarded food for their pigs from the Railway Stadium in Jodhpur. Near S.P.S. School they were stopped by five men standing with a scooter and a Hero Puch moped. The group, led by the present appellant Vishal Singh, branded them as thieves and attempted to search them. When Kaluram and his companions resisted, the appellant stabbed Kaluram in the chest with a knife, co-accused Manoj Kumar struck Kaluram with a stone, and the remaining three assailants beat them with fists. Kaluram collapsed a short distance away and died in hospital at 1:30 a.m.
Mukesh gave a parcha bayan at 2:15 a.m., resulting in prompt registration of FIR No. — at 2:30 a.m. All five accused were arrested immediately. A blood-stained knife was recovered on the appellant’s disclosure. After investigation, a chargesheet was filed. The Special Judge, SC/ST Act Cases, Jodhpur, convicted the appellant under Sections 302 and 341 IPC and sentenced him to life imprisonment; Manoj Kumar was acquitted, and the remaining three accused were convicted under Sections 323 and 341 but released on probation. The Rajasthan High Court, Jodhpur Bench, dismissed the appellant’s appeal. The present judgment is the Supreme Court’s decision on the appellant’s further appeal.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the appellant’s act of inflicting a single knife injury was committed in the circumstances contemplated by Exception 4 to Section 300 IPC (sudden fight without premeditation), thereby warranting a conviction for a lesser offence than murder under Section 302 IPC.
- Whether the evidence on record justified upholding the appellant’s conviction under Sections 302 and 341 IPC.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant’s Arguments
- The appellant was falsely implicated.
- Even if participation is accepted, only one injury was inflicted during a sudden quarrel and without premeditation; hence Exception 4 to Section 300 IPC applies and Section 302 IPC is inapplicable.
State’s Arguments
- The occurrence was not a mutual fight; the appellant and his associates were the aggressors who accosted and searched the victims.
- There was neither a sudden quarrel nor absence of premeditation attributable to the appellant; therefore Exception 4 has no application and the conviction under Section 302 IPC must stand.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Dhirajbhai Gorakhbhai Nayak v. State of Gujarat (2003) 9 SCC 322 | Conditions necessary for invoking Exception 4 to Section 300 IPC. | Quoted to reiterate that absence of premeditation, sudden fight, and no undue advantage are all mandatory prerequisites. |
| Parkash Chand v. State of H.P. (2004) 11 SCC 381 | Interpretation of “sudden fight” and “undue advantage” under Exception 4. | Used to highlight that unilateral aggression negates the defence of sudden fight. |
| Byvarapu Raju v. State of A.P. (2007) 11 SCC 218 | Parameters for reducing murder to culpable homicide under Exception 4. | Relied upon to emphasise that a single blow can still amount to murder if delivered with lethal intent. |
| Hawa Singh v. State of Haryana (2009) 3 SCC 411 | Further elucidation on the scope of Exception 4. | Cited to reinforce that the burden lies on the accused to establish the exception’s applicability. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Supreme Court reproduced and endorsed the settled legal position that Exception 4 to Section 300 IPC applies only when four cumulative conditions are satisfied: (i) absence of premeditation, (ii) a sudden fight, (iii) the offender has not taken undue advantage or acted cruelly or unusually, and (iv) the fight is with the deceased.
Evaluating the facts, the Court observed that the appellant was armed with a knife and, together with four companions, stopped and abused the victims, branded them thieves, and forcibly attempted to search them. When the deceased resisted, he was brutally stabbed in the chest with sufficient force to pierce the lung and pericardium, resulting in death. There was no evidence of a scuffle, mutual provocation, or sudden quarrel. The victims were unarmed and merely exercised their right to resist an unlawful search. Consequently, the appellant acted as the aggressor, took undue advantage by using a deadly weapon, and behaved in a cruel manner.
Because none of the foundational requirements of Exception 4 were met, the contention that the homicide should be treated as culpable homicide not amounting to murder was rejected. The Court therefore affirmed the concurrent findings of the trial court and High Court.
Holding and Implications
Appeal Dismissed – Conviction and life sentence under Sections 302 and 341 IPC affirmed.
Immediate consequence: the appellant continues to serve the life sentence imposed by the trial court. The judgment reinforces the narrow scope of Exception 4 to Section 300 IPC, confirming that unilateral aggression with a deadly weapon, even if it results in a single injury, can constitute murder when the statutory ingredients for the exception are absent. No new legal precedent was set, but existing principles governing “sudden fight” were reaffirmed.
Dr. Arijit Pasayat, J.— The challenge in this appeal is to the judgment of the Rajasthan High Court, Jodhpur Bench upholding the conviction of the appellant for offence punishable under Section 302 of the Penal Code, 1860 (in short “IPC”).
2. The accused along with four others faced trial. While the accused faced trial for alleged commission of offences punishable under Sections 302 and 341 IPC, others faced trial for offences punishable under Sections 323 and 341 IPC. The learned Special Judge, SC/ST Act Cases, Jodhpur, held the appellant guilty of offences punishable under Sections 302 and 341 IPC. We are not concerned with the conviction and sentence in respect of other accused persons.
3. The prosecution version in a nutshell is as follows:
At 8.00 p.m on 5-12-1996 in the city of Jodhpur P. Mukesh (PW 6) with his uncle Chetan Prakash (PW 7) as also his father Kaluram (since deceased) went to Railway Stadium on bicycles to bring waste meals discarded by the marriage party for their pigs. At about 10.15 p.m they were coming back from the Railway Stadium on two bicycles after collecting the waste meals near S.P.S School. By the side of the road, five persons were standing with a scooter and a Hero Puch. They stopped the deceased and others and asked wherefrom they were coming and called them thieves and wanted to take their personal search. When Kaluram as also Chetan Prakash refused to give their personal search, Vishal Singh, the accused-appellant herein, took out a knife from his pocket and inflicted the fatal blow on the chest of Kaluram. Co-accused, Manoj Kumar inflicted a stone-blow on the head of Kaluram. The remaining three persons started beating with fists. When PW 6 Mukesh and PW 7 Chetan Prakash intervened, all the assailants made good their escape.
4. After walking a few steps Kaluram became unconscious and fell down. Thereafter, injured Kaluram was taken to Railway Hospital in a taxi from where he was referred to Mahatma Gandhi Hospital for treatment where Kaluram passed away at 1.30 a.m
5. At the hospital itself Mukesh (PW 6) at 2.15 p.m gave a parcha bayan, Ext. P-7 to Girija Shankar, SI (PW 3) who sent the same to Police Station Sardarpura where FIR, Ext. P-24 was recorded at 2.30 a.m Immediately thereafter all the five accused persons were put under arrest. Knife (Article 1) was recovered on the voluntary disclosure statement given by the appellant which was seized, sealed and sent to the FSL where it was found stained with human blood.
6. After investigation chargesheet was filed. Since the accused persons pleaded innocence trial was held. One Manoj Kumar who had faced trial along with the appellant was acquitted of all charges. The other co-accused persons were convicted under Sections 323 and 341 and were released on probation.
7. Before the trial court the primary stand was of false implication and alternatively it was pleaded that there was single injury and that too in a sudden quarrel and sudden fight without premeditation and, therefore Section 302 has no application. The trial court did not accept the plea and as noted above recorded conviction and imposed life imprisonment.
8. In appeal, the stand taken before the trial court was reiterated. Learned counsel for the State on the other hand submitted that there was no quarrel as claimed by the accused. Therefore, Exception 4 to Section 300 has no application to the facts of the case. The High Court did not accept the plea of the appellant-accused and dismissed the appeal.
9. Stand taken before the High Court was reiterated. It is to be noted that occurrence took place at about 10.15 p.m on 5-12-1996 and the FIR was promptly lodged.
10. For bringing in operation of Exception 4 to Section 300 IPC it has to be established that the act was committed without premeditation, in a sudden fight in the heat of passion upon a sudden quarrel without the offender having taken undue advantage and not having acted in a cruel or unusual manner.
11. “10. The Fourth Exception of Section 300 IPC covers acts done in a sudden fight. The said Exception deals with a case of prosecution (sic provocation) not covered by the First Exception, after which its place would have been more appropriate. The Exception is founded upon the same principle, for in both there is absence of premeditation. But, while in the case of Exception 1 there is total deprivation of self-control, in case of Exception 4, there is only that heat of passion which clouds men's sober reason and urges them to deeds which they would not otherwise do. There is provocation in Exception 4 as in Exception 1; but the injury done is not the direct consequence of that provocation. In fact Exception 4 deals with cases in which notwithstanding that a blow may have been struck, or some provocation given in the origin of the dispute or in whatever way the quarrel may have originated, yet the subsequent conduct of both parties puts them in respect of guilt upon equal footing. A ‘sudden fight’ implies mutual provocation and blows on each side. The homicide committed is then clearly not traceable to unilateral provocation, nor could in such cases the whole blame be placed on one side. For if it were so, the exception more appropriately applicable would be Exception 1. There is no previous deliberation or determination to fight. A fight suddenly takes place, for which both parties are more or less to be blamed. It may be that one of them starts it, but if the other had not aggravated it by his own conduct it would not have taken the serious turn it did. There is then mutual provocation and aggravation, and it is difficult to apportion the share of blame which attaches to each fighter. The help of Exception 4 can be invoked if death is caused: (a) without premeditation; (b) in a sudden fight; (c) without the offender's having taken undue advantage or acted in a cruel or unusual manner; and (d) the fight must have been with the person killed. To bring a case within Exception 4 all the ingredients mentioned in it must be found. It is to be noted that the ‘fight’ occurring in Exception 4 to Section 300 IPC is not defined in the Penal Code. It takes two to make a fight. Heat of passion requires that there must be no time for the passions to cool down and in this case, the parties have worked themselves into a fury on account of the verbal altercation in the beginning. A fight is a combat between two and more persons whether with or without weapons. It is not possible to enunciate any general rule as to what shall be deemed to be a sudden quarrel. It is a question of fact and whether a quarrel is sudden or not must necessarily depend upon the proved facts of each case. For the application of Exception 4, it is not sufficient to show that there was a sudden quarrel and there was no premeditation. It must further be shown that the offender has not taken undue advantage or acted in a cruel or unusual manner. The expression ‘undue advantage’ as used in the provision means ‘unfair advantage’.”
These aspects have been highlighted in Dhirajbhai Gorakhbhai Nayak v. State of Gujarat (2003) 9 SCC 322, (2003) 5 Supreme 223, Parkash Chand v. State of H.P (2004) 11 SCC 381, Byvarapu Raju v. State of A.P (2007) 11 SCC 218 and Hawa Singh v. State of Haryana (2009) 3 SCC 411.
12. In the instant case the High Court noted that the appellant-accused was armed with knife and standing with his friends and accosted the deceased and PW 6. They were labelled thieves and after abusing them, the accused persons started search of their persons which was ordered by the present appellant. When the deceased resisted he was not only thrashed but also given fatal injury on his chest with such force that it penetrated up to lower lobe of lung as also pericardium resulting in his death. There was no evidence of any scuffle, much less sudden fight or sudden quarrel or altercation between the parties. It was the right of the deceased and PWs 6 and 7 to resist their personal search because they were not armed. That being so, Exception 4 to Section 300 IPC has no application to the facts of the case. The appellant has been rightly convicted in terms of Section 302 IPC.
13. We find no merit in this appeal which is accordingly dismissed.
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