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State Of Madhya Pradesh And Others v. Ramesh Chandra Bajpai .

Supreme Court Of India
Jul 28, 2009
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Factual and Procedural Background

The respondent was appointed as a Physical Training Instructor (PTI) in Government Ayurvedic College, Ujjain, on 18 January 1973. Seeking parity with teaching staff, he filed OA No. 907 of 1998 before the Madhya Pradesh Administrative Tribunal to be treated as a teacher and to receive the University Grants Commission (UGC) pay scale of Rs 3700-5700 effective from 1 January 1986.

The Tribunal dismissed the application on 16 September 1998, holding that PTIs were governed by the Madhya Pradesh (Indian Systems of Medicine and Homoeopathy) Class III Ministerial Services Recruitment Rules, 1987 and could not be equated with teachers or Sports Officers. A review petition (MA No. 277 of 1998) was filed, but during its pendency the Tribunal was abolished and the matter stood transferred to the High Court as Writ Petition No. 4005 of 2003.

A learned Single Judge allowed the writ petition, relying on P.S Ramamohana Rao v. A.P. Agricultural University and an earlier High Court order in W.P. No. 5438 of 2000, and directed fixation of the respondent’s pay in the teacher’s scale. The State appealed (Writ Appeal No. 201 of 2006), but a Division Bench dismissed the appeal on 4 January 2008, mainly because other PTIs had already been granted the UGC scale. The State of Madhya Pradesh then approached the Supreme Court.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether a Physical Training Instructor working in a Government Ayurvedic College is entitled to parity of pay with teachers who have been granted the UGC scale.
  2. Whether previous extension of the UGC scale to other PTIs and the doctrine of equal pay for equal work compel similar relief for the respondent despite differing statutory recruitment rules and qualifications.
  3. Whether the High Court correctly relied on P.S Ramamohana Rao v. A.P. Agricultural University to treat a PTI as a “teacher”.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellants' Arguments (State of Madhya Pradesh)

  • Recruitment to PTI posts is governed by the 1987 Rules, while Sports Officers fall under the Madhya Pradesh Educational Service (Collegiate Branch) Recruitment Rules, 1990; the two cadres differ in qualifications and pay and cannot be equated.
  • UGC scales have never been extended to staff of Ayurvedic colleges, including their teaching faculty; granting them to PTIs would create an anomalous situation.
  • The High Court misapplied P.S Ramamohana Rao, which dealt with the definition of “teacher” under a specific Andhra Pradesh statute and not with pay-scale parity.
  • Some PTIs had received the UGC scale only because of unchallenged court orders; such mistakes cannot be a basis for perpetuating illegality.

Respondent's Arguments

  • The State has already implemented High Court and Tribunal orders granting the UGC scale to several similarly-situated PTIs, including those in medical colleges; denying the same benefit to the respondent would be discriminatory.
  • An order dated 24 May 2004 extending UGC scales to PTIs in medical colleges demonstrates State acceptance of parity; there is no rational reason to exclude PTIs in Ayurvedic colleges.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
P.S Ramamohana Rao v. A.P. Agricultural University (1997) 8 SCC 350 Definition of “teacher” under a specific statute could include a Physical Director based on duties performed. Distinguished; Supreme Court held the definition was statute-specific and could not be applied to PTIs governed by different rules in Madhya Pradesh.
Govt. of W.B. v. Tarun K. Roy (2004) 1 SCC 347 Equal pay doctrine applies only when employees are similarly situated in recruitment source, qualifications, duties, responsibilities, etc. Relied upon to emphasise that differing educational qualifications and recruitment rules justify different pay scales.
Debdas Kumar (1991 Supp (1) SCC 138; 1991 17 ATC 261) Parity in pay cannot be claimed without identical essential qualifications. Cited to reinforce that holders of diploma in engineering could be treated differently from ordinary graduates; analogy used for PTIs vs. teachers.
State of Maharashtra v. Digambar (1995) 4 SCC 683 Failure to appeal an earlier erroneous order does not bar consideration of the merits in a subsequent case. Used to negate the argument that because earlier orders were unchallenged, similar relief must follow in this case.
State of Jharkhand v. Manshu Kumbhkar (2007) 8 SCC 249 A mistaken benefit granted in one case cannot be a precedent to continue illegality. Applied to hold that prior mistaken extension of UGC scales to some PTIs cannot justify fresh parity claims.
Vice-Chancellor, M.D University, Rohtak v. Jahan Singh (2007) 5 SCC 77 Article 14 cannot be invoked to perpetuate illegality. Invoked to reject discrimination arguments based solely on earlier erroneous benefits.
Kuldeep Singh v. Govt. of NCT of Delhi (2006) 5 SCC 702 Positive concept of equality; illegality cannot be continued under Article 14. Cited in support of the above principle.
Bihar Public Service Commission v. Kamini (2007) 5 SCC 519 Reiterates that equality cannot be claimed on the basis of a wrong order. Referenced to buttress the Court’s refusal to extend mistaken benefits.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Supreme Court compared the statutory frameworks governing PTIs and Sports Officers. Under the 1987 Rules, PTIs are Class III Non-Ministerial posts filled entirely by direct recruitment from diploma holders in physical training. In contrast, Sports Officers under the 1990 Rules require a postgraduate degree in physical education and are part of the Collegiate Branch Educational Service. The Court observed that neither set of rules classifies PTIs as “teachers”.

Reiterating the doctrine of equal pay for equal work, the Court held that parity arises only where there is "wholesale identity" in recruitment source, qualifications, duties, and responsibilities. The respondent’s educational qualification, recruitment channel, and statutory status differed materially from those of teachers who receive the UGC scale.

The Court further held that Article 14 cannot be used to perpetuate illegality; erroneous extension of UGC benefits to some PTIs—whether by court orders that went unchallenged or by executive mistake—does not create a right to similar benefits for others. Reliance on P.S Ramamohana Rao was misplaced because that decision was confined to the inclusive statutory definition of “teacher” in the Andhra Pradesh Agricultural University Act, which had no application to the respondent’s cadre.

Reinforcing its analysis with multiple precedents, the Court concluded that the High Court had erred in granting parity solely on the basis that other PTIs had obtained the UGC scale.

Holding and Implications

Appeal Allowed; High Court judgment set aside. No costs.

The respondent is not entitled to the UGC pay scale, and the State is under no obligation to extend that scale to PTIs in Ayurvedic colleges. The judgment clarifies that mistaken or unchallenged benefits extended in the past cannot form the basis for parity claims, reinforcing the limits of the equal-pay doctrine and discouraging perpetuation of administrative or judicial errors. No new precedent on pay-scale entitlement is set; the decision applies existing principles to the specific statutory frameworks involved.

Show all summary ...

S.B Sinha, J.— Leave granted. The State of Madhya Pradesh is before us aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the judgment and order dated 4-1-2008 passed by a Division Bench of the High Court of Madhya Pradesh, Indore Bench at Indore in Writ Appeal No. 201 of 2006 whereby and whereunder the appeal preferred by the appellant herein from a judgment and order dated 3-11-2004 passed by a learned Single Judge of the said High Court in Writ Petition No. 4005 of 2003, was dismissed.

2. The core question which arises for consideration before us is as to whether the respondent herein who is working as Physical Training Instructor in Government Ayurvedic College is entitled to claim parity of pay with the teachers who have been granted UGC scale of pay.

3. The respondent was appointed as Physical Training Instructor in Government Ayurvedic College, Ujjain by an offer of appointment dated 18-1-1973. He filed OA No. 907 of 1998 before the Madhya Pradesh Administrative Tribunal, Indore Bench (for short “the Tribunal”) with the prayer that the non-applicants in the OA (the petitioners herein) be directed to treat him as teacher and fix his pay in the pay scale prescribed for that post along with the benefit of senior scale and also give him the UGC pay scale (Rs 3700-5700) w.e.f 1-1-1986. In the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the non-applicants, it was pleaded that UGC scales have not been made applicable so far as the staff of ayurvedic colleges are concerned and that there was no sanctioned post of Sports Officer in the college for which the pay scale of Rs 3700-5700 was recommended and in that view of the matter the applicant could not have been treated on a par with the teachers who are employed in the School Education Department.

4. The Tribunal dismissed the application of the respondent observing that the applicant having not been holding the post of Sports Officer and having not been working in the government college administered by the Department of Higher Education, he was not entitled to any relief. The Tribunal also held that Physical Training Instructors cannot be treated on a par with the teachers because the Government has not issued any order equating the said two posts.

5. Soon thereafter, the respondent filed an application (MA No. 277 of 1998) for review of the order dated 16-9-1998 vide which the Tribunal had dismissed the OA. During the pendency of that application, the Tribunal was abolished and all the pending matters were transferred to the High Court. The respondent's case was then registered as Writ Petition No. 4005 of 2003. A learned Single Judge of the High Court allowed the writ petition relying upon the judgment of this Court in P.S Ramamohana Rao v. A.P Agricultural University (1997) 8 SCC 350 and the order passed in Writ Petition No. 5438 of 2000 directing that the pay of the writ petitioner be fixed in the scale prescribed for the post of teacher.

6. The Division Bench dismissed the writ appeal preferred by the petitioners primarily on the ground that a large number of Physical Training Instructors have already been granted UGC scale and an order declining relief to the respondent would result in discrimination. The Division Bench also referred to the judgment in P.S Ramamohana Rao (1997) 8 SCC 350 and held that the respondent cannot be deprived of the benefit of pay scale which has already been extended to other similarly situated Physical Training Instructors employed in the ayurvedic colleges.

7. The learned counsel for the appellants referred to the provisions contained in the Madhya Pradesh (Indian Systems of Medicine and Homoeopathy) Class III Ministerial Services Recruitment Rules, 1987 (hereinafter referred to as “the 1987 Rules”) and the Madhya Pradesh Educational Service (Collegiate Branch) Recruitment Rules, 1990 (hereinafter referred to as “the 1990 Rules”) to contend that recruitment to the posts of Physical Training Instructors and Sports Officers are regulated by different sets of rules. It was argued that holders of the two posts cannot be treated on a par for the purpose of fixation of pay in the UGC scale.

8. The learned counsel for the appellants submitted that the High Court committed serious error by relying upon the ratio of the judgment in P.S Ramamohana Rao (1997) 8 SCC 350 for the purpose of granting relief to the respondent because the only question considered therein was whether having regard to the nature of duties performed by the appellant therein, a person holding the post of Physical Director in Andhra Pradesh Agricultural University was entitled to be treated as teacher within the meaning of Section 2(n) of the A.P Agricultural University Act, 1963 (for short “the 1963 Act”) and was, thus, entitled to continue in service till the age of 60 years.

9. The learned counsel stated that benefit of the UGC scales of pay have not been extended to the employees of ayurvedic colleges including the members of teaching staff and those governed by the 1987 Rules. On the issue of grant of UGC scale of pay to other Physical Training Instructors, learned counsel invited our attention to Para 3(iii) of the rejoinder-affidavit, which reads as under:

“In reply it is submitted that it is correct that on the basis of the orders passed by the High Court some of the Physical Training Instructors have been given UGC pay scales but this has been done in compliance with the orders passed by the High Court and the same could not be challenged on the ground that the appeal had become time-barred and orders could not be challenged because of the advice received at the relevant time. Subsequently, it has been found that erroneously Physical Training Instructors of engineering, medical and ayurvedic colleges have been given UGC pay scales even though the Administrators, Lecturers, Professors and Principals of engineering, medical and ayurvedic colleges are not getting the UGC pay scales.”

10. The learned counsel for the respondent argued that after having accepted and implemented the orders passed by the Tribunal and the High Court in the cases of other Physical Training Instructors for grant of UGC scale of pay, it is not open to the appellants to discriminate (sic against) the respondent by relying upon the provisions of the 1987 Rules. He invited the Court's attention to an order dated 24-5-2004 to show that the Physical Training Instructors appointed in medical colleges of the State have been granted the benefit of UGC scale of pay and submitted that the High Court did not commit any error by directing the petitioners to fix the respondent's pay in the UGC scale. The learned counsel pointed out that as late as on 24-4-2004, the State Government has extended the benefit of UGC scale of pay to Physical Training Instructors of other colleges and submitted that there is no rationality or reason for denying the same benefit to the respondent.

11. It is not in dispute that ayurvedic colleges situated in the State of Madhya Pradesh are under the control of the Department of Medical Education. It is also not in dispute that at present recruitment to the post of Physical Training Instructor is regulated by the 1987 Rules. In terms of Rules 5, 6 and 8 read with the relevant entries of Schedules I, II and III of the 1987 Rules, the post of Physical Training Instructor is categorised as Class III Non-Ministerial under the heading “Establishment of Divisional Organisation” and the same is required to be filled 100 per cent by direct recruitment from amongst the persons possessing the requisite educational qualification of Diploma in Physical Training.

12. The post of Sports Officer finds mention in the four Schedules appended to the 1990 Rules. By virtue of Rule 8 read with the relevant entries of Schedules II and III of the 1990 Rules, the post of Sports Officer is required to be filled as under: 90 per cent by direct recruitment and 10 per cent by promotion from amongst the Assistant Sports Officers. The educational qualification prescribed for direct recruitment to the post of Sports Officer is a “postgraduate degree in physical education with at least 55 per cent marks and at the degree level of physical education, the percentage of total marks obtained should not be less than 50”.

13. A comparison of the provisions of the 1987 Rules and the 1990 Rules clearly establish that they not only deal with different classes of employees but the educational qualifications and scales of pay prescribed for the posts enumerated in the Schedules of two sets of Rules are entirely different. While the 1987 Rules regulate recruitment to Class III Ministerial and Non-Ministerial posts in various colleges imparting education in Indian System of Medicine including Ayurveda, the 1990 Rules regulate recruitment to different posts in the Educational Service (Collegiate Branch) including that of Sports Officer. The post of “teacher” does not find place either in the 1987 Rules or in the 1990 Rules. We have made a mention of this fact only because the respondent has claimed parity in the matter of pay scale with teachers.

14. In para 6 of the impugned order, the Division Bench of the High Court observed that the rules governing and regulating the service of the respondent make a distinction between Physical Training Instructor and teacher in the matter of status and pay scale, but proceeded to sustain the direction given by the learned Single Judge mainly on the premise that the orders passed in the cases of other Physical Training Instructors have not been assailed. The Division Bench also relied upon the ratio of judgment of this Court in Ramamohana Rao case (1997) 8 SCC 350 and observed that the nature and duties of the Physical Training Instructors are on a par with those of teachers.

15. In our view, the approach adopted by the learned Single Judge and the Division Bench is clearly erroneous. It is well settled that the doctrine of equal pay for equal work can be invoked only when the employees are similarly situated. Similarity in the designation or nature or quantum of work is not determinative of equality in the matter of pay scales. The court has to consider the factors like the source and mode of recruitment/appointment, qualifications, the nature of work, the value thereof, responsibilities, reliability, experience, confidentiality, functional need, etc. In other words, the equality clause can be invoked in the matter of pay scales only when there is wholesale identity between the holders of two posts.

16. In Govt. of W.B v. Tarun K. Roy (2004) 1 SCC 347 a three-Judge Bench of this Court held as under:

“14. Article 14 read with Article 39(d) of the Constitution of India envisages the doctrine of equal pay for equal work. The said doctrine, however, does not contemplate that only because the nature of the work is same, irrespective of an educational qualification or irrespective of their source of recruitment or other relevant considerations the said doctrine would be automatically applied. The holders of a higher educational qualification can be treated as a separate class. Such classification, it is trite, is reasonable. Employees performing the similar job but having different educational qualification can, thus, be treated differently.”

The Court further opined that in a case where the employees do not hold essential educational qualifications, they cannot claim parity in the scale of pay on the ground of equality stating:

“30. The respondents are merely graduates in Science. They do not have the requisite technical qualification. Only because they are graduates, they cannot, in our opinion, claim equality with the holders of diploma in Engineering. If any relief is granted by this Court to the respondents on the aforementioned ground, the same will be in contravention of the statutory rules. It is trite that this Court even in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 142 of the Constitution of India would not ordinarily grant such a relief which would be in violation of a statutory provision.”

17. It is also well settled that Article 14 of the Constitution carries with it a positive concept of equality. That article cannot be invoked for perpetuating illegality. To put it differently, an illegal or wrong order passed in one case cannot be made the basis for compelling a public authority to pass similar order in other cases. Even if the State implements an erroneous order passed by the court, it cannot be precluded from challenging similar order passed in another case, simply because appeal was not preferred in the earlier case.

18. In Govt. of W.B (2004) 1 SCC 347 the Court upon noticing a large number of decisions, observed:

“25. In a case of this nature, the courts are required to determine the issue having regard to larger public interest. It is one thing to say that in a given case the High Court or this Court may not exercise an equitable jurisdiction under Article 226 or Article 136 of the Constitution of India, but it is another thing to say that the courts shall grant a relief to a party only on the ground that a contention which is otherwise valid would not be raised on the ground that the same was not done in earlier proceedings.
28. In the aforementioned situation, the Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court manifestly erred in refusing to consider the contentions of the appellants on their own merit, particularly, when the question as regards difference in the grant of scale of pay on the ground of different educational qualification stands concluded by a judgment of this Court in Debdas Kumar 1991 Supp (1) SCC 138, (1991) 17 ATC 261. If the judgment of Debdas Kumar 1991 Supp (1) SCC 138, (1991) 17 ATC 261 is to be followed, a finding of fact was required to be arrived at that they are similarly situated to Debdas Kumar 1991 Supp (1) SCC 138, (1991) 17 ATC 261 which in turn would mean that they are also holders of diploma in Engineering. They admittedly being not, the contention of the appellants could not be rejected. Non-filing of an appeal, in any event, would not be a ground for refusing to consider a matter on its own merits (See State of Maharashtra v. Digambar (1995) 4 SCC 683.)”

19. In State of Jharkhand v. Manshu Kumbhkar (2007) 8 SCC 249 this Court held:

“11. Reliance by the High Court on the order passed in Sanjay Kumar case was thoroughly misconceived. It is to be noted that LPA was dismissed on the ground of delay. Even otherwise, merely because mistake had been committed in one case, there is no rational for perpetuating that mistake, even when the same is illegally impermissible.”

20. In M.D University v. Jahan Singh (2007) 5 SCC 77 this Court observed:

“28. Even assuming the respondent and the said Shri Taneja were similarly situated, we may observe that Article 14 of the Constitution of India carries with it a positive concept. Article 14 of the Constitution cannot be invoked, for perpetuating illegality. (See Kuldeep Singh v. Govt. of NCT of Delhi (2006) 5 SCC 702.)”

(See also Bihar Public Service Commission v. Kamini (2007) 5 SCC 519.)

21. In view of the aforementioned pronouncements, it must be held that the respondent cannot derive any benefit from the fact that in compliance with the orders passed by the Tribunal and the High Court, the State Government extended the benefit of UGC scale of pay to some of the Physical Training Instructors of ayurvedic and other colleges. We may assume that what the learned counsel has stated with reference to order dated 24-4-2004 is correct, but as noticed hereinabove the illegality cannot be allowed to be perpetrated by invoking the doctrine of equal pay for equal work.

22. We may now notice the ratio of the decision in P.S Ramamohana Rao (1997) 8 SCC 350. In that case, this Court was called upon to decide whether the Physical Training Instructor in Andhra Pradesh Agricultural University was a teacher within the meaning of Section 2(n) and was entitled to continue in service up to the age of 60 years. The appellant in that case was employed as a Physical Director in Bapatla Agricultural College, which was later on transferred to Andhra Pradesh Agricultural University. The University sought to retire the appellant on completion of 58 years. The writ petition filed by him questioning the decision of the University was dismissed by the Division Bench of the High Court on the premise that Physical Director does not fall within the ambit of definition of “teacher”.

23. This Court in Rao case (1997) 8 SCC 350 referred to the relevant provisions of the 1963 Act and the Regulations framed thereunder including Section 2(n) which reads as under:

“2. (n) ‘teacher’ includes a Professor, Reader, Lecturer or other person appointed or recognised by the University for the purpose of imparting instruction or conducting and guiding research or extension programmes, and any person declared by the statutes to be a teacher;”

24. The Court then noted that duties of the Physical Director in the University were, (a) to arrange games and sports daily in the evening for the students; (b) to look after the procurement of sports materials and maintenance of the sports ground; (c) to arrange inter-class and inter-collegiate tournaments; (d) to accompany the student teams for the inter-university tournaments; and (e) to guide the students about the rules of the various games and sports and held: (P.S Ramamohana Rao case (1997) 8 SCC 350)

“9. From the aforesaid affidavit, it is clear that a Physical Director has multifarious duties. He not only arranges games and sports for the students every evening and looks after the procurement of sports material and the maintenance of the grounds but also arranges inter-class and inter-college tournaments and accompanies the students' team when they go for the inter-university tournaments. For that purpose it is one of his important duties to guide them about the rules of the various games and sports. It is well known that different games and sports have different rules and practices and unless the students are guided about the said rules and practices they will not be able to play the games and participate in the sports in a proper manner. Further, in our view, it is inherent in the duties of Physical Director that he imparts to the students various skills and techniques of these games and sports. There are a large number of indoor and outdoor games in which the students have to be trained. Therefore, he has to teach them several skills and techniques of these games apart from the rules applicable to these games.
10. Having regard to the abovesaid material before us, we are clearly of the view that the appellant comes within the definition of a teacher in clause (n) of Section 2 of the Act.”

25. We may observe that definition of “teacher” contained in Section 2(n) of the Andhra Act was an expansive one to include those persons who had not only been imparting instructions but also were conducting and carrying on research for extension programmes. It also included those who had been declared to be a teacher within the purview of the definition thereof in terms of any statute framed by such State.

26. In our view, the aforementioned decision has been misapplied and misconstrued by the High Court. It is now well-settled principle of law that a decision is an authority for what it decides and not what can logically be deduced therefrom. In Ramamohana Rao (1997) 8 SCC 350 this Court, having regard to the nature of duties and functions of Physical Director, held that that post comes within the definition of teacher as contained in Section 2(n). The proposition laid down in that case should not have been automatically extended to other case like the present one, where employees are governed by different sets of rules.

27. For the aforementioned reasons, the appeal is allowed and the impugned judgment is set aside. No costs.